ETHNOCULTURAL PROCESSES
and NATIONAL PROBLEMS
in the
MODERN WORLD

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Этнокультурные процессы и национальные проблемы в современном мире

На английском языке

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INTRODUCTION

I. R. Grigulevich and S. Ya. Kozlov

It is of great scientific and political importance to analyse ethnic processes and national problems. The interest of academic circles and the broad public in these matters is growing steadily, reflecting the role they play in the modern world.

Since World War II, especially in the 1960s and 1970s, Soviet ethnographers, like historians, sociologists, philosophers, and other specialists, have done much very fruitful work on national relations and ethnic processes in the USSR and other countries, and have published a great deal on them. In 1975 Nauka Press (Moscow) issued a group work *Present-Day Ethnic Processes in the USSR* (republished in 1977), prepared by the Institute of Ethnography of the USSR Academy of Sciences, in which the research done earlier was generalised and the ethnic aspects of national processes in the USSR were analysed for the first time in an all-embracing manner.

In 1974 Progress Publishers (Moscow) published a collection of papers by Soviet authors (in English), in which certain ethnic and racial problems of today's world were studied.[1] The book evoked lively interest in many countries, and a second revised edition was printed in 1977, supplemented in part with new material. At the same time the comments of specialists and other readers

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[1] I. R. Grigulevich and S. Ya. Kozlov (Eds.). *Races and Peoples. Contemporary Ethnic and Racial Problems* (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1974).

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made it obvious that a new book on these matters was needed.

The new collection of papers presented here consists of two sections.

The first part is devoted to description of ethnocultural processes in the Soviet Union; the second part analyses ethnic processes and national problems in other countries.

The current rivalry of the two world social systems (socialist and capitalist) is characterised by a marked sharpening of struggle in the realm of ideology. One of the issues on which the statements of bourgeois ideologists are frequently wide of scientific objectivity and often have a character of tendentious misrepresentation and distortion is that of national development in the USSR and Soviet national policy. The aim of this falsification is to defame real socialism, belittle the possibilities and achievements of this progressive social system in the field of national relations, and neutralise the influence in other countries, especially in liberated and developing countries, of Soviet experience of dealing with the national question.

The USSR is one of the most multinational countries in the world. Its population—more than 260 million—includes members of more than 100 nations and ethnic groups. The size of these peoples ranges from a few hundred to tens of millions; their level of socio-economic and ethnocultural development was very different in pre-Soviet times. During the six decades of Soviet government they have travelled an immense historical road under the leadership of the Communist Party, and as a result of consistent implementation of Lenin's national policy all forms of national inequality have been eliminated in the USSR.

The equality of all the people inhabiting the USSR is consolidated by the Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Article 36 of which reads:

Citizens of the USSR of different races and nationalities have equal rights.

Exercise of these rights is ensured by a policy of all-round development and drawing together of all the nations and nationalities of the USSR, by educating citizens in the spirit of Soviet patriotism and socialist internationalism, and by the possibility to use

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their native language and the language of other peoples of the USSR.

Any direct or indirect limitation of the rights of citizens or establishment of direct or indirect privileges on grounds of race or nationality, and any advocacy of racial or national exclusiveness, hostility or contempt, are punishable by law.

Socialism, the society of real humanism and genuine democracy in all spheres of life, has created the necessary conditions, for the first time in history, for optimum development of all the peoples in a multinational state. As the resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU on the 60th anniversary of the Socialist Revolution said:

The fraternal friendship and unity of all nations and nationalities that make up the great and strong Union of Soviet Socialist Republics are firm and solid. The formation of the USSR and its successful development are the triumph of the Leninist nationalities policy conducted by the CPSU, a striking evidence that this policy is truly internationalist, and a great gain of socialism. The uniform economic organism that has been established in the country provides a firm material foundation for friendship and cooperation of our peoples. Real equality of all nations and nationalities in all spheres of the society's activities has been ensured; a culture that is national in form and socialist in content has flourished, and true fraternity of working men irrespective of their nationality, a fraternity cemented by common interests and goals and by the Marxist-Leninist ideology, has been established. Consistent implementation of the Leninist principles of the nationalities policy leads to ever greater affinity between all peoples of our multinational socialist homeland. The Soviet Union provides a clear and forceful example of how one of the most complicated questions in the development of human society can be successfully solved.[1]

An important manifestation and result of the carrying out of radical socio-economic, political, and cultural reforms in the course of building socialism and communism

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[1] *On the 60th Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution*, Moscow, 1977, p 11.

was (1) an essential evening up of the ethnocultural development of all the peoples inhabiting the USSR (the forming of socialist nations and nationalities), and (2) the coming into being in the USSR of a new historical community of people, the Soviet people. This community is characterised in particular by such factors as the socio-political and economic integration of all the peoples of the country within a single state, the USSR, a common Soviet culture, and the consciousness of all citizens of the USSR of belonging to the *Soviet people* (together with consciousness, of course, of belonging to a definite ethnos). This community—a phenomenon without precedent in world history—is international in its essence, but in no way unnational in character and content; it has arisen and is developing on the basis of the constructive, multiform interaction of all Soviet nations and nationalities and their cultures.

The experience of Soviet national development and of the ethnic and cultural evolution of the peoples of the USSR is undoubtedly of worldwide historical significance. The papers in which Soviet ethnographers describe various aspects of the ethnocultural processes in the USSR, drawing on extensive factual data, will therefore, we think, be welcomed with great interest by readers in other countries.

The paper by Yu. V. Bromley and V. I. Kozlov aims at clarifying the mechanism by which cultural processes operate in the realm of the intellectual culture of the peoples of the USSR, in particular in such spheres as science and art. M. Ya. Zhornitskaya's paper, in which the ethnocultural links of the peoples of the USSR are demonstrated from the dance, both professional and folk (traditional and folklore), also deals with this problem, as a kind of concrete illustration of it. The authors of these two contributions note, as a very remarkable phenomenon, the progressing exchange of cultural values among the peoples of the USSR, their mutual enrichment in all realms of culture, and the forming not simply of an international culture but also, in fact, of a common Soviet one which is a single culture in its socialist content. The ethnic uniqueness of the national cultures is not lost in this common Soviet culture but receives a new manifestation in it. By enriching the common Soviet culture with the most progressive and interesting elements of their own cultures, all the peoples of the Soviet Union have made impressive

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advances, well known throughout the world, in the development of their national cultures. In the light of these achievements, the statements of individual Western 'specialists' about the 'suppression' of national cultures in the USSR are quite unfounded.

In the set of questions relating to present-day ethnic processes, much space is devoted to the means and paths of interethnic relations, in particular to the role of languages. The contribution of S. I. Bruk and M. N. Guboglo is devoted to the ethnosocial role of language in the USSR and the problem of interlanguage contacts, especially to the spread of bilingualism as a most important factor bringing the peoples of the USSR together, and to the role of Russian as the Soviet peoples' language of international intercourse.

Certain Western 'Kremlinologists' try to demonstrate that a 'Russification' of the nations and nationalities of the country is taking place in the USSR. Soviet scholars, drawing on extensive material, convincingly show that the spread of Russian, which has become the most important means of intercourse and inter-national unity among the peoples of the USSR, and a means of disseminating the most significant achievements both of the cultures of each people and of world culture among all the nations of the country, has not in the least led to a lessening of the national languages' role but on the contrary has enriched them.

O. A. Gantskaya's paper discusses the theme of 'ethnos and family', drawing on the material of present-day Soviet reality. The family, the micronucleus of society, plays a very important role in the socialising of the younger generation, in passing on the ethnocultural heritage, and in moulding the national identity of the younger members of society.

The question of nationally mixed families, which are continually increasing in number in the USSR, reflecting the general internationalising of all interethnic, intergroup, and interpersonal relations in the USSR, is especially interesting.

Ethnic processes are traced in the papers of L. N. Terentieva, T. A. Zhdanko, and I. S. Gurvich on the basis of concrete material from several large regions (the Volga Valley, the Urals, the European North, Central Asia, and

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Siberia). Each of these regions, like all the peoples living in these historico-geographical areas of the USSR, has its own specific character, which is also seen in its ethnic processes. All the authors, however, stress the general common features that characterise these processes, irrespective of the ethnos and region, and specifically the parallel processes of the internal consolidation of peoples and their convergence with one another and all the peoples of the USSR in the moulding of the new historical community that is the Soviet people.

Zhdanko's paper is devoted to the national state demarcation carried out in Central Asia in the 1920s. This was a measure without parallel in world history, in the course of which very intricate matters of the state division along ethnic lines of an immense territory with a large, ethnically heterogeneous population were coped with. It is a striking example of peaceful, just solution of the national question in conditions of genuine equality of all the peoples, based on their social and political equality.

In concluding this brief review of the articles in this part of the book, we would remind readers of the outlook for the development of ethnic processes and national relations in the USSR expressed by the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, L. I. Brezhnev:

> The further drawing together of the nations and nationalities of our country is an objective process. The Party is against hastening the process: there is no need for that, since it is dictated by the entire course of our Soviet life. At the same time, the Party rules out any attempt to hold it up, to impede it on some pretext, or to give undue emphasis to national distinctiveness, because this would go against the general line of development of our society, the internationalist ideals and the ideology of Communists, the interests of communist construction.[1]

The other half of our volume is devoted to the ethnonational problematics of the rest of the world.

In Western Europe the processes of ethnic consolidation and of the forming of bourgeois nations were completed quite long ago (in most cases in the nineteenth century),

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[1] L. I. Brezhnev. *Following Lenin's Course. Speeches and Articles (1972-1975)* (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1975), p 77.

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but the national question has not yet been settled there in several aspects, in particular as regards national minorities. Socio-political experience confirms the truth of Lenin's thesis that 'it is *impossible* to abolish national (or any other political) oppression under capitalism'.[1] The sharpening of the national problem in several developed capitalist countries in the past ten or fifteen years supports this thesis.

A very tense situation has developed in Great Britain where a bitter struggle is being waged by the discriminated-against Irish Catholics in Ulster for equal rights with the Protestant population (of Anglo-Scottish origin); and in Scotland and Wales the movement for self-government has become active. In Belgium relations between Flemings and Walloons are becoming more and more acute. In Spain the Catalans and Basques are resolutely demanding autonomous national development. In France a strengthening of national feeling has been observed among Bretons. In North America the problem of the French-speaking population of Canada, who live mainly in the province of Quebec, is extremely acute; in the seventies they voiced their determination to achieve independent statehood.

The reason for this exacerbation lies in the social, political, and cultural inequality of the national minorities. The close link between national and social oppression adds special tension to the situation. The national question is posed very sharply in the United States in connection with the status of Negroes, Indians, Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, and certain other groups of the population. The position of immigrants, whose numbers and weight in the total population are sometimes very considerable, is a special problem in developed capitalist countries. These people are quite often subjected to various forms of social and national discrimination.

The contributions on two large regions of the world, South-East Asia and Africa (by, respectively, A. A. Bernova, N. N. Cheboksarov, and B. V. Andrianov) are very interesting. Both regions are distinguished by an ethnic, linguistic, and anthropological medley of population and

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[1] V. I. Lenin. The Discussion on Self-Determination Summed Up. *Collected Works*, Vol. 22 (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1964), p 325.

a variety of types both of ethnic community (from tribe to nation) and of socio-economic structure and organisation. Most of the countries are polyethnic. Within one state people with highly developed socio-economic relations are often neighbours of, and interact with, peoples at earlier stages of social evolution corresponding to earlier forms of ethnic community. This is specially characteristic of the countries of Tropical Africa, where the structural amorphism and 'transitional' character of many ethnosocial communities strike one, particularly when analysing the ethnic situation.

The natural course of historical development, including the ethnic evolution of the peoples of those parts of the world, was interrupted by imperialist colonisation. The colonialists strove in every way to hold back consolidation of nationalities and nations, and supported tribalism and ethnic separation. The development of capitalist relations, however, objectively promoted the breaking-up of socio-ethnic structures of pre-class and early class society, and the moulding of large new ethnic communities.

The new stage of ethnosocial development in Asian and African countries is linked with the national liberation struggle and the founding of independent states. In the course of the struggle and of present-day development a national identity has been moulded. As a rule, this characteristic feature of a nation has arisen in Afro-Asian countries before the appropriate basis of this form of ethnos, viz. a national economy, has taken shape.

An important feature distinguishing South-East Asia from, for example, Tropical Africa has been the fact that the boundaries of the colonies in most cases were those of states already established long before the colonial epoch; in the post-colonial period independent states were founded, as a rule, within these boundaries. The main trend of ethnic development and of interethnic relations in South-East Asian countries has been a process of national consolidation in which the role of consolidating centre has been taken by the main ethnos of each country, the other peoples gradually merging with it, or becoming 'associated ethnoi'.

Two trends are dominant in the ethnosocial processes in most countries of present-day Africa: (1) the uniting and consolidating of big ethnic communities that have

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been established mainly on the basis of groups of the populations closely related by language and culture (the type of ethnos most characteristic of Africa today being, in Andrianov's opinion, the ethnic national grouping or *narodnost'*) and national integration, i.e. the forming of large new ethnic communities on the basis of ethnoi and ethnic groups differing in level of social development, language, culture, and economic occupations; (2) the strengthening and growth of national and political identity within a state.

While insisting on the need for a truly scientific, realistic approach to the study of the ethnic situation in Africa, Soviet Africanists resolutely oppose tendentious misrepresentations of the ethnic composition of African countries and the processes taking place in them. In particular, they stress the significance of such factors as the development of a national economy, the establishment of a new culture enriched by the achievements both of the peoples of each given country and of other countries and continents, and active struggle against every manifestation of tribalism and other regressive phenomena.

The countries of Asia and Africa have many ethnocultural problems in common, in particular in the realm of linguistic development. Many peoples and tribes still do not have their own systems of writing. In a number of countries the state language is that of the former metropolitan country. Most Afro-Asian countries, having won political sovereignty, are devoting much attention and effort to consolidating their economic independence and to developing their national languages, in particular the common state language, and to educating the broad masses of the people in these languages. The authors of the papers referred to above touch on these matters in part but their significance is so great that the editors considered it useful to include a special contribution on them. Among the other aspects of the problematics concerned, its author, L. B. Nikolsky, also characterises Soviet experience of language development, appraising the possibility of employing it in developing countries. He justly suggests that it would not only be possible to apply this experience, allowing for the specific conditions of each country, but also, as historical experience indicates, very expedient and useful.

The national question in Latin America has its own special aspects. There the politically acute, many-faceted problem is that of the social and ethnocultural integration of the indigenous (Indian) population. It is well known how brutally the Indians were persecuted and exterminated during colonisation and in the subsequent period, the extermination sometimes taking the form of actual genocide.

The forming of nations has essential peculiarities in Latin America, where nations are being formed (the process, incidentally, is far from complete) on the basis of a very complex interaction of genetically different ethnoi, viz., the indigenous population (Indians), European colonists (predominantly Spanish and Portuguese), Negro slaves from Africa, and later immigrants from Europe and Asia. In recent decades there has been a marked activation of interbreeding and integration of large and small groups of the indigenous population (in various countries); the number of bilingual Indians is growing rapidly, while they have taken to modern ways of work, everyday life, and public affairs in one form or another in the objective course of the development of capitalism. At the same time, however, the survival of considerable groups of Indian agriculturalists in many areas who are very backward, almost indigent, without rights, and living isolated from the rest of the population, is a real factor. They preserve very much of their traditional culture, which has a distinct trend, moreover, toward further development in some cases (for example, among the Quechua). T. V. Goncharova's contribution studies this complex, contradictory process.

Light is also thrown on the little studied matter of interethnic relations in Oceania, where several countries have gained independence in recent years, and on the policy of Oceanic states on the national question.

The second section opens with a major contribution by S. I. Bruk analysing the changes in the world's population since World War II, and giving a detailed description on many levels of the present population and the main trends in ethno-demographic processes. The tables compiled by Prof. Bruk from his personal estimates, scrupulously checked against the latest data, will undoubtedly interest both specialists and the general reader.

In concluding this short summary we think it necessary briefly to explain the ethnic terminology employed in So-

viet ethnography, and concretely in the papers of this volume.

The initial concept for describing ethnic processes is that of 'ethnos'.

> Use of the term 'ethnos' (Prof. Bromley has remarked), by helping to avoid the ambiguities of the term 'people', makes it possible to express unambiguously everything that the concepts 'nation', 'ethnic national group' (*narodnost'*), 'nationality', and 'tribe' have in common. It is this common element connected with the existence in each of the groups of people signified by these terms of a definite language and a specific culture and way of life, and also with the existence of a common identity (or self-awareness), that it is now accepted to call 'ethnic', while the aggregates of people concerned are referred to as 'ethnoi'.[1]

The very close link between ethnic and socio-economic phenomena is stressed in Soviet ethnography, which makes it understandable why such importance is attached to the studied ethnic communities' membership of a certain socio-economic formation. It is that factor which underlies the historical, stadial classification of ethnosocial communities. According to this classification the typical type of ethnic community for the primitive epoch was the tribe, for the epochs of slavery and feudalism the ethnic national group (*narodnost'*) (which is divided, moreover, into the sub-types of slave-owning and feudal), for the epoch of capitalism and socialism the nation. Nations, the most developed ethnosocial communities and those most characteristic of the modern world, are historically established, stable communities of people with such inherent qualities as a community of language, territory, economic life, peculiarities of culture and mode of life, and identity, the decisive role in the moulding of this type of ethnosocial community being played by economic factors and such an important political factor as statehood. The fundamental difference between capitalist and socialist formations also

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[1] Yu. V. Bromley. Introduction to Yu. V. Bromley (Ed.) *Sovremennie etnicheskie protsessy v SSSR* (Nauka, Moscow, 1975), p 5. For a more detailed explanation of the concept 'ethnos' see: Yu. V. Bromley. The Term 'Ethnos' and Its Definition. In: I. R. Grigulevich and S. Ya. Kozlov (Eds.), *Op. cit.*, pp 17-44. See also Yu. V. Bromley. *Etnos i etnografiya* (Ethnos and Ethnography), Nauka, Moscow, 1973.

governs the essential differences between capitalist and socialist nations.

The various ethnic communities of class formations are designated in the Soviet literature by the term 'nationality' (*natsional'nost'*). To designate that part of an ethnos that lives in the territory of another state, constituting a minority of the population there, the term 'ethnic (or national) minority' is usually employed, but in the USSR another term is now used, viz. 'national group'.

As regards directly ethnic processes, Bromley and Kozlov have suggested distinguishing between

> two main varieties reflecting the peculiarities of the manifestation of these processes in the various spheres of an ethnos. One of them is reflected ultimately in a change in the ethnic identity of the people belonging to some one ethnos. These processes we call *ethnotransformational*, since they are linked with the transition from one ethnic state to another. The second variety is represented by *ethno-evolutionary* processes that are expressed in a significant change in any of the main parameters of an ethnos, even if it does not lead directly to a change of ethnic identity.
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> The main objective content of these ethnic processes is a change in the specific character of ethnic communities.[1]

It is now accepted in Soviet ethnography to distinguish between *ethnic processes proper* (changes in the sphere of ethnic phenomena) and *ethnosocial processes* (not only ethnic transformations but also the social, economic, and political changes taking place in the life of the people of a given ethnos).

Two main types of ethnic process proper are distinguished, viz. divisive and unifying, the latter being most typical of the epoch of capitalism and socialism. Present-day unifying processes are broken down into intranation (ethnic consolidation, and national consolidation) and inter-nation (ethnic assimilation and interethnic integration) ones.

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[1] Yu. V. Bromley and V. I. Kozlov. Ethnic Processes as the Subject Matter of Research. In: Yu. V. Bromley (Ed.) *Op. cit.*, p 16. See also: Yu. V. Bromley. *Toward Typology of Ethnic Processes.* The 8th World Congress of Sociology, Toronto, August 17-24, 1974 (Moscow, 1974).

It is extremely important to stress that the course of ethnic processes is affected by a host of factors and that they happen in different concrete historical circumstances. Our contributors, we think, have demonstrated this quite adequately from data on the countries and regions described by them. The reader who closely and objectively analyses their facts and conclusions will find that out for himself.

Our dynamic epoch, which is marked by great, diverse changes in literally all spheres of life, has introduced much that is new into ethnocultural processes and the practice of national relations. It is an important task of the social sciences today, and of all social scientists who want their work to actively serve the development of science and the progress of nations, to make a deep, all-round study of ethnonational processes and phenomena.

THE SOVIET UNION

PRESENT-DAY ETHNIC PROCESSES IN THE INTELLECTUAL CULTURE OF THE PEOPLES OF THE USSR

Yu. V. Bromley and V. I. Kozlov

Study of the ethnic processes taking place in the multinational Soviet Union is gradually deepening and broadening, spreading to all the spheres of life in which they are manifested, including the whole domain of intellectual culture in the broad sense of the term.[1] In ethnographic work on this theme the authors' attention is usually focused on the traditional mass phenomena of the spiritual culture of the peoples of the USSR (customs, religion, folklore, etc.); attention is also paid to those components (in particular, literature) that are directly linked with its specific ethnolinguistic character.[2] In this paper we think it advisable to turn to such spheres of intellectual culture as science and the arts (predominantly professional).

Traditional ethnography did not touch these domains of intellectual life, as a rule, leaving them to be studied by special sciences, viz., the history of science, philosophy, aesthetics, and art studies, although, as Tokarev has quite rightly remarked:

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[1] See: Yu. V. Bromley and V. I. Kozlov. Leninism and the Main Trends in Ethnic Processes in the USSR. *Sovetskaya etnografiya*, 1970, 1: 3-14.

[2] See, for example, K. V. Chistov. Ethnic Community, Ethnic Consciousness, and Certain Problems of Intellectual Culture. *Sovetskaya etnografiya*, 1972, 3: 73-85; N. P. Lobacheva. On the Formation of New Rituals of the Peoples of the USSR (an Experiment in Ethnographic Generalisation). *Sovetskaya etnografiya*, 1973, 4: 14-25.

> all the phenomena of the life of the modern nations of industrial countries fall to some extent or other into ethnography's sphere of interest.[1]

This paper does not pretend to be an all-round, detailed survey of these special areas of scientific knowledge. Its purpose is limited to pointing out that ethnic processes in the USSR find reflection in these fields of intellectual culture as well, to one degree or another, being manifested both in the flowering of the national cultures of the peoples of the USSR and in their integration in a common Soviet culture.

In surveying the manifestations of ethnic processes in science and art it is important first of all to allow for their being directly affected by ideology, which, as an aggregate of political, legal, moral, and other views, permeates all forms of social consciousness and social relations. The ideology of Soviet society is Marxism-Leninism, the world outlook of the revolutionary masses and the theory of the building of socialism and communism.

The Marxist-Leninist materialist outlook on the world took root and spread in our country, as is well known, in the course of struggle against idealist teachings of every kind, including religion. Religious ideology had a considerable influence on ethnic processes in the past. In backward Czarist Russia, with general illiteracy and the absence of such direct means of mass communication as radio and the cinema subsequently became, it was religion, through the Church, religious societies, and the school, that gave the masses of the people their ideological (including moral) education. Obligatory registration and legalisation of the main events of a person's personal life by the Church, from birth to death, and regulation of all the more significant festival and holiday customs, foods and dishes, etc., ensured that religion permeated the people's life and often reinforced and strengthened cultural differences between peoples and the differences in their mode of everyday life.

The effect of religion on interethnic relations was also considerable. It made contacts between peoples of different religious persuasion extremely difficult, and delayed

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[1] S. A. Tokarev. A Propos of Ethnographic Study of the Nations of Industrial Countries. *Sovetskaya etnografiya*, 1967, 5: 139.

processes of interethnic integration. Difficulties of that kind also arose with differences in the 'inner' variants of the main faiths (e.g. the Orthodox, Catholic, and Protestant Churches within Christianity) as well as with differences between the main faiths. When confessional affiliation segmented and divided individual peoples, that created obstacles to the processes of intra-ethnic consolidation. At the same time a certain coming together was noticed among peoples practising the same religion that was quite superficial (e.g. in customs and relations of everyday life) and did not affect ethnic identity and the traditional norms of interethnic relations.

Karl Marx pointed out that religion would disappear to the extent that socialism developed.[1] The history of the Soviet Union has fully confirmed the correctness of that forecast.

Economic, social, and political reforms, the growth of culture and education, the development of science, and communist (including atheist) training have led to a marked weakening of the influence of religion which has been of immense significance for the course of ethnic processes. In some cases it encouraged the development of processes of intra-ethnic consolidation, but the elimination of the old confessional estrangement had a particularly favourable effect on interethnic integration and, the converging and mutual enriching of the spiritual culture of the peoples of the USSR.

Such a very important component of Soviet people's social consciousness as the ideology of Soviet patriotism and socialist internationalism has been of extremely great significance for the development of ethnic processes in the Soviet Union. The ideology of great power chauvinism and bourgeois nationalism had already been largely unmasked as a reflection of exploiters' class interests before the Revolution. It was not superceded automatically, of its own accord, however, but through the ideological struggle waged by the Communist Party against various kinds of nationalism and the immense work put in by it to educate the working people. As Leonid Brezhnev has emphasised:

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[1] Karl Marx. *Capital*, Vol. 1. Translated by Samual Moore and Edward Aveling (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1974), pp 83-85.

It is to the Party's credit that millions upon millions of Soviet people of every nation and nationality have adopted internationalism—once the idea of a handful of Communists—as their profound conviction and principle of behaviour. This was a true revolution in social thinking, and one which it is hard to overestimate.[1]

Ideology is very closely linked with social psychology. In Soviet society the ideology and policy of proletarian internationalism ensured the moulding of a qualitatively new, internationalist psychology. The feelings of distrust of other peoples sown by the ruling classes in antagonistic societies and maintained by traditions even when its objective causes did not exist, gradually faded, giving way to a sense of confidence and fraternity among Soviet peoples. The process of the moulding of internationalist views, previously peculiar mainly to the working class, spread among the masses of the collective-farm peasantry, intelligentsia, and the whole Soviet people, as a result of the victory of socialism and creation of Soviet society's ideological and political unity, i.e. became a common Soviet process inherent in all classes and social strata of all the nations and nationalities of the USSR.

Allowance must be made, however, for the fact that psychology is more conservative than ideology; old national psychological attitudes continue to exist in the form of survivals even when the factors giving rise to them have disappeared from the scene. As Leonid Brezhnev has remarked:

It should be remembered that nationalistic prejudices, exaggerated or distorted national feelings, are extremely tenacious and deeply embedded in the psychology of politically immature people.[2]

In that connection the domain of ethnic psychology was an arena of ideological struggle during the forming and development of socialist nations and an important sphere of upbringing and education. The moulding of a revolutionary, internationalist, Marxist-Leninist outlook on the world in the broad masses of the working people also encourages a more correct view of national values; national

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[1] L. I. Brezhnev. *Op. cit.*, p 75.
[2] Ibid., p 76.

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exclusiveness and ethnocentrism are replaced by the notion of the progressiveness of the rapprochement and converging of nations and nationalities. A feeling of love for one's people and for the native ethnic territory is combined in Soviet people with an ever broadening sense of belonging to the Soviet people, and with Soviet patriotism, which is based on a very solid foundation of internationalism and the idea of the equality and indissoluble unity of the peoples of our country.

The community of Soviet people's principles and views built up in all spheres of social psychology during the years of Soviet rule, is of immense importance, along with an internationalist ideology, for the inter-nation relations of Soviet people. Such domains of social consciousness as morals and legal views have undergone far-reaching changes; common Soviet norms of morality and law are penetrating more and more deeply into the consciousness of the masses of the people. One must also make allowance for the existence of common knowledge, views, and impressions among Soviet people received in the course of studying by a common school syllabus, and from fiction and popular science, TV and radio programmes, magazines and journals, newspapers, etc. The closeness not only of the purpose but also of the curricula of the system of public and higher education in all the republics of the USSR, and the fundamental similarity of the work methods and content of the activity of cultural and adult and further educational institutions as means of mass information in Russian and the other national languages, has created not simply the basis but also an actively functioning mechanism bringing the cultures of the peoples of the USSR closer together.

The ethnic feature is largely manifested in the domain of spiritual life in the emotional rather than the rational sphere, in the realm of the emotions and feelings rather than that of reason. This circumstance has to be allowed for when we are considering the role of *science* in modern ethnic processes. As a system of knowledge of the laws of the evolution of nature and society science is not restricted to separate ethnoi and is international in its essence. Certain scientific trends that have taken shape in definite countries are sometimes, it is true, called 'national schools', but what is meant by that is primarily the theories con-

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stituting it and not the science itself; that applies especially to the natural sciences. The national affiliation of scientists acquires special significance when they make outstanding discoveries; their glory spreads to one degree or another to the ethnos to which they belong, raising national pride: Poles are proud, for example, that they gave the world Copernicus, the English that they gave Newton, Russians that they gave Lomonosov and Mendeleev, and so on. That undoubtedly strengthens national (ethnic) identity, so affecting ethnic processes. As for the essence of the matter under consideration, the bulk of the disciplines of the natural sciences, and especially of the technical sciences, in fact stand apart, as it were, from ethnic processes or (which happens more often) exert an ethnolevelling effect on the whole and encourage ethnointegration.

The general democratising of science that has come about in the years of Soviet rule has encouraged a strengthening of this influence. Whereas the advances of science and engineering have objectively served the interests of the ruling classes in bourgeois society, under socialism they have begun to serve the interests of the working people. Rapid development of science, which is being accelerated in the epoch of the scientific and technical revolution, has been ensured by an influx of research personnel from the most varied strata of Soviet society, and from ethnically different groups of the population. All that, plus the general rise in the standard of education, has strengthened science's links with the broad masses and intensified its role in the moulding of social consciousness. Big scientific centres have grown up in what were previously culturally backward areas of Czarist Russia. In addition to the USSR Academy of Sciences, the country's leading scientific institution, academies have been founded in all the Union Republics, and either branches of the USSR Academy or special institutes in Autonomous Republics. The conversion of science into a directly productive force that is one of the expressions of the contemporary scientific and technical revolution is immensely strengthening the role of industry as a factor internationalising social affairs (including the processes of intensified migration of the population and its ethnic 'mixing', the creation of multinational work groups, etc.), because the scientific and technical revolution is leading to a higher standard of social production and is

linking the various economic regions and sectors of the economy together by ever stronger ties.[1]

We must, however, note the rather special role of the social or humanitarian sciences in the relation we are concerned with. These sciences, whose object is to study society and various social phenomena and processes, many of which present themselves to the researcher in their national (ethnic) form, cannot avoid studying national (ethnic) phenomena. There is more of the national in the social sciences than in the applied and natural sciences. That is due in part to the social sciences' being more strongly linked with the emotional sphere; like literature they may reflect ethnic peculiarities of perception of the surrounding world and features of the emotions and impressions that are part of the domain of ethnic psychology. It is not out of place to recall here Marx' and Engels' remark that 'the French imparted to English materialism wit, flesh and blood, and eloquence'.[2]

We would specially emphasise in this connection the role of such sciences as history, ethnography, archaeology, linguistics, and folklore studies, which are linked in one way or another with the ethnic sphere by the very content of what they study.[3] The gathering of historical knowledge of each of the peoples of the Soviet Union, study of their historical traditions, clarification of fundamental questions of linguistic development, disclosure of national cultures' achievements, comprehension of the specifically ethnic in the sphere of folklore, folk art, customs and rituals, and propagation of this knowledge through the school, literature, and the press, radio, and television, have all affected and continue to affect ethnic identity directly, encouraging its development by demonstrating the ethnic distinctiveness determined by the features of a people's national development and the specific character of its culture and mode of everyday life. And they have all played a not unimportant role in consolidating the peoples of the USSR, in in-

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[1] See: B. Zh. Kelle. Proletarian Internationalism and the Factors in the Internationalising of Public Affairs. *Voprosy filosofii*, 1972, 12: 33.

[2] Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. The Holy Family. *Collected Works*, Vol. 4 (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1975), p 130.

[3] See: Yu. V. Bromley. *Etnos i etnografiya* (Ethnos and Ethnography), Nauka, Moscow, 1972, pp 204 ff.

creasing their internal cohesion, and so on. The effect of the social sciences in this direction is supplemented by historical, ethnographic, and regional museums, which usually have special exhibits demonstrating the ethnic distinctiveness of the population of such and such a region of the country.

The great influence of history and philosophy on ethnic self-awareness and identity also poses the task of struggling steadily against idealisation of individual nations' historical past and a one-sided approach to their traditions. Such artificial exaggeration of the nationally peculiar is inevitably fraught with an unnatural isolation, and a counterposing of one people against another, which inevitably encourages relapses into nationalism.

At the same time the social sciences have the job in socialist society of disclosing and demonstrating the progressiveness of the processes of the convergence and merging of nations, and of developing the ideas of internationalism as a counterweight to covert and overt ideas of nationalism and national exclusiveness. The Soviet historical sciences, for instance, are disclosing ancient traditions of fruitful links between the peoples of the USSR, their joint defence of the country against invaders, their joint revolutionary struggle against the Czarist autocracy and to build socialism and communism. The facts of archaeology and ethnography, which witness to all peoples' equal capacity for cultural progress, teach us to respect specific cultures.

In this respect the ideology moulding sciences, primarily dialectical and historical materialism, which form the philosophical basis of Marxism-Leninism, have special significance. In *The Manifesto of the Communist Party* Marx and Engels developed the main principles for dealing with the national question, namely: international uniting of the proletariat of all countries, nations, and races for common struggle to overthrow capitalism; recognition of the equality of peoples and irreconcilability toward any oppression of one nation by another; subordination of the national question to the proletarian revolution and the common tasks of fighting for socialism and communism; support for national movements directed against reactionary forces and classes; struggle against bourgeois nationalism, which splits the proletarian movement, etc. Lenin developed these propositions of Marxism in relation to the epoch of imperial-

ism and proletarian revolutions, and to the transition period between capitalism and socialism.

Soviet soc al scientists, basing themselves on the Marxist-Leninist legacy, pay much attention to generalising the practice of ethnic development in the USSR and to bringing out the determining role of the CPSU in guiding national processes. By helping decide administrative problems in this sphere Soviet social scientists are actively involved in the internationalist education of the working people through their work connected with analysing various aspects of contemporary national relations (economic, social, legal, etc.) in the USSR. Under developed socialism the Communist Party sets all sectors of the social sciences the task of deepening their research into various aspects of the ethnic processes in our country—their trends and prospects, features and tempos, optimising factors, and factors retarding the development and convergence of socialist nations and nationalities.

In considering the reflection of ethnic processes in the realm of *art*, and the effect of art itself on ethnic processes, we would note, first of all, the difference in the way the so-called traditional folk art (representational folk art, oral art, folk music, etc.) and professional art perform ethnic functions. The marked role of the traditional, everyday domestic arts in ethnic phenomena and processes is due to such indispensable features as its mass character and direct link with the ethnos. As for professional art, which is usually realised in individual artistic creation, not everything in the works produced is directly connected with the ethnic sphere, and the works by no means become common within the ethnos (and far from all of them at that). On the other hand, their spread, plus the trend of their content, is a necessary condition for their fulfilling of ethnic functions.

During the Soviet period professional art has become accessible to the very broad masses as a result of the sweeping social and cultural reforms, and is now having a greater effect on ethnic processes than traditional folk art, the domain of which is shrinking.

It is quite difficult to draw a general picture of any kind of the interaction of art and ethnic processes. The great diversity of the forms of art hinders it; some (e.g. the theatre) are directly linked with such an important component of the ethnos as language, others (music) do not display such

a connection; some (e.g. the cinema) may mirror reality much more realistically, while others (ballet) reflect it in more conventionalised forms, and so on. The differences in the 'capacity' of one art form or another to reflect reality, including the specific ethnic character in its external, material, linguistic-cultural, social, psychological, and other forms of manifestation, cannot help affecting features of the apprehension of various art forms and their effect on ethnic identity. In becoming accessible to the bulk of the members of ethnic communities and penetrating their general mode of living and consciousness, works of professional creativity themselves become part of the ethnos' cultural fund to one degree or another.

There is another circumstance of no little importance in art's performance of ethnic functions and that is that it does not reflect reality in an all-embracing way but selectively, not in the form of a mirror copy but refracted through the prism of individual features of its creators' or performers' character, through their creative talent and aspirations and social maxims. As a result an art work may be devoted either to the typical or to the extremely rare, either to the national or to the international; the specific ethnic character may be stressed or smoothed away. Art's effect on ethnic processes is not only strengthened by such reflection but is also characterised by a greater sense of purpose. Like the social sciences art is strongly affected by ideology, and depending on it can either accelerate ethnic processes or retard them, divide peoples or bring them together.

Being restricted in space to a brief description of the specific character of the interaction of the main forms of professional art and the ethnos, we find it advisable to distinguish, first of all, those arts that are most linked with the linguistic, cultural aspects of ethnic processes already considerably discussed in the specialist literature, namely, the theatre, cinema, and the medium most common in our day, television. These entertainment arts are particularly closely linked with language and literature, and are often based on the latter; as we know, many literary works have penetrated the broad masses thanks to screen or theatrical adaptations rather than directly through the printed word. Compared with the theatre, the cinema, which employs both outdoor location and studio shooting, has incomparably

greater possibilities of reflecting reality in its ethnic forms; these opportunities (and, on the whole, the ethnic aspect of cinema art) have become stronger since and through the development of sound films in which the vernacular is used, often with its dialectal peculiarities.

The forms of art in which there is no direct link with language and literature, and which may be perceived by the viewer directly, irrespective of linguistic affiliations, include painting and sculpture, on the one hand, and music and dance, on the other. Music, because it exerts a tremendous emotional force on deep levels of the psyche, has a prominent place in man's social and cultural life. Being organically linked with folk song, music reflects special features of melody, scales and modes, etc., and the specific ethnic character almost as strongly as language. At the same time, various peoples display similar musical phenomena both linked with cultural borrowings and with the independently occurring consequences of a uniformity of socio-economic mode, everyday mode of life, and natural conditions.

Choreography and the art of dance also rise from very old, stable forms of folk art. Analysis of the development of the dance, from folk dances to staged ballet performances, makes it possible to bring out not only the features of peoples' traditional dances in the past but also to trace the path by which the interconnection of the dance cultures of various local groups and peoples spreads.

Singing and musical art, which have found stage embodiment in the form of professional song and dance ensembles and solo concerts, on the one hand, and in such quite conventionalised forms of depicting reality as opera and operetta, on the other hand, occupy a place intermediate between the 'linguistic' and 'non-linguistic' forms of art. Their 'conventionality', incidentally, does not prevent them from reflecting the specific national character and, in particular, from widely employing all forms of folk art (song and music, dance, etc.). Local versions of traditional art are usually stylised on the professional stage and may acquire the function of general ethnic symbols on becoming the property of the broad masses.

The main condition for effective reciprocal influence between professional art and ethnic processes, as we have already remarked, is the mass character of art. On the eve of the Revolution, professional forms of art were far from

uniformly developed among the various peoples of Russia. Among some of them (e.g. the peoples of Siberia) there were only theatricalised ritual spectacles; among others (e.g. the peoples of Central Asia) there was a folk theatre; among others still (certain of the developed peoples of Russia in Europe and Transcaucasia) professional dramatic art already had a leading place. The Russian theatre, which took shape at the turn of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, has the most professional experience. The development of certain art forms was retarded by religious proscriptions, for example, the development of painting and sculpture among Islamic peoples by the ban on depicting people.

Just as the mass illiteracy inherited from Czarism could not be eliminated and educational standards raised among all the peoples of the USSR in a historically short time except by teaching in the mother tongue and creating and developing a national literature, and so on, so too professional art could not be developed and disseminated among the broad masses except through development mainly in national forms. In the 1920s the basis had already been laid for dramatic art among most of the peoples that had previously not had a professional theatre. The new plays produced on the stages of the national theatres in the vernacular portrayed the varied life of the Soviet country. In addition to the wealth of themes in playwriting, a variety of genre forms became established, from epic-heroic plays to psychological, domestic drama, from pointed publicistic satire to lyric comedy. All forms and genres of folk art were widely employed, and also special traditional art means of expressing thought (poetic turns of speech, theatrical plastic arts, stage design and sets, etc.). In striving to take art to the new mass audience theatres travelled to workers' settlements, put on plays for Red Armymen in front-line areas, and so on. The drawing of the broad masses into the building of socialism gave rise to a growth of folk talent and a flowering of amateur art. It is indicative that there were already around 500 theatres functioning in the USSR in 1956, and 570 in 1975, presenting plays in 40 languages of its peoples. In 1972, the year of the 50th anniversary of the founding of the USSR, plays were produced in 45 languages.

In many ways the other forms of professional art developed along the same lines as the theatre. Following the found-

ing of a Ukrainian cinema (represented most clearly by Dovzhenko and his school) and of a Georgian cinema (Shengelaya, Chiaureli, and others), for instance, other national cinemas developed that reflected features of the national culture and way of life in their films, national manners and customs, the natural environment, and the people's historical development. The printing of films, technically comparatively simple, and broad distribution of projectors (including mobile cinemas) ensured a multimillion audience for each film. The development of television has brought the screen even closer to the viewer.

Professional musical art has been developed intensively in Union and Autonomous Republics, including regions where, before the Revolution, it had almost not existed. On the basis of folk forms of musical creation—the Azerbaijani *mukumi* and Uzbek *makomi*, the Moldavian *doina* and Lithuanian *daina*, the Kazakh and Kirghiz *kyui*, and so on, operas and ballets, orchestral suites and symphonic poems were composed. The national ranks of musicians grew, musical groups arose and became active (the Russian Pyatnitsky Folk Choir, the Ukrainian Dumka Capella, etc.).

Painting and sculpture developed rapidly. The nationalisation of valuable art works, the development of museums and exhibitions, and the accessibility of art education to broad strata of the population were all aimed at making art culture the property of the working people. Among some peoples (for example, those of Central Asia), easel painting, graphic art, sculpture, and theatre design, hardly known before the Revolution, developed. In spite of the thematic closeness and often similarity of subjects in the pictures of artists in the different national republics, there is a noticeable originality of national perception of reality. Modern means of mass reproduction (polychromatic printing, etc.), plus permanent and touring exhibitions, have made the work of national professional artists accessible to the broad masses not only of the individual republics but also of the whole country.

The role of monumental art has also risen. In all Union Republics, for example, many urban neighbourhoods have been successfully decorated with works of monumental art—mozaics, frescos, park and garden sculptures—in which national motifs are often employed (e.g. wall paintings

and mozaics in themes from the national folklore in Georgia and Armenia).

Even distribution of all forms of the 'production' of professional art among the main peoples of the USSR has been combined with a more even 'consumption' of art by the masses through its accelerated growth among peoples previously backward in this respect. The republics of the USSR now already have, in the main, an even intensity of 'consumption', for example, of dramatic art, which is characterised by the number of attendances at theatres per 1000 inhabitans. Ethnosociological research carried out fairly recently in Tataria witnesses that

> at the time it was made there were no fundamental differences in the structure and character of the demand for cultural values between Tatars and Russians.[1]

In Kazan, for example, where there are Russian and Tatar theatres, 11.8 per cent of Russians went to the theatre once a month or more and 15.1 per cent of Tatars.[2]

The development and spread of professional art in its national forms, together with the development of a national literature and other components of national culture, have greatly encouraged the processes of national (ethnic) consolidation that have been developing since the Revolution among the peoples of Soviet republics. At the same time no single form of professional art has remained shut in within the sphere of the national but has included the international, with the latter gaining, moreover, in weight. This process has gone hand in hand with an ideological struggle against nationalistic, formalist, and other negative tendencies. A professional dramatic art was created in Union and Autonomous Republics, for instance, and developed on a new socialist basis, in struggle against displays of nationalistic tendencies, which were often expressed in an ignoring of the democratic culture of the past, a striving to confine the development of the art to a framework of dead forms and traditions, attempts to resurrect reactionary elements of culture (linked, for example, with religion), and denial of the need to assimilate other peoples' experience. Soviet

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[1] See: V. A. Petrov and I. V. Rybikova. The Culture of Townsmen. In: Yu. V. Arutyunian *et al.* (Eds.). *Sotsial'noe i natsional'noe. Opyt etnosotsiologicheskikh issledovanii po materialam Tatarskoi ASSR* (Nauka, Moscow, 1973), p 100.

[2] *Ibid.*, p 101.

cultural workers overcame these alien tendencies, however, and built the development of dramatic art, like other forms of art, on the principles of socialist realism and harmonious combination of the national and the international.

The internationalisation of all forms of art developing in the national regions of the USSR, carried out under the guidance of the CPSU, took several directions but primarily the line of fruitful contacts between peoples. These contacts were specially valuable for establishing new forms of art among peoples that used not to have them, for example, opera and easel painting among Central Asian peoples. Young artists and painters were trained in Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, and other big cultural centres; eminent art workers travelled to the republics of Central Asia from these centres to give direct help on the spot, and so on, which all promoted an interpenetration of various national traditions and styles, and a mutual enrichment of the national republics' art.

The fate of national dramatic art, whose development was inseparably linked with its internationalisation, is very indicative. Internationalisation was displayed above all in a broadening of the repertoire by employing both the works of world drama (the plays of Shakespeare, Schiller, and others), and the best examples of the drama of fraternal peoples. Plays by Ukrainian, Byelorussian, Georgian playwrights, and by dramatists of other republics, were staged in Russian theatres, while Russian playwrights, both classical (e.g. Ostrovsky) and contemporary (Pogodin, Arbuzov, Rozov, and others), are widely represented in the repertoire of national theatre companies. Internationalisation was also encouraged by unity of ideological and artistic interpretation of plays on the stage, and the creation of a Soviet school of acting and production. The founding of Russian, or rather Russian-language, theatres in the capitals of Union and Autonomous Republics was of great importance in intensifying inter-nation exchange in the field of dramatic art.

The wide spread of Russian in the USSR, it must be emphasised, is not evidence, as many bourgeois Kremlinologists would have it, of any 'Russification'. As experience has shown, the economic, socio-political, and cultural life of any multinational country requires the development of a lingua franca. In the Soviet Union it has come about histor-

ically that Russian, the language of the biggest people constituting the core of the Soviet state, became this lingua franca. At the same time the general, common Soviet culture functions not only in Russian but also in the languages of all the peoples of the USSR.

Internationalisation was even more marked in the cinema because of its highly mass character and orientation on a multimillion audience. This mass character was achieved by employing themes that presented interest to the broad masses of the public and a language understood by them. The films of republican studios were either made in Russian or dubbed into it, so becoming accessible to an international audience. On the whole the multinational cinema of the USSR is characterised by an internationalism of ideas and feelings and a common ideological content that springs from the soil of the Soviet people's moral and political unity. Most feature films are devoted to common Soviet themes, viz., the historical, revolutionary past of the country and the joint involvement of the peoples in building socialism. That, however, does not exclude a national colour in films, and reflection of the ethnic features of some one group of the population. There are also films devoted to national themes, showing, for example, the contemporary life of individual peoples of the Soviet Union or their historical past. These films acquaint the audience of one nationality with the life of the other peoples of the Soviet Union, contributing in no small way to educating Soviet people in the spirit of internationalism.

Inter-nation links in the realm of musical culture are seen most clearly when composers draw on other people's musical heritage, reworking it artistically. The broadening of one national culture's intonational 'vocabulary' by borrowings from another culture, and the assimilation of one republic's music by composers of another republic, are very important for developing the international foundations of musical culture. Just such an interaction has led to an enrichment and extension of the expressive means of the national musics of all the peoples of the USSR and the creation of common Soviet features in musical culture.

One of the most important forms of inter-nation contacts has become the holding of national art weeks, which began in 1936-41. During these weeks national plays, operas, ballets, and musical dramas were performed and concerts given

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by musical ensembles, dance groups, and choirs. Russian artists were involved in their preparation. Since the war they have become more common and that has helped enrich the art of the fraternal peoples with Russian culture's advanced experience. The All-Union Festival of Dramatic and Theatrical Art, held in 1972 in honour of the 50th anniversary of the founding of the USSR, vividly demonstrated the fruitful results of national exchange and mutual enrichment in the realm of art. It is indicative that there were more than 200 plays by dramatists of other republics in the repertoire of the theatres of the Russian Federation in the 1971/2 season, including dramas by Alexander Korneichuk (the Ukraine), Alexander Makaenok (Byelorussia), Ottia Joseliani (Georgia), Ion Drutse (Moldavia), and others. Showing of the best plays on television has also broadened Soviet people's acquaintance with the theatre of the different peoples of their country in recent years. As a result, all the main achievements of multinational Soviet art have become the common property of all the peoples of the country.

Such a specific sphere of creative art as the decorative and applied arts, which have deep roots among all the peoples of the USSR, has not been left unaffected by modern ethnic processes. After the Revolution there was a revival and development of local crafts, many of which had fallen into decay. At the present time folk art exists in all Union and Autonomous Republics partly as a domestic occupation but mainly in the form of organised crafts, most of them based on the traditions of local folk art. In the RSFSR these craft industries include Bogorod wood carving, Palekh and Fedoskino lacquers work, Khokhloma ware, Vologda handmade lace, the carpet weaving and jewellers' work of Daghestan, the stone carving of Tuva, the bone and ivory carving of Yakutia, and much else. The other Union Republics are also rich in traditional crafts. In the Ukraine there are the Kosovo and Oposhnyany ceramics, Reshetilovo rugs, and Hutsul wood carving; in Byelorussia osier and straw basket weaving, decorative weaving and hemstitching. In the republics of Transcaucasia the most traditional crafts are art metalwork, pile-rug weaving, and pottery; in the republics of Central Asia and Kazakhstan national embroidery, felting, pottery, and decorative knitting and crocheting; in Turkmenia the weaving of pile carpets, etc. In the Baltic

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Republics the production of jewellery and pottery has been widely developed, and also wood carving, various forms of decorative weaving, embroidery, and knitting.

Essentially new trends have been developed in applied art in Soviet times. A craft co-operative arose in the village of Palekh, for example, in 1924, based on the traditions of old Russian icon painting, which has now become world famous for its miniature lacquer masterpieces. The new outlook on the world and new subjects from the history and present-day life of the country have enriched not only the themes of Palekh artists' work but also their skill and craftsmanship. At the same time the changes in living standards and demand for applied art have often led to a change in the significance of individual types of article, or rather to a transformation of their everyday functions and growth of the role of aesthetic functions. In Kirghizia, for example, the nomadic herdsmen's decorated leather vessels have been made in reduced sizes in recent years and already enjoy a considerable market as souvenirs rather than domestic utensils.

In recent years, it must be noted, folk arts and crafts have begun to be in increasing demand in the Soviet Union (and throughout the world), mainly due to the heightened interest of an increasingly urbanised society in articles that diversify an everyday way of life filled with standard mass-produced products.

Applied art is developing in the USSR in a constant mutual enriching and reciprocal influencing of the cultures of the various peoples of the country. The vivid national school of metal chasing developed in Georgia in Soviet times has encouraged the spread of such workshops in other regions of the USSR, especially in the RSFSR and Baltic Republics. The highly developed applied arts of the Baltic have had a marked effect on craftsmen in other republics, especially on those engaged in making art ceramics, tapestries, and jewellery. The Baltic artists, in turn, have been noticeably influenced by the applied art of the Russian Federation. When individual folk craftsmen leave their native parts and enter another ethnic sphere, they take the craft traditions of another ethnos with them. When they go to live in other republics, craftsmen of another nationality sometimes master local forms of applied art and become involved in the development of the traditional local crafts. In Tuva, for instance,

several Russian craftsmen have been working with success in the traditional style of Tuvan folk art. In Yakutia Russian craftsmen are successfully engaged in traditional bone carving alongside Yakuts.

The modern items of the folk crafts retain a specific ethnic quality as a rule, linked with the handing down of traditions of craftsmanship formed within the ethnos concerned. These articles (e.g. Russian *matreshki* or nested dolls) sometimes even become a kind of ethnic symbol, not so much, of course, within their own ethnic community as in the eyes of the members of other ethnoi (tourists, for example). Craft work is penetrating ever more deeply into the everyday life of all the peoples of the USSR; as a result one may see not only books translated from other languages in the home of a modern family of any nationality, but also details in the interior decoration typical of other peoples—Ukrainian or Baltic ceramics, Georgian metal chasing, Uzbek or Turkmen rugs, Russian embroidery, etc. These items may have a semifunctional use or simply an aesthetic one, but in one way or another they promote the processes of interethnic integration.

The effect of the art forms not connected with language on the converging of peoples differs essentially, on the whole, from that of linguistic forms of culture. On the one hand, they can be comprehended directly ('without translation') in another ethnic environment; on the other hand, their adoption is closely linked with deep-lying layers of psychology and ethnic traditions. Adoption of the foreign acquires a nuance of exoticism, i.e. it is valued for how far it differs from what is customary in the native ethnic milieu. The increasing exchange of values in all fields of culture, however, entails a broadening and enriching of aesthetic tastes, and a capacity to comprehend other ethnic traditions as interesting variants of humanity's art culture rather than as something unusual. The internationalising of artistic tastes is a vivid manifestation of the general pattern of the converging of the Soviet peoples' spiritual culture.

This coming together embraces both traditional and professional art. Many of its traditional forms, as we have already said, are now experiencing a rebirth, while internation exchange in this field is becoming intensified. Professional forms, however, undoubtedly have a special place in the Soviet people's common cultural fund. In that connec-

tion we must stress once more that the national feature of the modern art culture of the peoples of the USSR does not simply consist in the legacy of the past but is largely also the result of new, professional creativity. At the same time it is in professional forms of culture that inter-nation interpenetration is taking place most actively on the whole, and it is these that have the greatest significance for the culture of the peoples of the USSR.

The process of internationalisation embraces both the ideological sphere of multinational Soviet art and the thematic aspect and subject matter and the forms of artistic creation. Not only is a further mutual enriching of the various national cultures thereby taking place, and the number of works meeting all-Soviet aesthetic criteria increasing, but there is also a collective development of international art forms.

Scientific planning of the development of spiritual culture is very important for the integrational processes in this sphere, and covers not only the creation of spiritual values but also their distribution and consumption.

Integrational interethnic processes in the realm of art are combined with growth in the volume of the national art cultures of the separate ethnoi, a growth that is manifested, on the one hand, in an increase in the total fund of art works among all peoples of the USSR, and, on the other hand, in a rise in the scale of consumption of works of art and an extension in the range of workers' spiritual wants. In spite of active exchange in the realm of art culture, many of its components, while acquiring an international character, are at the same time not losing their capacity to retain their national form or to be embodied in more or less expressive national variants. The national in the culture of each ethnos is more and more being harmoniously combined with the international, and as a result of this interaction a common Soviet culture is coming into being.

THE REFLECTION OF ETHNOCULTURAL LINKS IN PRESENT-DAY DANCE IN THE USSR

M. Ya. Zhornitskaya

The Socialist Revolution opened a new era in development of the culture of the peoples of the Soviet Union, and made all the treasures of culture and art accessible to the broad strata of the working people.

The right to enjoy the achievements of culture is a fundamental right of all citizens of the USSR. It is guaranteed by the USSR Constitution, Article 46 of which reads:

Citizens of the USSR have the right to enjoy cultural benefits.

This right is ensured by broad access to the cultural treasures of their own land and of the world that are preserved in state and other collections; by the development and fair distribution of cultural and educational institutions throughout the country; by developing television and radio broadcasting and the publishing of books, newspapers, and periodicals, and by extending the free library service; and by expanding cultural exchanges with other countries.

An outstanding result of the development of culture during the years the multinational Soviet state has existed has been the birth and crystallisation of such a special, many-faceted phenomenon as Soviet multinational choreography.[1] All the peoples of the country have been involved

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[1] By 'choreography' in Russian literature since the end of the nineteenth century, has come to be meant the whole art of dance (embracing traditional folk and popular dances, staged dances, and ballets).

in its creation, and the process has gone on hand in hand with an enriching of traditional dance culture.[1]

In the broad sense of the term culture is one of the vehicles of a people's ethnic qualities, and folk dance can be included fully in the 'ethnographic kernel' of culture, which includes 'those of its components for which traditionality, an everyday character, and a mass, popular nature are typical, i.e. the elements that constitute so-called folk culture.'[2] The direct transmission of the traditions of folk dance from generation to generation not only enables us to bring out the special features of the traditional dance of each people and features of their ethnic unity in the past, but also help us to trace the path of development and mutual enriching of various nationalities' choreography, and to establish the disappearance at the present stage of the old, closed isolation of folk dance.

Folk dance, it should be noted, has been created and refined over the ages. In its present-day form a folk dance continues to exist in a great many variants, but often preserves the original basis developed by the centuries. One of Soviet ethnography's undoubted achievements is its deep study of

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[1] The problems of dance's development have been discussed in a number of Soviet works. See, for example, *Igry narodov SSSR* (Games of the Peoples of the USSR), an anthology compiled by V. N. Vsevolodsky-Gerngross (Moscow, 1933); Igor Moiseev. The Choreographic Culture of the Peoples of the USSR. *Narodnoe tvorchestvo*, 1937, 2/3; K. Goleizovsky. *Obrazy russkoi narodnoi khoreografii* (The Images of Russian Folk Choreography), Moscow, 1964; S. S. Lisitsian. *Starinnie plyaski i teatralizovannie predstavleniya armyanskogo naroda* (Old Dances and Theatricalised Performances of the Armenian People), Vol. 1 (Erevan, 1956), Vol. 2 (Erevan, 1972); E. Nadezhdina, N. Elyash. *Bolshoi balet* (Big-time Ballet), Moscow, 1964; M. Zhornitskaya. *Narodnie tantsy Yakutii* (Folk Dances of Yakutia), Moscow, 1966; *idem. The Study of Folk Dancing in the USSR. Its State and Tasks* (Chicago, 1973); Yu. I. Slonimsky (Ed.) *Vse o balete* (All about Ballet), a reference dictionary compiled by E. Ya. Surits (Muzyka, Moscow/Leningrad, 1966); V. Krasovskaya. *Stat'i o balete* (Articles on the Ballet), Iskusstvo, Leningrad, 1967; G. Inozemtseva. *Narodny tanets* (Folk Dance), Moscow, 1971; *Musykal'niye kul'tury narodov: traditsii i sovremennost'* (Musical Cultures of the Peoples: Traditions and Today's Position), Moscow, 1973.

[2] Yu. V. Bromley. On the Relation of Ethnography and the History of Culture. *XIII Mezhdunarodnyi kongress po istorii nauki (Sektsiya 10. Istoriya nauk o cheloveke (antropologiya, psikhologiya, sotsiologiya, etnografiya)*, Moscow, 1971, p 7.

dance in the USSR.[1] The need to record the rich art of traditional folk dance and make it the birthright of the broad masses has played a major role in developing this research.

The most common method of recording choreography in the Soviet Union, generalised and basically developed by Verkhovinets,[2] and subsequently improved by Soviet choreographers,[3] is the descriptive one, which consists, in essence, in isolating the melodic line and apportioning the movements to the bars with verbal description of their elements. Illustrative material is used for the sake of greater visualness in the recording, viz., a graphic diagram of the spatial composition of the dance, photographs or drawings of the characteristic movements and positions, but they serve mainly as an illustrative supplement to the recording. There are also other systems of recording the movements and setting, but the one adopted in the USSR is the system of kinetic writing invented by Lisitsian.[4] Use of his method of graphic recording of movement has raised historical ethnographic research into folk dance to the level of an exact science. His system, unlike that of Rudolf Laban used in a number of countries,[5] is wholly and completely developed from an objective analysis of the movements, and is based on a mathematically exact breakdown of movement into its simplest, indivisible elements.

In addition to a record, the researcher employs all kinds of modern technical means: a cinecamera, for instance, to fix the performance; a tape recorder to record the melodies; a camera to fix separate striking poses.

[1] M. Ya. Zhornitskaya. *Op. cit.*, 1973.

[2] V. Verkhovinets (Kostiv). *Ukrains'ka khoreografiya. Teoriya ukrains'kogo narodnogo tantsa* (Ukrainian Choreography. The Theory of Ukrainian Folk Dance), Kiev. 1919; *idem., Teoriya ukrains'kogo narodnogo tantsa* (The Theory of Ukrainian Folk Dance), Poltava, 1920.

[3] E. M. Margolis. *O zapisi tantsa* (On the Recording of Dance), Moscow, 1950; T. S. Tkachenko. *Narodny tanets* (Folk Dance), 1st edition, Moscow, 1954, 2nd edition, Iskusstvo, Moscow, 1967; A. I. Gumenyuk. A Note on the Principles of Classifying Folk Dances. In: *Narodna tvorchist' ta etnografiya*, Book 4, (Kiev, 1964).

[4] S. S. Lisitsian, *Zapis' dvizheniya (kinetografiya)* (The Recording of Movement—Kinetography), Moscow/Leningrad, 1940.

[5] Ann Hutchinson. *Labanotation or Kinetography Laban. The System of Analyzing and Recording Movement*. Illustrated by Doug Anderson (Theatre Arts, New York, 1973). Lisitsian made a critical examination of Laban's kinetography in his book referred to above: pp 74-84.

The main principles of the study of folk dance in the USSR are determined on the whole by the view of ethnography accepted here as a science that investigates peoples, their stable ethnic features, ethnogenesis, and ethnic history. This approach, which takes consistent historicism most comprehensively into account, posits surveying the folk dance of each people historically in its becoming and development.

The material collected is enabling us to pass to comparative study of the dances of the peoples of the USSR, an important matter that may possibly be done in a special atlas of the folk dances of the USSR.[1]

The material now available makes it possible to conclude that a single stratum underlies Russian, Byelorussian, and Ukrainian dance.[2] The common origin of the Russian, Byelorussian, and Ukrainian nations determined the kinship of their cultures, which is clearly exhibited in their spiritual culture, especially in music and dances, as well as their material culture. Russian, Byelorussian, and Ukrainian dances have a common form (ring dances, song dances, square dances, etc.) and common subjects and motifs, but the dances of each nation have at the same time their own rhythms and composition, their own character and style of performance.

Stable common movement elements have also been traced in the folk dances of Transcaucasia. There are many parallels with Armenian folk dances in Georgian dance folklore. Tier ring dances, for example, are known among both Georgians and Armenians. A common plasticity of movement is distinctly discernible in Transcaucasian dances: speed and impetuosity, and flight. Elements of toe dancing are common to the dances of the peoples inhabiting Daghestan, the North Caucasus, and the mountain areas of Georgia.[3]

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[1] S. I. Bruk, S. A. Tokarev. The International Conference on an Ethnographic Atlas of Europe and Adjacent Countries. *Sovetskaya etnografiya*, 1963, 5: 152.

[2] N. Bachinskaya. *Russkie khorovody i khorovodnie pesni* (Russian Ring Dances and Round Dance Songs), Moscow, 1951; *idem*. Dissertation. The Musical Style of Russian Round Dance Songs (Moscow, 1969); A. Gumenyuk. *Narodne khoreografichne mistetstvo Ukraini* (The Folk Dance of the Ukraine), Kiev, 1963; Yu. Churko. *Belorusskii narodny tanets* (Byelorussian Folk Dance), Minsk, 1972.

[3] E. L. Gvaramadze. *O nekotorykh spetsificheskikh osobennostyakh gruzinskogo narodnogo tantsa* (On Certain Specific Features of Georgian Folk Dance), Moscow, 1964, p 6.

A common technique of performance is also characteristic of the dance of the peoples of Central Asia and Kazakhstan. The main expressive means in the dances of the Uzbeks and Tajiks are facial expressions and gesticulations. Graceful flexible movements of the hands and arms weaving the dance pattern, and mobility of the torso are also traceable in the Tajik dance *non-Bazy* and the Uzbek dance *pakhta*. Elements of a single technique are common to the dances of the Kirghiz *(kiiz* or *koshma)*, the Turkmen 'Shepherds', and the *sayakhatta* choreographic composition of the Kazakhs, created comparatively recently in Soviet times. The dances of the Kazakhs composed since the Revolution (on the basis of folk games and movements characteristic of work processes) have been enriched by elements of the dance movements of other peoples of Central Asia, interpreted in their own Kazakh manner.

Common technical features are traceable in the dance folklore of the peoples of the Volga—Tatars, Chuvash, Mari, and Mordvins. Portrayals of everyday life and work processes have a major place in their dances. The girls dance pliably and softly, in a reserved manner, with veiled coquetry. Drumming of the heels and gliding movements without big jumps predominate. The men perform dances crisply and vigorously, with half squats and stamping.

One can also trace ethnocultural connections in the dances of the peoples of North-Eastern Siberia. In spite of the differences in the plasticity of the dances of the Koryaks, Itelmens, Chukchi, and Eskimos, all these people have a single dance position with the legs flexed at the knee. A linear structure predominates in compositions. The dances of the Koryaks, Chukchi, and Eskimos are mainly mimetic. The habits of birds, and of wild and domesticated animals, are conveyed by expressive gestures and poses. They are danced to a drum, a sung melody, and shouts and cries.

The definite style of the dances characteristic of the population of a given historical, cultural province is formed as the result of a continuous process of reciprocal influencing and mutual enriching of the cultures of the separate, mainly neighbouring peoples. The form and content of folk dances is constantly changing, reflecting shifts in the people's historical, social, everyday, and cultural life.

It has become quite possible to bring out these aspects

of dance material with appropriate allowance for the history of the production processes of the inhabitants of these places and the performers of the dances, and by bringing out their everyday mode of life, social, economic, and cultural links with neighbouring peoples, and the attendant geographical factors. All that makes it possible to develop well-substantiated ideas about the historical type, level, and uniqueness, and about the characteristic structure and ethnic links of the genre repertoire of the dances being studied, and to employ material on folk dances actively to solve problems of ethnogenesis and of ethnic and cultural history. In this case folklore material on the dance reveals its ethnic and cultural-historical aspects, and can be correlated with the areas of distribution of certain sets or complexes of material culture and rituals, and with ethnolinguistic and ethnoanthropological areas.

The palette of the traditional dance of the peoples of the USSR is rich—Russian ring and group dances, the Ukrainian hopak and *kozachok*, the Byelorussian *lyavonikha* and *kryzhachok*, the Georgian *kartuli* and *horumi*, the Armenian *kochari* and *shalaho*, the Moldavian *hora*, the Ossetian *simd*, the Lithuanian *blezdingele*, the Lettish *sudmalinyas* (The Mill), the Esthonian *joksu-polka* (running polka), the Uzbek *Katta-uyin*, the Kirghiz *kiiz*. The palette of the traditional dances of the peoples of the Russian Federation is no less rich, for example, the Karelian *ristu-kondra*, the Udmurt dance with bells, the Udrian dance of the Komi ASSR, the *kariya* dance of the Upper Chuvash, the famous Kalmuck *chicherdyk*, the Bashkir 'Sons of Timerbey', and northern dances like the Yakut *osoopai*. The development of stage forms of traditional folk dance is a phenomenon of our day. Dances that used to be performed exclusively at festivals and holiday junketings have passed onto the stage and received a new life. The laws of the stage have necessitated changes in their composition and put a certain limit on the number of performers (allowing for the size of the stage), and enriched their content.

The basis of the modern dance in the USSR is the richness of its content, an intensive process of the convergence of themes, creative interests, and methods of realising the underlying conceptions, and a merging of elements of folk dance and classical ballet in both amateur folk (folkloristic) groups and professional dance companies.

In the early Soviet years the dances of other peoples had already begun to be included in the repertoire of amateur groups. Thus Russian ring and group dances, the *moldaveniasca*, the *lesghinka*, and the Ukrainian hopak began to be performed with success by Byelorussians, Uzbeks, Bashkirs, Yakuts, and other peoples. The basic movements typical of the dances of the Eastern Slavs in the past, like the *prisyadka* (squatting steps), *kovyryalochka* (heel and toe step), the 'change' step (long, short, short) have become components of the modern folk dances of many peoples of the USSR. The commonest song-dances surviving to our day and continuing among the people (like the *kozak*, *drapak*, *barynya*, *kamarinskaya*, and hopak) can now be quite justly called international dances, because they are danced over almost the whole area of Russia, the Ukraine, and Byelorussia. The Russian *kamarinskaya* and *barynya*, the Byelorussian *lyavonikha* and *kryzhachok*, and the Moldavian *jok* have passed firmly into the life of the Ukrainian people and become a constituent of the repertoire of both professional and amateur dance groups.

The trend of development of dance in the Soviet Union quite definitely reflects the ethnic processes going on among the peoples of the country.

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Many years' experience of Soviet national choreography has demonstrated that the means of expression polished by the ages in folk dance are the natural basis for the development not only of amateur but also of professional art.

The theatrical fate of folk dance in pre-revolutionary Russia was complicated and difficult. Before 1917 there were permanent ballet companies only in Moscow and St. Petersburg. There had been some development of the ballet in Kiev and separate productions had been staged in Tbilisi. In the 1920s folk dances began to be introduced into the fabric of musical dramas. In some republics ballet evenings were held. Then ballet began to be introduced into opera productions. In the atmosphere of general cultural upsurge in the 1930s the dance also developed. It was then that permanent dance groups developed in Union and Autonomous Republics, presenting performances in various genres.

Right from the first stage of its development Soviet chor-

eography was faced with the task of creating a new realistic ballet on the basis of a synthesis of the expressive means of both classical and folk dance. The quests of Ukrainian choreographers, who were soaked in the best traditions of folk dance and of the Russian classical school, were very fruitful in such national productions as, for example, 'Lileya' (composer Constantine Dankevich, choreographer Galina Berezova) and 'Marusya Boguslavka' (composer A. Sveshnikov, choreographer Sergei Sergeev), staged by the Shevchenko Opera and Ballet Theatre in Kiev.

When the Byelorussian State Theatre of Opera and Ballet was founded in Minsk, the first national Byelorussian ballet 'The Nightingale' (composer Michael Kroshner, choreographer Alexei Ermolaev) was produced; the theatre now, in addition to national ballets, also produces classical ballets.

A major event was the production in 1936 in the Paliashvili Opera House in Tbilisi of the Georgian national classical ballet 'Mzechabuki' (The Sun Youth) (composer Andro Balanchivadze, choreographer Vakhtang Chabukiani, a graduate of the Leningrad Ballet School). It was subsequently produced in a new version in Leningrad and other Soviet cities under the title 'Heart of the Mountains'.

The best Russian choreographers took part in creating and developing Armenian ballet. The first national Armenian ballet, staged in 1939, was 'Happiness' (composer Aram Khachaturian, choreographer Ilya Arbatov [Yagubian]). A milestone was 'Gayaneh' (composer Aram Khachaturian, choreographer Nina Anisimova) in the finale of which melodies of various peoples of the Soviet Union were heard.

> Here are the fiery, temperamental *lesghinka*, a manly, energetic, mettlesome Russian dance, the tempestuous hopak, and two Armenian dances *(shalaho* and *uzundara)*, and finally a vivid, original number, the Sabre Dance, in which the fire and vigour of the martial dances of the peoples of Transcaucasia are exhibited.[1]

Several original ballets also appeared in the repertoire of the Akhundov Opera and Ballet Theatre in Baku. A foremost place among them was taken by the national Azerbaijani ballet 'Gyz Galasy' (The Maiden Tower) (composer Afrasiab Badalbeyli, choreographers Sergei Kevorkov and

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[1] G. Tigranov. *Opera i balet Armenii* (The Opera and Ballet of Armenia), Moscow, 1966, pp 190-91.

Vakhtang Vronsky), produced in 1940. The ballet's choreography is rich in various forms of both classical and folk dance (Azerbaijani, Uzbek, Iranian, Georgian, and Armenian).

There was also a search for national form on the basis of classical dance, and the creation of the first national ballets in Moldavia, Central Asia (where the dance was undeveloped in general before the Revolution), and the Autonomous Republics of the RSFSR. The first national ballets in the Tatar, Bashkir, and Buryat ASSRs were created with the help of Russian artistes. Ballets of the classical repertoire and ones created in other republics were also successfully staged in the Autonomous Republics. In the Yakut ASSR a national ballet was produced with the direct help of Russian choreographers and teachers. A ballet 'Sir Smiege' (Wild Flower) (libretto by D. Sivtsev [Suorun-Omollon]; composers M. Zhirkov and Henry Litvinsky; choreographer S. Vladimirov) was produced in Yakutsk in 1947. A milestone for the young company was '*Churumchuku*' (libretto by M. Zhornitskaya and S. Ellyai-Kulachikov on a tale by the latter; composer Zh. Batuev; choreographer Kira Karpinskaya). Similar ballet companies were formed in Karelia (Petrozavodsk) and other Autonomous Republics, and then in a number of big cities.

A proper approach to the use of classical technique in combination with national styles of dancing, folklore motives, and ethnographic elements have played an immense role in the creation of national ballets. Skilful combination of classical and folk dance promotes the growth and development of national dance.

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An important aspect of national policy in the USSR is the systematic care shown for the development of national art, dance included. To further this aim artistes were regularly trained (and still are) for the ballet theatres of Kirghizia and Uzbekistan, Turkmenia and Tajikistan, Buryatia and Yakutia, Ossetia and Armenia, Moldavia and Tataria, and other republics, in the central ballet schools of Moscow and Leningrad. Graduates of these ballet schools, the most famous in the USSR, have formed the nuclei of new companies. A school of ballet with common principles has led to a definite unification of the performance and technique of the newly found-

ed companies. The appearance in the national theatres of graduates of the Leningrad and Moscow ballet schools, and of the ballet schools founded locally, has made it possible to include complicated classical ballets like 'Swan Lake', 'Giselle', 'Romeo and Juliet', 'Esmeralda', 'The Fountain of Bakhchisarai', 'Sleeping Beauty', and 'Don Quixote' in their repertoires. Today 'Giselle' can be seen in the south of the USSR in Tajikistan and in the north in Yakutia.

In the past twenty years or so a wide network of people's ballet theatres (amateur companies with a professional choreographer) has been developed which have had great success; their repertoires include 'The Fountain of Bakhchisarai', 'Cinderella', and other classical ballets. Simultaneously with the organisation of ballet companies in Union and Autonomous Republics, professional folk dance ensembles began to be formed, whose purpose was to popularise the best folk dances, to develop and perfect dancing skill, and to have a creative influence on the process that shapes folk dances. One of the first of these companies was the State Folk Dance Ensemble directed by Igor Moiseev, in whose programmes dances of the peoples of the Soviet Union and other nations are widely represented. A combination of the international and the national is a feature of all this famous company's programmes.

The dance group of the Pyatnitsky Choir (leader Tatyana Ustinova) has been called a laboratory of Russian folk dance. It has created original productions—*gusachok*, *Timonia*, 'The Crane', Russian Ring Dances, 'North-country Dance with Shawls' and 'Kursk Bells'—in which an enormous amount of folklore material was used.

At present all republics, autonomous regions and national areas have their own folk ensembles. While successfully assimilating the experience of the older companies they are creating their own new dance forms. The *Beryozka* troupe (director the late Nadezhda Nadezhdina), the Ukrainian State Dance Company (originally directed by the late Pavel Virsky), the Georgian State Dance Ensemble (leaders— Nina Romishvili and Ilya Sukhishvili), the Uzbek State Dance Ensemble, the Moldavian Jok Company (V. Curbet), the Krasnoyarsk State Dance Ensemble of Siberia (leader M. Godenko) have become world famous.

The first All-Russia reviews of amateur folk dance companies of the RSFSR and of the work of state song and

dance ensembles, held by the RSFSR Ministry of Culture in
1977-8 helped reveal the variety of the forms of creative
folk art in the Russian Federation.

They showed that active work is being carried out on the
spot to discover musical folklore and folk dances, and
that folk art is finding real embodiment. As an example we
may take the Bashkir State Dance Ensemble, whose director
and producer from the start was a young Bashkir, Faizi
Gaskarov, trained in the choreographic faculty of the State
Institute of Dramatic Art (GITIS) in Moscow, who painstak-
ingly collected and studied folk dances in the villages of
Bashkiria. He became a pioneer of the study of Bashkir folk
dance. From the material he collected, he created national
Bashkir dances like 'The Seven Maids', 'Zarifa', and 'The
Three Brothers' that have been taken into the golden treas-
ury of Soviet dance culture.

The development of Bashkir dance, as Gaskarov has well
demonstrated, followed a path of mutual enrichment in
the course of contacts with Russian dance culture and the
culture of neighbouring Volga peoples.

A similar picture is typical of the Tatar Republic, where
Gai Tagirov has long been collecting Tatar dances. He had
created significant stage dances on the basis of material
from the various Tatar ethnographic groups: 'Guests of
Kazan', 'Incident in a Medreseh', and many other dances.

The indigenous peoples of the Far North and Siberia are
developing their own dance art in fraternal culture co-oper-
ation with the various peoples of the Soviet Union. The
Koryak national dance troupe *Mengo* has created ballet-
pantomimes ('Mengo' and 'The Wooden Man') on the basis
of Koryak legends (composer G. Porotov; choreographer
A. Gil), and original stage dances on motifs from the folk-
lore of the peoples inhabiting Kamchatka (Itelmens, Aleuts,
and Evens). All the work of Gil and his company are an
example of the creative approach to traditional art, and of
proper use and interpretation of it. The company's dances
have a quite modern feel. This troupe has become very popu-
lar far beyond Kamchatka. Widely known, too, is the Chuk-
chi-Eskimo troupe *Ergyron* (Dawn). Its repertoire includes
Chukchi and Eskimo dances. In places where there is not
yet the basis for Big Ballet, amateur companies are being
formed that undertake one-act ballets. The Nenets youth
ensemble, for example, has shown a ballet 'Rainbow in the

Heart', and the Mansi ensemble a ballet 'Mansi-eryg', while the Itelmen group has produced a ballet 'Elvel'. Amateur song and dance ensembles have begun to spring up everywhere: *Osiktakan* (Little Star) in the Evenk Autonomous Area, the *Sibiryachka* troupe in the Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Area, the *Zharki* (Sunny Flower) troupe in the Khakass Autonomous Region, the *Kheiro* company in the Taimyr Autonomous Area, and many others.

The resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on measures to further the development of creative amateur art, which plots the road for improving the working people's aesthetic education, is an example of its unremitting concern for the growth of national talents.

The traditional and the new do not co-exist mechanically in choreography but are being developed in unbreakable interconnection and reciprocal determination. While the viability of the traditional is being tested by modernity, the fitness of the newly arising is being tested by audiences' reception.

Thanks to the development of the mass media, (cinema and television), the tours of professional theatres and amateur companies, festivals and competitions, there is broad publicity for the dance. A mutual enriching of the dance of the peoples of the Soviet Union is taking place, and the dances of one people are penetrating deeply into the everyday life of another. In addition, because of the general rise in culture, interest in classical dance is growing. The intensive interaction and gradual convergence of the national cultures of the peoples of the Soviet Union is leading to their unification and synthesis in the context of a single Soviet culture that is one in its national diversity.

THE CONVERGING OF NATIONS
IN THE USSR AND THE MAIN TRENDS
IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF BILINGUALISM

S. I. Bruk and M. N. Guboglo

In the sixty years or more of the building of socialism and communism in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics a new historical community has arisen and is successfully functioning, the community of the Soviet people. The main trend in relations between nations in Soviet society is determined by the dialectically interconnected processes of their development and convergence, which represents a model of the all-round cooperation, friendship, and brotherhood of all the nations and nationalities of the Soviet Union. The broader and the deeper inter-nation contacts are, the more rapidly does each people develop, being enriched by the progressive experience of all mankind and the achievements of other nations.

In a mature socialist society (Leonid Brezhnev has said) national relations continue to be a constantly developing reality, which keeps posing new tasks and problems.[1]

Of all the theoretical problems of Lenin's national policy in the epoch of mature socialism, that of studying the interconnection of the social and the national, including research into the reciprocal connection of the social, demographic, cultural, and linguistic aspects of contemporary ethnic processes, is acquiring special urgency.

There is a dual task in studying ethnic processes: on the one hand, to investigate the peculiarities of ethnic changes in different social strata and groups, and, on the other, to bring out the special nature of the social changes in different ethnic environments and among various peoples.

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[1] L. I. Brezhnev. *Following Lenin's Course*. (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1975), p 76.

In that connection we must bear in mind that the wiping out of class differences within the new historical community is taking place earlier than the 'overcoming of national differences, which will remain for a long time yet, right until the victory of communism on a world scale'.[1]

While national differences remain and national languages have a robust life, there will remain an urgent need in a multinational society, of course, for a single lingua franca or language of inter-nation intercourse; and processes of bilingualism will naturally develop, i.e. broad familiarity of peoples with a language foreign to them. In the period between 1970 and 1979 alone, for example, the number of persons of non-Russian nationality naming Russian as a second language freely spoken increased by nearly 20 million (from 41 900 000 to 61 300 000).[2] Underlying the growing trend toward further spread of national/Russian bilingualism is the fact that under developed socialism during the scientific and technological revolution and in the course of the internationalising of all spheres of the life of Soviet society, Russian, as the language of communication between nationalities, is becoming an important factor in the further convergence and co-operation of the nations and nationalities of the USSR and a condition for further acceleration of scientific and technical, social, and cultural progress.

One can consequently say, with full justification that the development of bilingualism is a long historical process. It is therefore an extremely important and urgent task to make an all-round study of linguistic processes in their interconnection with broader social processes—from the socio-economic to the psychological.

Under mature socialism, as the new Constitution of the USSR Article 19 says, the state helps enhance the social homogeneity of society, namely the elimination of class differences and of the essential distinctions between town and country and between mental and physical labour, and the all-round development and drawing together of all the nations and nationalities of the USSR.

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[1] P. N. Fedoseev. Theoretical Problems of Developed Socialism and the Building of Communism. *Kommunist*, 1976, 15: 50.

[2] *Naselenie SSSR po dannym Vsesoyuznoi perepisi naseleniya 1979 goda* (The Population of the USSR According to the Returns of the 1979 All-Union Census), Politizdat, Moscow, 1980, p 27.

When we speak of the drawing together or convergence of Soviet nations we usually mean, on the one hand,
the development of common features, the creation of a fundamentally similar socio-economic structure; the levelling up of the nations' standards of economic and cultural development, and consolidation of their community of views and standards of behaviour (and on the other hand) intensification of reciprocal exchange of material and intellectual values, and extension of relations based on the principles of proletarian internationalism.[1]

The converging of the peoples of the USSR is being manifested as follows:

(1) in consolidation of their political unity, which finds reflection in the joint activity of representatives of the various nationalities in the supreme constitutional bodies of the USSR, in extension of the involvement of representatives of the peoples of the USSR with different forms of their own national state system in the country's highest administrative bodies, and ultimately in a converging of the functions of the all-Union and national state apparatuses;

(2) in an extension of the internationalising of economic affairs, which finds expression in the most rational division of labour that will yield the maximum effect in exploitation of the country's natural resources both by all-Union enterprises and by those that come under local authorities; in regular, mutually beneficial exchange of peoples' labour tradition, and in a deepening of the peoples' co-operation in planning, science and technology, production, etc.;

(3) in enhancing social homogeneity, i.e. in gradual elimination of class differences, convergence of the two forms of socialist property, overcoming of the intrinsic differences between town and country and between mental and physical labour, and a converging of social indices in the various spheres of social activity;

(4) in processes of cultural convergence, which are manifested in an internationalisation of the nations' cultural fund, and in the dissemination of similar cultural ele-

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[1] *SSSR—velikoe sodruzhestvo narodov-brat'ev* (The USSR, Great Commonwealth of Brother Nations), Moscow, 1972, p 225.

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ments and an increasing familiarity with peoples of other nationalities.[1]

Problems of the means, ways, and factors of the drawing together of nations, in addition to those listed above, are of no little importance for the study of contemporary ethnic processes. Bilingualism, in fact, is one of the most important of these means of bringing the peoples of the USSR together, and in the moulding and functioning of the Soviet peoples as a new historical community of men.

In linking the problem of bilingualism with that of the converging of nations we have the following in mind:
(1) that bilingualism reflects the actual fact that a second language as a lingua franca is a powerful means of transmitting the information that is disseminated in the cultures of the peoples of the USSR during inter-nation contacts; and
(2) that bilingualism is a clear indicator of the process of convergence, since language in itself is one of the most important elements in any people's national culture, and since familiarity with a second language is nothing else than partial acquaintance with a second culture different from its own.

The basis for a general intensification of the linguistic life of the peoples of the USSR under mature socialism is consistent observance of Lenin's principles in the implementing of national policy, language policy included. The principle of the equality of languages and peoples has been raised to the level of a constitutional law.

> Citizens of the USSR (we read in Article 34 of the Constitution) are equal before the law, without distinction of origin, . . . language, . . . or other status.

According to Article 36 exercise of the equal rights of the peoples of the USSR

> is ensured by a policy of all-round development and drawing together of all nationalities . . . and by the possibility to use their native language and the languages of other peoples of the USSR.

The Soviet Constitution provides for equality of languages and peoples in all spheres of production, socio-political,

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[1] For further details see: Yu. V. Arutyunian, L. M. Drobizheva. *Sotsial'no-kul'turnoe razvitie i sblizhenie natsii v SSSR na sovremennom etape* (The Social and Cultural Development and Convergence of the Nations of the USSR at the Present Stage), Nauka, Moscow, 1972.

cultural, and everyday affairs. At all stages of criminal and civil proceedings, for example, the principle of language equality guaranteed by Article 159 of the Constitution is strictly observed.

> Judicial proceedings shall be conducted in the language of the Union Republic, Autonomous Republic, or Autonomous Area, or in the language spoken by the majority of the people in the locality. Persons participating in court proceedings, who do not know the language in which they are being conducted, shall be ensured the right to become fully acquainted with the materials in the case; the services of an interpreter during the proceedings; and the right to address the court in their own language.

The fact that this principle is reinforced legislatively in the new Constitutions of all Union and Autonomous Republics is exceptionally important.[1]

The internationalising of Soviet language affairs, including the development of bilingualism, while preserving their direct link with peoples' national development, is weakening national barriers between them at the same time. That does not restrict ethnic processes in any way, and at the same time strengthens the friendship of the peoples, which, as Leonid Brezhnev has said, is a 'precious birthright, one of the most important gains of socialism and most dear to the heart of every Soviet citizen'.[2] That is the most important difference between the way ethnolinguistic processes and bilingualism are established and function in Soviet society and similar processes in the capitalist world.

The history of multinational Soviet society is demonstrating to the whole world the grandeur of the socialist revolution, which has provided possibilities for the rapid development of all the national cultures and languages of our country and opened the road to the moulding of a single, common, Soviet culture and the development of a single language of inter-nation intercourse.

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[1] *Konstitutsiya SSSR. Konstitutsii soyuznykh sovetskikh sotsialisticheskikh respublik* (Constitution of the USSR. Constitutions of Union Soviet Socialist Republics), *Yuridicheskaya literatura*, Moscow, 1978, pp 81, 115, 149, 185, 218, 256, 294, 328-329, 363, 396, 431, 465, 498, 533, 566, etc.

[2] L. I. Brezhnev, *Following Lenin's Course* (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1975), p 62.

> In the half-century of the existence of the USSR, a Soviet socialist culture has emerged and flourished in this country, a culture that is identical in spirit and basic content, embodying the most valuable features and traditions of the culture and life of each Soviet nation.[1]

The level of development of a national culture depends, as a definite social phenomenon, on a historically concrete form of material production and social relations of a definite character determined by it. The cultural development of the peoples of the Soviet Union in the period of developed socialism is taking place on the basis of a further evening up of their cultures and overcoming of the differences in degree of intellectual maturity. As Soviet nations and nationalities flourish and the distinctive cultures evolve, the vertical channels by which the most valuable national experience accumulated by previous generations is apprehended become more and more significant. No less important, too, is the role of the horizontal channels by which the experience and achievements of other peoples of the USSR flow into the cultural fund of each nation. It is along them that the reciprocal influences operate on which the whole diversity of the internationalising of the Soviet peoples' cultural and social affairs rests. The internationalising of culture cannot develop freely in societies divided into antagonistic classes; only socialism opens broad paths for it. While excluding forcible methods of breaking down national barriers, socialism at the same time strengthens friendly economic and cultural relations between peoples, consolidates the community of economic affairs, territory, and culture, moulds general international features of everyday life and psychology, and actively stimulates development of the lingua franca's functions.

Two main trends are characteristic of the ethnic situation in the Soviet Union under developed socialism: on the one hand, there is increasing consolidation of nations and nationalities and development of national cultures and languages; and, on the other hand, a converging of all the peoples, the spread of elements of a common Soviet culture, and wide dissemination of Russian as the lingua franca. The processes

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[1] L. I. Brezhnev. *Following Lenin's Course* (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1975), p 72.

of ethnocultural interaction between peoples of the major historical and ethnographic provinces—Central Asia, the Caucasus, the Baltic, the Volga, etc.—have been intensified.

As a result of industrialisation and expanding urbanisation, territorial migration of peoples and social mobility within each nation [1] have been intensified, the boundaries and spheres of human activity have been broadened, and the variety of its form in all domains has increased (in production, leisure, family matters, etc.), the number of nationally mixed marriages is increasing, and the coming together of the peoples in culture and general way of life is accelerating. This convergence is accompanied with a development of bilingualism and growth in the role of Russian as the lingua franca and of elements of common Soviet culture. At the same time there is no doubt that the peoples of the USSR will retain their linguistic, cultural, and other features for a long time to come.

Identical conditions for becoming familiar with the language of another nation do not exist among the different peoples, or the same standard of knowledge and degree of use of a second language, or the same actual need for one. There are real differences, furthermore, among one and the same people as regards the spread of bilingualism, the forms it takes, the spheres in which it is used, and its social and ethnic consequences—differences between the rural and urban population, between the sexes and various age groups, and between different social and professional groups.

The sociological research begun by the USSR Academy of Sciences' Institute of Ethnography in the second half of the 1960s helped trace the real scale of bilingualism (along with other aspects of ethnic processes and national relations) in various classes and social and professional groups, the relationship of the first and second language in practical speech use, and the social, cultural, and other conditions for, and consequences of, the development of bilingualism. An attempt is being made in this research to bring out the relationship between the mother tongue and ethnic identity and the social and cultural 'results' of bilingualism.

The mastery of a second language and development of bilingualism associated with it are determined by each peo-

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[1] For more details see: M. N. Rutkevich and F. R. Filippov. *Sotsial'nie peremeshcheniya* (Social Mobility), Nauka, Moscow, 1970.

ple's needs. These needs are shaped in turn by the effect of a whole set of socio-political, economic, geographical, cultural, historical, and other factors.[1]

Among the many aspects of bilingualism (which is understood here primarily as mass bilingualism), the ethnosociological one is most important for the reason that language's social function is manifested particularly clearly in both the individual's speech behaviour and all spheres of any ethnic community's affairs. This approach to studying bilingualism and the processes of linguistic development and interaction has become common in Soviet ethnographic research, for three main reasons: 1) the constantly broadening study of contemporary ethnic processes on a country-wide scale; (2) steady improvement in the methods of sociological research and of quantitative analysis of mass ethnographic material; and (3) the broad drawing of a comparatively new object of study, viz., man's speech behaviour, into the purview of ethnology. In fact, a relatively new, autonomous field of research has been developing before our eyes that includes study of linguistic structure and the social functions of interacting languages, and investigation of the speech habits of various peoples.

The Revolution, which affirmed the equal rights of languages, provided fundamentally new conditions for the really free spread of bilingualism. It can now be said that an important factor in the forming of the Soviet people as a new historical community was, and still is, the establishment and development of bilingualism. The broad spread of Russian among non-Russian peoples and extension of its social functions have played a paramount role in this respect. The historically progressive character of the spread of Russian and development of bilingualism has been stressed in the Programme of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union:

> The voluntary study of Russian in addition to the native language is of positive significance, since it facilitates reciprocal exchanges of experience and access of every nation and nationality to the cultural gains of all the other peoples of the USSR, and to world culture. The Russian language has, in effect, become the com-

[1] For further details see: M. N. Guboglo. *Ethnolinguistic Contacts and Bilingualism*. In: Yu. V. Arutyunian *et al.* (Eds.) *Op. cit.*, pp 230-272.

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mon medium of intercourse and co-operation between all the peoples of the USSR.[1]

Consistent carrying out of the Party's programmes and implementation of Lenin's national policy are conducive today to the development of culture, science, and education in all Union and Autonomous Republics, and Autonomous Regions and Areas of the country. The languages of all the nations and nationalities of the USSR have an exceptionally important role in this. In accordance with the constitutional principle of free and equal development they are promoting progress of the national cultures of our country through fraternal co-operation and mutual enrichment. At the same time the current scientific and technical revolution, the rapid processes of urbanisation, industrialisation, and intellectualisation of the country are having a marked effect on shaping the need for national/Russian bilingualism, with a high degree of fluency in the lingua franca.

In his message to members of the all-Union theoretical conference on Russian as the language of friendship and co-operation between the peoples of the USSR held in May 1979, Leonid Brezhnev said:

Under developed socialism, when our country's economy has been transformed into a single national economic complex, a new historical community has come into being, the Soviet people, and the role of Russian is objectively growing as the language of inter-nation intercourse in the building of communism and education of the new man.[2]

Kremlinologists try to employ the wide spread of Russian in the Soviet Union so as to twist the essence and content of the present-day language affairs of its nations and nationalities. Accusations of 'Russification' are aimed at disrupting the unity of our peoples.[3] It is a fact, however, that the cultures of all the nations and nationalities of the USSR have been enriched and have grown during the building of socialism under the beneficial effect of Russian culture and the cultures of the other peoples of our country. The beneficial role of Russian and Russian culture in the progressive pro-

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[1] *The Road to Communism* (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1962), p 562.

[2] *Pravda*, 23 May 1979.

[3] See: S. Brown. *New Forces in World Politics* (Washington, D. C., 1974), p 177.

cess of the development and convergence of nations is not connected in any way with the imposition of one people's standards and values of any kind on other peoples.

A valuable source for study of the main trends in the development of bilingualism among the peoples of the USSR are the census returns and the findings of special ethnosociological surveys. All Soviet censuses have included as one of their main purposes determination of the country's linguistic structure. The programme of the 1970 Census was supplemented by a question on free mastery of a second language of the peoples of the USSR. Reliability of the data obtained was ensured by the determination of the population's national and linguistic affiliation being based on the self-awareness of the people questioned.

In the 32 years between the 1926 and 1959 Censuses [1], the number of persons of non-Russian nationality who gave Russian as their mother tongue increased by 3 300 000; in the 11 years between the 1959 and 1970 Censuses it increased by 2 800 000, which is evidence that the transition of considerable groups of various peoples to Russian was developing much faster.

Data from which the reader can judge the degree of discrepancy between the indices of nationality and mother tongue among various groups of the population in 1970 are given in Table 1. If Russians are ignored (only 203 800 declared a mother tongue other than Russian, i. e. only 0.16 per cent of their total number), the scale of the swing to the language of another nationality increased considerably among the other peoples of the USSR.

A population takes to the language of another nationality incomparably faster in towns than in rural localities. A better idea of this is given in Table 2, in which only the non-Russian population (which contains the bulk of those adopting another language) is considered. Townsmen constitute only 42.8 per cent of the non-Russian population (68.0 per cent of the Russian), but they include 76.4 per cent of all persons who consider a language other than that of their nationality to be their mother tongue. On the whole, nearly a quarter of the non-Russian urban population gave a mother tongue (mainly Russian), not that of their nationality, while

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[1] The 1926 Census was taken in December, and the 1959 Census in January.

only a little more than 5 per cent of the rural population did so. It is very striking that there was a high percentage in this category of the rural population (i.e. persons declaring a mother tongue other than that of their nationality) of persons with a non-Russian mother tongue.

Men declared a mother tongue other than that of their nationality rather more often than women, although no great differences were discovered on this point.

Table 1.

Persons Considering a Language Other Than Their Nationality's Their Mother Tongue
(in percentages)

Population by categories	Those considering their mother tongue (not that of their nationality) to be:		
	Russian	Another	Total
Total	5.4	0.7	6.1
Urban	7.8	0.5	8.3
Rural	2.2	1.1	3.3
Males	5.8	0.8	6.6
Females	5.0	0.8	5.8

Source: Central Statistical Board of the USSR. *Itogi Vsesoyuznoi perepisi naseleniya 1970 goda* (Returns of the 1970 Census), Vol. 4 (Statistika, Moscow, 1973), pp 20-42.

Table 2.

Persons (of Non-Russian Nationality) Declaring a Mother Tongue Other Than That of Their Nationality
(in percentages)

Non-Russian population by categories	Those considering their mother tongue (not of their nationality) to be:		
	Russian	Another	Total
Total	11.6	1.4	13.0
Urban	22.1	1.1	23.2
Rural	3.7	1.7	5.4
Males	12.2	1.4	13.6
Females	10.9	1.5	12.4

Source: as in Table 1.

These indices varied considerably among the different peoples. While 19.4 per cent of Byelorussians and 14.3 per cent of Ukrainians declared another mother tongue, the figure was less than 2 per cent among the main peoples of Central Asia and Kazakhstan, Georgia, and Azerbaijan. Even greater variations were typical of peoples not forming Union Republics.

Below are the numbers giving Russian as their mother tongue for the biggest groups of non-Russians:

Ukrainians	5 817 300	Poles	241 800
Byelorussians	1 718 400	Chuvash	219 700
Jews	1 682 800	Greeks	166 600
Tatars	607 600	Udmurts	121 300
Germans	604 200	Moldavians	113 400
Mordvins	278 900	Koreans	111 900
Armenians	268 800		

In addition, 546 300 Poles gave a language other than Russian or Polish as their mother tongue (mainly Byelorussian or Ukrainian), 363 000 Bashkirs a language other than Bashkir or Russian (Tatar), and 203 800 Russians a language other than Russian (Ukrainian).

The biggest divergence between nationality and mother tongue is observed among groups living outside the republic or autonomous region of their nationality. This is clearly

Table 3.

Persons Declaring the Language of Their Nationality To Be Their Mother Tongue
(percentages)

Nationality	Within their national republic	Outside it
Armenian	99.8	77.8
Byelorussian	90.1	40.8
Chuvash	94.5	79.1
Esthonian	99.2	53.5
Lettish	98.1	51.4
Lithuanian	99.5	72.0
Moldavian	97.7	79.0
Mordvin	96.2	70.4
Tatar	98.4	85.9
Udmurt	87.7	71.4
Ukrainian	91.4	48.4

Source: as in Table 1, pp 43-320.

shown in Table 3, in which figures are given on the proportion of persons naming the language of their nationality
as their native one, for separate large nations with sizable
groups living outside their respective republics.

There is a quite marked difference in the proportion of
persons naming the language of their nationality as their
mother tongue (within their republics and autonomous regions
and outside them) according to the type of state structure
(see Table 4).

Table 4.

**Persons Declaring the Language of Their Nationality
To Be Their Mother Tongue**
(in percentages)

Nationality (by type of state structure)	For the whole USSR	Within their republic or autonomous region	Outside their republic or autonomous region
Nations forming Union Repub-			
lics	95.9	97.8	86.2
The same, without Russians	90.2	94.6	65.7
Nations forming Autonomous			
Republics and Regions	79.4	92.3	68.1
Nations not forming their auton-			
omous units	60.7	—	—
Average for the USSR	93.9	97.5	82.1
The same, without Russians	86.9	94.3	66.7

Source: as in Table 1, pp 43-320.

Life in the milieu of another nationality, cut off from the
main mass of their own ethnos, is an important factor on the
whole in the gradual passage of various groups to the languages of other peoples, and recognition of these as their
mother tongue; the change, especially to Russian, takes place
very quickly in towns. The highest percentage of persons
naming the language of another nationality as their mother
tongue, it should also be noted, is to be found among peoples
who are settled in a dispersed way and (as a consequence) do
not have their own autonomous state organisation. The more
the foreign national milieu exceeds the numbers of the given
nationality the quicker members of the latter acquire a second language and come to consider it their mother tongue.[1]

[1] See: M. N. Guboglo. A Propos of the Effect of Settlement on
Linguistic Processes. *Sovetskaya etnografiya*, 1969, 5: 16-29.

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The 1970 Census, as we have already said, made it possible
for the first time to determine the degree to which the peo-
ples of the USSR had acquired a second language, especially
Russian. The total number of persons speaking Russian
fluently was 183 778 600 (141 830 600 as their mother ton-
gue, and 41 938 000 as a second language),[1] or 76 per cent
of the total population. If we consider only the non-Russian
population, Russian was spoken fluently by 54 845 200 per-
sons, or 48.7 per cent of the total. The main indices of
bilingualism in various groups of the population will be
found in Tables 5 and 6.

As with change of mother tongue, the most graphic idea
of the distribution of bilingualism is given by the indices
for non-Russian peoples, since bilingualism is only 3.1 per
cent among Russians (see Table 6).

Fluency in a second language is especially typical of towns-
men, and is rather more common among men than among
women.

Bilingualism of the type in which the second language is
Russian is that most developed in the USSR. In addition,
the population in separate areas of the country also know lan-
guages of other peoples well. Figures on how widely various
languages are used as a 'second' language are given in Ta-
ble 7.

The various types of bilingualism, interestingly, are not
confined to the republic concerned. Thus, of the 5 618 800
persons fluently speaking Ukrainian as a second language,
4 430 700 lived in the Ukrainian SSR, 908 000 in the
RSFSR, 98 000 in Kazakhstan, 59 000 in Moldavia, 45 400
in Byelorussia, 19 800 in Uzbekistan. Moldavian and Byelo-
russian are quite common in the Ukraine as a second lan-
guage, Tajik, Tatar, and Kazakh in Uzbekistan, Armenian
and Azerbaijani in Georgia, and so on.

The low proportion of bilingualism among Russians can
create a mistaken impression of weak mastery of a second
language among all groups of Russians. In the RSFSR,
where Russians live in compact groups and have little
contact in most areas with other peoples, bilingualism is in
fact a rare phenomenon among them (0.6 per cent), mainly

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[1] Central Statistical Board of the USSR. *Op. cit.*, p 331.

Table 5.

Number of Persons Fluent in a Second Language of the Peoples of the USSR

Population	Total number	Numbers fluently speaking a second language of the peoples of the USSR							
		Russian	Language of		Total	Rus-sian	Language of		Total
			own nationality	another nationality			own national-ity	another national-ity	
Total	241 720 100	41 815 900	4 007 400	6 353 500	52 176 800	17.3	1.7	2.6	21.6
urban	135 991 500	22 651 900	3 488 200	4 446 200	30 586 300	16.7	2.6	3.3	22.6
rural	105 728 600	19 164 000	519 200	1 907 300	21 590 500	18.1	0.5	1.8	20.4
males	111 399 400	21 659 100	1 988 100	3 084 400	26 731 600	19.4	1.8	2.8	24.0
females	130 320 700	20 156 800	2 019 300	3 269 100	25 445 200	15.5	1.5	2.5	19.5

Source: as in Table 1, pp 20-42.

Table 6.

Number and Proportion of Non-Russian Persons Fluently Speaking a Second Language of the Peoples of the USSR

Population	Total number	Fluently speaking a second language of the peoples of the USSR							
			Language of		Total	As a percentage of total population			
		Russian				Rus-sian	Language of		
			own national-ity	another nationality			own na-tionality	another national-ity	Total
Total	112 705 000	41 816 000	3 885 300	2 476 800	48 178 100	37.1	3.4	2.2	42.7
urban	48 271 300	22 652 000	3 408 500	1 250 800	27 311 300	46.9	7.1	2.6	56.6
rural	64 433 700	19 164 000	476 800	1 226 000	20 866 800	29.7	0.7	1.9	32.3
males	53 075 900	21 659 200	1 932 200	1 202 700	24 794 100	40.8	3.6	2.3	46.7
females	59 629 100	20 156 800	1 953 100	1 274 100	23 384 000	33.8	3.3	2.1	39.2

Source: as in Table 1, pp 20-42.

in autonomous republics and regions. At the same time the percentage of Russians living outside the RSFSR who declared fluency in a second language of the peoples of the USSR was as high as 15.8 per cent, and in Lithuania, the Ukraine, Byelorussia, and Armenia between 25 and 30 per cent of all the Russians living there.

Table 7.

Numbers Declaring the Languages Named as a Second Language Fluently Spoken by Them

Language	Number of persons speaking it as a second language	Language	Number of persons speaking it as a second language
Russian	41 938 000	Armenian	147 700
Ukrainian	5 618 800	Kazakh	146 100
Byelorussian	903 000	Mordvin	94 000
Uzbek	543 000	Chuvash	76 900
Tatar	344 400	Esthonian	69 500
Moldavian	283 400	Udmurt	51 300
Azerbaijani	263 200	Turkoman	51 000
Tajik	261 200	Kirghiz	41 500
Lettish	215 400	Others	785 800
Georgian	190 100	Total	52 176 800
Lithuanian	152 500		

Source: Central Statistical Board of the USSR. *Op. cit.,* pp 331-359.

The percentage of bilingualism among Russians living in small groups in areas with a marked preponderance of some other nationality, is especially high. In those cases the percentage of Russians knowing the language of the local nationality is almost equal to the percentage of that nationality knowing Russian.

In Soviet conditions bilingualism is thus not only mastery of Russian. Russians living in another linguistic medium are also actively involved in the process, which once more confirms the voluntary character of one people's familiarity with the language of another and the rise of mutual bilingualism on a broad scale.

There is a quite close connection between the degree to which bilingualism is developed and the form of national state structure. The proportion of persons among the ground nations of the Union Republics who speak Russian fluently

is lower on the whole than among peoples who have a different form of statehood or do not in general have their own autonomous state organisation. The percentage of persons speaking Russian fluently as a second language among two-thirds of the ground nationalities of autonomous republics, four-fifths of the indigenous peoples of autonomous regions and national areas, and the majority of the peoples who do not have their own autonomous state unit, for example, exceeds half their total numbers (among Balkars, Ingushi, Kalmucks, and Kabardians it is more than 70 per cent; among Abazinians, Adygei, Buryats, Chechens, Circassians, Gagauz, Karachays, Khakass, Komi, Mari, Tatars, and Udmurts it is 60 to 70 per cent). At the same time, only among Byelorussians, of all the nationalities of Union Republics, does the percentage of those speaking Russian fluently as a second language reach 49.0 per cent; among all the other nationalities of Union Republics it is lower.

Big nations differ from small nationalities in the forms and degree of bilingualism and in its functional role in the people's life. Among small nationalities, in particular, bilingualism employing a language other than Russian is common, Among Kurds, for example, 19.9 per cent speak Russian fluently and 36.2 some other language of the USSR (for Lesghins the figures are 31.6 and 22.3 per cent respectively; for Gypsies 53.0 and 16.4 per cent, for Greeks 35.4 and 14.5 per cent, for Rutuls 30.7 and 18.8 per cent, for Tsakhurs 12.2 and 43.5 per cent; many members of these nationalities are trilingual).

It is of interest to analyse the structure of the group of 10 360 900 persons declaring fluency in a language of the USSR other than Russian. Nearly 40 per cent of them (4 007 400) were persons declaring the language of their own nationality as their second language (their mother tongue not coinciding with their nationality).[1] It is characteristic of these people that the process of ethnic transformation is incomplete. The rest, more than 60 per cent (6 353 500 persons) belong to peoples that have been living for a long time in another national milieu outside purely

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[1] They included 2 273 500 Ukrainians, 571 400 Byelorussians, 222 300 Tatars, 166 600 Jews, 122 000 Russians, 97 700 Mordvins, 80 300 Armenians, and 68 500 Chuvash.

Russian regions (e.g. Russians in the Ukraine, Tajiks in Uzbekistan, Armenians in Georgia, etc.).[1]

Analysis of the census returns makes it possible to bring out the effect of settlement, and above all of the ethnic milieu, on the distribution of bilingualism. As with the change in mother tongue, there are significant differences among the main mass of a people living in its own republic or autonomous region and groups living outside its boundaries; the differences, however, are not so significant (see Table 8).

Table 8.

Distribution of Bilingualism by State Structure
(in percentages)

Peoples (by type of state structure)	Within their own republics or autonomous regions	Outside their republics or autonomous regions
Peoples forming Union Republics	14.9	29.3
The same, excluding Russians	35.4	50.8
Peoples forming Autonomous Republics and Regions	58.2	67.1
Average for the whole USSR	16.9	37.6
The same, excluding Russians	37.8	57.4

Source: Central Statistical Board. *Op. cit.*, pp 43-320.

When we pass to smaller administrative, territorial units (within which there is usually direct contact between people of different nationalities) the effect of the ethnic micromilieu on the distribution of bilingualism comes out clearly. To analyse it we took a republic with a quite complicated ethnic structure in which the main nationality, however, was settled compactly in a considerable number of areas. The Moldavian SSR met our requirements: in it Moldavians constitute 64.6 per cent of the population, Ukrainians 14.2 per cent, Russians 11.6 per cent, Gagauz 3.5 per cent, and Bulgarians 2.1 per cent. The proportion of bilingual persons with Russian as the second language was 33.9 per cent among Moldavians, 39.5 per cent among Ukrainians,

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[1] They included 3 876 700 Russians, 452 600 Jews, 281 100 Uzbeks, 249 700 Tajiks, 179 100 Ukrainians, 147 700 Poles, 132 700 Armenians.

62.0 per cent among Gagauz, and 70.3 per cent among Bulgarians; the percentage of persons with Moldavian as their second language was 13.3 among Russians, 15.9 among Ukrainians, 8.2 among Gagauz, and 7.6 among Bulgarians. When the administrative districts of Moldavia are grouped according to the weight of one nationality or another in them, seven types of ethnic milieu are distinguishable.

Analysis of the findings provides evidence of the great influence of the micro-milieu on the distribution of bilingualism. The general pattern among Moldavians is as follows: in their 'own' ethnic milieu, the extent of mastery of Russian was less on the whole than in the other types of environment. The extent of Moldavians' mastery of Russian and Russians' mastery of Moldavian was relatively the same in a Moldavian ethnic milieu. The comparatively small difference between the percentages of bilingual Russians

Table 9.

Age Distribution of Bilingualism
(in percentages)

Nations, by type of state structure	Age group						
	10 and under	11-19	20-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 and over
Nations forming Union Republics	4.9	21.1	27.8	22.9	19.4	14.7	10.8
The same, less Russians	9.3	47.5	64.5	54.1	46.6	35.1	23.2
Peoples forming Autonomous Republics and Regions	30.7	75.3	82.8	80.4	77.0	63.8	49.0
Average for the USSR	6.8	24.9	30.9	26.5	22.6	17.4	13.0
The same, less Russians	12.5	52.0	66.9	58.1	50.7	39.0	26.4

Source: Central Statistical Board of the USSR, *Op. cit.*, pp 360-382.
Note: Approximately 87 per cent of the total population of the USSR was taken into account in the table. Data on the following were not available:
(1) peoples not forming autonomous units of any kind;
(2) groups of the peoples of Autonomous Republics and Regions living outside their own Union Republics (e. g. Tatars in the Republics of Central Asia, or peoples of Daghestan living in Azerbaijan);
(3) categories for whom bilingualism was not broken down by age groups (more than $1^1/_2$ million persons).

and Moldavians justifies us in concluding that the extent of bilingualism is 'reciprocal'.[1]

In the absence of information on the dynamics of bilingualism (this phenomenon was only considered for the first time in the 1970 Census) it is rather difficult to analyse which causes in distribution are decisive. The data available on its distribution in various age groups, however, enable us to establish its main trend of development retrospectively. The figures are given in generalised form in Table 9, which reflects the processes of the growing spread of bilingualism in the USSR. People born before the Revolution who fluently spoke a language of other peoples of the USSR constituted less than a third of all the non-Russian population of the country. In the age group 20-29 the proportion of those speaking Russian fluently was twice as high. Apart from the school, intercourse in industry and army service play an important role, as is shown by the steep rise in bilingualism between the 11-19 and 20-29 age groups.

This trend is also discernible on the whole when the distribution of bilingualism is analysed for each nation separately. Let us take the breakdown for nations forming Union Republics as an example (see Table 10).

Bilingualism is weakly expressed among the under-tens in almost all nations, as one would expect, Kazakhs (for whom mixed settlement with Russians is most characteristic in rural localities) and Byelorussians for the sole exceptions. It is also not difficult to explain the steep fall in the proportion of bilingualism among people over 60 years of age (i.e. born before the Revolution) among the peoples of Central Asia and Azerbaijan; the almost complete illiteracy of these peoples before the Revolution, the low percentage of the urban population in those regions, the low territorial mobility, and settlement in compact ethnic groups played no small role in this (even the big towns were mainly uninational, or the different nationalities occupied different quarters of the town and seldom mixed with one another).

The way the school (secondary and, partly, higher) affects the development of bilingualism can be judged from

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[1] This trend must not, of course, be absolutised. The high percentage of Russians who speak Moldavian is due to the fact that the numbers involved were small.

Table 10.

Age Distribution of Bilingualism among the Nations
of Union Republics
(in percentages)

Nation	Age Group						
	10 and under	11-19	20-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 and over
Russians	0.9	4.2	4.8	3.6	3.5	2.9	1.9
Ukrainians	10.2	57.8	69.4	57.1	48.4	35.4	22.9
Byelorussians	18.0	75.6	80.1	71.8	66.3	53.6	35.1
Uzbeks	4.4	23.2	39.9	31.1	26.6	18.3	8.3
Kazakhs	19.7	62.2	74.6	67.0	58.7	39.7	19.7
Georgians	3.7	17.1	34.8	32.0	30.4	26.0	15.9
Azerbaijanis	4.8	20.6	38.7	30.9	31.6	23.3	10.4
Lithuanians	4.2	39.8	72.2	58.4	43.1	28.2	23.6
Moldavians	7.5	43.8	67.6	56.9	45.0	32.4	29.8
Letts	9.6	49.0	75.3	68.5	52.6	40.0	41.1
Kirghiz	6.3	32.8	52.1	37.6	30.7	17.8	6.8
Tajiks	6.0	35.3	53.1	48.4	44.7	35.0	27.3
Armenians	9.3	30.7	56.0	51.7	52.5	46.0	33.6
Turkomans	3.5	20.6	37.2	29.7	25.0	14.8	5.4
Esthonians	3.4	25.2	59.9	46.5	28.5	17.7	23.6

Source: Central Statistical Board of the USSR. *Op. cit.*, pp 360-382. The figures for Russians, Ukrainians, and Byelorussians relate to the whole area of the USSR; for the other nations they refer to the respective Union Republics and areas where there are large groups of the nation (the data cover 93 to 99 per cent of the total population of these nations).

the 11-19 age group. The percentage of bilingualism is more than five times higher on the average than in the preceding age group, and although not reaching the maximum, still includes nearly half the youths and girls of the non-Russian nations of the Union Republics.

The next age group (20-29), as already mentioned above, in which factors other than school begin to affect bilingualism, has the highest percentage of bilingual persons. That applies fully, however, only to the nations that form Union Republics. If we take those of Autonomous Republics and Regions, where bilingualism originally spread earlier and embraced a higher percentage of the population (connected with these peoples' long, mixed settlement with Russians and other nations and widespread teaching in two languages in the schools) we find a maximum percentage of bilingualism among the older age groups. That applies especially

to peoples who are in close ethnic interaction with Russians and for whom a high percentage of persons declaring Russian as their mother tongue is characteristic. Thus, among Karelians, Mordvins, Komi and Komi-Permyaks, Udmurts, Kalmucks, and certain other nations, the highest percentage of bilingualism is observed in the 30-39 and 40-49 age groups.[1]

As will be seen from Tables 9 and 10, the average proportion of bilingual persons in the 11-19 age group for the whole country is roughly equal to that for the 30-49 bracket, and in every case is higher than the percentage as a whole for all age groups. This indicates that bilingualism is becoming more common and that the school alone at present provides opportunities for the same number of people to master a second language as used to be provided by all factors taken together twenty or thirty years ago.

We lack the space to analyse all the census data relating to bilingualism. In particular, problems linked with whether the population in the different republics has the same approach to the concept 'fluency in another language of the peoples of the USSR' require further treatment. It may be the explanation, in part, of why the percentages of peoples speaking Russian among Uzbeks, Tajiks, Turkomans, and Azerbaijanis are noticeably lower than among the other nations forming Union Republics, especially the Slav ones (it is quite probable that the mutual comprehensibility of Ukrainian, Byelorussian, and Russian psychologically affects a positive reply about knowledge of the respective second language).

For greater clarification of the trend of linguistic processes, and of the effect of urbanisation, sex and age structure, character of settlement, and other factors on them, we need to analyse both linguistic indicators (i.e. fluency in another language of the peoples of the USSR, and the corresponding indicator of nationality and mother tongue) for each nation separately.

Socialist society consistently exercises planned control over all social processes, linguistic ones included; the job of the social sciences in this connection is not simply to study these and other processes theoretically but in practice

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[1] See: Central Statistical Board of the USSR. *Op. cit.*, pp 368-375.

to develop reasoned, scientifically sound recommendations so as to optimise them. As regards controlling ethnic and linguistic processes, it is exceptionally important to make a constant, systematic analysis and to check the relationship of the objective and subjective factors that influence the course of their development. Detailed, all-round clarification of the needs of the various peoples, and of different groups of any one nation, to know and employ another language foreign to them, above all Russian (on which, in the Soviet Union, has fallen the historical mission of serving as the lingua franca), is most important, for example, in the development of linguistic processes, including the mass spread of bilingualism.

In connection with the growing importance of social forecasting in, among other fields, the social evolution of the languages of the peoples of the USSR, it is becoming important to organise research with a direct forecasting bias. The solution of problems of that kind depends primarily on how fully, comprehensively, and close to reality the population's linguistic needs are disclosed, above all the need for knowledge of a second language. The need for a second language as a means of intercourse is not, of course, the same for all people. Apart from the numerous objective and subjective factors in the shaping of such a need, purely socio-linguistic phenomena, like for example the functional comprehensiveness of the language of one's own nationality, play an important role. In today's conditions, therefore, when languages of the socialist nations of the USSR possess the broadest range of functions in the history of their evolution, serving as the means of intercourse from the sphere of family and everyday relations to that of science and the mass media, the attitude of members of the nations of the USSR to a second language is nothing other than their attitude to bilingualism and an expression of the need for it. A person who has answered the item in a questionnaire during an ethnosociological survey about what language he or she would like to know or in what language it is desirable in his or her view to teach children in school, has in essence expressed his or her attitude not only to the second language but also to the first, i.e. to the language of his or her own nationality, and has consequently 'voted' for or against bilingualism.

In order to predict the evolution of bilingualism and

of the convergence of the nations of the USSR [1] it is specially important to have data as well on the actual use of both languages in assimilating the cultural experience of one's own nation and the achievements of the other nations of the USSR. The view that there is a direct link between bilingualism and national interrelations has already been expressed in the literature. The more often a person of one nationality communicates with a person of another nationality in his or her second language, the greater is the probability, other things being equal, that he or she will display a positive attitude to persons of the other nationality. One must not absolutise that hypothesis, of course. It requires further substantiation, using the most precise methods to measure both the degree of mastery of the second language and the distribution of positive situations. On the whole, however, the problem attracts attention even in the posing, because it provides valuable pointers for understanding the possibility of employing bilingualism as a lever to optimise inter-nation relations.

All this calls for thorough consideration of the channels of the spread of bilingualism, the effects of certain circumstances, situations, factors, spontaneous or conscious mastery of a second language and the expediency of using it in varied practical activity on linguistic processes.

Of the various kinds of bilingualism existing in the USSR, national language/Russian bilingualism [2] is especially important, in which Russian functions as the second language and the language of intercourse. Two important trends can be traced in this process from the example of the evolution of this type of bilingualism: viz., extensive and intensive.

The first type, in essence, is the spread of bilingualism 'in breadth', i.e. in the mastery of Russian by more and more members of non-Russian nations. The second trend is the development of bilingualism 'in depth' i.e. in better mastery of Russian. Both are manifested differently in various groups of the urban and rural population. Among

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[1] For further details see: M. N. Guboglo. A Contribution to Study of the Outlook for the Evolution of Bilingualism among the Peoples of the USSR. *Istoriya SSSR*, 1978, 1: 27–42.

[2] For further details see: Yu. D. Desheriev (Ed.). *Razvitie natsional'no-Russkogo dvuyazychiya* (The Development of National Language/Russian Bilingualism), Nauka, Moscow, 1976.

the rural inhabitants of Tataria, for example, growth of bilingualism is predominantly extensive, because there are still many people in the villages of that Republic who do not know Russian. They are mainly elderly persons, or children of pre-school age (under-sevens). That, however, does not exclude bilingualism being developed 'in depth' among certain rural Tatars, for example among the intelligentsia; it is a matter of the predominance of one trend or the other. In contrast to the rural environment an urban milieu favours good mastery of Russian by Tatars. Ethnosociological research in the Republic has also brought out a direct dependence between frequency of the use of Tatar in the home and the age of Tatars (both urban and rural): [1] the older they are, the more often intercourse is in Tatar. If we add that there is an impressive difference in the spread of bilingualism among opposite age groups (16-17 and 60 and over) one can readily conclude that there is a steady extension of bilingualism even in the home.

The survey's findings indicated that the younger the age group of rural Tatars the less frequently they spoke only one language, i.e. Tatar. Russian is particularly common among the youth, but an appreciable difference is discernible in this respect between the youth of town and country. The processes that we now observe in the linguistic life of rural youth is a past, or almost past, stage for most townsmen. As in the country, there is a reverse dependence in the Republic's towns between age and the use of Russian as a second language in Tatars' speech habits. The second language's mounting functional load is altering the 'ratio' of the partnership of the interacting languages to some extent. The redistributing of the functions of Tatar and Russian is not, however, following the same path among the various generations of townsfolk. Communication in Tatar is declining among Tatar youth, as a rule, through their transition to intercourse in Russian only, while among the older generations this decline is occurring mainly through bilingualism.

These two tendencies sometimes manifest themselves differently among the peoples of other Autonomous Republics and Regions. In Karelia, for example, the essence of

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[1] The survey was carried out among the Republic's adult population aged 16 and over.

the current ethnocultural situation is that the rural population speaks Russian fluently, and that Russian is becoming the main medium of communication among Karelians along with Karelian. Among the rural population of Union Republics in which there is quite a high proportion of persons who do not know a second language (Russian), the extensive trend is far from exhausted (that applies especially to the peoples of the Central Asian and Transcaucasian Republics, and to Esthonia).

The 1970 Census returns covered only fluency in a second language; it must therefore be assumed that the actual spread of bilingualism is much wider.

As an example we may take certain features of bilingualism in the Moldavian SSR, comparing the data of the 1970 Census with the findings of an ethnocultural survey carried out by the USSR Academy of Sciences' Institute of Ethnography in 1971. The survey showed that the real spread of Russian among Moldavians and of Moldavian among Russians, was much broader than recorded by the Census. When we take all degrees of mastery of the second language into account, including a smattering adequate for communication with a person of another nationality, it turns out that 94.4 per cent of all urban Moldavians and 84.0 per cent of all rural Moldavians know Russian.[1]

The interaction of languages is not, however, limited to the broad development of Moldavian/Russian bilingualism. The opposite trend is no less important, i.e. mastery of Moldavian by Russians living in Moldavia; 52.0 per cent of the urban Russian population knows Moldavian to one degree or another (true, less well in most cases than Moldavians know Russian).

Surveys made in other Union Republics have recorded a similar trend. The development of bilingualism among various groups of the Russian population of Tallinn, in particular, provides evidence of this. The proportion of adult Russians knowing Esthonian is 37.5 per cent among

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[1] During the 1970 Census only 33.8 per cent of the Moldavians in the Republic (including 62.5 per cent of the urban population and 27.8 per cent of the rural) claimed that they spoke Russian fluently. The difference between the survey's findings and the Census returns must be considered less in fact, because the former took account only of the adult population, while the latter covered the whole population.

building workers, 38.6 per cent among engineers and technicians, and 44.7 per cent among workers. It is even higher among the youth; 65.3 per cent among secondary school pupils and 67 per cent among pupils of evening schools.[1]

The spread of education and raising of skills in connection with the rapid industrialisation and urbanisation of the USSR have had a considerable effect on the spread of Russian among persons of non-Russian nationality. Surveys in Autonomous Republics (Tataria, Udmurtia, and Karelia) have brought out a single trend in this respect: the higher people's social and professional status the more often and more fluently, as a rule, they speak Russian as their second language.

In Kishinev (Moldavia) half of the unskilled workers of Moldavian nationality speak Russian fluently; the proportion rises to 71 per cent among skilled workers, 79.2 per cent among specialists with higher education and personnel of the higher echelons, and 92.1 per cent among scientific workers and people in the arts. There is a similar trend in the countryside, with the difference that the proportion of persons speaking Russian fluently is lower in each social and professional group.

Comparison of the data of surveys made among peoples that have a different form of national-state system, indicates not only different scales of familiarity with a second language but also a different need for it in everyday conversation. That is due, in particular, to the peoples of autonomous republics and regions and national areas feeling a special need for bilingualism because their standard of general education and familiarity with both the common Soviet culture and world culture largely depends on knowledge of Russian. In most cases these people receive secondary and higher education, scientific training, and political education in Russian.[2]

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[1] Cited by E. N. Piall from a personal communication by V. G. Govorushchenko in: A Propos the Development of National Languages and Types of Bilingualism. In: P. A. Azimov, Yu. D. Desheriev, F. P. Filin (Eds.) *Problemy dvuyazychiya i mnogoyazychiya* (Nauka, Moscow, 1972), p 117.

[2] Yu. D. Desheriev. *Zakonomernosti razvitiya i vzaimodeistviya yazykov v sovetskom obshchestve* (Patterns of the Evolution and Interaction of Languages in Soviet Society), Moscow, 1966, p 326; *idem. Zakonomernosti razvitiya literaturnykh yazykov narodov SSSR v*

Factors of a sociolinguistic character, and also nonlingui-
stic factors (e.g. the ethnic environment, urbanisation, etc.),
play an important role in extending the scale of bilingual-
ism. Research has disclosed a close link between the degree
of mastery of a second language (and the extent of its spread)
and the frequency with which it is used as a lingua franca
in various spheres of industrial, social, political, and family
life, and everyday relations. These surveys have helped us
to start laying new historiographic bases for studying bi-
lingualism, by which we mean the bringing of facts not
contained in census returns or in other statistical sources
of any kind under scientific purview, primarily information
on the role of the mother tongue and Russian (or some other
language spoken in the USSR) as the lingua franca in the
home, in industry, for reading books, newspapers, maga-
zines, and journals, and for listening to the radio and watching
television.

During such research in the Tatar ASSR a connection
was discovered between mastery of languages and rural
Tatars' speech habits (see Table 11).

The link between fluency in a second language and its
use in conversation was much more noticeable in the sphere
of production contacts than in the domain of everyday
domestic intercourse. A quarter of the rural Tatars ques-
tioned who spoke Russian more fluently than Tatar spoke
Russian more often at home; the proportion of those who
used Russian at work was more than twice as high.

The existence of a direct dependence between degree of
fluency in a second language and the extent to which it is
used is quite obvious; and there would probably be no need
to make a special investigation into it, were it not for the
interest raised by another aspect of the matter, i.e. the cases
of a discrepancy between these two sociolinguistic catego-
ries. As the findings of research projects have shown, such
cases are in fact often met. We find a small category of per-
sons (6.5 per cent) among rural Tatars who speak their
own language more fluently but who nevertheless speak
Russian at home or interlard Tatar with Russian words
(see Table 11). The proportion of this same category of

*sovetskuyu epokhu. Razvitiye obshchestvennykh funktsii literaturnykh
yazykov* (Patterns of the Development of Literary Languages of the
Peoples of the USSR. The Development of the Social Functions of
Literary Languages), Moscow, 1976.

persons rises at work to 14.0 per cent. In another group of rural Tatars who speak Russian more fluently, three-quarters used Tatar or both languages equally at home, but around half of them used Tatar or both languages at work. In other words the sphere of production contacts was more favourable than the domestic sphere for the group's realisation of its potential linguistic possibilities.

We still do not have the possibility to judge the trend of links between standard of fluency in a second language and the frequency of its use, with bilingualism, in people's speech behaviour. The question of what affects what therefore still remains an open one. Most probably the link observed

Table 11.

Mastery of Languages and Speech Behaviour
(in percentages; from a survey among rural Tatars)

	Language spoken most fluently		
Language normally spoken	Tatar	Russian	Both
At home			
Tatar	93.5	61.5	76.4
Russian	2.4	24.4	8.2
Both	4.1	14.1	15.4
At work			
Tatar	86.0	36.0	41.4
Russian	2.8	52.0	18.2
Both	11.2	12.0	40.4
Number of persons questioned	2 310	86	364

Table 12.

Speech Behaviour and Fluency in the Second Language among Bilingual Rural Tatars (Tatar ASSR)
(percentages)

	Language in which more fluent			Number of persons polled
Language normally spoken at home and at work	Tatar	Russian	Equally fluently	
Only Tatar	90.1	2.2	7.7	1007
Only Russian, or both equally	18.7	31.3	50.0	64

Source: Institute of Ethnography's survey among rural Tatars.

has a bilateral character; the more fluently people speak a second language the more apt they are to use it (a fact we have already been able to satisfy ourselves on), while the more often the second language is spoken, the better it is mastered (as is indicated by the data in Tables 12, 13 and 14).

In fact, when a person of one nationality or another habitually speaks his or her own language at home and work,

Table 13.

Speech Behaviour and Fluency in the Second Language among Bilingual Karelians (Karelian ASSR)
(percentages)

Language normally spoken at home and at work	Language in which most fluent			Number of persons questioned
	Karelian	Russian	Finnish	
Karelian	94.3	10.3	3.3	486
Russian	74.1	50.6	4.1	506
Both equally	89.9	30.7	4.7	504

Source: a survey among rural Karelians.

Table 14.

Speech Behaviour and Fluency in the Second Language among Bilingual Moldavians (Moldavian SSR)
(percentages)

Language usually spoken at home and at work	Language spoken more fluently			Number of persons questioned
	Moldavian	Russian	Both equally	
A. Urban				
Moldavian	70.0	5.0	25.0	1329
Russian	37.8	22.7	39.5	642
Both	47.6	6.0	46.4	754
B. Rural *				
Moldavian (manual workers)	83.4	1.5	15.1	8950
Moldavian (workers by brain)	68.0	1.4	30.6	724
Russian	15.3	72.5	12.2	130
Both	28.2	—	71.8	83

* With the exception of the group of workers by brain specially singled out, all the other Moldavians questioned in rural localities were manual workers of various trades and skills.

that fact is quite obvious proof that he or she is more fluent in this language (see Tables 12 and 14). Only among 10 per cent of rural Tatars, 13.6 per cent of rural Karelians, and 30 per cent of urban Moldavians, who speak only their national language at home and work is their knowledge of a second language (Russian) of a higher standard than that of the first, or is knowledge of the two identical. On the contrary, when rural Tatars speak only Russian at home and at work, or interchange the two (Russian and Tatar), it can be assumed on the analogy of the foregoing that they know the second language (Russian) better than that of their own nation, or at least as well.

One sometimes comes across the view that sociological research affirms generally known truths; and that is often the case. In fact, it would hardly enter one's head to doubt the existence of direct links between frequency of use of a second language and fluency in it; and the 'Tatar' and 'Moldavian' experiments once more confirm just that obvious (from the common-sense angle) conclusion. Let us pass, however, from consideration of the processes of bilingualism among the rural population in the Tatar ASSR and the Moldavian SSR to that in the villages of Karelia. Among rural Karelians who spoke both languages (Karelian and Russian) to the same degree at home and at work, the majority (90 per cent) spoke not Russian but the first language (Karelian) more fluently. Again three-quarters of the Karelians who spoke only Russian at home and at work were also more fluent in Karelian than in Russian (see Table 13). If we did not have the evidence of rural Tatars and of rural and urban Moldavians (see Table 14), it would seemingly be difficult to infer that greater fluency is retained in the national language even when the second language is used more often.

We are thus faced with two opposite trends. In one (the 'Tatar' and 'Moldavian') the frequency of use of the second language is directly associated with a higher standard in it, but in the second trend (the 'Karelian') such a connection is not observable. The examples considered indicate how complicated the processes of bilingualism are in different regions of the country and among different peoples, and what a significant role sociological research is called upon to play in their study.

The school, an ethnically mixed milieu, contacts between

peoples, and several other factors undoubtedly play a leading role in both the spread of bilingualism and the standard of mastery of the second language. Urban Tatars, for example, workers by brain, almost all converse in two languages at work rather than in one. More than half of all the rural intelligentsia speak either Russian only in the production sphere or both languages with equal frequency. Russian is heard more frequently among Tatars, as a rule, the higher their social status. The social and economic development of the Soviet countryside, consequently, during which the rural population's social structure is being improved, is promoting the development of real, as well as potential, bilingualism, and a broadening of the interaction of Tatars and Russians.[1]

The public activity of people of non-Russian nationality and their broad use of a second language in addition to their own are also having a definite effect on speech behaviour in the domain of domestic intercourse, an effect that is specially marked in towns.[2]

The dominant role of the school in spreading bilingualism has often been mentioned in sociological publications. The findings of the research carried out by the USSR Academy of Sciences' Institute of Ethnography in various regions of the country have made it possible, however, to amend and refine this indisputable thesis. We must stress, first of all, that it is a matter of the school's influence in spreading bilingualism among non-Russian peoples of the Soviet Union in which the second language is Russian as the lingua franca. This is very obvious from the example of the Moldavian urban population, for whom the school's role in the spread of bilingualism far and away exceeds the effect of many other factors in strength, in particular such factors as direct intercourse, army service, etc. At the same time it is not the school that plays the dominant role in the development of bilingualism among the Russian urban population in Moldavia, but direct contacts and intercourse with friends. In one and the same ethnolinguistic area, consequently, namely the towns of Moldavia, the

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[1] By potential bilingualism we mean simply knowledge of a second language, by real bilingualism broad use of it in various spheres of life.

[2] M. N. Guboglo. *Art cit.* In: Yu. V. Arutyunian *et al.* (Eds.), *Op. cit.*, pp 256–257.

significance of one and the same factors in the spread of bilingualism is not manifested in the same way among Moldavians and Russians (see Table 15).

Table 15.

Factors in the Mastering
of a Second Language by Moldavians
and Russians in Moldavian Towns
(in percentages)

Question: if you know a second language (Russian for Moldavians, Moldavian for Russians) where did you learn it?	Nationality	
	Molda-vian	Russian
Total number of persons questioned	2359	1057
Answers:		
at school	53.0	18.1
in the army	14.4	—
in the parents' family	11.0	10.0
mixing with friends	32.7	26.9
in higher school	9.0	2.0

Source: Survey by the Institute of Ethnography, USSR Academy of Sciences.

There are also considerable differences in the role of one and the same factor at different historical stages and in the life of different generations. The findings of the survey in Moldavia indicated a tendency for the school's role in urban Moldavians' acquiring of Russian as a second language to increase. It showed, for example, that the younger the person the greater was the influence of learning the language at school. The older the person, on the contrary, the stronger was the effect of another factor, namely communication.

Under developed socialism the tendency toward further convergence of peoples in the field of bilingualism is not manifesting itself in the same way. In some cases, for large socialist nations for example, the national school plays the main role in acquiring a second language (with good teaching of Russian); in others (as is plain from the case of small nations), this is being brought about by the school with teaching in Russian. The resolution of the CPSU's Central Committee on measures to improve the work of the general secondary school, published in November 1966, stressed the need for special attention to the teaching of Russian

in rural national schools.[1] The consistent converging of
the nations and nationalities of the Soviet Union is an ob-
jective process, and the Communist Party pays constant
attention to the development of the school, in which the
firmest foundations for mastery of a second language are
laid.

In accordance with the statute on the fundamentals of
the USSR's and Union Republics' legislation on educa-
tion, parents themselves decide what language their chil-
dren will study in the general school.[2] The spread of replies
to questions on the desired language of education can be
taken provisionally as a sort of optimum norm. By compar-
ing the proportion of persons giving preference to a lan-
guage other than their mother tongue with that of persons
'voting' for the national language in teaching, we get a
relative quantity that provides evidence of the nations'
great need for a second language of instruction in the school
sphere. The figure so obtained can be taken as an indicator
(or index) of the desirability of (or preference for) a second
language in school.[3] As the Institute of Ethnography's
surveys have shown, there are considerable variations in
the need for a second language as the language of instruc-
tion in the general school. It is more strongly expressed, in
particular, among urban Uzbeks and Moldavians, and less
markedly among the Esthonian urban population. Quite
obviously a rural milieu moulds an orientation toward bi-
lingualism less than an urban one.

When the optimum relationship between the contracting
languages' social functions has the form of a norm fixed by
means of this index, there is a direct and a reverse connec-
tion, it must be stressed, between this norm and individ-
uals' statements: on the one hand, everyone's personal
view of the desirability of a second language is the product
of the social standards existing in the society or the environ-
ment of members of his or her nationality, and, on the other
hand, he or she himself or herself is a co-creator of these
same social standards. The index's value varies, of course,

[1] *Voprosy ideologicheskoi raboty KPSS. Sbornik documentov*
(Problems of the CPSU's Ideological Work. Documents), Politizdat,
Moscow, 1972, p 375.

[2] See: *Pravda*, 21 July 1973.

[3] In itself this index can be described variously as an index of
preference, prestige, attractiveness, expediency, etc.

among different peoples, and among different groups of one and the same nation.

The need for a second language, including its use as the language of instruction in schools, is not constant. It develops synchronously with the development of the nation itself and corresponds primarily to the development both of its own (national) culture, and of the cultures of other nations of the USSR, and to the density and frequency of its communicative and other contacts with other nations.

Ethnosociological surveys indicate a quite close reciprocal determination of the three most important linguistic characteristics, viz., competence, and activity in, and orientation on, the second language; similarly, the closer they are to each other, and the more closely they are interwoven, the greater the guarantee that the processes of bilingualism will develop in constant, dynamic evolution and equilibrium. Rapid social advancement of many persons of non-Russian nationality is almost necessarily linked with good knowledge of Russian as the language of broad internation communication. But it is characteristic of man that the satisfaction of some needs gives rise to a desire for other, broader ones. We must therefore expect improved linguistic competence and extension of speaking in a second language to give rise to a further consolidation of a person's need for that language, and an increase in its attractiveness and preferability (in his or her view), without in any way reducing the love for his or her mother tongue.

The multilingual Soviet press plays a major role in the integrational processes of the reciprocal influencing and enriching of national cultures, in strengthening the community of the peoples' cultural development, and in bringing the nations of the USSR closer together.

A most important indicator of their coming together has been the transition of most of the nations and nationalities of the USSR from a traditional monolingualism to bilingualism.[1] Their contribution to the common fund of

It would seem better, however, to stick closely to the original source, i. e. the form of the question as formulated in the survey questionnaire. The index of desirability is thus that of desire for teaching to be in the second language, and desire for children to be taught in the language of their own nationality.

[1] K. V. Chistov. Ethnic Community, Ethnic Consciousness, and Certain Problems of Spiritual Culture. *Sovetskaya etnografiya*, 1972, 3: 81.

the Soviet Union's international culture has grown through translation of their works into Russian and successive editions of the translations. The experience of cultural development of recent years in the Soviet Union indicates that it is necessary to know Russian and to use it widely in order to assimilate the stock of knowledge accumulated by mankind. At the same time broad use of a second language (Russian) creates real grounds for theoretical rethinking of the relation between language and the national cultures of many of the USSR's peoples.

Many non-Russian people's need for bilingualism will grow in the course of overcoming existing differences between town and country and between mental and physical work. The use of two languages to obtain cultural information does not at all mean to restrict the rights of one of them in favour of the other. The more intensive social processes become, the more the need for bilingualism of the national language/Russian type will be felt. At the same time spread of the lingua franca among the nations of the Soviet Union 'is also promoting the development of certain integrating tendencies in the everyday sphere, which is usually distinguished by the greatest ethnic seclusion'.[1]

The surveys in Tataria and Moldavia showed that the extension of bilingualism with Russian as the second language has not just meant Tatars' and Moldavians' acquiring of a language of international communication but has also meant a rise in their general educational standards and professional training, a broadening of their horizons, and a raising of their intellectual level. Rural Tatars, for example, who speak two languages, display a greater potential readiness for further social mobility. The significance of Russian is growing especially now in regard to the development of spiritual culture. The fraction of Moldavians and Tatars who read newspapers and various literature in Russian, or in both languages, already much exceeds the fraction of those who have access to scientific and cultural values only through their national language.

The use of two languages to become acquainted with the achievements of Soviet and world culture increases, as a rule, with rise in social and professional status; 28.6 per

[1] R. F. Its. The Soviet People, a New Type of Historical Community. *Vestnik LGU*, 1972, *20, Seriya yazyka, literatury i istorii,* 4: 35.

cent of unskilled Moldavian manual workers read fiction in two languages, 48.0 per cent of skilled workers, 56.0 per cent of specialists with secondary education and officials of the middle echelon, and 68.4 per cent of scientific and other creative and cultural workers.

Use of the language of another nation in no way reduces interest in the mother tongue. According to the returns of the 1970 Census 93.4 per cent of Moldavians (including 90.6 per cent of townsmen and 99.2 per cent of the rural population) declared Moldavian their native language. Moldavians, consequently, while actively assimilating foreign culture through Russian, also widely enjoy the wealth of their own spiritual culture. This is evidence that the development and enriching of Moldavian culture is proceeding in optimum conditions in the course of international contacts.

The role of Russian in the drawing together of national cultures and consolidation of the international unity of Soviet society has been well brought out by the well-known Kirghiz novelist Chinghiz Aitmatov.

Internationalism (he comments) lay at the bottom of the process of the mutual acquaintance and then complex interaction and brilliant flowering of our national cultures, which have been built up into a single Soviet culture. At the same time we must note the outstanding unifying mission of Russian culture, which is quite without parallel. We must stress its role in this historical process not because it has been created by a great people—that goes without saying—but because Russian culture, and above all the Russian language, have promoted, and are promoting, our general progress and are a necessary, unqualified factor for the further perfecting of our cultures.[1]

The spread of bilingualism 'in breadth' and 'in depth' has no essential effect in transforming nations' national identity. Bilingualism is a factor which, helping to eradicate ethnic prejudices, furthers the strengthening of friend-

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[1] *K novomu rastsvetu mnogonatsional'noi sovetskoi kul'tury* (Toward a New Flowering of Multinational Soviet Culture. Proceedings of the Boards of the Creative Unions of the USSR, November 1972), Politizdat, Moscow, 1973, p 96.

ship and co-operation among the Soviet nations and the building of a single international community, namely the Soviet people.

The development and functioning of bilingualism in any one ethnic milieu is an objective process but one closely linked both with language policy and with the Soviet Union's general national policy, which is a most important factor affecting the peoples' historical development. The control over language processes (the development of bilingualism included) exercised by both the Communist Party and the Soviet state offers broad possibilities for affecting the social and ethnic development and convergence of the nations and nationalities of the USSR in a purposeful way.

ETHNOS AND FAMILY IN THE USSR

O. A. Gantskaya

Ethnographic research into the relationship of the ethnos and the family is especially important in the multinational Soviet state. It brings out the specific ethnological features of ethnic processes in the domain of the family and integrating community typical of the general tendency toward a drawing together of the country's nationally diverse population. On the plane of scientific modelling of the family of the future it is ethnographers who determine the potential for natural maintenance of ethnic nuances in its various national environments. Ethnography provides the information needed for day by day ideological work, and for present-day social development, viz., information on the special features of family relationships among individual peoples and in each of the ethnocultural provinces.

The modern family is a stagial phenomenon engendered by mankind's social and cultural evolution. As an ethnocultural microstructure it is part of the principal systems of relations and connections (socio-economic, legal, ethnic, etc.). Relations within the family (husband/wife, father/children, mother/children, children/children, etc.) and the family's relations with other institutions are governed by the laws inherent in these systems. Being a social institution of a definite ethnos, the family is actively involved in the socialising of the youth and, in particular, in the moulding of their national identity.

With a preponderance of endogamy of ethnoi within their boundaries of compact settlement, the family repro-

duces each ethnos.[1] Among peoples that retained survivals of tribal division until recently (e.g. the Turkomans), marriage between members of various groups that used to be endogamous is evidence of national consolidation, of the overcoming of tribal indentity, and the triumph of national self-awareness.

In ethnic contact zones (the area of ethnic boundaries, large cities, areas with pockets of other nationalities, etc.), mixed marriages create families that are a micromedium of processes of integration and natural assimilation.

Archives and literary sources indicate that inter-nation marriages were rare in Czarist Russia. That is brought out quite clearly by the much greater number of such marriages in towns than in country areas. Mixed marriages occurred to some extent in the strip along ethnic frontiers, where cultural connections were also specially strong in the past. Marriages were most often concluded between members of related peoples, close in language and culture.

Religious bans had a negative effect on the contraction of marriages with persons of another nationality. Ethnically mixed marriages were tolerated only between fellow believers. Religious discord often fed national prejudice. Where there were direct contacts and intercourse of a nationally mixed population the unaccustomed character of the everyday mode of life, and different family structure of each of the nationalities were often an obstacle to mixed marriages. Peoples were also divided by political and economic inequality and national oppression.

After the Socialist Revolution's victory in Russia, the carrying out of Lenin's national policy laid firm foundations for friendship of the peoples. The evolution of national relationships and the rise and consolidation of features of the communist future in them is a lengthy, complicated business. A growth in the number of inter-nation marriages reflects this process to a certain extent.

Present-day ethnic mixing in marriages in both the towns and the rural areas of the USSR is mainly traceable from the findings of ethnographic surveys and the statistics processed by demographers, ethnographers, and sociologists.

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[1] On this point see: Yu. V. Bromley. Ethnos and Endogamy. *Sovetskaya etnografiya*, 1969, 6: 84-91; *idem. Etnos i etnografiya* (Ethnos and Ethnography), Nauka, Moscow, 1973, pp 114-127.

Censuses, demographic surveys, and the use of question-naires in sociological research yield very valuable information.

The returns of registry offices also reflect the frequency of both different variants of mixed marriages and uni-national marriages in the towns and villages of the USSR (in some cities, however, the nationality of the spouses has not been indicated on the forms since 1960). These data are preserved in many republican and city archives; chronologically they cover 20 to 25 post-war years; in individual cases materials relating to the 1920s and 1930s have been preserved.

The statistical theorem of multiple probabilities is employed to process registrars' data.[1] In each of the variants of nationally mixed marriages, no less than in uni-national ones, both the observed (actual) frequency and the theoretical probability to be expected with non-dependence of marriage on nationality are calculated. The hypothetical probability of two independent phenomena combining is equal to the derivative of the frequencies of each taken separately. The observed actual frequency of combination almost always differs to some extent from the theoretical probability. Comparison of these quantities helps bring out the trend of development of inter-nation relations in the sphere of marriage.

The observed frequency of uni-national and mixed marriages, however, does not depend simply on the spouses' national background. It also manifests the effect of social factors and territorial heterogeneity. The gathering of data in cities where there is no longer a division into national quarters has excluded, or nearly excluded, territorial heterogeneity (Moscow, Leningrad, Riga, etc.). In other towns, where there are still survivals of such settlement, and in rural areas with a mixed national population, the possibility of territorial heterogeneity affecting the conclusion of marriages has to be kept in mind. An attempt is being made by the author and L. N. Terentieva and colleagues at the Institute of Ethnography to take the social factors into

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[1] The technique was suggested by Prof. G. F. Debets. See: O. A. Gantskaya and G. F. Debets. A Propos of the Graphic Representation of the Results of a Statistical Survey of Marriages between Nationalities. *Sovetskaya etnografiya*, 1966, 3: 109-118.

account, for which purpose selected data were obtained on the social background of the persons marrying in certain cities. Study of the material, however, has not been completed at the time of writing, so that it would be premature to draw conclusions on how far the social factor affects marital choice.

Study ·of the massive statistics obtained from registry offices has indicated that the actual frequency of uni-national marriages is almost always higher than their theoretical probability. Marriages between members of different nationalities, on the contrary, are much less frequent than their theoretical probability. In the years studied (from 1946 to 1967), however, there was a marked tendency for the indices to come closer together. In Russian/Ukrainian marriages (husband Russian, wife Ukrainian, and conversely husband Ukrainian, wife Russian), Russian/Byelorussian, Ukrainian/Byelorussian, and Byelorussian/Polish marriages, for example, the actual frequency was often the same as, or even higher than, the theoretical probability, which is evidence of a decline in the influence of nationality on marriage in the USSR. There is every ground for supposing that the factor of national affiliations will not affect the formation of families in the society of the future, but it must be taken into account at present when society's evolution in the relatively near future is being forecast. The discrepancies still existing between the theoretical probability and actual frequency of nationally mixed marriages (with a different degree of variation in their different variants, but a common tendency to come closer together) are not, however, evidence either of national prejudice or, even more, of antagonism. The reasons for this phenomenon do not lie on the surface of life, and thorough investigation of ethnosocial psychology is needed to clarify them.

In ethnically mixed families the ethnic situation is defined by several main indices: viz., the language of intercourse of parents and children; the specific ethnographic character of everyday life; parents' choice of nationality for their children, the children's own choice of nationality on coming of age. The choice of nationality of the young people of mixed families, whatever it is, has a marked effect on the course of ethnic processes. Given the great mobility and urbanisation of the population and a ubiquitous tendency for an increase in the frequency of inter-

nation marriages, their significance for the ethnic develop-
ment of the USSR's population is growing.[1]

Ethnic processes also take place outside the domain of
mixed-marriage families, embracing single-nation ones
as well, and being reflected in the system of inner-family
relations, traditions, and customs. Through the effect of
socio-economic factors, ethno-contacts, and reciprocal cul-
tural influences (direct and indirect), there is a consolida-
tion of the components of one people or of closely related
peoples, natural assimilation, integration of the nationally
varied population of certain historico-cultural provinces,
and a general process of integration of the Soviet people.

When the reflection of these processes in the family's
everyday life is being investigated, allowance has to be
made for the general foundations of marital and family
relations having been laid down in the past in each histori-
co-cultural province among the peoples of any one socio-
economic formation and similar religious faith. These re-
lations' dependence on the level of socio-economic develop-
ment and religion made itself felt, moreover, in the exist-
ence of one and the same or similar forms of family and
marriage among unrelated peoples not in direct contact
with one another and living in different historico-cultural
provinces.

The similar features of marital and family relations ob-
served do not exclude their having a specific ethnic character
proper to a people or a group of related peoples. The family
still remains the vehicle of ethnic features of a certain kind,
including certain features of family customs like etiquette,
ceremonies, relations between members of the family, and
so on. At the same time common dominants characteristic
of the integration of the Soviet people are traceable in the
families of all nationalities.

Soviet legislation has reflected the establishment and
development of marital and family relations in various
periods of the USSR's history, and has had a big impact in
turn on these relations. In 1968 the USSR Supreme Soviet
passed an Act of immense importance, viz., the Fundamen-

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[1] On this point see: L. N. Terentieva. Adolescents' Definition of
Their National Affiliation in Nationally Mixed Families. *Sovetskaya
etnografiya*, 1969,3: 20-30; O. A. Gantskaya, L. N. Terentieva. An Eth-
nographic Investigation of National Processes in the Baltic Republics.
Sovetskaya etnografiya, 1965, 5.

tals of Legislation of the USSR and Union Republics on Marriage and the Family. Subsequently, in 1969, marriage and family codes were confirmed in the Union Republics that took each republic's specific cultural and customary life into account. In all this legislation it is stressed that one of the objectives of the Soviet state is further consolidation of the family.

Conditions have been created in the course of the socio-economic and cultural reforms in the USSR for young people to become acquainted and meet, for free marital choice irrespective of nationality, social status, etc., which is one of the factors in the integration of the Soviet people helping to stabilise the modern family's structure.

It is characteristic of most of the peoples of the Soviet Union for the territorial factor (place of birth and domicile) to have a different effect on contacts in town and country. In rural settlements youths and girls become acquainted in childhood, and neighbourhood and family connections are stronger there. Parents are well acquainted, as a rule, with their grown-up children's choice, and more often than in town they try to intervene in their relations. Rural young people usually work where they live (with the exception of those in outlying villages around towns, who work in the town, and students). One can say that the territorial factor influences the coming together of youths and girls to the same extent as the production factor (contacts during work).

The territorial factor has less significance in young people's contacts in towns. Urban youth come together mainly at work or in the course of studies, and community of interests plays a big role in that. It is not fortuitous that people of the same profession, working together, or students in one and the same college, marry one another.

Young people get acquainted and come together (in both town and country) during their holidays and leisure hours, irrespective of domicile and place of work. To some extent, therefore, a considerable number of marriages are concluded between people of different professions and even between the inhabitants of different towns and rural communities.

There are specific features in young people's relationships before marriage in historico-cultural provinces. In the European province, for instance, overt displays of love, friendship, and affection are freer than in other regions.

The etiquette of courting permits display of tenderness before relatives, acquaintances, and even in the presence of strangers, in public places, and in the street. Open courtship does not compromise a girl even when, for some reason or other, marriage does not take place.

In other historico-cultural provinces (the Caucasus, Central Asia, Siberia) the etiquette of courtship of the indigenous population prescribes great reserve and restraint. This is linked, to some extent, with the effect of traditions handed down from archaic forms of social organisation, and to such things as patriarchal segregation of the sexes, shunning, and the associated need to conceal true relations and intentions.[1] Among peoples professing Islam certain rules of young people's behaviour were formed under the influence of religious bans. In rural districts in Central Asia, for example, youths and girls still keep quite separate from one another at holiday festivities and during leisure, and at entertainments (e.g. at the cinema, in the club, etc.), which is apparently a survival of women's former isolation under Moslem law. This survival of an old custom is not thought of in any way, or associated with religion in the consciousness of the young people themselves.

In the Caucasus, especially in rural areas, lovers try not to display their feelings in public. Open courting (going to the cinema or the club together, and so on) without subsequent marriage is considered by many to be insulting to a girl. At the same time, the parents of nubile girls try to provide the conditions at home for youths to meet them (e.g. among the Adygei). If conditions permit, they give their daughter a separate room where youths can visit her in the presence of her sister or a friend (the parents themselves do not enter the room). When accepted as a suitor a young man visits the girl in the evening in the company of friends. A 'go-between' still often plays an important role in contacts between an engaged couple; his relation to the girl is defined by the custom of sworn brotherhood.[2]

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[1] Shunning is an old custom whereby a fiancée must not associate with the fiancé's relatives, and a young wife with her husband's relatives.

[2] See: E. L. Kojesau, M. A. Meretukov. Family and Social Life. In: M. G. Autlov and L. I. Lavrov (Eds.). *Kul'tura i byt kolkhoznogo krest'yanstva Adygeiskoi avtonomnoi oblasti* (Nauka, Moscow/Leningrad, 1964), p 137.

Ethnographic surveys indicate that the specific ethnoregional character of young people's relationships before marriage, and in particular the etiquette of courtship, are more strongly exhibited in small urban settlements and rural localities than in big towns. Interestingly, the reserve in display of feelings and in courting before strangers especially characteristic of rural youth in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Kazakhstan, for example, is lost to some extent among those who go away to study or work in a big industrial town in another ethnic province, like Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, Minsk, Novosibirsk, etc. On returning to their native village, however, young people consider themselves obliged to conform with local customs, if only outwardly, the effect of the ethnic and social milieu making itself felt in that way. Youths and girls who continue to live in cities gradually adopt rules of young people's behaviour that are new to them, which can be considered a manifestation of the integration of young people of various nationalities in big towns.

The patterns of development of new marital-family relations in the USSR are traceable in the change in the indices of age of marriage (minimum, predominant, mean), which used to differ greatly in the past not only in historico-cultural provinces but even among the different peoples of such a province. The general trend discernible during the integration of the Soviet people is a levelling out of the age of marriage, with a gradual rise in some areas (e.g. the Volga Valley, Central Asia, Kazakhstan, the Caucasus, and Siberia), and a lowering in others (the age of marriage in the Baltic Republics used to be specially high: 26-30 for men and 21-25 for women in Lithuania; about 24-25 for men and 21-23 for women in Latvia; 28.8 for men and 25.5 for women in Esthonia).[1]

Young people's deciding of the problems of marriage by themselves has become a general phenomenon of marital

[1] See: L. N. Terentieva, M. V. Shlygina (Eds.). *Semya i semeiny byt kolkhoznikov Pribaltiki* (The Family and Family Life of Collective Farmers in the Baltic Republics), USSR Academy of Sciences Publishers, Moscow, 1962, pp 30, 81, 99; Ya. S. Smirnova. The Change in the Age of Marriage among Peoples of the North Caucasus in Soviet Times. *Sovetskaya etnografiya*, 1973, 1; M. G. Pankratova. The Family and the Everyday Life of the Rural Population. In: Yu. V. Arutyunian *et al.* (Eds.). *Sotsial'noe i natsional'noe* (The Social and National), Nauka, Moscow, 1973, p 194.

and family relations among all the peoples of the Soviet Union.

It would be a mistake to think that modern Soviet youth completely ignore material factors when forming a family. The theoretical possibility of starting family life with a partner with whom you will not have housing and material difficulties seems attractive to many young men and women in any national or social milieu; in real life situations, however, the absence of this possibility is seldom a serious obstacle to marriage, since the main thing is mutual love and not mercenary calculations.[1]

Every young person, on getting married, consciously or unconsciously considers his or her partner a helpmate in life, a support on the road to achieving set aims that express his or her sense of values (to obtain an education, to be successful at work, to bring up children, to create a comfortable home, to organise leisure, etc.). The picture of such an ideal partner is a factor in marital choice. Another factor is parents' example (positive or negative).

A striving for homogamy (search for a partner with similar psychological and social features) is characteristic of some young people, and heterogamy (search for a partner with different psychological and social traits) of others. People with different psychological traits and a different temperament get married no less often, probably, than people who are like one another. In a favourable life situation they often supplement each other as it were, and even the disagreements arising between them by no means always lead to painful conflicts. Incompatibility of the spouses can lead, in family life, sometimes right at the beginning, but usually later, to anomalies and extreme 'hostile' expressions of various traits, intellectual discord, a sharp opposition of standards of value, i.e. to factors that are social though also connected with psychological ones.

The problem of ethnopsychological traits in opinions on the best marital partner presents great interest but has so far been little studied; it can be said, however, from cer-

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[1] According to a survey conducted in 1962 at the Leningrad Palace of Marriages, 76.2 per cent of the couples questioned considered love, or love and common interests, mutual confidence, and sincerity, to be the main basis for a lasting marriage. See: A. G. Kharchev. *Brak i sem'ya v SSSR* (Marriage and the Family in the USSR), Mysl, Moscow, 1965, p. 179.

tain ethnographic surveys, that there are dominant criteria in this respect among different peoples or groups of peoples. Among the peoples of the Caucasus, for example, marked pride, reserve, modesty, and respect for elders are considered positive features in a young bride's character and conduct. Young grooms should have the same qualities, not display their feelings openly before outsiders, and be bold and courageous. The notions of the qualities of the ideal bride and groom built up among a people or group of peoples in the past still have a certain effect on marital choice. That does not mean, of course, that personality, temperament, and the individual's psychological traits play no part in this choice. It is a matter simply of the preponderance of certain criteria.

In the USSR the possibility of marrying is defined for all the peoples by common norms of law and morality, which encourages integration of the multinational Soviet people. The survivals of the clan and other types of exogamy observed in the recent past among the peoples of the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Siberia (e.g. taboos on the marriage of fellow-villagers, sworn brothers and sisters, or people related by foster-kinship) have largely disappeared, or are disappearing. The customs of levirate and sororate (viz., compulsory marriage of a younger brother to the widow of a deceased elder brother, and of the husband of a deceased wife to her sister) have disappeared.

Neither the different financial position of the parents of the couples marrying, nor their parents' membership of different social groups has any great influence on marriage, as a rule. The parents and relatives attach importance primarily to the prospects of the bride and groom themselves, depending on their education, capacity to earn their own living, social activity, and personal qualities of character and conduct (kindness, decency, perseverence, and other positive traits).

Kinship of interests and intellectual closeness are an important condition of a happy marriage. They are most probable, and most often arise, between people of the same social milieu and of equal cultural standards. That is obviously why, as we have already commented, socially homogeneous marriages, including marriages between people of the same profession (e.g. doctors, artists, actors, musicians, etc.), are common, in addition to socially heteroge-

neous ones. Kinship of calling and work interests help bring potential marital partners together. Work in a certain branch of the economy, medicine, science, or art often determines the sphere of people's everyday intercourse according to work interests and provides opportunities for daily meetings of the future spouses.

Socially heterogeneous marriages are more frequent in rural communities than in towns, because operation of the factors of domicile and work in the same collective or state farm often coincides in the country. An agronomist and a dairymaid, a collective farmer and a nurse, a tractor driver and a schoolteacher, and other socially heterogeneous combinations are quite common in marriages there. In a mill or factory young people of different social categories and professions (engineer, technician, draughtsman, skilled worker) have dealings at work and during leisure (group excursions to town, young people's evenings, club activities, etc.) that help bring them together and make different variants of marital union possible. The fact that the cultural standards of many skilled workers in big industrial enterprises are as high, or almost as high as those of the technical intelligentsia is also of significance.

Even when there are certain differences in education and a different social background in the partners at the time of marriage, they do not feel any intellectual disharmony because their cultural standards will in fact be almost identical, or may potentially coincide in the long run. Unfortunately, however, intellectual discord develops later in some cases just the same, after several years of married life, if one of the spouses (often for objective reasons, e.g. the wife, having had children) lags behind her student or graduate husband. Such families break up more often in town than in rural localities where the couples are more closely united economically, and the family often retains its significance as an economic nucleus (through the existence of a smallholding). In addition, there are more opportunities for new encounters in town and the social milieu has less influence. At present there is no great difference in the frequency of socially heterogeneous marriages by nation or historico-cultural province. But in the European part of the USSR (especially in the towns) the preponderance of socially homogeneous marriages is more impressive than in Central Asia, the Caucasus, and Siberia where the conse-

quences of women's past inequality are still felt (many men's educational standard and social position are rather higher than women's).

Consolidation of the socialist system of the economy, Soviet legislation, social changes, and the cultural revolution have created a common basis for all the peoples of the USSR for the rise, formation, and stabilisation of a new Soviet family. The community of structure of the Soviet family is another indicator of the integration of the USSR's multinational population. The family's structure depends, of course, on the number and relationship of the generations forming it (by direct or collateral kinship). In the USSR the conjugal family of two or three generations now predominates, preserving close connections with near relatives (father, brother, mother, sister). Families that do not maintain family relations are much less frequent. The nuances in the degree to which old forms of the family survive, and in the attitude of the people around them to separation of young couples from their parents, are due to the fact that the family was at various stages of development as a social organism in the pre-revolutionary past in specific historico-cultural provinces and among separate nations.

An important determinant of family structure is the number of children. A woman's opportunity of taking part in production, and her social activity at various ages, depend to a certain extent on the number of children in the family. Children are brought up quite differently in large and small families; the relationships between the members of the family build up differently, and family ties are manifested differently. It remains a moot point whether a high or low index of the number of children can be considered an ethnic peculiarity. It is noticeable, however, that large families are common among the peoples of Central Asia, and Kazakhstan, the Caucasus, and Siberia, while small families predominate in the European zone, especially in the cities. In the Volga area, interestingly, Tatars have rather more children than Russians (the index of the average number of children in a Tatar family in Kazan, for example, is 115, and for a Russian family 100).[1] The tendency to have many

[1] See: E. K. Vasilieva, M. A. Shustova, I. P. Trufanov. The Family and Life of Townsmen. In: Yu. V. Arutyunian *et al.* (Eds.). *Op. cit.*, p 145; M. G. Pankratova. *Art. cit.*, pp 202-206.

or few children, one may suppose, reflects the concrete sense of values of the members of one people or another, or of separate groups of same, and forms part of the general system of values in the domain of the family.

At today's stage of ethnic evolution there are differences in the number of children in urban and rural families among all the nations of the USSR, families being bigger as a rule in the country. In comparison with the families of other social groups there are fewer children in intellectuals' families, especially if the wife has a high professional or public position.

There are still difficulties in Soviet society in the way of woman combining professional and family roles.[1]

The 24th and 25th Congresses of the CPSU paid much attention to improving the living conditions of big families and of women working in industry, to expanding housing construction, and to developing and improving various services.[2] Expansion of the public services sphere should in time reduce housework to the minimum and so eliminate the grounds for conflict situations now associated with the sharing of family responsibilities between wife, husband, and other members of the family.

A problem in the study of present-day ethnic processes is that of the relationship between the elements of social and ethnic integration and the old traditional elements of family customs and celebrations. The specific nature of these elements is traceable among every nation and group of nations (whether ethnically close or remote) inhabiting a certain historico-cultural province or area (e.g. the Baltic), and among people living long distances apart and unrelated by origin. In one case the peculiarity of the element of a custom or holiday ritual is an ethnic feature of a peo-

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[1] See: A. G. Kharchev, S. I. Golod. *Professional'naya rabota zhenshchin i sem'ya* (Women's Professional Work and the Family), Leningrad, 1971, p 35.

[2] See: *24th Congress of the CPSU* (Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, Moscow, 1971), pp 62-66, 78-81; L. I. Brezhnev. Report of the CPSU Central Committee and the Immediate Tasks of the Party in Home and Foreign Policy. *Documents and Resolutions. XXVth Congress of the CPSU* (Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, Moscow, 1976), pp 64-66; A. N. Kosygin, Guidelines for the Development of the National Economy of the USSR for 1976-1980. *Documents ...*, pp 158-159.

ple's culture; in a second type it characterises the culture of the peoples of a certain zone or area and functions among related peoples there as an ethnic feature in a broader sense; in a third type the common feature may be the result of direct reciprocal cultural influences, but is more often a stagial phenomenon still preserved among peoples since its origin at some stage of their socio-economic evolution.

Ethnosocial and cultural integration is leading in the USSR to a certain levelling of family customs and celebrations and to the gradual disappearance of many old forms. At the same time common Soviet traditions of family celebrations and festive ceremonies are arising and becoming widespread, such as, for example, 'Komsomol' (Young Communist) weddings, 'Red weddings' (Central Asia), 'collective farm weddings'. A new event for many peoples is the celebration of silver and golden wedding anniversaries, birthdays, children's graduation from school, the induction of recruits called up to the Soviet Army, etc. New family customs often arise and take root in the cities and then spread to rural localities.

The family celebrations of the population in areas along ethnic frontiers, and in small national groups scattered among a compact majority of inhabitants of the indigenous nationality, to some extent reflect natural assimilation (if it occurs) and cultural integration. It is difficult, however, to trace this because of the levelling of old customs and spread of new ones. Cultural borrowings between ethnoi in contact with one another do not, as we know, immediately or always lead to a change of some sort in the national identity of their members, but only in certain conditions. Many Russian inhabitants of the Ukraine and Moldavia, for example, have preserved their national identity, although quite a few elements typical of Ukrainians and Moldavians can be traced in their culture, in particular in their wedding ceremony.

In the nationally mixed families of rural areas of the Soviet Union, the family customs of the compact national majority are maintained, as a rule, if one of the spouses belongs to it. In urban mixed families, in addition, there is often also an integration of family customs of the national environment of each of the spouses, with a general tendency to reach a common level.

Family customs and celebrations are becoming unified in the course of a people's consolidation (the merging of ethnic and ethnographic groups, and the disappearance of relics of tribal divisions) or of the integration of the nationally mixed population of each historico-cultural province.

The general trend of the development of family structure in all Soviet republics is toward a reduction in the number of authoritarian families and the spread of families with actual recognition of the equality of the parents, adult children, and all other relatives living together with them. This trend is manifested more in urban families than in rural ones. Certain ethno-regional differences are observed in the determination of the head of the family and in the character of relations within the family and of family ties; they are also discernible in family etiquette, which reflects these relations and ties to a certain extent. Families that are headed by the wife, or by both spouses, are found most of all in the European cultural province, where there is a very high percentage of employment of women in social production; but there, too, there is a certain unevenness in the distribution of such families among the different peoples. Among Tatars, for example, a woman (not a widow or divorcee) heads a family less often than among Russians, Ukrainians, Byelorussians, and the Baltic nations. There are elements in Tatar family etiquette of a stressing of the prestige of the man as the head of the family. The wife by tradition conducts herself with marked respect toward her husband, especially when there are guests, and a daughter-in-law tries to show respect for her husband's father and mother, and so on.

Among most of the peoples of the European part of the USSR the relation of the spouses is, not defined by any strict rules of family etiquette. Family ties in town are limited to near relatives. In rural localities family ties are broader.

Among the peoples of Siberia the head of the family is almost always the senior male. A woman heads a family only in case of widowhood with adolescent children. Family etiquette prescribes respectful treatment of old people, and preserves a number of rules associated with old customs of shunning. The authority of old people is high, mutual family help and the custom of guesting are common.

Supremacy of the senior male is also characteristic of most families of the peoples of the Caucasus. Even in families headed by young people, the influence of the old men is very great in deciding family matters. Marked respect toward seniors is a very important rule of conduct of members of the family. Survivals of shunning of the daughter-in-law by the husband's senior relatives can be traced in the etiquette; in some families the young women do not sit at table with male guests. Families maintain links not only with close relatives but also with distant ones, giving them help and hospitality. The custom of hospitality extends to friends and acquaintances of the family, and even to outsiders.

There is much in common between Caucasian customs and the family and marriage relations of the peoples of Central Asia and Kazakhstan. In this historico-cultural zone elements of the integration of family structure of all Soviet peoples are interwoven with traditional rules of family etiquette and with certain surviving phenomena whose origin goes back to the time when the large patriarchal family and its earlier forms prevailed. Families with a distinctly expressed supremacy of the man predominate, but even in them the economic independence of working women and young people has created the basis for equality in the family, and independence of its members in the main matter, namely decision of their own life. By family etiquette juniors should show respect for elders, and the wife should treat her husband and his older relatives with marked politeness and courtesy. The custom of shunning and taboos of various kinds have lost their former significance; when they are observed it is only by tradition.

Family ties are as strong and broad in Central Asia and Kazakhstan as in the Caucasus. One can still find that Turkomans, for example, consider kinship in the male line to be closer. The intensity of the intercourse of relatives is displayed in frequent mutual visiting.

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The specific nature of family structure in the different cultural zones and provinces, and among definite peoples, is thus a very complicated assemblage of ethnic features and traditions, including survivals typical of earlier stages

in the ethnoi's socio-economic evolution. At the same time ethnological study of the relationship of the ethnos and the family helps us trace common phenomena that have arisen, and are arising in the family relationships of the multinational population of all the historico-cultural provinces of the USSR in the course of integration of the Soviet people. This community constitutes the basis of the present-day Soviet family. Ethnic processes that embrace the whole system of inner-family relations, traditions, and customs are also taking place, in particular in the microenvironment of nationally mixed families.

ETHNOCULTURAL CHANGES
AMONG THE PEOPLES OF THE VOLGA,
URALS, AND FAR NORTH OF EUROPE

L. N. Terentieva

The Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic is the most multinational republic of the Soviet Union. It is inhabited by around 80 nations and nationalities, and it is in it that inter-nation contacts are especially varied and ethnic processes of all kinds are actively developing.

The complexity of the RSFSR's national composition has determined the character of its administrative structure, which is that of a federation embracing 16 Autonomous Republics, five Autonomous Regions, ten Autonomous Areas, six administrative territories (units containing autonomous regions), and 49 administrative regions. Its area is 17 075 400 square kilometres, and its total population 137 551 000 (1979).

The vastness of its territory and clearly expressed geographical zones, which largely determined the type of the peoples' economic activity in the past, the ethnic variety of the population, and special features in the historical evolution of the peoples all led to the formation of several cultural provinces that have not yet lost their significance. In the European part of the RSFSR, the Volga Valley, the Urals, and the Far North, which are divided into smaller units for economic geographical zoning, are multinational in character.

The Volga and Urals embrace six Autonomous Republics (the Udmurt, Mari, Chuvash, Mordovian, Tatar, and Bashkir ASSRs) and several administrative regions (the Ulyanovsk, Penza, Kuibyshev, Saratov, and Volgograd Regions, and parts of the Chelyabinsk, Perm, and Orenburg Regions).

A specific feature of the area is that the peoples living in it are settled in patchwork fashion. The average density of the rural population is relatively high, ranging in 1970 from 26.7 per square kilometre in the Bashkir ASSR to 67.6 per square kilometre in the Chuvash ASSR.

The Far North of Europe includes two Autonomous Republics (the Karelian and Komi ASSRs), two Autonomous Areas (the Nenets and the Komi-Permyak), and six regions. The data for this area analysed here related to the two biggest peoples, the Karelians and the Komi. Two other peoples, the Nenets and the Saami, who have more traits in common with the peoples of the Far North of Siberia by virtue of the specific features of their culture, require special ethnographic consideration in conjunction with the neighbouring peoples of Siberia. In addition small, not very numerous groups of Finnish-speaking people (Weps, Wods, Izhors, and Finns) live in several parts of the region. The number of Weps in the area was 8 280 in 1970, of Wods and Izhors 784, and of Finns 46 447, a high percentage of them living in towns. The total number of these peoples was higher in the past, but in the course of time they have merged with neighbouring peoples (especially Karelians and Russians) for several reasons (peculiarities of settlement, migration), which has led to their gradually losing their identity, language, and specific features of their culture.[1] The part of the area considered is more uniform in ethnic structure than the Volga region and the Urals and has a relatively compact distribution of population, but with a much lower average density of the population (0.8 per square kilometre in the Komi ASSR in 1979, and 0.9 per square kilometre in Karelia).

In order to characterise the ethnic processes among the peoples of these areas we shall take certain basic information about them: viz., data on numbers and distribution, the ethnic environment, the ratio of rural and

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[1] For further details about these peoples see: N. Shlygina. The Wods, Izhors, and Leningrad Finns. In: V. N. Belitser *et al.* (Eds.) *Narody Evropeiskoi chasti SSSR*, Vol. 2 (Nauka, Moscow, 1964), pp 310-328; V. Pimenov. The Weps. *Ibid.*, pp 364-376; and the Central Statistical Board of the USSR. *Itogi vsesoyuznoi perepisi naseleniya 1970g* (Returns of the 1970 Census), Vol. 4 (Statistika, Moscow, 1973).

urban population, and their social and professional structure.

Considerable differences in the absolute numbers and dynamics of the peoples are typical of the areas being considered. The numerical factor—the absolute size of the contacting peoples—in itself already affects the course of ethnic processes. Long ethnic interaction of peoples very different in numbers usually leads, for instance, to the smaller one being dissolved into the milieu of the other. The movement of the numerical size of populations affects the trend of ethnic processes (see Table 1). The rates of growth of the peoples considered can be broken down into three groups: (1) those of the Tatars, Bashkirs, Chuvash, and Mari people, which are higher than the mean growth figures for the whole USSR, and for Russians in the RSFSR; (2) those with indices rather lower than average, namely the Udmurts and the Komi people; (3) those characterised by a decline in numbers, viz., the Mordvins and Karelians. [1] Numbers and rates of growth, and the indices of the population's natural movement, are determined to some extent by the peculiarities of these peoples' ethnic evolution. The birth rates of the different peoples of the USSR vary markedly from the average for the country. These differences also reflect ethnic features of the process of natural reproduction, the stability of family traditions, and certain of the population's standards of values. When the numbers of children per 1000 mothers, for instance, are compared for the republics concerned, a much higher index of childbearing is found among the mothers of the indigenous nationalities than among Russian women: in the Bashkir, Tatar, and Chuvash ASSRs, for instance, the average number of children per 1000 Bashkir, Tatar, and Chuvash mothers in 1970 was 2570 in towns and 2793 in the country, and per 1000 Russian mothers 1700 and 2153 children respectively.[2] This higher birth rate, with comparable and, on the whole, much lowered rates of infant mortality, affects the rates of natural growth of these republics' multinational population. The rapid increase in numbers of the different peoples reflects, in addition, the course of their consoli-

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[1] See: S. I. Bruk. Ethnodemographic Processes in the USSR (from the Returns of the 1970 Census). *Sovetskaya etnografiya*, 1971, 4: 24.
[2] Calculated from the returns of the USSR 1970 Census.

Table 1.

**Dynamics of the Population of the Volga, Urals, and
Far North of Europe**

People	Total population (for the USSR as a whole) in thousands	1979 as a percentage of			
	1979	1926	1939	1959	1970
Tatars	6 317	190.8	146.4	127.2	106.5
Chuvash	1 751	156.8	127.8	119.1	103.4
Mordvins	1 192	89.0	81.9	92.8	94.4
Bashkirs	1 371	192.0	162.5	138.6	110.6
Udmurts	714	138.9	117.8	114.2	101.4
Mari	622	145.3	129.2	123.4	103.8
Komi, Komi-Permyaks	478	127.1	113.2	110.9	100.6
Karelians	138	55.6	54.5	82.6	94.5

Sources: S. I. Bruk. Ethnodemographic Processes in the USSR (after the returns of the 1970 Census). *Sovetskaya etnografiya*, 1971, 4:25. *Naselenie SSSR...* (Politizdat, Moscow, 1980).

dation, while the decline in numbers of certain peoples also records a process of gradual assimilation (for further details, see below).

The compactness of settlement of the peoples of the Volga and Urals differs in degree. Those most compactly settled are the Udmurts and Chuvash, the most dispersed are the Mordvins. This caused considerable difficulties in the past, and to some extent still does, as regards ethnic consolidation, which is obvious from the example of the Mordvins, whose main groups, the Erza and the Moksha, are divided territorially from one another. The settlement of Tatars in the Central Volga and the Urals, where they live compactly, and in other areas where they are dispersed among Russians, is also characteristic in this respect.

In Czarist Russia the processes of consolidation of the Volga and Urals peoples were complicated even more by their being broken up among the small administrative units—*uezds* and *volosts* (ridings or counties and parishes) of several provinces. The Kazan Tatars, for example, were broken up among 11 counties of three different provinces. [1]

[1] N. I. Vorobiev, G. M. Khisamutdinov (Eds.). *Tatary Srednego Povolzh'ya i Priural'ya* (Tatars of the Middle Volga and Urals), Nauka, Moscow, 1967; N. I. Vorobiev. *Kazanskie tatary* (Kazan Tatars), Kazan, 1953.

The creation of autonomous republics and areas after the Revolution greatly accelerated ethnic consolidation.

The complexity of settlement and the ethnic patchwork made the state system of these peoples extremely complicated. The greatest coincidence of ethnic boundaries with those of the autonomous units was achieved in the Udmurt ASSR, the least in the Tatar and Mordovian ASSRs. The degree of compactness of settlement of the different peoples determined the degree of difference between their total numbers and the numbers settled within their own republics. The least divergence of these two figures is noted among the Komi people, Bashkirs, and Udmurts, the greatest among Mordvins and Tatars (see Table 2, left-hand column).

Table 2.

Distribution of the Peoples of the Volga, Urals, and European North
(after the 1970 Census)

People	Living in their own republic, as a percentage	
	of the nation	of the population of the republic
Komi	85.8	28.6
Bashkirs	72.0	23.4
Udmurts	68.8	34.1
Karelians	57.5	11.8
Chuvash	50.5	70.0
Mari	49.9	43.6
Mordvins	28.9	35.5
Tatars	25.9	49.0

Source: calculated from Central Statistical Board of the USSR. *Itogi Vseso-yuznoi perepisi naseleniya 1970 goda*, Vol. 4 (Statistika, Moscow, 1973).

The ethnic environment has an essential effect on the trend of ethnic processes. The facts on the relative weight of the main nationality within its own republic present interest in that connection. It is highest in the Chuvash ASSR, where Chuvash constitute 70 per cent of the total population. In 1970 in the Komi ASSR and the Karelian ASSR the indigenous nationality was 20 per cent of the republic's total population in the first case, and around 12 per cent in the second case. The figures cited are not constant values, but vary according to the indices of the popula-

tion's natural growth, migration, and ethnic processes. The composition of the population of the Bashkir ASSR is comparatively stable. In the Tatar and Mordovian ASSRs the indigenous population has the highest increment in specific weight; in the other republics it is falling, especially in the Udmurt, Komi, and Karelian ASSRs. This is directly due to the rapid growth of their population through the influx of people of other nationalities from outside.

Russians are the biggest nationality among the non-indigenous population of the republics surveyed. [1] Their proportions vary from 24.5 per cent in the Chuvash ASSR to 68 per cent in the Karelian ASSR. The number of Tatars living in other Autonomous Republics of the Volga than the Tatar ASSR varies between 3 and 6 per cent of their total population, and the number of Chuvash between 3 and 5 per cent. In the Komi and Karelian ASSR there is a quite significant percentage of Ukrainians and Byelorussians (up to 9 per cent). On the whole the Chuvash ASSR has the most homogeneous national composition and the Karelian and Bashkir ASSRs the least. In the Bashkir ASSR the most numerous indigenous nationalities are Russians (40.5 per cent), Tatars (24.7 per cent) and Bashkirs (23.4 per cent). [2]

It is important, when we are investigating ethnic processes, to take the ratio of the urban and rural populations into account, because town and country differ in a marked way in both the rates and the trends of these processes.

In Czarist Russia the peoples of the Volga, Urals, and North were overwhelmingly peasants; only among the Tatars was there a small number of townsmen (11 per cent in 1897). The proportion of the urban population among each of these peoples is given in Table 3. As will be seen from the table there was a rapid growth of the urban population among the indigenous nationalities in the 43 years between the 1926 and 1970 censuses. In comparison with the figures for the USSR as a whole, those for the republics show that these indices are very close for the Karelians, Komi, and Chuvash. Among the other peoples the urban population grew more rapidly outside the republic than within it, and in areas of former dispersed settlement or of modern migra-

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[1] We arbitrarily call the members of all nationalities that do not coincide in name with the name of the Autonomous Republic 'non-indigenous'.

[2] Central Statistical Board of the USSR. *Op. cit.*, p 16.

tion. Accelerated growth in numbers of townsmen through internal migration of the indigenous rural population was most characteristic of the Chuvash ASSR, which is why the proportion of the indigenous population to the total urban population is especially high in Chuvashia (see Table 3).

Table 3.

Degree of Urbanisation of the Indigenous Populations of the Volga, Urals, and European North
(after the 1926, 1959, and 1970 Censuses)

People	Degree of Urbanisation			In their own republic 1970	Proportion of the indigenous nationality in the republic's total urban population
	for the USSR as a whole				
	1926	1959	1970		
Tatars	14.4	47.3	55.0	38.6	29.7
Karelians	2.9	31.0	44.8	44.7	24.3
Komi	2.6	24.4	36.4	33.1	13.6
Mordvins	2.2	29.1	36.1	17.2	8.3
Udmurts	1.2	22.3	32.1	28.0	14.5
Chuvash	1.6	19.7	29.1	23.0	36.0
Bashkirs	2.1	19.7	26.6	17.6	7.8
Mari	0.8	11.7	20.5	14.6	11.3

Source: compiled from the returns of the 1926, 1959, 1970 Censuses.

What has been said about the size of urban and rural populations needs to be supplemented by data on the social structure of the peoples studied. When the ratios of social groups are compared by years there is a marked growth in numbers of workers and employees through a drop in the number of persons engaged in agriculture. Between 1939 and 1959, for instance, their numbers almost doubled. In 1959 the highest proportion of workers and employees was recorded among Karelians and the Komi people (92.5 and 72.7 per cent of the total population respectively); among Tatars, Bashkirs, and Udmurts it averaged 42.7 per cent; among the other peoples of the region under consideration it was rather lower in 1959 (around 30 per cent). [1]

[1] Calculated from the 1959 Census returns; for further details on these processes in the USSR see: Yu. V. Arutyunian. Changes in the Social Structure of the Soviet Nations. *Istoriya SSSR*, 1972, 4; Yu. V. Arutyunian and A. A. Dolinin. General Trends. In: Yu. V. Arutyunian *et al.* (Eds.). *Sotsial'noe i natsional'noe* (The Social and National. An Experiment in Ethnosociological Research in the Tatar ASSR), Nauka, Moscow, 1973, pp 14-23; O. I. Shkaratan. Structure and Social Mobility of the Urban Population. In: Yu. V. Arutyunian *et al.* (Eds.). *Op. cit.*, pp 24-51.

In subsequent years the number of workers and employees grew increasingly faster (a very vital change in social structure).

Urbanisation and balancing of the nations' social structure were also accompanied with radical changes in the professional structure of these republics' populations through an increase in skilled types of work, which in turn had a vital effect on the course of their ethnic evolution.

We begin our survey of ethnic processes with those of consolidation. Consolidation of the socialist economy and of a social structure of uniform type, rapid growth of the urban population and urbanisation of the rural population, and the development of economic and cultural links within ethnic communities have helped strengthen their internal ethnic structure, eliminate the isolation of the ethnic subdivision inherited from the past, and mould a sense of ethnic unity. In that connection the data on changes in ethnic identity are specially indicative. During the Tatar nation's socialist development, for instance, a Tatar identity has taken shape among previously isolated Tatar language groups (Mishars, Kryashens, Nagaibaks), which largely explains the very marked growth in numbers of Tatars recorded by the censuses (see Table 1). There is also active consolidation of the Mordvin nation, viz., an ethnic and cultural convergence of the two components of its ethnic communities (Moksha Mordvins and Erza Mordvins), which was reflected to some extent in the 1970 Census. The tendency to be aware of their ethnic unity has been manifested more strongly among urban Mordvins than among countrymen. [1]

Among the other peoples of the Volga and Urals (Mari, Chuvash) unity of identity had already been recorded in previous censuses. At the same time the folk memory has not lost past notions of their division into isolated local ethnic groups. The Mari ethnos included three such groups, the Chuvash two. Geographical spatial epithets were long used to distinguish them. Among the Mari people the following were distinguished: Hill Mari living on the high, hilly right bank of the Volga, Lea or Forest Mari living in wooded localities on the left bank of the Volga, and Eastern Mari

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[1] V. N. Belitser, V. A. Balashov. Certain Features of the Modern Ethnic Evolution of the Mordvin People. *Sovetskaya etnografiya*, 1968, 1: 123.

living in the Bashkir ASSR and partly in Sverdlovsk Region and the Tatar ASSR. The Chuvash were divided into the Upper Chuvash living along the upper reaches of the Sura River, and the Lower Chuvash, settled along its lower course. The specific local features of these ethnic groups of Mari and Chuvash used to be manifested in their everyday mode of life and certain features of their culture, and in peculiarities in the dialectal differences of their languages. The last are still felt to some extent even now in their culture, as will be seen below.

Changes in the linguistic situation are important evidence of the evolution of consolidation. The elimination of dialectal peculiarities and the forming of a common literary language are usually evidence of the overcoming of barriers between a people's isolated local groups, and encourage their merging. Among the peoples of the Volga, Urals, and North who had previously lacked a system of writing (except the Tatars and Bashkirs, who had employed the Arabic script), these complex processes can now be considered almost completed. [1] In Soviet conditions they are not so much spontaneous as controlled by a system of measures to ensure maximum extension of the communicative functions and improvement of the structure of the literary languages created. The rapid spread of the literary languages was encouraged by their introduction in the domains of education, business correspondence, and secretarial work, literature, science, the mass media (press, radio and cinema), etc. The conditions for real use of the literary languages came about as a result of the general increase in literacy among the population and its active involvement in the realm of state socio-political activity and social production. A direct dependence is also discernible between the extent to which the common national languages have spread and the character of settlement, the ratio of the urban to the rural population, and their sex and age structure, etc. [2]

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[1] M. I. Isaev. *Sto tridtsat' ravnopravnykh (o yazykakh narodov SSSR)* (One Hundred and Thirty Equals: on the Languages of the Peoples of the USSR), Nauka, Moscow, 1970.

[2] M. N. Guboglo. On the Effect of Settlement on Linguistic Processes. *Sovetskaya etnografiya*, 1969, 5: 16-29; E. I. Klementiev. The National and Cultural Orientation of the Karelian Urban Population. *Sovetskaya etnografiya*, 1976, 3: 57-68.

Linguistic consolidation not only has common features among the peoples under study, as a result of which a single literary language for the whole people is taking shape, but also has its specific features. Among Mordvins, for example, the two closely related literary languages Erzan and Mokshan are interacting, with active use of Russian. Among the Mari people, where two literary languages were originally formed for the Lea Mari and the Hill Mari, there is now a gradual transition to one of them, that of the Lea Mari. Among the Bashkir population of the Bashkir ASSR, a third of whom long ago passed to using Tatar, two literary languages function, Bashkir and Tatar. Consolidation of the Karelians is taking place, because of the peculiarities of their ethnic development, on the basis of Russian and Finnish.

As a literary language's functions expand, the sphere of the use of dialects shrinks. At present they are limited solely to everyday life in the more remote rural communities, and are mainly spoken by old folk. The use of dialects in oral speech is also characteristic where the people is scattered and other languages of peoples of the USSR (predominantly Russian) function as the literary language.

In the domain of material culture consolidation is taking place in the following way. Those elements of material culture that preserve traditional forms to the greatest extent also retain many former local differences most stably. Dress is the best example. Among the rural population of Chuvashia, for example, a single style of traditional women's dress has gradually taken shape, consisting of a shiftdress similar to those of city cut, trousers, apron, a headscarf, and factory-made work shoes of modern style. But details are introduced into this common national ensemble, as regards the range of colours, accessories, and decoration typical of the clothes of the various ethnographic groups of Chuvash. [1]

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[1] M. Ya. Sirotkina, V. I. Kuzmina (Eds.). *Chuvashi*, (The Chuvash), Vol. 1, *Material'naya kul'tura* (Material Culture), (Chuvash State Publishers, Cheboksary, 1956), pp 253-349; *Chuvashskoye izobrazitel'noye iskusstvo* (The Chuvash Fine Arts), Chuvash State Publishers, Cheboksary, 1960, pp 13-46; see also: S. N. Shitova. Folk Costume of the Bashkirs. In: R. G. Kuzeev *et al.* (Eds.) *Arkheologiya i etnografiya Bashkirii*, Vol. 3 (BF AN SSSR, Ufa, 1968), pp 125-227.

In those elements of material culture that have been large-
ly subject to reconstruction and modernisation because
of scientific and technical progress, new features have taken
shape that are not only common to each given ethnos
but are also drawing it closer to other peoples, especially
related or neighbouring ones.

In the domain of spiritual culture the processes of eth-
nic consolidation have been greatly encouraged by the
flowering of all forms of professional culture, which is al-
ready developing as a general national culture. That ap-
plies especially to such mass forms of culture as the theatre,
literature, and music. [1]

The processes of assimilation are affecting those groups
of the population today who, though compact, are a rela-
tively small inclusion in another national environment, and
also those who are settled in a scattered, dispersed way.

Two trends have been observed in these processes: (1)
one indigenous nationality assimilates another, usually
smaller in numbers; or (2) small groups of one people or
another merge with Russians. Both these trends were oper-
ating in Czarist Russia, but then, in addition to natural
assimilation, there was forced assimilation. Natural as-
similation reflected natural processes of the interaction of
ethnoi, usually when there was numerical inequality; the
second type was the consequence of Czarism's policy. In to-
day's conditions in the USSR, with full equality of all na-
tionalities guaranteed, there is only natural assimilation.

An important stage in this process is linguistic assimi-
lation; a change in the elements of culture and everyday
life is also important. The end result of any assimilation
(like consolidation) is a change in ethnic identity. In the

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[1] G. M. Khisamutdinov. Education and Culture. In: N. I. Voro-
biev and G. M. Khisamutdinov (Eds.), *Op. cit.*, pp 398-433; 446-451;
V. N. Belitser, N. I. Vorobiev, L. N. Terentieva, N. N. Cheboksarov,
N. V. Shlygina (Eds.) *Narody Evropeiskoi* chasti SSSR, Vol. 2 (Nauka,
Moscow, 1964); R. Taroeva. The Karelians, Spiritual Culture, pp 360-
363; V. N. Belitser. The Komi People. Spiritual Culture, pp 433-442;
idem., The Komi-Permyaks. Spiritual Culture, pp 465-471; *idem.* (with
A. Novitskaya). The Udmurts. Spiritual Culture, pp 504-509; T. Kryu-
kova. The Mari People. Spiritual Culture, pp 540-547; V. N. Belitser.
The Mordvins. Spiritual Culture, pp 587-597; N. I. Vorobiev. The
Chuvash. Spiritual Culture, pp 624-633; *idem.* The Volga Tatars.
Spiritual Culture, pp 668-681; R. G. Kuzeev and S. N. Shitova. The
Bashkirs. Spiritual Culture, pp 730-741.

region we are concerned with all these stages in the assimi-
lation process are observable in various combinations.

The dynamics of the stability of mother tongues among
the people we are studying come out in Table 4. It is clear
from the data that the transition to Russian is most inten-
sive among Karelians and Mordvins. Among Karelians, for
instance, the number of persons who recognised Russian
as their mother tongue was 4.5 per cent in 1926, 28.0 per
cent in 1959, and 36.1 per cent in 1970. Among Mordvins
the figures were 6.0 per cent in 1926 and 21.3 per cent in
1970. In this connection we would point to the Bashkirs,
a third of whom had already passed to using Tatar several
centuries ago while steadfastly preserving their ethnic iden-
tity. To some extent that also applies to certain ethnic
groups of Mordvins, for example the Karatai Mordvins,
who speak Tatar but retain their identity.[1] Among other
Volga and Urals peoples the index of divergence of mother
tongue and national affiliation varied in 1970 between 8
to 9.5 per cent and 17.0 per cent among the Mari and Tatars
and from 12.1 to 16.6 per cent among the Chuvash and Komi
people. The variation depends on many factors, whether

Table 4.

Ratio of Nationality and Mother Tongue
(after the Census Returns for the RSFSR)

People	Percentage considering the national language their mother tongue		
	1926	1959	1970
Mari	99.3	95.5	91.9
Tatars	98.9	93.6	90.5
Udmurts	98.9	89.6	83.5
Chuvash	98.7	91.5	87.9
Komi	96.5	89.9	83.4
Karelians	95.5	72.0	63.9
Mordvins	94.0	79.9	79.7
Bashkirs	53.8	61.6	65.9

Sources: the returns of the 1926, 1959, and 1970 USSR Censuses.

[1] R. G. Kuzeev, S. N. Shitova. Bashkiry (The Bashkirs), BF AN
SSSR, Ufa, 1963, p 8; V. N. Belitser. The Karatai Mordvins and
Their Culture. In: V*oprosy etnicheskoi istorii Mordovskogo naroda*
(Trudy Instituta Etnografii AN SSSR, No. 13), USSR Academy of
Sciences Publishers, Moscow, 1960, pp 227-257.

the process relates to town or country, within the national republic or outside it. In 1970, for example, 43.5 per cent of Mordvin townsmen gave Russian as their mother tongue, but only 10.1 per cent of countrymen. Among Karelians the corresponding figures were 49.5 and 26.5 per cent.

The percentage of persons within their republic who declared a mother tongue other than the republic's national language was 1.6 among Tatars, 5.5 among Chuvash, 3.8 among Mordvins, and so on; outside the republics the figures were 14.0, 21.0, and 29.6 respectively.[1]

There are also certain differences in the degree of divergence of nationality and mother tongue according to age and sex. It is met more often among children and young people than among the older generations, especially among peoples for whom the adopting of another language is a less active process. Among Chuvash children aged 0 to 15, for example, the discrepancy was 14 per cent in 1970; in the age group 20-29 it was 11.8 per cent; and in the 30-39 bracket 7.4 per cent. For peoples among whom the process of change of language is more intensive, the differences noted between age groups are less pronounced (e.g. among Mordvins and Karelians). Sex differences are insignificant but the divergence of mother tongue from nationality is higher among males than among females in both town and country. Among Mordvins and Karelians, for instance, the gap between the sexes is 7 or 8 per cent in town and 3 or 4 per cent in the country.[2]

When all the factors mentioned that affect the divergence of nationality and mother tongue are compared, two stand out especially: (1) whether they are taking place in town or country, and (2) within the republic or outside it. The wider the gap between a given group and the main ethnic mass, and the more dispersed the given ethnos is, the more sharply the divergence between language and nationality makes itself felt. Other factors (age and sex) affect it less, and are themselves also largely governed by the first two.[3]

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[1] Calculated from the census returns of the Central Statistical Board of the USSR, *Op. cit.*

[2] *Ibid.*

[3] V. V. Pimenov. The Mother Tongue as a Factor in Ethnic Integration (from Udmurt data). In: N. N. Rochev *et al.* (Eds.) *Leninskaya natsional'naya politika v deistvii* (Theses of Papers and Communications at a Zonal Conference on the 50th Anniversary of the Komi ASSR), Komi Book Publishers, Syktyvkar, 1971, pp 186-188.

The stability of the components of traditional material and spiritual culture varies greatly during assimilation. Since these processes, however, mainly affect small, scattered groups, as we noted above, the features of traditional culture typical of the main nucleus of the ethnos are preserved least of all in their environment in modern conditions. In merging with another ethnos, these groups, it has been noted, are usually receptive not to its features that have come down from earlier times and reflect the ethnos' definite specific ethnic character but to those common Soviet features that have taken shape during the socialist transformations of culture and daily life. On the whole, the degree to which the traditional features of the interacting ethnoi's cultures are borrowed is thus not very great during assimilation.

The surveys made among Tatars and Karelians disclosed a certain dependence between change of language and the subjects' attitude to one feature or another of their national culture and to the penetration of non-native elements into the domain of family and everyday life. It was found, for instance, that linguistic processes play a specially vital role among the factors determining (rural) Karelians' definite departure from traditional forms of culture; the change in mother tongue also signified a weakening of the orientation of that part of the population on Karelian culture. In the Tatar ASSR the same direct link was noticed between linguistic processes and orientations on interethnic contacts in everyday life; an increase in a positive attitude to such contacts (e.g. to nationally mixed marriages) was also determined by the degree of linguistic assimilation.[1]

The change in ethnic identity in the area under consideration is most marked among Mordvins and Karelians. Among Mordvins it is mainly due, apparently, to the peculiarities of their settlement and their high mobility. The process of natural assimilation of Mordvins (mainly by Russians and Tatars) is very old. Let us take the ethnographic group of Teryukhan Mordvins, living in Gorky Region (the former Nizhny-Novgorod Province), as an example. In the middle of the nineteenth century they lived in 49 villages, and their numbers totalled about 25 000. At the

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[1] M. N. Guboglo. The Socio-ethnic Consequences of Bilingualism. *Sovetskaya etnografiya*, 1972, 2: 33-36.

beginning of this century they adopted Russian, but still considered themselves Mordvins in the 1920s. At the present time they all count themselves Russians; their material and spiritual culture has lost its characteristic features and merged with Russian. Another group of Mordvins, the Karatai mentioned above, live in the Tatar ASSR. They have adopted the Tatar language but preserve their Mordvin identity. Mordovian, Russian, and Tatar features are noticeable in their culture.[1] The present-day processes of the merging of separate groups of Mordvins with Russians, and the period of their highest intensity, can be judged, in particular from the demographic data; in spite of a relatively high rate of natural growth, the total numbers of the Mordvin people fell by 13.3 per cent between 1939 and 1959, and by 1.7 per cent between 1959 and 1970 (see Table 1).

The assimilation of Karelians by Russians is more marked among those who resettled in the Tver Province (now Kalinin Region) in the seventeenth century, or those who changed their place of residence through evacuation during the war (1941-5).[2] Within the Karelian ASSR assimilation is less intensive than among Karelians living outside it, but it is still more marked than among the indigenous peoples of the other republics in the region we are studying. Apart from the long-standing close ethnic and cultural contacts of Karelians with Russians, mentioned above, the difference is due to several factors specific to modern Karelia: viz., the special features of the national structure of its population built up during industrialisation (a considerable preponderance of other nationalities, especially Russians, over the indigenous population); its social structure (a high proportion of workers, among whom ethnic merging proceeds much more actively than among peasants); the specially high percentage of mixed families, and so on. Very essential, too, is the functional significance of Russian in the Karelian ASSR.

Processes of cultural integration are especially charac-

[1] V. I. Kozlov. *Dinamika chislennosti narodov* (The Dynamics of the Size of Peoples), Moscow, 1969, pp 342, 343; *idem.*, The Settlement of Erza and Moksha Mordvins. *Sovetskaya etnografiya*, 1958, 2: 50.

[2] I. P. Pokrovskaya. The Population of Karelia in 1920-1969. In: A. I. Afanasieva, V. I. Mashesersky, K. A. Morozov (Eds.) *50 let Sovetskoi Karelii* (Karelia Publishers, Petrozavodsk, 1970), pp 268-308.

teristic of the region under consideration. This is primarily due to the peculiarities of the settlement of the peoples of the Volga, Urals, and North, and their common historical past. Today's peoples followed a path of physical and cultural merging in their formation. In the Middle Volga and Urals the local Finnish-speaking tribes interacted in the early stages with incoming Turkic tribes.

The results of the interaction of these peoples' cultures are quite evident, in particular, in the many similar features of their material culture, especially dress. Mari women's smocks (shifts) are similar in cut and ornamentation to those of the Moksha Mordvins. The shape of the Chuvash headdress is similar to the Mordovian and Mari; the dress of the Hill Mari is difficult to distinguish from that of the Upper Chuvash. The spread of women's smocks with a frill or flounce made of multicoloured, coarse homespun linen or hemp cloth among Mari women was undoubtedly a Tatar or Bashkir influence; in the women's dress of various Tatar ethnic groups there are separate details adopted from the Mordovian costume; the towel-like headdress of Bashkir women resembles the women's headbands of the Chuvash and Finnish-speaking people of the Volga. There are many common features in Bashkir and Tatar men's dress and headgear; and the multicoloured women's leather footwear, bast shoes, etc., of these people are of the same type.[1]

The various degrees of ethnic kinship of these peoples and the marked differences in their mode of economy, the close contact between the settled agricultural populations and the nomadic pastoralists, the considerable differences in their social structure, etc., all led to specially complicated and often unexpected combinations of features of the culture of any one ethnic unit. Take, for example, the fact of the adoption by settled agriculturalists of elements of a costume not normal to them but typical of nomads, in particular of trousers with a wide crutch or gusset among southern Udmurts.[2]

[1] For further details see: R. G. Kuzeev, S. N. Shitova. *Op. cit.*, R. G. Mukhamedova. *Tatary-mishari* (Mishar Tatars), Moscow, 1972; V. N. Belitser. Narodnaya odezhda Mordvy (Mordvin Folk Costume), Moscow, 1973; G. S. Maslova. Dress. In: Yu. V. Bromley *et al* (Eds.). *Sovremennie etnicheskie protsessy v SSSR* (Nauka, Moscow, 1975), pp 212, 227-229, 233-238.
[2] N. I. Vorobiev. Conclusion to N. I. Vorobiev and G. M. Khisamutdinov (Eds.), *Op. cit.*, p 508.

After the annexation of the Central Volga and Urals by Russia conditions developed for broad contacts between the peoples of this region and Russians, predominantly with the rural population. These contacts, as described earlier, embraced the sphere of the peoples' economic activity and certain aspects of everyday life. We would mention, in particular, the building of a single type of dwelling (close to the South Russian type) among the peoples of the Volga and Urals under the influence of Russian architecture; the adoption from the Russians of their interior layout of houses, types of stove, manner of decorating peasants' log cottages, gates, and fences with complicated wood carving; the borrowing of various farm implements and ways of farming; the introduction of new crops, and the spread of vegetable growing and horticulture.

Russians' long contacts with the peoples of the Volga and Urals in turn determined their adoption of many features of the culture of the indigenous population of the area; for example, the spread of crafts like jewellery-making, felt-making, and the tanning of high-quality leather (yuft or Russian leather), so characteristic of the Tatars, among the Russian rural population.

Russians also adopted certain specific architectural features from the Volga peoples: viz., conical structures and buildings with flat roofs, dugouts and semi-dugouts, farmsteads with a free siting of structures; and widely adopted the style of polychrome painting of dwellings. Other types of farm implements and farm buildings became common (e.g. the *saban*, a type of plough for heavy steppe soils; and the *shishi*, a grain-drier of special construction); and two-storey barns or granaries. In dress Russians took over various kinds of robelike and sleeveless garments, types of headgear, kinds of footwear, and styles and motifs of decorating clothing. Dishes and utensils were also widely borrowed. And there was also a certain borrowing of terminology—in the names of items of material culture.[1] The intensity of interethnic contacs increased as trade developed and these peoples were drawn into the orbit of capitalist relations. Factors retarding reciprocal influence were the low

[1] E. P. Busygin. *Russkoe naselenie Srednego Povolzh'ya* (The Russian Population of the Central Volga), Kazan, 1966, pp 246-280; N. I. Vorobiev. Settlements and Dwellings. In: N. I. Vorobiev and G. M. Khisamutdinov (Eds.). *Op. cit.*, pp 89-113.

mobility of the population (except for seasonal migration, especially among Tatars), the extremely small number of townsmen, various religious bans (especially among Moslems), and a low level of literacy. The last circumstance, plus poor knowledge of Russian, prevented those peoples from acquiring Russian culture, which was more advanced at the time.

In the north of the European part of the USSR the processes of cultural interaction proceeded differently. Unlike the Volga peoples, the Karelians mainly had intercourse with related Finnish-speaking peoples (Saami, Weps, Izhors, Wods, and Finns). The culture within the separate local groups of Karelians was consequently more uniform. The differences between them showed mainly in the dialects of their language. The Karelians came into close contact with Russians earlier than the peoples of the Volga and Urals, which largely determined the trend of development of their economy and many features of their culture. At the same time the Russian population in Karelia, as on the Volga, was affected by the culture of the aborigines of the area.[1]

The ethnic contacts of the Komi people with other peoples were quite weak in the past, and were limited for a long time to the neighbouring Nenets population (mainly the northern group of the Komi people). From the Nenets they adopted reindeer herding, types of fur garments, means of transport, and certain other features of their culture. After settlement of the area by Russians, the Komi's culture, like that of the Karelians, came under the active influence of Russian culture. From the Russians they adopted the North Russian style of dwelling, women's dress, and certain traditions of applied folk art (e. g. polychrome painting on wood).[2]

The national policy of the Communist Party and Soviet State, and accelerated development of the economy and culture of the previously backward provinces of Czarist Russia (including the regions being considered here), have encouraged unhindered, all-round, interethnic contacts of the peo-

[1] V. V. Pimenov and T. F. Taroeva. Ethnic Processes in Soviet Karelia. In: A. I. Afanasieva *et al.* (Eds.). *Op. cit.*, pp 215-247.

[2] V. N. Belitser. Essays on the Ethnography of the Komi Peoples. (Trudy Instituta Etnografii AN SSSR, No. 15) USSR Academy of Sciences Publishers, Moscow, 1958); L. P. Lashuk, *Formirovanie narodnosti komi* (The Forming of the Komi Nationality), Moscow, 1972.

ples of the whole country, contacts that now embrace the most various spheres: examples are joint, equal involvement in the work of state bodies; intercourse at work; joint education of children and young people of various nationalities in schools and colleges; contacts in family life and social and public work; exchange of cultural values in all kinds of forms, and so on.

An important index of the convergence of peoples (and at the same time a basic condition of it) is the spread of a single lingua franca. In the USSR Russian has become this lingua franca, in particular in the regions being considered. According to the 1970 Census Russian is spoken freely either as a second language or as the mother tongue by up to 80 per cent of the individuals of non-Russian nationality in these regions (from 56.7 per cent among Bashkirs to 96.0 per cent among Karelians).[1]

The fate of traditional culture is closely linked with cultural interaction. Research has indicated a quite high degree of retention of traditional forms of material and spiritual culture by the peoples we are considering; at the same time two mutually complementary processes are developing vigorously, i. e. intensive spread of common Soviet features of culture, or of features adopted from neighbouring peoples, among both the urban and rural population, and a creative reworking of traditional old forms of culture in relation to modern requirements and tastes. Let us touch briefly on the essence of these processes.

Traditional features are preserved in the domain of material culture in elements that are directly linked with the people's everyday way of life: viz., housing, food, dress, and various kinds of applied art. In the villages of these republics, for instance, traditional types of dwelling predominate. The principal traditions of the old way of building are observed also in the villages in the building of new individual homes. This applies especially to the external finish of the house and to its interior. At the same time many new features have made their appearance; the layout of the house has become more complicated, and the bunk and sleeping shelf above the stove have been removed from the living premises. The kettle or copper built into or sus-

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[1] The problems of bilingualism are dealt with in the paper in this volume by S. I. Bruk and M. N. Guboglo. See pp 51-89.

pended above the stove has become a rarity, and modern city style furniture has been widely introduced. While the traditional decoration of dwellings with carving and polychrome painting persists, modern motifs, e.g. the hammer and sickle, dove of peace have been introduced into the ornamentation and there are new borrowings from neighbouring peoples.[1]

In new villages (e. g. in lumbering settlements in Karelia and the Komi ASSR) houses built to standard designs predominate. Traditional features in dwellings of this type are only retained in the interiors, in the way the furniture is arranged and in the interior decoration.[2]

Food, of course, is an element of material culture that retains traditional features most stably and at the same time takes in various innovations more rapidly and firmly, including interethnic borrowings. For the modern daily diet of the peoples of the Volga and Urals, both in town and country, a combination of general European cooking and dishes and culinary items traditional for them is characteristic. This is observed both in family life and in the widely developed system of public catering (cafeterias, restaurants, and special food shops). The traditions of Tatar cuisine are especially stable, and its influence on the everyday life of neighbouring Volga peoples and the Russian population of the area is just as marked now as it used to be. Various flour confections and ways of preparing meat dishes are most popular, such as various kinds of home-made noodles (*salma*, *lapish*), stuffed chicken, all kinds of pastries and pasties baked or fried in fat (*belyashi*—small pasties filled with meat; *pereme*; and *buarsak*—bits of pastry fried in fat; *chekchek*—bits of pastry prepared in the same way and drenched in honey). In the northern part of the area, among the population of the Karelian and Komi ASSR, similar phenomena are observed—a combination of these peoples' traditional cuisine and general European cooking. Mutual borrowing of many traditional elements of the daily diet

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[1] E. P. Busygin. *Op. cit.*, pp 280-290; R. G. Kuzeev, S. N. Shitova. The Modern Collective Farm Cottage of Northern Bashkirs. In: R. G. Kuseev and K. V. Salnikov (Eds.). *Arkheologiya i etnografiya Bashkirii*, Vol. 1 (BF AN SSSR, Ufa, 1962), pp 268-282; R. G. Mukhamedova. *Op. cit.*

[2] *Verkhnii Olonets—poselok lesorubov* (Upper Olonets, a Lumbermen's Settlement), Moscow/Leningrad, 1964, pp 146-150.

goes on parallel among the Karelian and Komi peoples in contact with newcomers of a Slav milieu (Russians, Ukrainians, and Byelorussians). The settlers, for example, have adopted ways of salting mushrooms new to them (especially Ukrainians and in part Byelorussians), ways of preparing *kalitka* (open pasties with a cereal or potato base), of baking fish pies, and of preparing dried and pickled fish, etc.

The degree to which traditional dress is retained varies greatly. Among the peoples of the Volga and Urals the traditional women's costume has lasted longer than among the Komi people, and especially than among the Karelians. In many Volga areas it was still common at the beginning of the 1920s, often in very archaic forms. The men's traditional costume went out of use among most of these peoples (except the Tatars and Bashkirs) much earlier.

City-style dress is typical now of all social strata of the urban and rural population of these republics, but with the inclusion of elements of one kind or another of the traditional dress. Let us consider a few examples. Elements of the traditional dress with city-style clothes are most pronounced among Tatars, Bashkirs, and Southern Udmurts. Elderly Tatar and Bashkir women wear a long, full variegated dress, ornamented leather boots *(ichigi)*, a sleeveless jacket or gilet, head scarves in the traditional manner, and a fitted (usually velvet) coat. Among young women, who meet the demands of modern fashion in the general silhouette of their costume, there is a marked preference for a traditional colour scheme and style (e.g. a dress cut wholly from variegated cloth). They also wear *ichigi*. In the modern dress of elderly Tatar and Bashkir men the long shirt worn outside the trousers with a waistcoat is still preserved, and skullcap *(tyubeteika)* and boots. Young men usually only wear a *tyubeteika* from the traditional elements of Tatar dress.

In the Chuvash ASSR men's white linen shirts and women's linen dresses cut and ornamented in a style characteristic of traditional Chuvash dress, are very popular among both Chuvash and Russians.[1]

The traditional women's costume has been most fully preserved among the Moksha Mordvins. It is worn by young

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[1] N. I. Vorobiev. *Economy and Material Culture.* In: N. I. Vorobiev, A. N. Lvova, N. R. Romanov, A. R. Simonova. (Eds.) *Chuvashi,* Part I (Chuvash State Publishers, Cheboksary, 1956), pp 272-277.

women and girls as well as by elderly women, but considerable changes have been made in its structure, affecting the cut of shirts, the ornamentation of clothes, and the colour range of embroidery. Both elderly and young women have made their contribution to creative development of the old traditional costume. In the 1940s and 1950s there was a creating of new types of women's folk costume among the Mari people, which took a different path among the Hill Mari and the Lea Mari.[1]

The various forms of applied art of the Volga, Urals, and Northern peoples have not only retained their significance in their present-day everyday life, but have received a new lease of life through the organization of special co-operative workshops in which folk artists make various items of the traditional arts and crafts. There are such co-operatives of Udmurt rug-weavers, Chuvash and Mari embroiders, Tatar leatherworkers, etc. The articles they make enjoy a lively demand among the republics' population and in other areas of the USSR.[2] The Central Industrial Institute of Arts and Crafts in Moscow devotes much attention to preserving and developing the traditions of applied folk art.[3]

[1] T. A. Kryukova. The Modern Women's Dress of the Volga Peoples (Udmurts, Mordvins). *Sovetskaya etnografiya*, 1950, 2: 77-92; *idem.*, Contribution to Study of the Modern Dress of the Mari People. *Uch. zap. Mariiskogo nauchnoissledovatel'skogo instituta yazyka, istorii, literatury*, No. 5 Yoshkar-Ola, 1953; G. S. Maslova. *Art cit.*, pp 224-227, 235-238.

[2] S. A. Avizhanskaya, N. V. Bikbulatov, R. G. Kuzeev, *Dekorativno-prikladnoe iskusstvo Bashkir* (The Decorative and Applied Arts of the Bashkirs), Bashkir Institute of History, Language and Literature of the USSR Academy of Sciences, Ufa, 1964; *idem.*, *Narodnoe iskusstvo Bashkir* (An Album of the Folk Art of the Bashkirs), Sovetsky khudozhnik, Leningrad, 1968; N. I. Vorobiev. Folk Art. In: M. I. Sirotkin and M. I. Ivanov (Eds.) *Chuvashi*, Vol. 2 (Chuvash Book Publishers, Cheboksary, 1970), pp 261-262; F. Kh. Valeev, N. I. Vorobiev. Folk Art. In: N. I. Vorobiev and G. M. Khisamutdinov (Eds.). *Op. cit.*, pp 501-504; T. Kryukova. *Mordovskoe narodnoe izobrazitel'noe iskusstvo* (Mordvin Folk Art), Saransk, 1968; N. S. Koroleva, *Narodnaya vyshivka RSFSR* (Folk Embroidery of the RSFSR), Moscow, 1961; E. F. Shumilov. From the History of the Implementing of Lenin's Plan of Monumental Propaganda in Udmurtia. In: A. N. Golubkova (Ed.). *Iskusstvo Udmurtii* (The Art of Udmurtia), No. 1, Udmurt Research Institute, Izhevsk, 1975), Nauka, Moscow, 1965.

[3] E. V. Pomerantseva (Ed.) *Russkie khudozhestvennye promysly* (Russian Arts and Crafts), Nauka, Moscow, 1965.

The processes of mutual enrichment are developing much faster in the domain of intellectual culture in today's conditions than in the sphere of material culture. While many traditional forms are being maintained stably by each nation (e. g. in family ceremonies and public celebrations), they are being actively developed and new forms are being created (a change in the subjects and images of modern folk work, a modernisation of genres, etc.). What is particularly characteristic today, however, is an active adoption of the intellectual values of one people by another, which applies both to certain forms of traditional culture (e. g. songs, dances, music) and even more to the various forms of professional culture that have emerged fairly recently among these peoples. The exchange of cultural values is not limited, of course, to the interaction of neighbouring nations. Each people is making its own contribution to the general Soviet culture and experiencing the latter's beneficial influence on its own.[1]

Many forms of professional culture—literature, music, theatre, the fine arts, etc.—have been born and developed among these nations during the building of socialism, with the help and assistance of members of the other nations of the Soviet Union, especially of the Russian people. This has helped to bring the cultures of these people closer together as well as evening up their cultural development. Translations of the works of their writers into Russian, and of Russian literature into the languages of the peoples of the region we are studying, have made them mutually accessille. Established forms and common elements in the cultural sphere are the inclusion of works by national composers and dramatists in the repertoires of national theatres, and in radio

[1] V. P. Bochkarev et al. The Flowering of the Mordovian People's Culture. In: M. V. Dorozhin et al. (Eds.). Pod zvezdoi Oktyabrya (Mordovian Book Publishers, Saransk, 1967), pp 219-294; N. I. Vorobiev and G. M. Khisamutdinov (Eds). Op. cit.: Kh. Kh. Tarmukhametov, F. I. Urmancheev. Folk Poetic Art, pp 433-441; M. N. Nigmedzyanov. Folk Music, pp 452-480; N. I. Vorobiev. Conclusion, pp 505-513; B. V. Bikbulatov. Bashkirskii aul (The Bashkir Village), Ufa, 1969, pp 147-187; N. A. Baskakov, R. G. Kuzeev (Eds.) Razvitie yazykov i kul'tur narodov SSSR v ikh vzaimosvyazi i vzaimodeistvii (The Development of the Languages and Cultures of the Peoples of the USSR in Their Interrelations and Interaction), BF AN SSSR, Ufa, 1976; N. V. Chistov. Certain Characteristic Features of the Converging of the Spiritual and Material Culture of the Peoples of the USSR. In: Yu. V. Bromley et al. (Eds.) Op. cit., pp 363-382.

and television programmes, the organisation of exhibitions of the work of these nations' artists, weeks of the art and culture outside their republics, broad publicity for their cultural achievements in the periodical press, and so on. That has promoted both an increasing exchange of the cultural birthrights of the peoples in contact with one another, and internationalisation of their artistic tastes.

The description of present-day ethnic processes in these regions would not be complete if we did not touch on the domain of family relations, in particular on mixed marriages and their significance for an ethnos' evolution. As the primary social nucleus the family functions simultaneously as the subject and the object of ethnic processes, mixed marriages usually speed up ethnic processes be they consolidatory, assimilatory, or integrational, but the development of such marriages and their frequency are themselves largely determined by the trend and course of these processes in the macro-environment.

Family surveys among the peoples of the Volga, Urals, and European North have yielded evidence of a quite high proportion of interethnic marriages in the past 20 years and of a tendency for such to become more frequent.[1] That relates equally both to the urban and the rural population. Let us take a few examples. In the main towns of the Volga and Urals Republics mixed marriages constituted the following proportions of all marriages in 1960: in Cheboksary, Saransk, and Ufa around 30 per cent, in Yoshkar-Ola 15 per cent, and in Kazan 12.0 per cent.[2] The proportion of interethnic marriages in rural localities is highest in the Karelian and Komi ASSRs, where it was as much as 45 to 50

[1] This statement is based on data obtained by the author from republican archives and the Archives of the Institute of Ethnography of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

[2] K. Kh. Khanazarov. On an Aspect of the Convergence of Nations. *Obshchestvennie nauki v Uzbekistane*, 1968, 6: 25; L. N. Terentieva. Research into the Family in the Republics of the Volga and Urals from the Angle of Ethnic Processes. In: V. N. Lyubimov *et al.* (Eds.). *Torzhestvo leninskoi natsional'noi politiki*, (Chuvash Research Institute, Cheboksary, 1972); O. I. Shkaratan. The Ethnosocial Structure of the Urban Population of the Tatar ASSR. *Sovetskaya etnografiya*, 1970, 3: 13.
Populations: Cheboksary (Chuvash ASSR) 1959—104 000, 1979—308 000; Saransk (Mordovian ASSR) 1959—91 000, 1979—264 000; Ufa (Bashkir ASSR) 1959—547 000, 1979—969 000; Yoshkar-Ola (Mari ASSR) 1959—89 000, 1979—201 000; Kazan (Tatar ASSR) 1959—647 000, 1979—993 000.

per cent of all marriages among workers in the timber industry in 1960 and 25 to 30 per cent among collective farmers.[1] A considerable number of both urban and rural mixed marriages involve the indigenous nationalities. Marriages of members of these nationalities with Russians predominate. In Bashkiria, however, Bashkir-Tatar marriages predominate over other variants. There has been a marked evening up of the proportion of men and women of the indigenous nationalities making mixed marriages. In 1965, for instance, even in Kazan where marriages between Tatar girls and men belonging by birth to other faiths than Islam used to be forbidden by the Mohammedan religion, an equal proportion of Tatar men and women married 'infidels' (in 1921 the number of Tatar women making such marriages was only one-sixth of the number of Tatar men marrying non-Tatar women).[2]

It is also no less vital for ethnic processes what ethnic groups or ethnographic units of a given ethnos contract unin_nation marriages. In Czarist Russia, with low mobility of the population and a preponderance of peasants, Russians and members of the indigenous nationalities usually married only within their local group, and that acted like a brake, along with other factors, on the consolidating of nations. In today's conditions marriages between members of different ethnic units of one and the same ethnic community occupy a considerable place in uni-nation marriages (e. g. marriages between Erza and Moksha Mordvins, Lower and Upper Chuvash, Northern and Southern Udmurts, etc.), which is undoubtedly having a favourable effect on the consolidating processes among these peoples.

The effect of mixed marriages or of marriages between members of different local groups of one nation on ethnic processes makes itself felt in the second generation. The offspring of such marriages not only distinctly display features of the integrated culture inherited from their parents but also (and this is particularly important) become conscious of belonging to one or other of the two interacting ethnoi. In this connection marriages between persons of different nationality also operate as a factor influencing change in a population's structure from the angle of its eth-

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[1] L. N. Terentieva. The Family—a Micromedium of Ethnic Processes. In: Yu. V. Bromley *et al.* (Eds.). *Op. cit.*, pp 463-475.
[2] From data in the State Archives of the Tatar ASSR.

nic composition. Surveys in the areas we are concerned with have indicated that young people's preference for one of the nationalities of their parents is determined by the trend of the ethnic processes in the macro-environment and not by traditions of adopting the father's nationality. In all variants of marriages the same tendency is displayed in the next generation: a reduction of the set of nationalities through selective preference either for the nationality that coincides with that of the autonomous republic or for Russian nationality (in Bashkiria, also, for Tatar nationality).[1]

Nationally mixed marriages, like other phenomena in ethnoi's affairs, belong to the domain of inter-person national relations, the effect of which is also governed by psychological factors. The increase in the frequency of interethnic marriages and the favourable attitude of the surrounding social milieu toward them, and the trends being manifested in the formation of young people's ethnic identity indicate an absence of national prejudice and the forging of firm, friendly links between the peoples we have been considering.[2]

The ethnic processes described above are also observable on the whole in other historico-cultural provinces of the Soviet Union, but in addition also have their own specific traits determined by the features of those regions' historical evolution. Features of settlement, the existence of close economic and cultural links between these nations, and the integrating role of Russian and Russian culture have all determined the direction and rates of the organic intermingling of simultaneously occurring processes of the consolidation of nations and of their integration, convergence, and merging. Equally characteristic, as well, is a specially active adoption of Russian culture and of the Russian language.

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[1] L. N. Terentieva. Young People's Determination of Their Nationality in Mixed Marriages. *Sovetskaya etnografiya*, 1969, 3: 20-31; O. I. Shkataran. *Op. cit.* p 15.; L. N. Zherebtsev. Contribution to the Matter of the Determination of the National Affiliation of Children of Mixed Marriages. In: N. N. Rochev *et al.* (Eds.). *Op. cit.*, pp 184-185.

[2] L. M. Drobizheva. Socio-cultural Features of the Personality and the National Situation (from the data of surveys in the Tatar ASSR). *Sovetskaya etnografiya*, 1971, 3: 3-16. Yu. V. Arutyunian. *Sotsial'naya struktura sel'skogo naseleniya* (Social Structure of the USSR'S Rural Population (Moscow, 1961), pp 189-202.

NATIONAL STATE DEMARCATION
AND THE ETHNIC EVOLUTION
OF THE PEOPLES OF CENTRAL ASIA

T. A. Zhdanko

In the 1920s there was a building of national republics throughout the Soviet Union; the general principles of the Communist Party's Leninist national policy, which ensured peoples' full equality, gave them assistance in overcoming economic and cultural backwardness, and provided freedom of national self-determination, were being put into practice. The common interests of the working people of the different nationalities that had taken the road of building a new society, their desire to pool their efforts, and their striving for fraternal co-operation found practical embodiment in the founding in December 1922 of a single multinational state, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The national demarcation of Central Asia carried out in 1924-5, the formation of new national republics, and their voluntary adherence to the USSR were an important stage in national state development and a major milestone in the establishment and development of the great commonwealth of Soviet nations.

Apart from its progressive effect on the future of the peoples of Central Asia, this historical act, which was prepared under Lenin's direct guidance, also took on broad international significance. In all preceding history there had been no such cases of peaceful settlement of the complicated state problems connected with the division of such an extensive territory and numerous, ethnically heterogeneous population along national lines. The formation of the national republics and regions of the Soviet East, and their subsequent rapid evolution, became a convincing example for

the peoples of the rest of the East, and of the whole world, that a just settlement of the national question was really possible.

The historical experience of the national demarcation of Central Asia is being studied in an all-round way by historians, philosophers, and lawyers; ethnographic study of it is no less important, above all to throw light on its role as a factor promoting ethnic processes of consolidation and ethnopolitical integration of the socialist nations and nationalities of Central Asia. To develop this problem, however, we must first investigate the peculiar ethnic situation that had built up in Central Asia at the time of the national demarcation, and which was taken into account by the Communist Party and Soviet state in carrying this demarcation through.

During the preparations for and carrying out of national demarcation the Central Asian region was studied in a comprehensive, thorough way; new facts were gathered that provided more precise information on the ethnic composition of the population, the size and areal settlement of the principal peoples and of their local groups. The need for urgent study of a whole series of theoretical ethnological matters then became clear: viz., how far the various peoples were ethnically consolidated; the historical authenticity of the ethnonyms and their correspondence to the people's own names for themselves; the economic, cultural, and ethnic gravitation of a host of isolated local ethnographic groups and dispersed minor nationalities to one major people or another.

It was also necessary to distinguish the trend and depth of assimilation processes in areas of mixed population (e. g. Uzbek/Tajik), and to determine the forms of ethnic identity and the predominant languages among the different groups in them. All these problems, and many others, took on truly urgent, vital significance during the national demarcation because they provided substantiation for the choice of optimum variants of the boundaries, territories, and names of the new states and national administrative formations.

It is with just this set of the matters that arose during national demarcation in connection with the historically established ethnic situation in Central Asia that this paper is concerned.

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On the eve of national demarcation, in 1923, the peoples of Central Asia who formed the population of the Turkestan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, and the Bukhara and Khorezm People's Soviet Republics, were at different levels of socio-economic development and ethnic consolidation. Their ethnic history had been a centuries' long process in which autochthonous, and ethnic components coming into the area in antiquity, the Middle Ages, and modern times were involved to varying degrees. Features of an ethnic community had begun to take shape among the peoples of Central Asia (Tajiks, Uzbeks, Turkomans, Kirghiz, Kazakhs, and Karakalpaks) in the ninth to twelfth centuries A.D., when the foundations of their languages, ethnic territories, and specific ethnographic features of their economy and mode of life were laid.

In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries their formation was affected by the considerable migration of Turkic-Mongolian tribes in connection with the Mongol conquest, and in the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries by the migration of nomadic and semi-nomadic Uzbek tribes. In that connection ethnologists usually date the concluding stage of the ethnogenesis of the Uzbeks, Kazakhs, Kirghiz, and Karakalpaks, i. e. peoples whose ethnic make-up most of all reflects the mass migrations of those historical periods, to the sixteenth century.

Three foci of centralisation took shape in Central Asia from the sixteenth and to the eighteenth centuries, viz., the Bukhara, Khiva, and Kokand Khanates, ruled by Uzbek dynasties.

The founding of the Khanates signified only a partial, incomplete overcoming of feudal disunity.[1] With the prevailing appanage system the khans' attempts to overcome the separatist tendencies of the tribal chiefs and feudal lords who ruled the separate regions were unavailing. With the continuous wars and discord certain regions passed into the hands of various rulers many times; forced mass resettlement of the inhabitants of conquered towns and villages was common practice; there was also often migration because

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[1] See: S. P. Tolstov. *Po drevnim del'tam Oksa i Yaksarta* (Along the Ancient Deltas of the Oxus and Jaxartes), Moscow, 1962, p 297.

of the destruction of irrigation systems during the wars
and internecine strife. Thus, neither socio-economic back-
wardness nor the general political situation provided the
conditions for a uniting of the peoples of Central Asia and
the evolution of processes of ethnic consolidation. Such an
important factor as the formation of states, which is usual-
ly an important condition for the normal development of
ethnic communities,[1] could not make itself felt in the sit-
uation historically established, because all three Khanates
were ethnically non-homogeneous. In the Khiva Khanate,
in addition to the numerically preponderant Uzbeks, there
were also Turkomans, Kazakhs, and Karakalpaks, on whom
heavier taxation and services were imposed. In the Bukhara
Khanate Uzbeks and Tajiks predominated, but there were
also Turkomans, Kazakhs, and small nationalities long set-
tled in the area (Arabs, Gypsies, Central Asian Jews, etc.).
The population of the Kokand Khanate had the same motley
composition and included Kazakhs, lowland Tajiks, Kara-
kalpaks, and a big ethnic nucleus of Kirghiz, in addition
to Uzbeks. In Eastern Bukhara, in the mountain regions
and valleys of the Pamirs, beyond inaccessible passes,
lived small Pamir nationalities (Roshani, Shugnani, Vak-
hani, and others), speaking old Eastern Iranian languages
incomprehensible to Tajiks. Their isolation from the other
Moslem peoples of Central Asia was heightened by their
belonging to the Ismailite religious sect.

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In the early nineteenth century, before their annexation by
Russia, the peoples of Central Asia were ethnic commu-
nities of the kind typical of the feudal epoch, which Soviet
ethnologists are accustomed to call nationalities *(narod-
nosti)*. They were well known in world ethnology, and es-
pecially in Russian work, as fully formed ethnoi, with defi-
nite languages and their own types of economy, peculiar-
ities of daily life and material and spiritual culture, and
with established ethnonyms and territories for the princi-
pal ethnic masses, i.e. with all the signs or attributes that
have, as Prof. Bromley puts it, 'a general significance and

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[1] V. I. Kozlov. *Dinamika chislennosti narodov* (Dynamics of the
Size of Peoples), Nauka, Moscow, 1969, p 36.

traditional character, for everyone within an ethnos, and specific, distinguishing features characteristic of that ethnos'.[1] In addition, the features of uncompleted ethnic consolidation that distinguish a nationality from a nation in the stadial-historical classification of ethnoi were characteristic of them, viz., a plethora of dialectal differences in the languages, a host of local variants in culture and mode of life, and a duality of ethnic identity (consciousness of belonging to a local or regional group of fellow-countrymen or a tribal group as well as to a definite people). While Tajiks and settled, agricultural Uzbeks had a 'fellow-countryman' awareness as a second kind of identity, Turkomans, Kazakhs, Kirghiz, and Karakalpaks (nomadic and semi-settled) and some Uzbeks (semi-nomadic) equally strongly retained a consciousness of belonging to certain clan and tribal groups.

In pre-revolutionary Russian literature, and also among certain authors at the beginning of the Soviet period, there was a tendency, as we know, to disparage the level of social and ethnic development of these predominantly pastoral, Turkic-speaking peoples. On the grounds that there were still tenacious survivals of tribal differences among them in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the view took shape that a clan system predominated among them, and they were classed ethnically as conglomerates of separate tribes. Later the question of their socio-economic and ethnic level of evolution acquired more principled meaning; during the building of a national state system these theories encouraged propaganda for all kinds of nationalist conceptions—from great power chauvinism (asserting the 'prematurity' of national self-determination for the peoples of Central Asia) to Pan-Turkish (which denied the real existence of the Turkic-speaking nationalities that had taken shape in Central Asia). Bourgeois nationalist Pan-Turks opposed the creation of national Soviet republics, advocating unity of a mythical 'Turkestan nation' in a 'Turkic Republic'.[2]

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[1] Yu. V. Bromley. Contribution to the Concept 'Ethnos'. In: *Rasy i narody* (Races and Peoples), Vol. 1 (Nauka, Moscow, 1971), p 21.

[2] A. A. Gordienko. *Sozdanie sovetskoi natsional'noi gosudarstvennosti v Srednei Azii* (The Creation of Soviet National Statehood in Central Asia), Moscow, 1959, pp 134-135, 148, etc.

The extreme archaising of the socio-economic and ethnic evolution of the Turkic-speaking peoples of Central Asia and Kazakhstan, which was being exploited at that time by nationalist parties and groupings hostile to the Soviet state, however, had no scientific, historical foundation.

We must not ignore the difference between the tribal groups surviving then among the peoples of Central Asia and the tribes and clans of a really primitive kind that actually still existed in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in areas more backward than the steppe regions of nomadic pastoralism, for example among the food-gatherers, hunters, and fishers of the taiga and tundra of Northern Siberia, who were in the course of passing from a primitive clan community to a class system. Unlike the tribes of an archaic type, the Central Asian tribes of nomads and semi-nomads existed in a class society [1] and had become organically a part of ethnic communities of a taxonomically higher order, i.e. nationalities, since mediaeval times; there is no doubt that some groups that were called 'tribes' were without doubt relics of mediaeval nationalities that had had their own states in the past (e.g. Karluks, Kipchaks, Naimans, etc.). Many of the major tribes of Turkomans, with their heterogeneous ethnic composition and complex ethnogenesis, were obviously descendents of the ethnic components of the mediaeval Oguz nationality that had been unable to consolidate because of unfavourable historical conditions. [2]

Many of the clan and tribal units among Turkomans, Kazakhs, Karakalpaks, Kirghiz, and other Turkic-speaking nationalities of Central Asia in the nineteenth century were rather closer in essence, and in their ethnic image, to the type of ethnic community we call ethnographic groups than

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[1] On the late tribes of class society see: S. M. Abramson. Certain Problems of the Social Structure of Nomadic Societies. *Sovetskaya etnografiya*, 1970, 6: 72.

[2] T. A. Zhdanko, Ethnic Communities with Survivals of Clan and Tribal Structure in Central Asia and Kazakhstan in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries. In: Wolfgang Weissleder (Ed.). *The Nomadic Alternative. Modes and Models of Interaction in the African-Asian Deserts and Steppes (World Anthropology)*, (Mouton, The Hague and Paris, 1978),' pp 137-145; K. Shanijarov. Early Elements in the Ethnogenesis of the Uzbeks. In: W. Weissleder (Ed.). *Op. cit.*, pp 147-155; S. G. Agadzhanov, A. Karryev, Some Basic Problems of the Ethnogenesis of the Turkmen. In: W. Weissleder (Ed.). *Op. cit.*, pp 167-177.

to the tribes of primitive communal type; in any case their transformation in that direction had already been going on long before the Revolution, in spite of the preservation of many survivals of olden times in their daily life.

Levshin, well known as an expert on the ethnology of the Kazakhs, wrote in the early nineteenth century:

> However different the generations making up the present Kirghiz-Kazakh hordes, they have all finally merged into one people living in one place... Language, religion, way of life, and morals provide proof of this. Traditions indicate the same.[1]

There is also much other objective historical evidence confirming the forming of a consciousness of belonging to a certain nationality among ethnoi from survivals of a clan-tribal ethnic structure and patriarchal mode of life, for example, notions of a common origin and historical fate of the tribal groups that constituted a given nationality.

Notions of the people's unity of origin and integrity, reflected in the unique traditional form of geneological and historical traditions, also exist among Turkomans, Kazakhs, Kirghiz, and Karakalpaks.[2]

Growth of ethnic consciousness from the seventeenth to the early nineteenth centuries was promoted by the development in Central Asia of liberating ideas and people's movements against their ruling khans and the foreign conquerors invading Central Asia. The advanced thinkers and poets (e.g. the seventeenth century Uzbek poet Turdy and the distinguished eighteenth century Turkoman poet Makhtum Kuli) called for the ending of internecine strife and for unity of all the tribes and clans of their 'single people' to fight common enemies.[3]

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[1] A. I. Levshin. *Opisanie kirghiz-kazach'ikh ili kirghiz-kaisatskikh ord i stepei* (A Description of the Kirghiz-Kazakh or Kirghiz-Kaisat Hordes and Steppes) Part III, (St. Petersburg, 1832), p 5.

[2] See: A. N. Kononov. *Rodoslovnaya turkmen. Sochinenie Abdul-gazi khana Khivinskogo* (The Pedigree of Turkomens. The Works of the Khiva Khan Abdul-gazi), USSR Academy of Sciences Publishers, Moscow/Leningrad, 1958; N. A. Aristov. An Attempt at Clarifying the Ethnic Composition of the Kirghiz-Kazakhs of the Great Horde and of the Karakirghiz from Pedigree Legends. In: *Zhivaya starina*, Vols. 4, 5 (St. Petersburg, 1894).

[3] See: S. P. Tolstov. Contribution to the Twentieth Anniversary of the National Demarcation of Central Asia. *Sovetskaya etnografiya* 1950, 1: 7-10; T. A. Zhdanko. Lenin's National Policy in the New Historical Stage. *Sovetskaya etnografiya*, 1960, 2: 9-10.

Some ethnologists base their idea of the low level of ethnic evolution of the Kazakhs and other Turkic-speaking peoples of Central Asia on the instability of their ethnonym allegedly observed in the nineteenth century, citing in particular the confusion introduced into the All-Russian Census of 1897 by the vagueness and indeterminacy of the names of Kazakhs and Kirghiz (Kazakhs were called Kirghiz, Kirghiz-Kaisats, and Kirghiz-Kazaks, and Kirghiz Kara-Kirghiz, 'wilderness' Kirghiz, and Buruti). This difference of ethnonyms, however, was not due at all to any absence of a stable identity among these peoples. One had developed, in particular, among the Kazakhs in the fifteenth century, and even earlier among the Kirghiz. In Russian documents of the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries Kazakhs were called the 'Kazak horde'. The replacement of the true ethnonym 'Kazakh' by the title 'Kirghiz' (probably to distinguish them from the Russian Cossacks of the neighbouring areas of Siberia) occurred later.[1] The name 'Kirghiz' passed into official documents irrespective of the people, who continued to use their own names for themselves. The incorrect nomenclature took such firm root in official papers and historiography that it survived until the Revolution and even until the national demarcation of Central Asia. Initially the Soviet Autonomous Republics of these peoples bore the names Kirghiz and Kara-Kirghiz; only in April 1925 did the 5th Congress of Soviets of Kazakhstan revive the historically correct name of the Kazakh people, and rename the republic the Kazakh Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic.

Very interesting, convincing data on the level of this group of peoples' ethnic evolution are provided by linguistic research, in particular by study of the history of their languages and dialects. The well-known Soviet Turkologue Baskakov distinguishes several types of dialect system, including the following:

(a) dialect systems reflecting traces of tribal structure;
(b) dialect systems in which the division of the dialects is based mainly on territorial criteria, although traces of tribal structure are preserved in the ethnic composition of the people concerned;

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[1] Translator's note. The Russian nouns and adjectives are extremely alike (*Kazak*—Cossack; *Kazakh* — Kazakh; *kazach'ya orda*—Kazak(h) horde; kazachestvo—the Cossacks).

(c) dialect systems of Turkic peoples who have lost traces
of tribal division and tribal names.

Baskakov divides dialects into early ones, coinciding
with tribal speech, and historically later, feudalised urban
speech or dialects. By this classification the dialects of
Turkomans that coincide with their biggest tribes (Yamuts,
Tekins, Geklens, etc.) belong to the first category of
'tribal' dialects. The dialect system of Uzbek also belongs
to this type but to another later group: three groups of
Uzbek dialects (Kipchak, Oguz, and Karluk) evolved in
the complex conditions of the Uzbek people's ethnogene-
sis. Uzbek dialects have thus preserved a tribal division,
on the one hand; on the other hand, urban dialects evolved
(the Namangan, Tashkent, and Andijan from Karluk, and
the Khorezm from Oguzo-Kipchak). As for the languages
of the Kirghiz, Kazakhs, and Karakalpaks, their dialects
(like those of Bashkir) belong, Baskakov concludes, to the
second type of dialect system, the division of which is al-
ready mainly determined by territorial criteria rather than
tribal structure.[1] In fact, the dialects of Kirghiz break down,
as is known, into northern and southern groups, of Kazakh
into north-eastern, southern, and western; in Karakalpak
there are two dialects, north-eastern and south-western.

The territorial division of dialects is evidence that tri-
bal survivals in the ethnic structure of the Kazakhs, Kirg-
hiz, and Karakalpaks have long lost the significance of de-
termining factors in the languages of this group of ethnoi,
which had already reached the stage of ethnic evolution
corresponding to the nationality *(narodnost')* of the epoch
of feudalism.

After Russia's annexation of Central Asia in the second
half of the nineteenth century, the objective course of history
in this remote borderland of the Russian Empire laid
the basis, irrespective of the Czarist Government's plans
and policy, for a certain shift in ethnic evolution. The es-
tablishment of firm political authority ended feudal wars
and internecine strife. As capitalism penetrated the econo-
my it gradually revived after centuries of stagnation. The
first railways appeared, commerce expanded, commercial

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[1] N. A. Baskakov. The Ethnolinguistic Classification of the Dia-
lect Systems of Modern Turkic Languages. *Trudy VII Mezhdunarod-
nogo kongressa antropologicheskikh i etnograficheskikh nauk*, Vol. 5,
Moscow, 1970), pp 682-688.

cotton-growing developed, commercial stock-raising devel-
oped more and more in nomadic areas, and small indus-
trial enterprises processing raw materials started up. The
area was drawn into the common Russian market, and that
entailed the development of new, though still small, social
strata (local workers, a bourgeoisie, and bourgeois intellec-
tuals) among the peoples of Central Asia. The progressive
democratic ideas of Russian society directed against national
inequality and the autocracy's policy in Central Asia pen-
etrated Turkestan. The attention paid by progressive Rus-
sian ethnologists, writers, and artists to the history and eth-
nography, languages, and mode of life of the local peoples
also influenced the forming of national identity. Talented
poets and scholar-educators appeared among the Uzbeks,
Tajiks, Kazakhs, and other local nationalities; their works
promoted the development of literary languages and the
rise of national liberation trends and moods. The growth
of national identity and a national movement began to
make itself specially felt in Central Asia and Kazakhstan
after the first Russian Revolution of 1905-7. All these fac-
tors led to the development of rudiments of the forming of
bourgeois nations among certain of the peoples (Uzbeks,
Tajiks, Kazakhs) but the process could not be completed then
in colonial Turkestan, and the Revolution caught these
nationalities only in the initial stage of national develop-
ment.

State and administrative boundaries divided the ethnic
territories of Central Asia inhabited by one and the same
people into isolated parts. As before annexation to Russia,
the Uzbeks, Tajiks, Turkomans, Kirghiz, and Karakalpaks
were cut up among three states, viz., the Russian Empire
(which included Turkestan), Bukhara, and Khiva (vassals
of Russia). Kazakhstan, too, was divided; part of it was in
the Turkestan Governor-Generalship, another part in the
Steppeland Governor-Generalship, and the western areas
in the Astrakhan Province. The Caspian region was gov-
erned for a long time by a special 'provisional status' and
was only added to the Turkestan territory in 1899.

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The triumph of the Socialist Revolution opened the road to
free national development for all the peoples of Russia,
those of Turkestan included. The building of national states

began there in 1918; the 5th Congress of Soviets of the Turkestan Territory proclaimed the formation of the Turkestan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (within the boundaries of the old Turkestan Governor-Generalship). In 1920 the Kirghiz Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was formed on the territory of Kazakhstan (within the boundaries of the former Steppeland Governor-Generalship). Both of these Autonomous Republics formed part of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic. Only in 1920 was the Revolution victorious in the Bukhara and Khiva Khanates; People's Soviet Republics (the Bukhara and Khorezm) were formed on their territory. From 1920 to 1923 people's democratic power broke the despotic feudal system of government there in a radical way; organs of a People's Soviet state were set up and the land, banks, and industrial enterprises nationalised. The peoples of these republics took the road of non-capitalist development and not long before national demarcation of the area both republics were transformed by decision of their *Kurultays* (Congresses of Soviets) into the Bukhara and Khorezm Soviet Socialist Republics.

War-time dislocation and the Civil War deprived the Soviet state of the opportunity, immediately after the Revolution, of altering the boundaries of the state formations established by the Czarist Government that divided the peoples of Central Asia. In 1924 the total population of the three republics was 8 131 100, of whom 5 254 600 were in the Turkestan ASSR, 2 236 400 in the Bukhara People's Soviet Republic, and 640 100 in the Khorezm People's Soviet Republic.[1] Around 67 per cent of all the Uzbeks living in the three republics were in the Turkestan ASSR, 22 per cent in the Bukhara PSR, and 11 per cent in the Khorezm PSR. The Tajiks were divided almost equally between the Bukhara PSR (52.3 per cent) and the Turkestan ASSR (47.7 per cent). More than 42 per cent of all the Turkomans lived in the Turkestan ASSR (mainly in the Transcaspian Region), 27 per cent in the Bukhara PSR, and 30 per cent in the Khorezm PSR.[2]

In spite of the difficult political and economic situation,

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[1] *Novy vostok*, 1925, 8/9: 48.
[2] *Istoriya Uzbekskoi SSR* (History of the Uzbek SSR), Vol. 3 (Tashkent, 1967), p 379.

however, the Soviet Government met the people's wishes, even in the years of foreign intervention and civil war, for partial alterations of internal administrative boundaries, taking the inhabitants' national composition into account. In the Turkestan ASSR, for example, the Transcaspian Region was turned into the Turkmenian Region; in the Bukhara Republic compact areas with a Tajik and Turkoman population were demarcated, by forming Tajik and Turkmenian regions and in the Khorezm Republic the following were formed along national lines: a Kazakh-Karakalpak Region, a Tashauz Region (predominantly Turkoman), and a New Urgench Region and a Khiva District (in which Uzbeks predominated).

These partial national, territorial reforms made on the initiative of the local population by the Soviet state before national demarcation undoubtedly reflected a desire by isolated local groups of Turkomans, Kazakhs, Tajiks, and Karakalpaks to unite and realise the right to self-determination, which is one of the many pieces of objective evidence of the growth of these peoples' identity and a new stage in their ethnic evolution.

The next objective of the Soviet Government's national policy in Central Asia soon became a radical alteration of state frontiers, i.e. national demarcation.

The theoretical posing of the matter was Lenin's. In 1920 he was directly concerned with the preparations for national demarcation and approved the project of Turkestan Communists and of the Turkestan Commission of the RSFSR's Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars for the future development of statehood in Central Asia. His notes and remarks on it included an assignment to compile an ethnographic map with the proposed boundaries of Uzbekistan, Turkmenia, and Kazakhstan.[1]

In 1920-21, in returning several times to the matter of the new state structure of Central Asia, Lenin opposed suggestions for the immediate breaking up of Turkestan into several republics, and was against haste in this complicated business, which called for great scientific and political preparation and broad ascertainment of the views of the working people of all the nations of Central Asia. He ad-

[1] See: V. I. Lenin. *Collected Works*, Vol. 41, Fifth Russian Edition, p 436.

vised careful preparation of the appropriate documents, without deciding the delineation of one republic or another in advance.[1]

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Immense work was done between 1920 and 1924 to prepare for demarcation scientifically, above all to study the ethnic composition and territorial distribution of the population. The All-Russia Census of 1897 was scrupulously analysed, and also the censuses of 1917 and 1920, and the pre-revolutionary archives, statistics, and other data. The Commission on Study of the Tribal Composition of Russia and Neighbouring Countries of the Russian Academy of Sciences, set up in 1917, was brought into study of the population. All kinds of tables and summaries, lists of peoples, and papers on the structure and history of the population of Central Asia were prepared and published and ethnographic maps were compiled.

Leading scholars (historians, ethnographers, and orientalists like I. I. Zarubin, M. S. Andreev, A. A. Semenov, P. P. Ivanov, and A. A. Divaev) took part in this work, of great state importance, of preparing for national demarcation. Many of them went out on special ethnographic commissions and expeditions to collect the data needed.

Because of the lack of precise data on the numbers and national composition of the population it was necessary, in 1924, in order to decide matters of demarcation correctly, to organise a special field survey of the population of the Bukhara and Khorezm Republics (where a census had never been taken) so as to supplement the 1920 Census, which had covered only the Turkestan ASSR in Central Asia. For the first time in history the ethnic composition of the inhabitants of the Khanates was subjected to detailed, scientific scrutiny. The survey's staff were instructed to ascertain the wishes of the inhabitants themselves in the complicated, ethnically mixed villages on their inclusion in one republic or another. A little later another big, official survey was arranged on the initiative of the Central Asian Bureau of the Central Committee of the Russian Com-

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[1] V. I. Lenin. *Collected Works*, Vol. 42 (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1968), p 198.

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munist Party (Bolsheviks) to make a selective study of the economy and socio-economic system of the population of the least known areas of Central Asia. Eleven separate volosts in all three republics were surveyed and described in detail.

At the same time, and in close co-operation with the preparations for national demarcation, scientific surveys begun earlier were being completed so as to substantiate the economic zoning of Central Asia. The Central Asian Economic Council set up in 1923 to direct economic activity in the Turkestan ASSR, and the Bukhara and Khorezm PSRs, played a major role in organising all public surveys of the territory in those years.

For the first time in Central Asia a Statistical Board was set up, which published two volumes of a *Statistical Yearbook*. The series *Documents on the Zoning of Turkestan* also contained valuable data for studying the population's ethnic composition and ethnography. It was the first time in the history of ethnology that such massive, simultaneously gathered, ethnographic data were assembled, including ethnostatistical information and ethnic maps, covering large areas. The precise, profound observations in the realm of national interrelations and reciprocal ethnic influences made during the surveys were extremely valuable as the first historical stage in the study of modern ethnic processes. The work of the Commission on Zoning's expedition, led by I. P. Magidovich, which surveyed the area and population of the former Bukhara Khanate, was particularly valuable in this respect.

The need to take the population's ethnic identity into account when deciding whether to include an area within a national republic called for great attention by the workers who processed the scientific data for the commission on national demarcation to small, ethnically unstable groups with weakly expressed trends of ethnic gravitation toward one major people or another, and with an indeterminate or 'dual' tribal/ethnic identity. As a result of their observations they managed to unravel very important ethnic processes, in particular the gradual disappearance of a feeling of belonging to tribal groups during consolidation of the Uzbek nation. From that angle the gradations of 'dual' ethnic consciousness noted by Magidovich among semi-nomadic Uzbeks in the areas he studied present exceptional

interest. He established several stages (levels), as it were, during loss of awareness of belonging to a certain tribal group.

> Among Bukhara Uzbeks (he wrote) there are those among whom even the old men simply do not understand at first the question 'To what tribe or clan do you belong?', and only after long explanation reply that there are no tribes or clans (among them—*T. A. Zh.*). Others first of all call themselves Uzbeks and only after much questioning add the name of their tribe or clan union, and by all indications are not very sure of their pedigree. A third group first name their tribe to the question of nationality, and then not so keenly say that they are Uzbeks. Finally, a fourth group (Kipchaks, Naimans, Turks) often counterpose themselves to Uzbeks, Kirghiz, and Kazakhs.[1]

No less important is the material collected and generalised then by Magidovich and others on another trend in the Uzbek people's national consolidation, namely, completion of the converging of ethnographic groups of so-called Sarts (Uzbek-speaking) with Uzbeks, which was reflected in the ethnic identity of these groups. The complex ethnogenesis of the Uzbek people linked with the several waves of Turkic tribes that settled in the oases of the Central Asian mesopotamia of the Amudarya and Syrdarya over centuries, determined the preservation among them of survivals of a division into three ethnographic groups differing slightly from one another, descendants of the three main components ('layers') of their ethnogenesis: (1) descendants of a local Iranian-speaking population already Turkicised in the sixth to twelfth centuries, long-settled agriculturists and townsmen, who usually called themselves Sarts (in the Ferghana, Tashkent, and Khorezm oases this name served as the principal name of the indigenous Turkic-speaking population for themselves); (2) a 'Turk' ethnic group, descendants of an equally old Turkic-speaking population that had not, however, settled down and that retained a semi-nomadic way of life and tribal (clan) division; and finally (3) Uzbeks, descendants of the steppe tribes that followed the troops

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[1] *Materialy po raionirovaniyu Srednei Azii*, Book 1 (Territory and Population of Bukhara and Khorezm: Part 1—*Bukhara*), Tashkent, 1926, p 180.

of Sheibani Khan and settled in Central Asia in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, who also preserved survivals of tribal division (their name for themselves passed to the consolidating Uzbek nationality).[1] Uzbeks and Sarts had been interacting very intensively for several centuries; apart from the view prevalent among ethnologists that the differences between them consisted solely in mode of life and economic system, the following view of their ethnic difference, however, was held: they had figured separately both in the literature and in censuses, right until national demarcation when the question of their relationship became a matter of close study. Magidovich wrote, a propos of this:

> The data of the statistical censuses and studies since 1897 confirm by millions of indications of the population itself that there is no special Sart people distinct from Uzbeks, and no special Sart language distinct from Uzbek.[2]

He noted further that with each census or administrative survey in the towns and villages of the Ferghana and Tashkent *uezd*, in the 'centres of Sart settlement', 'the number of Sarts had declined catastrophically', and that there could only be such instability because the settled Turkic population did not see any difference between the word 'Uzbek' and 'Sart', but more readily called themselves by the first name.[3]

'Sarts' already did not figure in the 1926 Census, as we know, but retention of the separateness of Uzbek-speaking 'Turk' groups like the Kipchaks of the Ferghana Valley and the Kuramins of Tashkent Region, which was expressed in their ethnic identity, proved more persistent, and only subsequent censuses and ethnographic surveys established their gradual integration and absorption into the body of the Uzbek nation.[4]

[1] A. Yu. Yakubovsky. *K voprosu ob etnogeneze uzbekskogo naroda* (A Contribution to the Question of the Uzbek People's Ethnogenesis), Tashkent, 1941; M. G. Vakhabov. *Formirovanie uzbekskoi sotsialisticheskoi natsii* (The Forming of the Uzbek Socialist Nation), Tashkent, 1961; *Narody Srednei Azii i Kazakhstana*, Vol. 1 (Moscow, 1962), pp 167-172; *Etnograficheskie ocherki uzbekskogo sel'skogo naseleniya* (Ethnographic Essays on the Uzbek Rural Population), Nauka, Moscow, 1969, pp 18-20.

[2] *Materialy po raionirovaniyu Srednei Azii*, Book 1, p 174.

[3] *Ibid.*

[4] See: V. K. Gardanov, B. O. Dolgikh, T. A. Zhdanko. The Principal Trends in the Ethnic Processes among the Peoples of the USSR.

No less interesting observations of ethnic processes were made by the members of Magidovich's expedition in the areas of mixed Uzbek and Tajik population of the former Bukhara Khanate, where centuries of contact had led to processes of ethnic interaction. In addition to Uzbekicised groups of Tajiks, the party discovered many small groups of Uzbeks who had adopted features of the Tajiks' culture, spoke Tajik, and called themselves Tajiks, but for all that retained Uzbek tribal ethnonyms.[1]

We have cited only some of the observations of one of the workers who investigated the population of Central Asia in the period of national demarcation relative to the ethnic processes that were taking place in the first Soviet years, but which had, of course, begun much earlier in the pre-revolutionary period.

Apart from a certain consolidation of nationalities and nations, other ethnic processes had also been observed in pre-revolutionary Central Asia: namely, linguistic assimilation and acculturation of the Central Asian Gypsies, Arabs, and Jews; assimilation into the milieu of the Uzbek population of certain groups of Turkomans (in areas of the Nuratin Mountains and the Middle Amudarya) and Karakalpaks (in Samarkand Region). A converging of the local population and Russians was manifested to a certain extent, mainly in areas of immigration in Kazakhstan and Kirghizia; contacts with Russian peasant settlers helped the nomad herdsmen to take to agriculture and a settled life, while the peasants borrowed the local inhabitants' experience of farming in the territory's specific natural conditions, and learned their languages.

Ethnic contacts were strengthened in Soviet times, in the new conditions of the forming and development of socialist nations and nationalities. Study of them is one of the main lines of ethnographers' research at the present time.

Sovetskaya etnografiya, 1961, 4: 13; B. Kh. Karmysheva. The Ethnographic 'Turk' Group among the Uzbeks. *Sovetskaya etnografiya*, 1960, 1: 6; Ya. R. Vinnikov. The Present-day Distribution of Peoples and Ethnographic Groups in the Ferghana Valley. In: *Sredneaziatskii etnograficheskii sbornik*, No. 2 (Moscow, 1959).
[1] *Materialy po raionirovaniyu Srednei Azii*, Book 1, pp 231-234.

The whole aggregate of this broad, seriously executed work to prepare for national demarcation made it possible to tackle the compilation of a scheme of the territories and boundaries of new republics and autonomous regions on the basis of economic and ethnographic data and to make careful allowance for the populations' wishes and the objectives of the future building of socialism. That made it possible to pass in a scientifically substantiated way to the practical decision of this complicated constitutional task. It became possible to carry out a national state demarcation in 1924-5 when the Civil War was ended, the organs of Soviet power in the republics consolidated, and the republics' economies in the main restored, and when education, culture, and art in the national languages had begun to develop rapidly. In 1923-4, as was mentioned above, the Khorezm and Bukhara PSRs had already been converted into socialist republics. After confirmation of the three Central Asian Republics' proposals on national demarcation, the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and the All-Union Government set up a Central Territorial Commission of representatives of the republics and regions and of all the territory's main nationalities.

This territorial commission's draft plan became the basis for drawing the boundaries of the new Union Republics and Autonomous Republics and Regions. On 16 September 1924 the 3rd Emergency Session of the Central Executive Committee of the Turkestan ASSR passed a law on carrying out national demarcation and adopted an appeal to all the peoples of Central Asia and Turkestan. Similar acts were passed by the sovereign authorities of Bukhara and Khiva. The act on national demarcation and its essence and objectives were widely explained and discussed in all the republics, towns, villages, and nomad camps. In February 1925 Constituent Congresses were convened in the Uzbek and Turkmenian Republics, which elected their governments and adopted declarations on joining the USSR.

The declaration adopted by the 1st Constituent Congress of Soviets of the Uzbek SSR proclaimed, in the name of all the peoples of Uzbekistan, the voluntary desire of Uzbekistan to join the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

The labouring masses of the Uzbek people declare before the whole world their unswerving decision to voluntarily join the USSR with the rights of an equal member.[1]

Similar decisions were taken by the Constituent Congress of the Turkmenian SSR.

Lenin's prediction, already written in 1916, was confirmed:

The masses of working people, as they liberate themselves from the bourgeois yoke, *will gravitate* irresistibly towards union and integration with the great, advanced socialist nations.[2]

Voluntary entry into the powerful USSR became a decisive factor guaranteeing rapid, all-round progress for the peoples of the republics of Central Asia, and reconstruction of society along socialist lines. The fraternal aid of the other peoples of the Soviet Union helped them liquidate the economic and cultural backwardness inherited from the pre-revolutionary past in a very short historical period, carry through a cultural revolution, build socialism, and take the road to the building of communism.

As a result of the national state demarcation Autonomous Republics and Regions were founded, in addition to two Union Republics uniting all the main peoples of Central Asia; the Tajik ASSR became part of Uzbekistan. Kirghizia was delineated as an Autonomous Region, forming part of the RSFSR (and became an Autonomous Republic in 1926).

The Karakalpak Autonomous Region was included in the Kazakh ASSR, to which were also passed the Semirechye Region and areas of the Syrdarya Region inhabited by Kazakhs, which had previously been part of the Turkmenian Republic. Later, as these national republics and regions developed, their form of statehood was altered and they passed to a higher form. Thus the Tajik Autonomous Republic was converted into a Union Republic in 1929 and its area increased by including in it the Khojent Area, inhabited mainly by Tajiks. The Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region had already been formed in the Republic in 1925.

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[1] *Istoriya Uzbekskoi SSR* (History of the Uzbek SSR) Vol. 3, p 406.

[2] V. I. Lenin. *Collected Works*, Vol. 22 (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1974), p 339.

In 1936 the Kazakh ASSR and the Kirghiz ASSR were converted into Union Republics. In 1932 the Karakalpak Autonomous Region was converted into an Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic within the RSFSR; in 1936 it passed into the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic.[1]

The main result of national demarcation, naturally, was a change in the ratio of the ethnic groups of the population within each republic.

The newly formed republics re-united formerly divided, isolated peoples. In all the Union and Autonomous Republics formed by the national demarcation, the principal nationality represented a compact majority.

Into the Uzbek SSR passed 82.6 per cent of the Uzbeks living in the USSR, and they constituted 76.1 per cent of the Republic's total population. In the Turkmenian Republic were 94.2 per cent of the Turkomans, and they constituted 71.9 per cent of the population of Turkmenia. There proved to be 75.2 per cent of all Tajiks within the Tajik SSR, who constituted 71.2 per cent of the Republic's population. The Kirghiz ASSR included 86.7 per cent of all Kirghiz, who constituted 66.2 per cent of its population. In the Kazakh ASSR were concentrated 93.4 per cent of the Kazakhs of the USSR, who constituted 57.4 per cent of the Republic's population. Finally, 79.3 per cent of all Karakalpaks passed into the Karakalpak Autonomous Region, where they constituted 38.1 per cent of its population.[2]

Allowance for national composition was the main criterion but not, however, the sole principle in the creating of the new republics. The need for a simultaneous, scientifically substantiated, economic zoning of Central Asia was taken into account, and also the need to provide each republic and autonomous region with all the conditions to ensure development of the economic community. Attention was paid to the economic gravitation of an area to one urban centre or another, and to the historically established econom-

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[1] For further details on the national state system of the individual republics see: Kh. T. Tursunov. *Obrazovanie Uzbekskoi Sovetskoi Sotsialisticheskoi Respubliki* (The Formation of the Uzbek SSR), Tashkent, 1957; A. Nusupbekov. *Ob'edinenie kazokhskikh zemel' v Kazakhskoi SSR* (The Uniting of the Kazakh Lands in the Kazakh SSR), Alma-Ata, 1953; S. A. Rajabov. *Tadzhikskaya SSR — suverennoe sovetskoe gosudarstvo* (The Tajik SSR — Sovereign Soviet State), Dushanbe, 1957.

[2] *Revolyutsionni Vostok*, 1934, 6: 116-124.

ic and everyday links between the inhabitants of towns and rural localities, agricultural oases, and stock-raising areas.

It was therefore considered expedient for small groups of the Uzbek population who had been long living among big ethnic groups of Kazakhs (e. g. in the areas of Turkestan and Chimkent) not to be included in Uzbekistan. Certain areas with a Kazakh and Tajik population were left in Uzbekistan. When forming new economically expedient boundaries, Lenin wrote, 'to cut the towns off from the villages and areas that economically gravitate towards them, for the sake of the "national" factor, would be absurd and impossible'.[1] And it was from that angle that the fate of towns like Bukhara and Samarkand was considered, which became part of Uzbekistan although large numbers of Tajiks lived in them.

During the carrying out of national demarcation, an economic demarcation was also made, namely, the sharing out among the new state formations of all the material values (mills and factories, crop areas, herds of livestock, and cultural and educational institutions) so that afterward each of the republics would dispose of sufficient resources to ensure successful development of its economy and culture. Attention was also paid to the distribution of water sources and irrigation systems, which were of paramount importance in the conditions of Central Asia.

Many contentious matters had to be decided during the national demarcation and difficulties connected with the economic and cultural backwardness of the area had to be overcome. The Communist Party fought both the attempts of counter-revolutionaries to utilise the legacy of former national hostility for their own ends and to distort the sense and purpose of national state demarcation, and manifestations of bourgeois nationalism and great power chauvinism.

Demarcation gave a strong impulse to development of the people's political activity and involvement in the state's political affairs and government; the policy of equality of languages and the introduction of national languages into administration and court proceedings brought the authorities close to the popular masses, not to mention the sig-

[1] V. I. Lenin. *Collected Works*, Vol. 20 (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1972), p 50.

nificance of the direct participation of representatives of the working people in governmental bodies and at all levels of administration. The formation of national republics also promoted the development of national identity by overcoming survivals of territorial and tribal (clan)-ethnic identity. During the rapid growth of the economy and culture all the elements of the socio-economic and ethnic community inherent in nations of the epoch of socialism took shape in the republics.

The development of education, a system of writing, and a literature in the mother tongue, and the forming of a national theatre, music, and other forms of art, brought about the moulding of new national forms of culture, socialist in content.

The creation of Soviet national statehood eliminated the grounds for national contradictions and many of the causes giving rise to national friction, discord, and sometimes enmity, and strengthened friendship and peaceful co-operation between the nations. The appeal of the Central Executive Committee of the Turkestan ASSR to all the peoples of Central Asia in 1924, in connection with the demarcation, declared:

> We shall bury once and for all the remnants and vestiges of intricate national legal relations still surviving in one way or another, left in the legacy of Czarism's colonial policy.[1]

The subsequent consolidation of the socialist nations of Central Asia has been expressed in an increase in their monolithic ethnic character, in the disappearance of dialects and certain ethnographic peculiarities of the former local and ethnic groups.

The gradual converging of nations associated with the formation of a new historical community, the Soviet people, has been becoming increasingly important, right from the first years of Soviet rule. The distinguishing feature of the ethnic processes of the convergence of nations is not at all assimilation or the absorbing of one nation by another, but their growing internationalisation, the development of common Soviet features in the peoples' economic affairs, culture, and spiritual life. The converging of nations is a bilateral process affecting both the ethnic commu-

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[1] Cited from Kh. T. Tursunov. *Op. cit.*, p 219.

nities in contact with one another. Internationalisation is actually expressed in a general weakening of the ethnic factor, the spread of an ethnically neutral ('urban') culture, and broad interaction and mutual enrichment of the cultures of different peoples. Bilingualism, or multilingualism, with unforced linguistic assimilation, is also a typical feature of it.

The pattern of this two-way process and its dialectical unity were brought out in that historical act of Lenin's national policy, the national state demarcation of the republics of Central Asia in 1924-5 and their voluntary joining of the USSR. It was not for nothing that its contemporaries expressed the idea at the time that it would be more proper to call it the reunification and further consolidation of the peoples of Central Asia in the single family of socialist nations and nationalities of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics than 'demarcation'.

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We have already remarked above that bourgeois nationalists more than once opposed the creation of national republics in Central Asia during demarcation, putting forward instead Pan-Turk projects for the formation of a 'Turkestan' or 'Turkic' Republic on its territory that would allegedly unite some 'common Turkic' community consisting of all the Turkic-speaking populations of Central Asia. Pan-Turk slogans did not, however, find support among the broad masses of the public; the peoples of Central Asia who had emancipated themselves from colonial and national oppression aspired to self-determination. The Communist Party's policy aimed at setting up national Soviet states met their historically formed dreams and aspirations. That decided the success of one of the greatest measures in the Soviet state's national policy and ensured rapid rates of socialist construction in the republics of the Soviet East, consolidation of the socialist nations, and other progressive processes, which gave rise to a sharp hostile reaction in capitalist countries, a stream of lies and slanders, and constant attempts to distort and blacken the aims and results of the national state demarcation of Central Asia. Pan-Turk conceptions, which suffered fiasco in their time, have again become a weapon of falsifiers. Kremlinologists in the USA and Great Britain like Pipes and Kolarz, and other self-

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styled experts on the problems of Central Asia, are trying with might and main, basing themselves on 'theories' of a mythical 'unity of the Turkestan people' that contradict the historical facts, to propagate a bankrupt version that the Uzbeks, Kazakhs, Turkomans, Kirghiz, and Karakalpaks constituted a single Turkic people before the Revolution; these writers consider their taking shape as nations, and the development of their national languages, to be an 'artificial construction', the fruit of a 'forcible' policy by the Soviet authorities allegedly dictated by a striving to 'divide' and 'break up' the indigenous population into separate nations so as to 'split' and weaken them. Pipes, for example, has said that before the twentieth century and later Central Asia preserved its ethnic unity,[1] that with the exception of the Tajiks all the Muslims of Central Asia spoke local Turkic dialects that were on the way even before the Revolution, according to him, to forming a single Turkic language of the whole population of Central Asia. In his opinion this process was hampered by the Soviet authorities' language policy, which allegedly exploited even minimum dialectal differences between Turkic-speaking sub-groups and granted the rights of full-fledged literary languages to local variants of one and the same Turkic language.[2] Kolarz, too, who considers the Turkic population of Central Asia a single community of Turks, does not disagree with Pipes. Pan-Turk conceptions seemingly suit authors of that type. They have far outdone even the coloniser-minded writers of pre-revolutionary times, who still did not deny the specific features of the culture and language of the Turkic-speaking peoples of Central Asia, although belittling their level of ethnic evolution, in their unscholarly character, contradiction of the historical facts, and distortion of the real ethnographic phenomena.

In spite of all these slanderous 'works' and 'theories', historical experience has incontrovertibly demonstrated that the creation of national, Soviet statehood and the entry of the newly formed republics into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics strengthened unity of the peoples of

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[1] See: Richard Pipes. Muslims of Soviet Central Asia: Trends and Prospects, Part II. *The Middle East Journal*, 1955, *9*, 3: 295.

[2] See: Richard Pipes. Muslims of Soviet Central Asia: Trends and Prospects, Part I. *The Middle East Journal*, 1955, 9, 2: 159.

Central Asia in the great socialist commonwealth of nations and became a powerful stimulus to their all-round progressive development on the road to building communism.[1]

The Soviet Union has now celebrated sixty years of the Socialist Revolution, and more than half a century has passed since the formation of the Soviet Republics of Central Asia. In those five decades they have achieved a growth and flowering unprecedented in scale, and become industrial/collective farm states with a first-class modern industry, a multisectoral, highly developed agriculture, and an advanced science, culture and art. In the socialist division of labour built up among the Union Republics, each of them has a definite economy of a specific character. The industrial image of Uzbekistan, for example, is decided by a combination of more than a hundred branches of industry; as in the other republics of Central Asia, the leading ones are electricity generation and the chemical, steel, and engineering industries. But Uzbekistan also specialises in, and occupies first place in the Soviet Union in the production of cotton-picking and other equipment for cotton-growing and ginning. The industry of Turkmenia has 80 branches; this republic has become a major oil and gas producer. Many times more oil is now extracted each day in the Turkmenian SSR than in the whole of 1924, the year it was founded. Its volume of industrial production has risen more than 130-fold in fifty years.[2] The industrial potential of Tajikistan, a mountain republic possessing inexhaustible water power resources, and of Kirghizia has grown even faster. The republics of Central Asia now export the products of their industry to foreign countries, including capitalist countries in Europe and many developing countries in the East.

The Central Asian republics are the main cotton-growing area of the USSR; among them the Uzbek SSR takes first place, producing two-thirds of the annual crop of raw cotton.

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[1] Kh. Tursunov, and M. Khakimov. The Forms and Methods of National State Construction in the Soviet East—National Relations in the USSR: Theory and Practice. *Problems of the Contemporary World*, 1974, 4 (29): 151-166.

[2] Resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Turkmenistan on the 50th Anniversary of the Turkmenian SSR and Communist Party of Turkmenia. *Turkmenskaya iskra*, 10 February 1974.

Cotton-growing and other branches of agriculture are being promoted by the extension of irrigation. Uzbekistan provides a good example of the scale of irrigation in Central Asia; before the Revolution there was only one irrigation system of an engineering type on its territory; now there are more than 900 with 24 000 operating hydrotechnical installations and 100 000 kilometres of canals. The republic's eleven reservoirs contain around 4 000 million cubic metres of water; big man-made lakes have appeared on its map.[1] The Kyzylkum desert has been developed; on the virgin lands of the Hungry Steppe big new state and collective farms have been established annually yielding thousands of tons of cotton, fruit, vegetables, and other farm produce. The traditional sector of the economy of the peoples of Central Asia—sheep-farming—has been developed on a new, scientific basis (caracul in Uzbekistan and Turkmenia, fine-fleeced in Kirghizia).

The republics' achievements in the realm of culture are also great; the population is now nearly 100 per cent literate, and nearly half of it (ten years of age and older) has higher or secondary (full or incomplete) education. Before the Revolution there were no higher education institutions in them; now there are 40 higher schools and 170 specialised secondary schools in Uzbekistan alone.[2] Hundreds of thousands of specialists—engineers, agronomists, economists, etc., with the appropriate education and qualifications—work in the various fields of the republics' economies.

Science is developing—all the republics have Academies of Sciences, and certain republican research institutions are of national importance to the USSR (e.g. the Turkmenian Academy of Sciences' Desert Institute, the Tajik Academy of Sciences' Institute of Astrophysics).

The development of various literary genres is characteristic of the contemporary national arts of the peoples of Central Asia; many writers and their talented works, translated into Russian and other languages, enjoy a world reputation. Just as widely known are many remarkable dramatists, musicians, singers, and dancers, and certain

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[1] Sh. Rashidov. Lenin's Party—Party of Innovators. *Kommunist*, 1970, 6: 54.

[2] Resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan on the 50th Anniversary of the Uzbek SSR and Communist Party of Uzbekistan, *Kommunist Uzbekistana*, 1974, 1.

theatre companies and dance ensembles. The artists, sculptors, and graphic artists of the republics of Central Asia have done talented work that has made a big contribution to the common Soviet culture. The flourishing of the various forms of their national art is one of the most important results of the socialist reforms.[1]

The forming of the national republics of the Soviet East and their subsequent flourishing in the fraternal family of the peoples of the USSR are historical events of a political importance that goes far beyond the borders of the USSR. These republics have become models of the establishment of real peace and co-operation among peoples, a vivid example of the just solution (on the basis of the theory of Marxism-Leninism and the principles of socialist internationalism) of one of the most complicated problems of the development of human society, viz., the national question.

[1] P. Azimov and Y. Desheriev. The Soviet Experience in Developing National Cultures on the Basis of Native Languages—National Relations in the USSR: Theory and Practice. *Problems of the Contemporary World*, 1974, 4 (29): 132-150.

PRESENT-DAY ETHNIC PROCESSES AMONG THE PEOPLES OF SIBERIA

I. S. Gurvich

The ethnic aspects of the present-day national development of the peoples of Siberia and the Far North are now attracting the attention both of specialists and of the broad public. Study of the ethnic processes in Siberia, and especially in the Far North, has deepened in recent decades; not only has field material been gathered but a whole number of meaty papers have been published that enable us to judge the course of the present-day ethnic evolution of the indigenous peoples of Siberia (including the small peoples of the Far North and Far East).[1]

Stydy of the varied ethnic processes in Siberia is making it possible to say, to some extent, what the ethnic fate of this vast region's peoples is, and that is naturally of great theoretical and practical value.

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[1] L. P. Potapov. On the Consolidation of the Peoples of Siberia. *Voprosy istorii*, 1955, 10; I. S. Gurvich. The Present-day Ethnicl Processes Occurring in Northern Yakutia. *Sovetskaya etnografiya*, 1960, 5:3-11; I. S. Yukvich. Socio-economic Transformation and Modern Ethnic Development of the Inhabitants of the Siberian Polar Zones of the North-Eastern Regions. In: *Circumpolar Problem*, New York, 1977, pp 53-60; Z. P. Sokolova, On Certain Ethnic Processes Taking Place among the Selkups. Khanty, and Evenks of Tomsk Region. *Sovetskaya etnografiya*, 1961, 3: 45-52; A. V. Smclyak. On the Present-day Ethnic Evolution of the Peoples of the Lower Amur and Sakhalin. *Sovetskaya etnografiya*, 1967, 3; I. S. Gurvich, R. O. Dolgikh (Eds.). *Preobrazovaniya v khozyaistve i kul'ture i etnicheskie protsessy u narodov Severa* (Transformations in the Economy and Culture and Ethnic Processes among the Peoples of the North), Nauka, Moscow, 1970; S. S. Savoskul. Social and Cultural Dynamics of the Peoples of the Soviet North. In: *Polar Record*, 1978, 19, 199: 129-132.

All the peoples of Siberia have travelled a long way in Soviet times in their political, economic, and cultural development. Because of the differences in level of their socio-economic state in the past, and in the natural, geographical conditions, the specific nature of their economy, and their differences in size and density, the character of the ethnic processes among the peoples of Southern Siberia and the Far North have inherent features of a specific kind, a circumstance that calls for special consideration of the ethnic changes among the peoples of Southern Siberia, who were agriculturalists and pastoralists in the past, and among the small peoples of the North (hunters, fishers, reindeer herders, and hunters of marine fauna).

The peoples of Southern Siberia (Buryats, Tuvans, and the Altaian people) were comparatively big nationalities at the end of the nineteenth century. Although drawn to one degree or another into the general Russian market, they had still not reached the stage of industrial capitalism. Right up to the Socialist Revolution a semi-feudal system prevailed among them, and tenacious survivals of a clan/tribal system persisted. A nomadic or semi-nomadic economy, a primitive farming technique, brutal exploitation by the Czarist Government and the prosperous local upper class encouraged the maintenance of backwardness, and retarded these peoples' development. For those reasons the individual clan, tribal, local, and ethnographic units among them were marked by considerable isolation and the preservation of cultural distinctions.

The elimination of all forms of national oppression by the Socialist Revolution roused the peoples of Siberia and the Far North to conscious life. A national state system was developed. Autonomy was granted to the Yakuts in 1922, and to the Buryats in 1923; in 1922 the Gorno-Altai Autonomous Region was formed, in 1925 the Khakass Autonomous Area, and in 1930 the Khakass Autonomous Region. In 1921 the Tuvan People's Republic was founded, which joined the USSR in 1944 as an Autonomous Region, and has been an Autonomous Republic since 1961.

The disinterested aid given to these national republics and regions by the more developed peoples of the USSR enabled them to reconstruct their economies. Socialist industrialisation, the restructuring of agriculture, and a rise

in culture brought about complex ethnic changes among these Siberian peoples.

At the beginning of the socialist reforms the Buryat language was divided into a number of dialects differing from one another in vocabulary and phonetics (the Khorin, Selenga, Tsongal, Tunkin, and other dialects). The Mongol system of writing, based on vertical characters, served the Lamaist cult but was inaccessible to the broad masses. In essence the Buryats were a people without a system of writing.

The development of a Buryat system of writing, at first on the basis of the Latin alphabet and then of the Russian Cyrillic, and the creation of a literary language close to living speech were a great event that significantly affected the uniting of the Buryat people. The introduction of teaching in the mother tongue in the schools of Buryatia, the publication of newspapers and books, and broadcasting in Buryat led to dialectal differences beginning to disappear. The socialist reconstruction of agriculture and the formation of big collective farms helped the nomadic Buryats to adopt a settled mode of life. Consistent extension of the arable area, the ploughing up of virgin lands, the substitution of stall feeding for primitive pastoral stock-raising, and the development of major industrial construction on the Buryat ASSR's territory made for a general rise in the Buryat people's standard of material prosperity. That circumstance, and in particular the growth of big Buryat settlements and the gathering together of the population of small hamlets in them, broke up the archaic tribal/clan structure. The division into exogamous clans artificially maintained for Czarism's fiscal purposes lost its significance in the new economic and social conditions, which helped strengthen a general Buryat national identity. The granting of Soviet national autonomy to the Buryats, the general rise in cultural standards, the development of a national literature, and the formation of professional forms of the fine arts, theatre, and music all influenced the spread of this concept.

The sweeping changes in everyday life gave the Buryat nation (1970 population 314 600) a new image. The old customs that rigidly governed relations between people went out of use. Rules that humiliated the dignity of daughters-in-law and stressed male supremacy in the family disappeared. It has now become usual for a woman to address her

father-in-law directly by his name and for her to take an equal part in the discussion of family affairs. New family ceremonies have been developed. At the same time, old rituals like the custom of hospitality have been retained. A modern cycle of agricultural rituals is gradually being created—harvest festivals, shepherds' days, tractor drivers' days, etc.

The consolidating of the Buryat nation is reflected on the ethnic plane not only in a breaking down of the old isolation of the separate ethnographic groups but also in a merging with the Buryats of groups of the so-called Mounted Evenks who lived in several areas of Buryatia and had long ago adopted the Buryat language. In the 1959 Census the majority of Mounted Evenks called themselves Buryats. The monolithic character of the Buryat ethnos has thus been considerably reinforced in Soviet times. Some Buryats, it must be noted, live outside the Buryat ASSR, forming big groups in the Aginsky-Buryat Autonomous Area of Chita Region and in the Ust-Orda Buryat Autonomous Area in Irkutsk Region, which has also had a certain effect on their national development.[1]

The Yakuts (1979 population 328 000 [2]) have also travelled a considerable road of ethnic development in Soviet times. Yakutia has been converted from a backward borderland of Czarist Russia in Soviet times into a republic with a developed mining industry and large-scale agriculture. The abandonment of a semi-nomadic mode of life and primitive subsistence economy, and of scattered settlements of one or several families for big communities, and the breaking down of the isolation of the old way of life have overcome clan/tribal forms of identity. The outmoded division into clans and tribes has in fact died out. Young people usually do not know what clan their parents belonged to. Exogamous

[1] P. T. Khapteev *et al.* (Eds.) *Istoriya Buryatskoi ASSR* (History of the Buryat ASSR), 2 vols. (Buryat Book Publishers, Ulan-Ude, 1959); K. V. Vyatkina. Buryatia. In: M. G. Levin, A. P. Potapov (Eds.). *Narody Sibiri* (*Narody Mira. Etnograficheskie ocherki*), USSR Academy of Sciences Publishers, Moscow/Leningrad, 1956, pp 217-266; V. I. Zateev. *Formirovanie i rastsvet buryatskoi sotsialisticheskoi natsii* (The Forming and Flourishing of the Buryat Socialist Nation), Ulan-Ude, 1961; K. V. Vyatkina. *Ocherki kul'tury i byta buryat* (Essays in the Buryats' Culture and Life), Leningrad, 1969.

[2] *Naselenie SSSR...* (Politizdat, Moscow, 1980), p 25.

bans have also disappeared. The dying out of domestic crafts and the wide distribution of factory-made articles, and the changes in the very character of family life have led to a smoothing out of past differences in the traditional material culture of big ethnographic and regional local groups of the Yakut people.

The old ethnographic differences between the central Yakuts, inhabitants of the Lena-Amga mesopotamia, and the Vilui, Upper Yana, Kolyma, and Olekma Yakuts were ironed out during the building of socialism. The northern Yakut reindeer herders, in the past much closer in their way of life to the nomadic Evenks than to the semi-settled Yakut cattlemen, have rapidly come closer to the bulk of the Yakuts, losing the ethnographic features of their everyday mode of life and material and spiritual culture.

The separate groups of Yakut-speaking Evens who lived among an overwhelmingly Yakut population have come closer to the latter and merged with them. The ethnic uniting of the Yakut nation has undoubtedly been facilitated by the monolithic character of the language, a circumstance that helped introduce teaching in the mother tongue not only in elementary schools after the development of a Yakut system of writing (1922) but also in incomplete secondary schools.[1] Linguistic unity accelerated the forming of a Yakut literature and dramatic art. The rise in material prosperity, and the striving of the broad masses of Yakuts to make full use of the blessings of modern technique, led to a considerable change in their traditional culture. The traditional yurt or *balagan*, which is a four-cornered dwelling of upright logs resembling in shape a truncated quadrilateral pyramid, no longer satisfies Yakuts. The walls of yurts used to be daubed on the outside with a mixture of clay and cow dung; and sheets of ice were frozen into the windows in lieu of glass. The cowshed was under the same roof as the yurt but separated from it by a thin partition. This arrangement was considered to conserve heat and make it easier to tend the cattle in winter, though it fouled the atmosphere of the dwelling and made it dirtier.

The majority of poor Yakuts did not wear underclothing.

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[1] Editor's note: in the traditional division of the Soviet school, elementary schools had four forms (years), incomplete secondary schools seven (now eight), and full secondary schools ten (sometimes eleven).

Instead they wore trousers and shirts made of calfskin. In winter, because of the shortage of provisions half-rotten fish, pickled in pits, and dried pine sapwood were used as food. After collectivisation this 'peculiarity of the Yakuts' culture, it goes without saying, disappeared. Log-built houses and city-style clothes have become common among them. At present they have an all-round, developed culture (a rich literature, original fine arts, their own theatre, and so on), which is the common property of the whole nation.[1]

Consolidating processes have also been at work among the Tuvans (1979 population 166 000 [2]). Before socialist reforms began in Tuva the feudal isolation of the different administrative areas (Khoshuns and the much smaller Sumons) had a marked effect. Clan/tribal units also survived. The socio-economic reforms carried out during the time of the Tuvan People's Republic (1921-44) led to liquidation of the feudal system. After Tuva joined the Soviet Union rapid industrial development of the republic began. The organising of big collective farms and the reconstruction of stock-raising (the main branch of Tuvan agriculture) made it possible to complete the nomads' transition to a settled way of life. Firm economic ties were established in these conditions between the different regions of Tuva, previously isolated. The old economic seclusion of such ethnic units as the Tojin Tuvans disappeared. A special survey made in the Tuvan ASSR showed that a territorial mixing of clan/tribal groups has taken place in recent decades, which is a clear manifestation of national consolidation.

The national system of writing created in 1930, which was followed by the shaping of norms of a Tuvan literary language, had its effect not only in the spread of literacy and development of a Tuvan literature, but also in the elimination of the specific linguistic and cultural isolation of the separate ethnographic groups.

Consolidation of the Tuvan nation was also furthered by factors like the building of a modern system of school education in Tuvan, the rise of a system of cultural and

[1] S. A. Tokarev, I. S. Gurvich. Yakutia. In: M. G. Levin, A. P. Potapov (Eds.). *Op. cit.*, pp 267-328. V. P. Antipin, Z. V. Gogolev, F. I. Golovnykh (Eds.), *Istoriya Yakutskoi ASSR* (History of the Yakut ASSR), Vol. 3 (USSR Academy of Sciences Publishers, Moscow/Leningrad, 1956), pp 207-352; I. S. Gurvich, *Art. cit.*

[2] *Naselenie SSSR...* (Politizdat, Moscow, 1980), p 25.

further education institutions, and the development of professional art.[1]

On the whole the ethnic processes taking place among the socialist nations of Southern Siberia that have taken shape in Soviet times are expressed in the following: a restructuring of the traditional forms of culture; a sharp linguistic break; the erosion of dialects; break-up of the surviving clan/tribal organisation; overcoming of the isolation of the separate ethnographic and local groups; the superseding of tribal and local forms of identity by national ones; and the integration of separate small nationalities and national minorities in the main mass of the nation.

The ethnic development of the Altaian people (59 000 in 1979) and the Khakass (69 000[2]), which took shape as nationalities in Soviet times, is undoubtedly of interest for understanding the character of the ethnic evolution of the peoples of Southern Siberia. Before the Revolution the indigenous population of the High Altai was broken up into tribes and territorial groups that hardly associated with one another and consequently were without either a common name for themselves or a common ethnic identity. The collective term 'Altaians' was mainly used in the ethnological literature. The tribes of southern Altaian pastoralists (Altai-Kizhi, Telengits, Teles, and Teleuts), on the one hand, and the northern taiga tribes (Tubalars, Chelkans, and Kumadins), on the other hand, differed in language and culture. The Altai tribes were broken up, in turn into exogamous clans, which were isolated entities.

The granting of regional autonomy to the population of the High Altai, the development of economy, the laying of lines of communication, and the liquidation of past cultural backwardness fostered a coming together of the isolated territorial and clan/tribal groups. In 1920 the population began to be called Oirots in the literature after the folklore hero Oirot Khan. Subsequently, however, as national identity strengthened, another form of ethnonym hard-

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[1] V. I. Dulov. Survivals of the Communal-Clan System and Clan Life among the Tuvans in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries (up to 1917). *Sovetskaya etnografiya*, 1952, 4; L. P. Potapov. The Tuvans. In: M. G. Levin, L. P. Potapov (Eds.). *Op. cit.*, pp 420-472; S. I. Weinstein. *Tuvintsy-todzhintsy* (Tojin Tuvans), Moscow, 1961; N. A. Serdobov. *Istoriya formirovaniya tuvinskoi natsii* (History of the Forming of the Tuvan Nation), Kyzyl, 1971.

[2] *Naselenie SSSR...* (Politizdat, Moscow, 1980) p 27.

ened, viz. Altaians, which superseded the tribal ones. The restructuring of the economy and sweeping changes in daily life smoothed out the ethnographic differences between the separate Altaian tribes to a considerable extent. Consolidation of the Altaian peoples' ethnic and linguistic unity was encouraged by the literary language that arose on the basis of the southern dialects, which enabled teaching in the mother tongue to be introduced in elementary education. Fiction was published in the Altaian language. The northern dialects, however, are still preserved in everyday life. Because of the small numbers of the Altaian people, the youth of the literary language, and its limited lexical possibilities, Russian plays a considerable role in their public affairs. At present the Altaian people have consolidated into a single nationality whose culture combines valuable elements of the traditional culture of the Altaian tribes, their centuries' old work experience, and common Soviet forms.[1]

Five Turkic-speaking tribes of the Minusinsk Basin (Kachins, Koybals, Sagai, Beltirs, and Kyzyls), who differed markedly in the trend of their economies and cultures, have united into a single Khakass nationality in recent decades.[2]

As a result of the development of socialist industry and the restructuring of agriculture, links between the previously isolated territorial groups of the Khakass were strengthened.

In 1924-25 a Khakass alphabet was devised that enabled a Khakass national literature to arise. Underlying the Khakass literary language are the Kachin and Sagai dialects.

Community of culture and way of life led to a common name for themselves, Khakass, hardening among the indigenous population of the Minusinsk Basin. The division into clans *(soyoki)* has lost its past significance.

The ethnic evolution of the 26 'minor' peoples of the Far North and East of the USSR, who numbered altogether around 151 000' persons in 1970, has its own specific character. Eighteen of them live along and beyond the Arctic Circle. They are the Chukchi and Chuvans (14 000 in 1979), Koryaks (7900), Asiatic Eskimos (around 1500), Itelmens (1400),

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[1] L. P. Potapov. *Etnicheskii sostav i proiskhozhdenie altaitsev* (Ethnic Composition and Origin of the Altaians), Leningrad, 1969.
[2] L. P. Potapov. The Khakass. In: M. G. Levin, L. P. Potapov (Eds.), *Op. cit.*, pp 376-420.

Aleuts (around 500), Yukagirs (800), Evens (12 000), Evenks (28 000), Dolgans (5 100), Nganasans (1000), Nenets and Ens (30 000), Selkups (3600), Kets (1100), Khanty (21 000), Mansi (7600), and Saami (1900). Seven nationalities live in the Far East, viz., the Nivkhs (4400), Nanai (10 500), Ulchi (2600), Udegei (1600), Negidals (around 500), Oroches and Oroks (1100); and one nationality, the Tofalars (around 400), lives in the mountainous areas of the Sayan Range.[1]

In pre-revolutionary Russia these peoples were the most backward groups of the population. Some of them, like the Yukagirs, were on the verge of extinction at the beginning of this century.

Before the Revolution destitution and a high mortality were the lot of the Evenks, Evens, Chukchi, and Koryaks.

The fur-traders ruthlessly exploited the indigenous population of the Far North, bartering tea, tobacco, and guns for furs and selling their trade goods at very high, speculative prices. The remoteness of the areas where these peoples lived from cultural centres, the harsh climate, the peculiar features of trapping and hunting, and the nomadic life of the reindeer herders and hunters made for extreme isolation and exclusiveness, and linguistic splintering of the peoples of the North.

Socialist reconstruction of the northern fur trade and a far-reaching restructuring of these peoples' whole culture and everyday mode of life, and the breaking down of their past isolation gave rise to significant changes in their ethnic evolution.

Anticipating a little, we would note here that the main change was a rapid internal transformation of the established ethnic communities as a result of economic development and cultural advance. There has been a coming together of the indigenous population of the North with the Russian population, and in some areas a coming together of ethnic groups speaking different languages that used to be isolated in the past. There has been a merging of small groups of the Northern peoples with the socialist nations. These ethnic changes, it must be stressed, are taking place naturally, without any kind of administrative pressure.

What is the reason for the intensive ethnic processes occurring at present in the Far North? The data gathered

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[1] *Naselenie SSSR...* (Politizdat, Moscow, 1930), pp 25-26, 27.

enable us to see that one of the main factors accelerating the ethnic processes is the breaking down of the past isolation (relative, of course). With the abandoning of a subsistence economy, and the development of education, a health service, and a system of cultural and educational institutions, the various ties between the peoples of the northern borderlands and other regions of the Soviet Union have been strengthened. Modern transport has brought the North close to the central areas of the USSR.

The deer trails and 'post routes', suitable only for packtrains, are being superseded by motor roads and winter motor tracks. Aircraft have linked the most remote settlements firmly with regional and territorial administrative centres.

A whole set of special conditions has affected the course of ethnic processes. A generation from the indigenous population who have had seven-year or specialised education and speak Russian fluently now play a leading role in the collective and state farms of the Far North; for this generation the old linguistic barrier that used to divide the indigenous population has been surmounted.

The assimilation of modern, common Soviet culture by broad strata of the indigenous population, and their acquiring of cultured habits and standards of conduct that encourage transformation of the traditional culture are also having their effect.

The characteristic features of the ethnic processes can be demonstrated from the example of the Koryaks, the indigenous population of the Koryak Autonomous Area in Kamchatka Region. According to the 1970 Census there were altogether 30 900 persons in the Area (34 000 according to the 1979 Census), including 5893 Koryaks, 970 Itelmens, 613 Evens, 1164 Chukchi, 22 200 Russians, and others. The Koryaks, in spite of their small numbers, used to be divided (according to the 1926 Census) into 55 per cent nomads (reindeer herders) and 45 per cent coast Koryaks (settled fishers and hunters of marine animals).[1] The coast Koryaks were broken up into eight isolated local groups. Each group had its own features of culture and its own name for itself. The reindeer herders called themselves

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[1] P. E. Terletsky. *Naselenie Krainego Severa po dannym perepisi 1926/27 gg.* (The Population of the Far North according to the 1926/27 Census), Leningrad, 1932, p 11.

Chavchyv, the coast Koryaks Nymylan or Paren, Apukin, etc., after the places where they lived. The nomadic reindeer herders employed a special dialect of Koryak; coast Koryak was divided into eight dialects, which were broken down further into local forms of speech. The phonetic differences of the dialects were so marked that nomads speaking the Chavchyv dialect did not understand their settled fellows very well. Although the reindeer herders and coast Koryaks maintained trade relations with one another, they rarely intermarried, and were not conscious of being a single nationality.

The socialist reconstruction of the Koryaks' economy and everyday mode of life led to a certain consolidation of their isolated groups. The organisation of state fishing enterprises in the Koryak National Area in the 1920s had a revolutionising effect on the coast Koryaks' life and enabled them to restructure their traditional, extremely primitive production complex. Broad involvement in commercial fisheries led to their gradually becoming concentrated around the fishing bases.

The process of consentration of the coast Koryaks into comparatively big settlements took a whole decade and led to the coming together and intermingling of the local groups. A breaking down of their past isolation was also encouraged by the extensive political, cultural, and education work that was developed among them. The wiping out of illiteracy was of immense significance. The devising of a system of writing for Koryak and the publication of schoolbooks, the running of schools and courses, and broadcasting in Koryak helped raise the population's cultural standards and broaden their outlook, which also helped overcome the seclusion of the ethnographic groups of coast Koryaks and local associations of nomads.

The coming together of nomads and coast Koryaks mainly belongs to the post-war period when the Koryak collective farms were amalgamated and merged into joint fishing and herding units. The joint enterprises, and life in common settlements, led to a bridging of the past gulf between settled Koryaks and nomads, although certain cultural differences continue to exist among them. The uniting of Koryaks from different dialect groups in big settlements did not lead to a merging of dialects. As a rule the minority adapted itself to the dialect of the majority, and only

minor dialects disappeared. Intermarriage between coast Koryaks and former nomads became more frequent. There was an exchange of the cultural values developed by the different subdivisions. All that led to national identity beginning to prevail over local forms. The present-day ethnic evolution of the Koryaks, it must be noted, does not consist simply in an internal consolidation of this nationality, although that is proceeding very intensively.

In recent decades the merging of small groups of Evens with the Koryaks around them, and their absorption by the latter, has intensified. After the socialist reconstruction of the fur trade, the Kamchatka Evens converged on the Koryaks, passed from trapping to a more profitable occupation, viz., reindeer herding of the Koryak type, and adopted Koryak national dress as working clothes. Intermarriage of Evens and Koryaks became more frequent.[1]

There have been similar processes in the Chukotka Autonomous Area, but they are taking rather different forms.

The Chukotka Autonomous Area is a district with a complex ethnic structure. The Chukchi are the main group of the indigenous population numerically; according to the 1970 Census they numbered 11 000 in the Area. In the past they were divided into coast (settled) and tundra (nomadic) groups. According to the 1926 Census the coast Chukchi were 30 per cent of the total and the nomads 70 per cent.[2] The 1959 and 1970 Censuses did not distinguish between these two groups. According to the figures of the Area Executive Committee around 40 per cent of the indigenous population were associated with reindeer herding.

Eskimos constitute a significant ethnic group in the Area and numbered 1500 persons in 1979, of whom 60.7 per cent named Eskimo as their mother tongue.[3]

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[1] I. S. Gurvich. Ethnic Processes in the Far North-East of Siberia. In: I. S. Gurvich, B. O. Dolgikh (Eds.). *Preobrazovanie v khozyaistve, kul'ture i enticheskie protsessy u narodov Severa* (Nauka, Moscow, 1970), pp 195-225; I. S. Vdovin, *Ocherki etnicheskoi istorii koryakov* (Essays of the Koryaks' Ethnic History), Leningrad, 1973, pp 280-293.

[2] P. E. Terletsky. *Op. cit.*, p 11.

[3] *Naselenie SSSR...* (Politizdat, Moscow, 1980), p 25.

In addition there are Evens and old Russian settlers in the Area (total population: 1970—101 000; 1979—133 000).

The reconstruction of the economy of the indigenous population above all accelerated the process of consolidation and internal uniting of the Chukchi nationality. Since the Chukchi were considerably more consolidated than the Koryaks at the turn of the century, this process has had certain specific features in the Area, and still does. The dialects of Chukchi are very close to one another. The differences between the coast Chukchi and the nomads were mainly manifested in their economy, and in features of their material and spiritual culture. The organisation of co-operative groups for sealing in 1928-30 encouraged an enlarging of the coast Chukchi settlements and a breaking down of the internal isolation of the different local groups.

In the 1940s co-operative associations spread among the Chukchi reindeer herders. Collectivisation was actually only completed in the post-war period in the Area. The relationships within nomad camps and the extremely unstable, chance, neighbourly links between territorially close camps gave way to broader social and economic ties—collective farm, state farm, and territorial, administrative relations within the rural Soviets and districts of the Area. The overcoming of the isolation of camps promoted an internal uniting of the Chukchi nationality. Culture centres, schools, writing in the mother tongue, and the press have undoubtedly had an effect on this.

The eliminating of local peculiarities became quicker especially in the 1950s after the enlarging of collective farms. The Chukchi herders were concentrated then into relatively big associations, and sometimes into state farms, often together with coast Chukchi and Eskimos.

On the whole the enlargement promoted a breaking down of the coast and tundra Chukchi's old isolation.

After the uniting of farms some Chukchi herders began to work in the coast economy, and a few individuals from the coast Chukchi, mainly young men, switched to the tundra and became herders. Membership of one ethnographic group or another, however, still has a very strong influence on the choice of profession. Coast Chukchi often refuse to take up the care of reindeer, pleading lack of experience and familiarity with nomadic life. The converging of coast

and deer Chukchi is nevertheless very marked; it has been fostered not only by the common economy but also by the extensive efforts made to spread writing in the native language. At present textbooks, propaganda material, and fiction are published in Chukchi (which is widely used in everyday life). Broadcasting is carried on in Chukchi, and a Chukchi-language newspaper *Soviet Chukotka* is published. With the development of the press there have been considerable changes in the Chukchi language itself, through the addition of new terms to its vocabulary, borrowed mainly from Russian.

At present the feminine dialect of Chukchi has in essence disappeared, and is now only used by very old women. In the settlements with their intense social and public life, young Chukchi women have taken up the masculine speech through the effect of broadcasting and newspapers.

In addition to the internal ethnic uniting of the Chukchi people, intensive assimilation, which also became stronger in the 1950s,[1] is noted in a number of districts of the Area.

The general trend of the ethnic evolution of the peoples of the North is distinctly traceable among the Nenets (in the Nenets Autonomous Area and the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Area) and the Khanty and Mansi (in the Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Area). The internal consolidation of each of these nationalities has also increased in Soviet times. The enlargement of hunting (trapping) associations, the setting up of big collective and state farms, and the building of central buildings and premises have led to a considerable concentration of the nomadic families and of those who lived on isolated holdings into big settlements, which has speeded up the disappearance of division into clans, encouraged the converging of separate ethnographic and local groups with the main body of the nationality, and a smoothing out of dialectal diversity. The Nenets dialects have lost many peculiarities through the fact that teaching in the literary Nenets language has been introduced in the schools.[2] This speech has now also taken hold among the forest Nenets. The Ens, a small, Samoyed-speaking nationality,

[1] I. S. Gurvich. The Ethnocultural Development of the Coast Chukchi and Asiatic Eskimos. *Sovetskaya etnografiya*, 1973, 5.

[2] L. V. Khomich. Present-day Ethnic Processes in the North of the European Part of the USSR and Western Siberia. In: I. S. Gurvich, B. O. Dolgikh (Eds.). *Op. cit.*, pp 26-81.

have converged and merged with the Nenets in the Taimyr Autonomous Area.[1] Similar consolidating processes are characteristic of the Khanty and Mansi.[2]

Consolidating processes are also developing to a certain extent among the very small nationalities of the North that number only a few hundred persons. Because of their small numbers, however, and of firm cultural and economic relations with their neighbours, the uniting tendencies among them have not become predominant. As an example we may cite the ethnic evolution of the Aleuts of the Komandorskie Islands. Their isolation has been broken down in Soviet times. With reconstruction of the Islands' economy and raising of the population's material prosperity and cultural standards, primitive elements of the Aleuts' traditional culture have disappeared. A consequence of their drawing together in big settlements has been that the Bering dialect of Aleut has superseded the dialect of the small population of Medny Island. The increased coming together of the Aleuts with the numerically superior immigrant population, the commonness of intermarriage with Russians, and education in Russian have led to a linguistic transformation. Aleuts have gradually passed from being bilingual to using Russian; the small Aleut nationality, however, still retains its national identity.[3]

Marked ethnic changes, it must be noted, have not affected all the nationalities of the North. Certain groups, like the Nganasans of the Taimyr Autonomous Area, mix little with the neighbouring Dolgans and Evenks, and continue to maintain their own language and their own kind of culture and many traditional features of everyday life.[4]

We do not have the space to consider the various concrete ethnic shifts connected with the development of the socialist nationalities of the Far North and Far East. On the

[1] V. P. Vasiliev. The Nenets and Ens of the Taimyr Autonomous Area. In: I. S. Gurvich, B. O. Dolgikh (Eds.). *Op. cit.*, pp 106-163.
[2] Z. P. Sokolova. Contemporary Ethnic Processes among the Ob Ugrians. In: I. S. Gurvich, B. O. Dolgikh (Eds.). *Op. cit.*, pp 85-105.
[3] I. S. Gurvich. Aleuts of the Komandorskie Islands. *Sovetskaya etnografiya*, 1970, 5: 112-124.
[4] Yu. B. Simchenko. The Main Features of Present-day Ethnic Processes among the Indigenous Population of the Avam Tundra of the Taimyr Autonomous Area. In: I. S. Gurvich, B. O. Dolgikh (Eds.). *Op. cit.*, pp 164-178.

whole they amount to the breaking down of tribal barriers, and a convergence and uniting of small ethnic formations among themselves or a merging with neighbours. As a result, a new ethnic structure has essentially taken shape among them, marked language shifts are occurring, and local, clan, and tribal forms of identity are disappearing.

Our survey of these ethnic processes would be one-sided if we did not mention the converging of these peoples with all the peoples of the Soviet Union, and in the first place with the Russian population around them.

The industrial and agricultural development of Siberia and the North that took place in the 1930s and 1940s, the extensive building of housing, and the social and cultural development attracted a considerable number of settlers to this region. At present the North of the USSR is undergoing a rapid industrial development unprecedented in tempo and scope. In the Far North-East, in the Chukotka Autonomous Area, deposits of gold and non-ferrous metals have been opened up, in the northern districts of Yakutia reserves of tin, gold, and diamonds are being exploited, and in the Khanty-Mansi and Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Areas an oil and gas industry is being organised on the basis of the recently discovered petroliferous province, the biggest in the USSR. In the Taimyr Autonomous Area there is the Norilsk Polymetal Combine, and new deposits are being developed along a broad front.[1] Industrial development and the building of a modern transport system are increasing the flow of new population to the North.

According to the 1970 Census the proportion of the indigenous population in the Yakut ASSR was 43 per cent, in the Buryat ASSR 22 per cent, in the Gorno-Altai Autonomous Region 21 per cent, in the Koryak Autonomous Area 28 per cent, and in Chukotka 13 per cent.

Although the immigrant population, predominantly Russian, is mainly concentrated in the towns and workers' communities, the majority of the rural population is nevertheless also of mixed national composition. In that connection the peoples of Siberia and the North have adopted many elements of the culture and standards of conduct

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[1] S. V. Slavin. *Promyshlennoe i transportnoe osvoenie Sovetskogo Severa* (The Industrial and Transport Development of the Soviet North), Moscow, 1961; *idem. Osvoenie Severa* (Development of the North), Moscow, 1975.

characteristic of the immigrants in recent years. In Soviet times a considerable part of the indigenous population has become bilingual in connection with the spread of secondary and higher education and frequent contacts with Russians, i.e. they speak Russian in addition to their mother tongue. Bilingualism is playing a very important role in their life, enabling them to become acquainted with the spiritual wealth created by mankind, and modern forms of art. According to the 1970 Census 66.7 per cent of Buryats, 41.7 per cent of Yakuts, 38.9 per cent of Tuvans, 54.9 per cent of the Altaian people, and 52.5 per cent of the peoples of the North and Far East spoke Russian fluently. Between the 1959 and 1970 Censuses the number of such among Buryats rose from 5.1 per cent to 7.4 per cent, among Yakuts from 2.4 per cent to 3.7 per cent, among Altaians from 11.5 per cent to 12.8 per cent, and among the peoples of the Far North and Far East from 24 to 32.6 per cent.[1]

Intermarriage between these indigenous peoples and the immigrant population, predominantly with Russians, is becoming more frequent. Special surveys in several areas have indicated that the percentage of mixed families is usually not more than 10 to 15 per cent. Among the Nenets, however, who have long been living in Russian surroundings, mixed families constitute around 20 per cent.[2] There is also a considerable percentage of mixed families among the Altaian people. The dynamic growth in the numbers of all the peoples of Siberia and the North between the 1959 and 1970 Censuses, however, and the rapid development of their national cultures, are evidence of these ethnic communities' stability.[3]

Processes of internal consolidation, and these peoples' convergence with all the nations and nationalities of the Soviet Union, which are taking place in close unity, characterise the sweeping progressive changes that are taking place in our day in this vast region of the Soviet Union.

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[1] Central Statistical Board of the USSR. *Op. cit.*, pp, 130, 132, 62, 92, 102. The returns of the 1979 All-Union Census indicate a further rise in the number of persons of non-Russian nationality freely speaking Russian.

[2] L. V. Khomich. *Art. cit.*, *idem. Problemy etnogeneza i etnicheskoi istorii nentsev* (Problems of the Ethnogenesis and Ethnic History of the Nenets), Moscow, 1976, p 168.

[3] I. S. Gurvich. *Art. cit.* In: *Rasy i narody*, pp 143-166.

OTHER COUNTRIES

THE POST-WAR DYNAMICS AND STRUCTURE
OF THE WORLD'S POPULATION

S. I. Bruk

The socio-economic changes that have taken place in the world since World War II are exceptionally important and have had immense effect on the course of demographic processes. Population problems have begun to play an increasing role in the home policy of countries. They have begun, moreover, to concern the United Nations and many other international bodies. International conferences have been convened at government level to discuss the demographic problems facing mankind. Careful study of these problems, however, prompts the conclusion that purposeful socio-economic reforms can provide the conditions for overcoming the difficulties associated with the changed demographic situation.

Soviet demographers are carrying on extensive, varied research into population problems. The importance of their work was indicated by Leonid Brezhnev in the Report to the 25th Congress of the CPSU:

Soviet scientists should not lose sight of the problems of environment and population growth which have recently assumed such a serious aspect. Improvement of the social use of natural resources and the formulation of an effective demographic policy are an important task facing a whole complex of natural and social sciences.[1]

Most of the world's countries took censuses in 1969-76. There are now only comparatively few where the statistical count of the population is badly done and a census has not been taken either at all or for a long time. It could easily

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[1] *Documents and Resolutions, XXVth Congress of the CPSU* (Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, Moscow, 1976), p 88.

be concluded, therefore, that world and continental sum-
maries and tables of the main population indices could
be compiled with a high degree of reliability, but it must
be remembered that the countries for which there are no
reliable statistics include several large ones, viz., China
(the last census was taken more than 25 years ago, and
data on current estimates are almost completely unavailable),
Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, and the
Yemen Arab Republic. Since around two-fifths of the
population of Asia and Africa live in countries with poorly
organised statistical counts (i.e. more than a quarter of
the world's population), that fact naturally cannot help
affecting the accuracy of estimates.[1] Even in those countries
in which a census is taken regularly, the errors in determin-
ing the population's size are sometimes quite big. In In-
dia, for example, the difference between the current esti-
mates and the 1971 Census was nearly 14 million. The
Pakistan Planning Commission announced after the taking
of the 1961 Census that it underestimated the population
by between 5 and 7 per cent.

Despite all that, however, the demographic trends and
structure of population growth can be more or less accurate-
ly established.

Population problems embrace a wide range of matters
and we do not have the space to discuss them all here.
We shall therefore confine ourselves simply to describing
those connected with the dynamics and structure of popu-
lation.[2] Our paper will analyse the following main indices:
(1) population dynamics and reproduction; (2) family
structure, marriage and divorce; (3) age structure; (4) sex
structure; (5) migration; (6) urbanisation; and (7) ethnic
and racial structure.

In order to calculate all these indices we have used va-
rious United Nations statistical yearbooks [3] and numerous

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[1] Suffice it to note that by taking the annual increment of China's
population over the past ten years as 1.4 per cent (a figure that is
considered quite reliable by the experts of several countries) instead of
1.8 per cent (the UN figure), we get a population that is 33 million
smaller.

[2] In considering the structure of population we have excluded a
whole set of problems associated with its social, class and profession-
al composition, and employment, all of which depend not so much on
the demographic situation in a country as on its socio-economic state.

[3] UN *Demographic Yearbooks for 1955-1977* (United Nations,

handbooks on both the world as a whole [1] and separate countries, census returns [2], and so on. To calculate ethnic and racial composition we have employed work done by the USSR Academy of Sciences' Institute of Ethnography at the beginning of the 1960s,[3] in which the numbers of all the peoples and racial types of the world were estimated for the first time. We have employed the methodological principles used in that work to estimate the numbers of peoples and racial types in the middle of 1975.

1. POPULATION DYNAMICS AND REPRODUCTION

Analysis of the demographic processes in the post-war world indicates that there have been big shifts in the structure of the world's population in recent decades. The victory of socialism in a number of countries in Europe, Asia, and Latin America, the gaining of statehood by more than a hundred countries that used to be colonies or semicolonies, the acceleration of socio-economic development and industrialisation in many previously backward countries, and the rapid growth of urban population in them, together with a steep fall in mortality (in particular, in

New York, 1956 to 1978; U.N. Population Division. *World Population Prospects as Assessed in 1963* (United Nations, New York, 1970); *idem. Total Population Estimates for the World, Regions, and Countries Each Year, 1950-1985* (United Nations, New York, 1970); *idem. World Population Prospects, 1965-2000, as Assessed in 1968* (United Nations, New York, 1970); U.N. Statistical Office. *Population and Vital Statistics Reports, and Statistical Papers* (United Nations, New York, 1970 to 1977).

[1] See, for example, *Narodonaselenie mira. Spravochnik* (Handbook of World Population), Statistika, Moscow, 1978.

[2] For data on the USSR, see: USSR Central Statistical Board. *Itogi Vsesoyuznoi perepisi naseleniya 1959 goda SSSR* (Returns of the 1959 All-Union USSR Census), Vols. 1-7 (Statistika, Moscow, 1962; *idem. Itogi Vsesoyuznoi perepisi naseleniya 1970 goda* (Returns of the All-Union 1970 Census), Vols. 1 to 7 (Statistika, Moscow, 1972-4); *idem. Narodnoe khozaistvo SSSR v 1978 g.* (The Economy of the USSR in 1978), Statistika, Moscow, 1979.

[3] S. I. Bruk. *Naselenie zemnogo shara* (The World's Population) — a supplement to the map *Narody mira*, Moscow, 1961; S. I. Bruk (Ed.). *Chislennost' i rasselenie narodov mira* (Numbers and Distribution of the Peoples of the World), USSR Academy of Sciences Publishers, Moscow, 1962; S. I. Bruk and V. S. Apenchenko (Eds.). *Atlas narodov mira* (Atlas of the Peoples of the World), Moscow, 1964.

infant mortality), have led to changes in the relationship of the various demographic parameters and to an intensification of the differences between industrially developed and developing countries in the character of reproduction and the structure of the population. On the other hand, there has also been a convergence of certain demographic indices.

Increasingly accelerating growth of the world population is the chief phenomenon in post-war demographic processes. In the socio-economic literature of countries other than the USSR, and in the purely demographic work published in the West, the term 'population explosion' is as a rule used to describe the reasons for this phenomenon's development. Analysis of the statistics for a long period, however, refutes the view of many Western workers about an 'explosion' or 'uncontrolled' population growth in the post-war period, although there have been considerable quantitative and qualitative changes in the demographic processes.

The growth rates of the world's population have in fact been getting faster and faster, as a result of the development of the productive forces. It was 1000 million around 1820, 2000 million a hundred years later, in 1927, and 3000 million thirty-three years later in 1960. It has increased by another 1000 million in only sixteen years, i.e. twice as fast (the mean annual increment in that interval being 62.5 million). This acceleration is not infinite, however. Certain socio-economic conditions are arising in which the rates begin to slow down.

When did the steep jump in population growth occur? What was it connected with? What factors are decisive in demographic processes? All these questions can be answered if we survey population movement over a long period.

The dynamics of the world's population as a whole is determined by its natural movement, i.e. by the ratio of the birth and death rates. In a number of countries and continents migration also affects the change in population size (in certain periods it may even be more significant in individual countries than the effect of natural movement). For several decades in the nineteenth century, for instance, immigration into the USA, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand was higher than the natural growth of their population. In Ireland, on the contrary, the population declined

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steeply through emigration, in spite of a considerable excess of births over deaths (from 8 200 000 in 1845 to 5 400 000 in 1871).

For many thousand years the world's population grew extremely slowly, which can be attributed to the low level of the productive forces and man's great dependence on nature in the early stages of human history. In antiquity and the Middle Ages natality was very high almost everywhere, and close to the biological possible; but mortality was also very high owing to periodic outbreaks of epidemics, unhygienic living conditions, and frequent famines and wars. Natality proved on the whole to be only slightly higher than mortality; and although favourable conditions arose at times in separate areas for a certain decline in mortality, the deviations from the average, very low indices of natural growth were in all probability not very great.

From the sixteenth century population growth rates rose markedly, which was a consequence of development of the productive forces within the context of capitalism. The growth of industrial production in several countries was accompanied with an advance of agriculture, an increase in the production of food, and progress in medicine (especially in combating epidemics), which could not help affecting demographic processes. In the second half of the eighteenth century there was an even steeper acceleration of population growth. Whereas it had increased before that by around 0.1 per cent per annum, growth averaged 0.5 per cent in the next 150 years (to the beginning of the twentieth century). The character of the demographic processes began to be very different in countries with different levels of socio-economic development. In the most developed countries there was a decline in mortality (though this was an extremely slow process and took many decades). In spite of a simultaneous fall in natality, rates of natural growth were still considerably higher in these countries than in those that had fallen into colonial or semi-colonial dependence.

The two world wars, in inflicting enormous casualties, could not help affecting demographic processes in the twentieth century. In spite of that world population has increased by 150 per cent in our century. The increase, however, has been different in various regions.

Whereas very high population growth was characteristic

only of Europe in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, with high natality and low (for the time) mortality, that type of reproduction was already being noted in the first two decades of the twentieth century in most of the countries of Latin America (in Europe the decline in natality at that time was more significant than the fall in mortality). At the beginning of the twentieth century mortality was much higher in the countries of Asia and Africa than in other regions, and natural growth (in spite of high natality) was comparatively low (0.3 to 0.8 per cent per annum). The high natality there (usually exceeding 40 per thousand inhabitants a year) was largely due to early marriage and a striving for many children. The last point, in turn, was linked with the very high infant mortality, which threatened to leave parents without offspring (in most Afro-Asian countries one child in four, and in some African countries one in three, or even two, died before reaching one year of age). Mortality was also very high among young people and adults. Hunger and epidemics annually carried off tens and hundreds of thousands, and even millions.

In the 1920s, the first decade after World War I, a comparatively high increase in population was already characteristic, and was observed in almost all regions of the world; only highly urbanised Europe was an exception, from which there was, at the same time, a considerable flow of emigrants to the Americas and Australia. The annual increase in population of 1.5 per cent in Asia, Africa, and the Americas was evidence of the prevalence almost everywhere of high natality, since mortality was then almost double what it is now. The population of Asia and Africa grew particularly rapidly, natural growth rising several times over compared with the first two decades of the twentieth century.

The world economic crisis that began in the 1930s, the tense political situation in various regions of the world, the war preparations being made by the reactionary fascist regimes in Germany, Italy, and Japan, and then the outbreak of military conflicts in Ethiopia, China, and Spain could not help affect demographic processes. The mean annual increase of population in the 1930s fell on the average to 1.0 per cent for the world, and in certain developed capitalist countries there began to be distinct signs of the onset of depopulation. In France the number

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of deaths was already greater than the number of births in 1935. There was a steep fall in population growth in the biggest country of the capitalist world, the USA. Population growth rates declined by almost a third in Asia. Only the countries of Latin America stood out against this trend; the mean growth of population there even increased to 1.8 per cent per annum.

World War II brought terrible calamities to the peoples of the Soviet Union and other regions. The direct loss of life alone during World War II was more than 50 million. As for indirect losses connected with the fall in natality and increase in mortality (in many countries the birth rate was lower than the death rate), they were two and a half times greater than the direct losses, according to approximate estimates (by interpolating one can suggest that the world lost at least 175 million people as a result of World War II).

In the 1940s the mean annual increase for the world as a whole fell to 0.8 per cent, and in Europe to 0.3 per cent (only at the end of 1947 did the population of this part of the world reach the pre-war figure). In the Soviet Union, which bore the brunt of the war and suffered the biggest casualties, the population fell in that decade by 15 million (the pre-war level being reached only in 1955). There was a certain reduction of population growth rates in Asia and Africa. Only in the Americas, which were not directly affected by the war, and in Australia, did the population grow at increasing tempos. That applied especially to Latin America where the average increment reached 2.4 per cent per annum (a hitherto unprecedented rate!). A third of this increase, however, it should be noted, was due to the immigrants who streamed there from devastated Europe in the first post-war years.

The dynamics of world population after World War II can be judged from Table 1.

Every socio-economic formation and every definite period in society's evolution are characterised by certain demographic indices. Marked deviations from these averages are the essence of 'population explosions', which are not so rare in the history of society's development.

One of the first of these 'explosions' occurred during the so-called Neolithic Revolution, which began in the tenth to eighth millennia B. C. and consisted in the transition

from an appropriating (gathering) economy to a producing one (the transition to agriculture and animal husbandry). A marked acceleration in population growth rates was registered in the second half of the eighteenth century, which coincided in time with the industrial revolution in Western European countries. It was no accident that it was then that Malthusian theories became common, according to which population allegedly grew in geometric progression and the means of subsistence in arithmetic progression only. The whole course of mankind's social and economic evolution has demonstrated the complete bankruptcy of such misanthropic theories that only epidemics, wars and other calamities that carry off a mass of human lives allegedly establish a correspondence between the number of people and the means of subsistence.

Table 1.

World Population and Annual Growth by Major Regions

Region	Population (in millions)				Annual Increment (in percentages)		
	1950	1960	1970	1975	1950- 1960	1960- 1970	1970- 1975
The world	2502	2983	3599	3947	1.8	1.9	1.85
USSR	180	214	243	254.3	1.75	1.3	0.9
Europe (less the USSR)	392	425	459	474	0.8	0.8	0.6
Asia (less the USSR)	1368	1645	2023	2240	1.9	2.1	2.0
Africa	219	270	350	403	2.15	2.6	2.6
North America	166	199	226	236	1.8	1.3	0.9
Latin America	164	214	279	319	2.7	2.7	2.7
Australia and Oceania	12.6	15.8	19.3	21.1	2.3	2.0	1.8

Note: the figures in the table were obtained by adding together the latest precise data for each country separately. The figures in the UN *Demographic Yearbook* for the world as a whole are as follows: 3610 million in 1970 and 3967 million in 1975. The difference between them and our calculated figures is due to Asia (without the USSR) and Latin America (our 1975 figures for which are 15 million and five million lower respectively).

We have every right to speak of a population explosion in the 1920s, which occurred after World War I, though it mainly affected only Latin America, Asia, and Africa.

The explosion of the 1950s and 1960s differs from all preceding ones both qualitatively and quantitatively. The

fact is that there was a steep fall in mortality in a very short time in the post-war period which affected the overwhelming majority of countries. Natality, the most constant component of natural growth, could not adapt itself quickly to the changed conditions. As a result, natural population growth increased in almost all countries without exception, averaging 2 per cent for the world as a whole in the mid-1960s and exceeding 3 per cent per annum in several countries in Central and South America, Africa, and Asia. The birth rate in some of those countries at the same time was higher than 5 per cent, i.e. close to the biological possible. Mortality fell to 2 or 3 per cent even in the most backward areas. As a result the population of many coun tries, and even of whole regions (Southern Africa, Central and South America, Western Asia), more than doubled between 1950 and 1975.

The post-war rise in natality in developed capitalist countries (the 'baby boom') connected with the return of men from the forces, the restoration of interrupted marital relations, and the pick-up in the economy, proved to be more significant and protracted than had been expected (and in any case was higher than after World War I). The rise in natality was accompanied with a steep fall in mortality (especially in infant mortality), which all led to population growth in Europe and the developed countries of other parts of the world being very considerable in the first post-war decade. From the mid-1960s, and in some cases from the beginning of the 1960s, the general trend changed in most developed countries; a decline in natality set in which, by overtaking the fall in mortality, led to a gradual slowing down of natural growth rates that is still going on.

The demographic situation took a different course in the developing countries that were gradually emancipating themselves from colonial and semi-colonial dependence. The quickening of population growth rates in them in the past three decades was due primarily to a substantial decline in mortality with maintenance of high natality (in some countries the latter even rose a bit because of the population's improved health). The decline in mortality was primarily due to a reduction of mortality among both infants (as a consequence of the instituting of a midwifery service and observance of the elementary rules of sanita-

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tion and hygiene) and older children. The improvement in general sanitary and hygienic conditions, and vigorous measures to combat epidemics and acute infectious diseases carried out in most countries with the aid of international organisations, led in a short time to a halving or more of the general death rate.

That does not, however, mean that developing countries already compare with industrially developed ones in the main demographic indices. There is still a very big gap, as before, between the two groups of countries; in expectation of life (45 in Africa and 71 in Europe so that, as a result, the proportion of persons aged 60 and over in developing countries is 33 to 50 per cent lower than in developed countries); in the general death rate (around 14 per 1000 in developing countries, and nine in other countries), and especially in infant mortality (which largely determines the comparatively high general mortality in developing countries). Infant mortality in the world as a whole is around 80 per 1000 births (in developing countries around 100 on the average; in other regions only around 25). In several African countries 150 to 200 of every 1000 babies born die before reaching one year of age.

As for natality, it is 130 per cent higher in developing countries than in developed ones. The weight of the latter in general population growth consequently fell from 20 per cent in the mid-1950s to 10 per cent in 1975.

The comparative stability of the average birth rate for the world over many years is of interest. From 1950 to 1970 it was around 34 per 1000. Mortality, however, while remaining unchanged in developed countries, declined by a third in all other regions over the two decades, which led to an increase in mean annual population growth from 1.6 per cent in the early 1950s to 2 per cent at the end of the 1960s.

The socio-economic reforms in developing countries that have the effect of lowering natality are 'cancelled out' to some extent by traditions of large families (in past historical periods this tradition was a natural reaction to the very high mortality then existing, and reflected the people's instinctive desire to 'survive'). In many agrarian countries, where children are put to work very young, a large number of children is still considered a factor ensuring the family's well-being.

These traditions often retain their force even when the socio-economic conditions engendering them have radically altered. In recent years, therefore, demographers studying the dynamics of a population's natality have been paying special attention to study of its ethnic features, traditions, mode of life, morals, and family organisation, and to analysing social psychological factors (views, maxims, prejudices).

In most countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America natural growth exceeds 2 per cent per annum. The sole exceptions are the Argentine, Uruguay, Singapore, Hong Kong, and certain other small countries, and China. As for developed countries, only Japan, New Zealand, and certain countries in Europe have a natural growth a little higher than 1 per cent, and only one—Albania—has a growth of 2.5 per cent. The highest natural growth (3.0 to 3.5 per cent) is characteristic of most of the Arab countries of Asia and Africa, Thailand, Zambia, Kenya, Tanzania, the Dominican Republic, Colombia, Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Ecuador; the record in that respect is held by Mexico (an increase of 3.6 per cent in 1974). At the same time a natural increase of population has been typical of certain countries in Europe in recent years.

In the 25 years from 1950 to 1975 the world's population increased by 57.8 per cent (the USSR by 41.3 per cent, the rest of Europe by 20.9 per cent, the rest of Asia by 63.7 per cent, Africa by 84.0 per cent, North America by 42.2 per cent, Latin America by 94.5 per cent, and Australia and Oceania by 67.5 per cent). The uneven growth has led to a redistribution of population in the major regions (see Table 2).

* * *

What have been the main trends in the evolution of demographic processes in recent years? What is the outlook for the future?

According to UN experts' forecasts population growth will not change significantly in the coming decades (the fall in natality observed in most countries will be compensated by a roughly similar decline in mortality in developing countries). It is considered that the 'peak' of population growth was reached, or should be reached, in the following years: in Europe in 1950-55, in the USSR, North America,

and Australia in 1955-60, in Eastern Asia in 1960-65, in the rest of Asia in 1970-75, in Latin America in 1975-80, and in Africa in 1985-90. It was suggested that world population growth would be at its highest during the 1970s and the early 1980s.

In accordance with these estimates population growth rates should begin to slow down only in 1985 and natural growth decline from 2 per cent in 1985 to 1.7 per cent by the end of the century. It is suggested that there will be a fall in natality for the world as a whole from 3.1 per cent to 2.5 per cent and a decline in mortality at the same time from 1.3 to 0.8 per cent. According to the UN forecasts the world's population will probably be around 6250 million in 2000.

Table 2.

The Distribution of World Population by Regions
(in percentages)

Region	1950	1975
USSR	7.2	6.4
Europe (less the USSR)	15.8	12.0
Asia (less the USSR)	54.6	56.8
Africa	8.7	10.2
North America	6.7	6.0
Latin America	6.5	8.1
Australia and Oceania	0.5	0.5
The World	100	100

None of these forecasts, it seems to us, allow for the new trends in population development that have only just become perceptible in recent years.

The vigorous growth of population had laid a heavy burden on the weak economies of developing countries. It is not surprising, therefore, that the socio-economic development programmes of most of them provide for implementing a policy of 'family planning'. A whole set of circumstances—accelerated urbanisation (the number of urban dwellers in developing countries has trebled in 25 years, and their proportion in the total population has risen from 17 to 30 per cent); rising educational standards; growth of female employment in social production; a broad campaign against early marriages (and in some countries

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legislation against them); propaganda for contraception—could not help affecting the level of natality and so of natural growth. The indices are affected by many other factors, of course, primarily by ethnic and psychological ones, besides the general level of a country's development.

Even by analysing the very general figures of Table 1, it can confidently be said that somewhere toward the end of the 1960s a fall began in natural population growth rates for the world as a whole. This fall was particularly rapid in all developed countries and less so in Asia (excluding the USSR). In Africa and Latin America growth rates in the early 1970s were about equal to those in 1960.

A rather more exact picture can be drawn by comparing the data for smaller regions (see Table 3).

Table 3.

Annual Growth of Population
(in percentages)

Region	1960-1970	1970-1975
The World	1.9	1.85
USSR	1.3	0.9
Europe (less the USSR)	0.8	0.6
Eastern	0.6	0.55
Southern	0.8	0.75
Western	1.0	0.75
Northern	0.5	0.5
Asia (less the USSR)	2.1	2.0
Western	2.75	2.75
South	2.3	2.25
South-East	2.6	2.7
East	1.75	1.65
Africa	2.6	2.6
North	2.9	2.4
West	2.4	2.6
East	2.65	2.8
Central	3.2	2.75
Southern	3.35	3.0
The Americas	2.0	1.9
North	1.3	0.9
Central	3.4	3.35
The Caribbean	2.25	1.55
Tropical South	2.8	2.9
Temperate South	1.5	1.6
Australia and Oceania	2.0	1.8

Table 4.

Indices of Natural Population Movement

Region	Years	In millions			Rates (per 1000)		
		births	deaths	excess of births over deaths	births	deaths	natural growth
The world	1975	121.02	50.07	70.95	30.7	12.7	18.0
	1970	121.06	50.97	70.09	33.6	14.1	19.5
Developed coun-tries	1975	17.39	10.23	7.16	15.9	9.4	6.5
	1970	18.24	9.59	8.65	17.4	9.2	8.2
USSR	1975	4.61	2.36	2.25	18.1	9.3	8.8
	1970	4.23	2.00	2.23	17.4	8.2	9.2
Europe (less the USSR)	1975	7.07	4.94	2.13	14.9	10.4	4.5
	1970	7.59	4.66	2.93	16.5	10.1	6.4
Japan	1975	1.91	0.71	1.20	17.2	6.4	10.8
	1970	1.98	0.71	1.27	19.0	6.8	12.2
North America	1975	3.51	2.09	1.42	14.8	8.8	6.0
	1970	4.12	2.08	2.04	18.2	9.2	9.0
Australia and New Zealand	1975	0.29	0.13	0.16	17.4	8.1	9.3
	1970	0.32	0.14	0.18	20.9	9.0	11.9
Developing coun-tries*	1975	103.63	39.84	63.79	36.3	14.0	22.3
	1970	102.82	41.38	61.44	40.3	16.2	24.1
Asia (less the USSR and Japan)	1975	73.40	29.07	44.33	34.5	13.7	20.8
	1970	75.76	31.04	44.72	39.6	16.3	23.3
Africa	1975	18.33	7.85	10.48	45.5	19.5	26.0
	1970	16.20	7.50	8.70	45.8	21.2	24.6
Latin America	1975	11.73	2.86	8.87	36.8	9.0	27.8
	1970	10.71	2.79	7.92	38.2	10.0	28.2
Oceania (less New Zealand)	1975	0.17	0.06	0.11	37.1	13.3	23.8
	1970	0.15	0.05	0.10	37.7	13.6	24.1

* For convenience of calculation developing countries arbitrarily include all countries of Asia (less the USSR and Japan), Africa, Latin America, and Oceania (less New Zealand).

Natural population growth fell in 13 of the 20 regions, remained unchanged in two, and rose in five. By using averages for the decade and the quinquennium we may, of course, rather strongly distort the real picture since the peak growth in various countries and regions was reached at different times. In addition, there were considerable variations of natural growth in different countries within large regions (in Eastern Europe, for example, annual natural growth is $+1.06$ per cent in Romania and -0.35 in the German Democratic Republic). We must therefore try and compare the data for two definite dates and for each country separately. The data on natural population movement for all the 209 countries and territories of the

Table 5.

Change in Natural Population Growth between 1970 and 1975

| Region | Change in natural population growth between 1970 and 1975 | | | | | |
| | Decrease | | Increase | | No change, or exact data not available | |
	Number of countries	1975 population (millions)	Number of countries	1975 population (millions)	Number of countries	1975 population (millions)
The world	65	2068.4	39	493.9	22	1369.3
Developed countries	22	736.8	7	97.3	2	256.8
USSR	—	—	—	—	1	254.3
Europe (less the USSR)	17	372.8	7	97.3	1	2.5
Japan	1	111.0	—	—	—	—
North America	2	236.4	—	—	—	—
Australia and New Zealand	2	16.6	—	—	—	—
Developing countries	43	1331.6	32	396.6	20	1112.5
Asia (less the USSR and Japan)	16	1019.0	6	70.3	10	1036.7
Africa	11	101.3	20	247.8	8	47.6
Latin America	16	211.3	6	78.5	1	25.4
Oceania (less New Zealand	—	—	—	—	1	2.8

Note: To avoid chance results the table includes only those countries with a population of a million or more (although more than two-fifths of the world's countries are thus excluded from the analysis, their combined populations are less than 0.5 per cent of the world total).

world that have a more or less permanent population are summarised in Table 4.

The data on changes in natural population growth are given in Table 5.

In the USSR natural growth remained at the previous level in 1970-75. The annual increase of population varied between 2 200 000 and 2 400 000. The big difference between population growth in the republics of the European part of the USSR and those of Central Asia was maintained as before (e.g. natural growth in the RSFSR was 5.9 per thousand in 1970 and 1975, and in Tajikistan 28.4 and 29.0 respectively).

In this same quinquennium natality fell further in the rest of Europe, with a corresponding drop in the rate of natural growth. The decline was so marked that even the absolute population growth in that region was 800 000 less in 1975 than in 1970 (if we exclude the figures for Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Yugoslavia, then one million less). In West Germany, Austria, Luxembourg, West Berlin, and the German Democratic Republic deaths have exceeded births in recent years (and in Great Britain in 1976); the same situation will probably develop in Belgium and Sweden in coming years. The decline in growth is due to a steep fall in natality (from 16.5 to 14.9 per 1000 population) and a certain rise in mortality. A comparatively high natural growth is characteristic of all the socialist countries (except the German Democratic Republic), and of Iceland, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain. Because of the carrying out of an effective demographic policy (long paid leave for women with small children; loans for newlyweds that are repayable in part only on the birth of one child and are cancelled on the birth of several children; and many other benefits) natural growth doubled in Hungary and Czechoslovakia in the period under review, and increased by 5 to 20 per cent in Poland, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria.

In Japan, the United States, Canada, and New Zealand there has also been a decline not only in the rates of population growth (by a third in the USA) but also in its absolute scale because of a steep fall in natality. If we take 15 births per 1000 of the population as the limit of a very low birth rate, then almost all the countries of Central, Western, and Northern Europe and the USA crossed it some

time ago (in West Germany it has even fallen to 9.7, and in Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, and Great Britain to between 10 and 12).

Population growth rates are falling in Asia (without the USSR). The countries where this decline has been recorded statistically include such big ones as India, Indonesia, Iran, the Philippines, and Thailand. Demographers also have no doubt that population growth rates are declining in China, although we have included it in the third group for caution's sake (exact data not being available). Even then, however, not only are population growth rates declining in Asia (less the USSR) but also absolute growth, which is happening in spite of a quite marked drop in mortality (from 16.3 to 13.7 per thousand); the fall in natality has been even more marked—from 39.6 to 34.5 per thousand over five years.

Things are more complicated in Africa, and the availability of statistics worse. A census has not been taken in a number of African countries, or where taken the figures have not yet been published. Nevertheless, judging by other countries where statistics are available, mortality is falling slowly but steadily, while natality has either been stabilised or is beginning to decline in some countries. In any case the absolute indices of natural growth are still rising, though marginally. It will apparently take at least another decade before birth and death rates in Africa begin to approach the corresponding mid-70s level for Asia.

In Latin America there was a steep fall in mortality—more than two decades ago, which advanced these countries to first place in the world as regards rates of natural growth. The level of mortality has now stabilised and natality is beginning to fall (particularly so in the Caribbean Basin). And although the absolute level of population growth increased somewhat in the quinquennium under review, growth rates are beginning to decline.

For the world as a whole the annual increment of population stabilised at 70 million in 1970-75, while the growth rate declined from 19.5 to 18.0 per thousand of the population.

The factors that show themselves in a decline in natural growth are continuing to operate in countries of various type. Implementation of a certain demographic policy can retard this decline, and in some cases (as has happened

in several socialist countries in Europe) can even increase natural growth substantially; considering the objective conditions of social development, however, it must be concluded that *the world's population growth rates were maximum in the 1950s and 1960s.*

Let us return, however, to the UN forecasts. The last one (1977), based on population figures for the world's countries in 1973, could not work the trends in population dynamics already noticeable then. It estimated the world's population in the middle of 1970 at 3632 million and in the middle of 1975 at 4022 million.[1] The forecast thus proved to be overestimated by 33 million for 1970 (mainly for Asia) and by 75 million for 1975 (67 million for Asia, eight million for Latin America, and seven million for North America; the birth and death rates of the population of Africa will approach those of Asia in the middle of the 1980s. *The decline in population growth rates predicted in all variants of the forecast for 1985 in fact began 15 years earlier.*

All that gives us grounds for considering that the UN demographers' estimates need revision. We can say quite confidently that the world's population will not be more than 4400 million in 1980, at least 60 million fewer than predicted. It can also be suggested that it will not exceed 5500 to 5800 million by the year 2000.

2. FAMILY STRUCTURE, MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE

Marriage and divorce, and family status, have a very direct bearing on reproduction. Their parameters in turn depend on other demographic indices (natality, mortality, and age and sex structure) and are governed to a considerable extent by the socio-economic conditions, customs, and traditions in each country. The cardinal changes that have occurred in nations' affairs in the post-war period have had a substantial effect on family status.

There have been various forms of marriage in the course of history, as we know, some of which have either disappeared or are gradually disappearing. Most of the peoples

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[1] Forecasts are usually given in three variants—minimum, average, and maximum. Over small intervals of time the difference between them is not great. Here we have used the figures for the most probable one, viz. the average variant.

of the world now live in monogamous families, but in a number of countries in Africa and some in Asia (mainly Islamic ones) polygyny is permitted, and polyandry among individual small peoples in Tibet, Southern India, and Nepal.[1] These forms of marriage have been becoming less common in recent decades, but it is difficult to say how intensive the process is because such marriages (the general term for both forms is polygamy) occur in the countries most poorly studied statistically.

A special study of the matter was made in three African countries in 1955-61 (now Zaire, the Central African Republic, and Guinea). The proportion of polygynous marriages unexpectedly turned out to be considerable. Out of the 734,000 families investigated, 490,000 (or 66.8 per cent) proved to be monogamous; in 23.4 per cent of the families there were two wives, in 6.8 per cent three wives, and in 3 per cent four or more wives. In Guinea, the only one of the three countries in which Islam was the dominant religion, the proportion of polygynous marriages proved to be higher than in the other two (38.2 and 27 per cent respectively).[2] In Togo, according to the 1970 Census, 46 per cent of men aged 50-54 had at least two wives.

The 'marriage rate' (number of marriages concluded per 1000 of the population) varies greatly from country to country, depending in particular on the structure of their population. The effect of age structure is especially strong. In developing countries with a high percentage of children the marriage rate should, of course, be lower, but in fact, as we shall see below, the situation is quite complicated; the level of marriage is affected by many social and economic factors; traditions, too, have a considerable effect.

For the world as a whole men start a family most often in the 25-29 age bracket, and women in the 20-24 bracket, but the age of marriage varies greatly in different countries. The minimum age of marriage is regulated by law in almost all countries. For males it is lowest (14) in Ireland, Spain, and several Latin American countries, and highest (21) in certain countries of Central and Northern Europe. The minimum age for females is usually lower (from 12

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[1] Polyandry and, incidentally, polygyny, too, have recently been banned by law in Nepal.

[2] See: *Narodonaselenie stran mira. Spravochnik* (The Population of the Countries of the World. A Handbook), Moscow, 1974, p 95.

to 18). Studies of the matter indicate, however, that it is not so much laws as each people's customs and traditions that determine the age of marrying.[1]

Customs and traditions in turn develop under the influence of social and economic factors, and are also considerably affected by geographical location. In the tropics, for instance, puberty is reached earlier, and people there naturally marry at a younger age than in the temperate and cold zones. The proportion of early marriages is especially high in the three biggest countries of the Indian sub-continent. According to the data for 1961, 52.8 per cent of the females of Pakistan married at 15 to 19 years of age, 69.5 per cent of the females of India, and 89.5 per cent of those of Bangladesh.[2]

The median age of marrying (i.e. the age at which half of the people of a given generation marry) is an extremely sensitive indicator of the marriage rate. In most countries in Europe it is around 25 for men (from 23 in Bulgaria to 29 in Greece), and around 22 for women (from 20 in Bulgaria to 25 in Greece). Early marriages are also typical of Hungary and Czechoslovakia, late ones of Ireland and Italy. The median age of marriage is quite different in developing countries. In India it is 19 for males and 17 for females, in Turkey 20 and 18 respectively, and in Pakistan 22 and 17. For most other countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America this index is low for women (19 to 21), but not for men (23 to 25, i.e. almost the same as in Europe).

In recent decades there has been a certain levelling out of the age of marriage. In regions with a preponderance of early marriages brides and grooms are 'growing up', but are 'getting younger' where late marriage predominates. The returns of the USSR 1959 and 1970 Censuses provided evidence of that. In 1959 from 31.8 to 44.2 per cent of the females aged 16 to 19 were already married in the various republics of Central Asia, but in 1970 only 19.1 to 24.9 per cent. In the same period the proportion of married women aged 16 to 19 increased from 10.1 per cent to 11.2 per cent

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[1] The laws themselves, incidentally, are usually established taking custom and tradition into account.

[2] Even earlier marriages had been typical of these countries a few decades earlier. In 1931, for instance, almost half (49.4 per cent) o the females aged 10 to 14 in British India were married.

among Ukrainians, from 7 to 7.6 per cent among Byelorus-
sians, from 10.7 to 13.4 per cent among Georgians, and
from 4.5 to 5.9 per cent among Letts.

Social and cultural reforms, the development of higher
education (especially its accessibility to women), and the
increasing commonness of families consisting only of the
parents and their children (which, as a rule, presupposes
their own source of means of subsistence) is leading to
marriages beginning to be concluded at a more mature
age in lands with traditionally early marriage. In towns
and cities, where all the factors mentioned above manifest
themselves particularly strongly, people marry later, as
a rule, than in rural localities.

The proportion of persons not marrying at all varies
in different countries from 1 or 2 per cent to 10 or 12 per cent,
only sometimes reaching 15 to 20 per cent and higher (the
fraction rises with a disproportion in the sexes or if part
of the population does not marry for religious reasons;
in some cases marriage falls off with economic instability).
The difference between developed and developing countries
in this respect is especially marked. In Europe, for instance,
more than 10 per cent of women aged 50 to 54 were neither
married nor widowed in eight countries at the beginning
of the 1970s (in Ireland even 21.1 per cent, Switzerland
16.6 per cent, Norway 15.6 per cent, and Finland 13.9 per
cent). The corresponding proportion for men of the same
age was rather lower (showing the effect of an excess of
females over males), but for all that was quite high. In
Asia and Africa the proportions of men and women not
marrying are much lower (2 to 4 per cent), in some countries
with a marked preponderance to males the percentage of
unmarried women even falls to 0.5 and 0.7 per cent (in
India and Pakistan the proportion of unmarried males is
only 3.2 and 2.2 per cent respectively).

There are around twice as many widows in the world
as widowers. In industrially developed countries this is
largely due to males' lower expectation of life, and in some
developing countries to a traditional prejudice against
widows' remarrying (as a consequence of which second
marriages are very rare among them).[1]

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[1] This prejudice is particularly characteristic of several countries
in Asia and Africa.

The marriage rate is considered high when more than 700 persons per thousand of a given sex aged 15 or older are married. This level depends not only on the commonness of early marriages but also on the level of mortality in the older age groups (higher as a rule among men) and how frequently the widowed and divorced remarry.

In Europe the highest marriage rate for men is that of Bulgaria (750 males per 1000); this index is also above 700 in the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland and Romania. It is above 700 for females only in Bulgaria (737) and is approximately 700 in Romania. The lowest marriage rates for men are in Ireland (less than 500), and in Albania, Finland, Greece, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland (500 to 600), for women in Austria, Finland, Ireland, and Spain (500 to 550). The substantial numerical preponderance of females over males in almost all countries in Europe explains the lower level of marriage among them. The proportion of widows is high only in countries that suffered heavily during World War II, but in any case is much lower than the proportion of women not marrying.

In Asia and Africa the picture is rather different. There the level of marriage is often higher among females than among males (which is explained by the numerical preponderance of males in some countries, and by earlier marriage among females).[1] Marriage rates higher than 700 are typical of males in India, Nigeria, Turkey, and several Arab countries; a rate above 800 is typical for females in Benin, Guinea, and Nigeria (in most other African and Asian countries it varies between 700 and 800). The lowest marriage rate is observed among males in Sri Lanka (449) and the Republic of South Africa (574) and among females in Southern Rhodesia (457), Sri Lanka (503), the Republic of South Africa (572), and Japan (579). In many countries in Asia and Africa (India, Iran, Pakistan, Algeria, Benin, Egypt, Gabon, Guinea, Mali, Morocco, Nigeria, Tunisia, Zaire, etc.) the proportion of widows is much higher than the proportion of women not marrying.

In the USA 685 males and 626 females per 1000 of each

[1] The commonness of polygynous marriages there also has a certain effect.

sex aged 15 and older are married (in Canada and Australia the index is about the same).[1]

In the USSR 722 males per 1000 aged 16 and older are married, but only 580 females per 1000 of the same age. There is also a very great difference in the level of marriage among the different peoples; it varies for females from 504 for Esthonians to 671 for Uzbeks; for males the variation is rather less, from 671 for Esthonians to 745 for Byelorussians.

Divorce has a considerable effect on the marriage rate, and although official divorce statistics do not, as a rule, reflect the true state of affairs [2], it can definitely be said that the number of divorces is increasing every year in most countries (see Table 6).

The number of divorces in the USSR rose considerably in 1966 when a law simplifying the procedure was passed. In the past ten years the number of divorces has remained

Table 6.

Divorces in Selected Countries

	Number of divorces per 1000 persons	
Country	1950-54	mid-1970s
Australia	0.84	1.76
Belgium	0.50	1.32
Canada	0.39	2.34
Denmark	1.54	2.60
Finland	0.77	2.11
Great Britain	0.68	2.50
Japan	0.93	1.11
Netherlands	0.57	1.56
New Zealand	0.79	1.55
Sweden	1.17	2.46
USA	2.47	5.02
West Germany	1.13	1.76

[1] We have not given information on the marriage rate in Latin America here because the official statistics for that region are very understated; in Latin American countries only legal marriages are taken into account, although so-called consensual marriages (free unions) have become quite common there.

[2] Official divorces are very difficult to obtain in many bourgeois countries. In some Catholic countries they are forbidden altogether or have been permitted only in recent years. The actual number of divorces is therefore often much higher in them than the statistics indicate.

at roughly the same level; in 1978 there were 3.5 divorces per 1000 of the population.

The proportion of childless couples among divorcers, it should be noted, varies from a third (in most countries) to two-thirds and more (in certain Arab countries). It is quite probable that the steep fall in natality and consequent rise in the number of childless couples is a cause of the increase in divorce (we do not touch on all the other causes since we are interested here only in the effect of demographic factors). The increase in the number of divorces is leading, in turn, to a fall in natality (though this point has not yet, incidentally, been adequately studied).

The structure of the family varies greatly in different countries. In developed countries families consisting of a husband, wife, and their children (the small family) greatly predominate. In developing countries there are many large, three-generation families (parents, their sons and their wives, and grandchildren). The average size of a family is lowest in the countries of Europe distinguished by a low birth rate and high proportion of single adults [1]. In Great Britain, Czechoslovakia, France, Hungary, and Norway, for instance, the average family consists of 3.1 persons, in West Germany of 2.9, in Sweden of only 2.8 persons. In some developing countries the average family is twice as big; 5.8 in the Philippines, 5.7 in Costa Rica, 5.6 in Honduras, etc. In the USSR the average size of a family is 3.5 persons, the index being much higher in the republics of Central Asia and Azerbaijan and lower in other regions (let us note, also, that this difference has increased over the past 15 years).

3. AGE STRUCTURE

The age structure of the world's population has probably altered more in the post-war period than all the other de-

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[1] The proportion of 'families' consisting of one adult is as high as 21.9 per cent in Sweden, 20.3 per cent in West Germany, 19.6 per cent in France, 18 per cent in Norway, and 14 per cent in the USA. In the USSR the proportion is also high, 19.5 per cent (in 1970 this category numbered 10.400,000 women and 3.900,000 men), which is largely the consequence of the unfavourable sex structure of older age groups.

mographic indices.[1] It varies greatly from country to country and depends primarily on the features of reproduction and character of migration; wars also have a substantial effect on it. Age structure in turn affects all the other demographic indices, especially the birth and death rates, and determines the proportion of the economically active population, manpower, etc.

The age structure of the major regions of the world at the beginning of the 1970s is given in Table 7.

Two main types of age structure are distinguished. Most developing countries (with high natality and mortality, and a low mean expectation of life) belong to the first type, which is marked by a very high percentage of the child age bracket and a small fraction of the elderly. The countries of Europe and North America, and Japan, Australia, and New Zealand belong to the second type, have a not very high natality, low mortality, and long expectation of life, and have a lower proportion of children and a high percentage of the elderly.

Table 7.

Age Structure of the World's Population
(in percentages for the mid-1970s)

Region	0-14	15-59	60 and over
USSR	29	59	12
Europe (without the USSR)	24	60	16
Asia (without the USSR)	38	57	5
Africa	44	51	5
North America	25	60	15
Latin America	42	52	6
Australia and Oceania	31	58	11
The World	36	56	8

Because the difference in the proportion of children between the two groups of countries is greater than that of the elderly age bracket, developing countries as a rule

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[1] We group population here (as is often done) into three broad groups: children (from 0 to 14), persons of productive age (from 15 to 59), and the elderly (60 and over). The proportions of the first and third groups normally vary considerably from one country and major region to another, while the proportion of the middle group varies within narrow limits in most cases.

have a lower percentage of the productive age group (in individual countries even markedly lower). On the whole the post-war period has been characterised almost throughout by a rejuvenation of society in the first group and an ageing in the second.

The proportion of children in the countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America usually exceeds 40 per cent, and in several developing countries is close to half the total population (Mali 49.5 per cent; Nicaragua 48.3 per cent; Costa Rica, Iraq, Zimbabwe, and Togo 48 per cent). Only a few countries in those parts of the world, those most developed economically (Japan, Mongolia, Sri Lanka, Argentina and Uruguay), have a percentage of children less than 40 per cent. In the developed countries, their proportion varies between a fifth and a quarter (Sweden 20.9 per cent, Hungary 21.4 per cent, Switzerland 23.5 per cent, the German Democratic Republic 23.6 per cent, France 23.7 per cent, Japan 24 per cent, Great Britain 24.1 per cent). In only two countries in Europe do children constitute more than 30 per cent (Albania and Ireland). In the USA children constitute 28.5 per cent and in Australia 28.9 per cent of the population.

In the USSR the proportion of children in 1970 was 29 per cent (in Czarist Russia, in 1897, it was 40.4 per cent). There are considerable differences at the same time between the separate Soviet republics (e.g. children constitute 46.6 per cent in the Tajik SSR and 21.6 per cent in the Latvian SSR) and between major regions as a whole (44.8 per cent in the Central Asian republics and 24.1 per cent in the Baltic republics).

The difference in the proportion of children between developing and developed countries has increased in recent decades owing to the high natality and steep fall in infant mortality in countries of the first group and the lowered natality and increase in expectation of life in countries of the second group.

As for the elderly a high proportion is usually typical of developed countries with a low percentage of children. The highest proportion of old people is in the German Democratic Republic (22.0 per cent), Austria (20.1 per cent), Sweden (19.3 per cent), Great Britain (18.5 per cent), France and Belgium (18 per cent), and other countries in Europe; the lowest in the countries of Africa, Asia, and

Latin America (in some of them people of the older age groups constitute only 3 to 5 per cent of the population).[1]

The proportion of the elderly continues to rise in the USSR, from 6.8 per cent in 1939 to 9.4 per cent in 1959 and 11.8 per cent in 1970. This rise is mainly due to the increase in the proportion of old people in the RSFSR and republics of the European part of the USSR (17.3 per cent in the Latvian SSR, 16.8 per cent in the Esthonian SSR, 15.0 per cent in the Lithuanian SSR, 13.9 per cent in the Ukrainian SSR, 11.9 per cent in the RSFSR); in the republics of Central Asia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Armenia it varies between 7.2 and 8.9 per cent. One of the reasons for the lower proportion of old people in the population of Central Asian and certain Transcaucasian republics is the very high percentage of children.

The proportion of the productive age groups is considered high if it exceeds 60 per cent of the total population, and low when it does not reach 50 per cent. First place in this regard is taken by Japan (65.6 per cent) and last place by Iraq (45,0 per cent). In most of the countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America this index varies between 45 and 50 per cent. In Europe there is not a country in which the proportion of persons of this age bracket is less than 54 per cent.

In the USSR the percentage of the productive age groups, despite a certain decline in the recent years (from 61 per cent in 1959 to 59.2 per cent in 1970) [2], continues to be quite high, especially in the RSFSR, the Ukraine, Latvia, and Esthonia (61.1 to 61.6 per cent); it is much lower in the republics of Central Asia and Azerbaijan (45.9 to 49.4 per cent).

A significant index for characterising a population's age structure is what is known as the median age. The

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[1] Even in Yugoslavia, which has the lowest proportion of old people in Europe (11.5 per cent), it is still higher than in any country in Asia, Africa, or Latin America.

[2] The proportion of persons of productive age fell particularly steeply in the republics of Central Asia and in Azerbaijan between 1959 and 1970 (from 53.3 per cent to 47 per cent on the average for all these republics, and most of all in the Tajik SSR—from 53.3 to 45.9 per cent), which was due to the considerable increase in the proportion of children and elderly persons.

median age divides the whole population into two equal parts, a younger half and a second half older than this age level. The median age of the population of the major regions of the world is shown in Table 8.

Median Age of the World's Population by Regions
(early 1970s)

Region	Median age (years)
USSR	29.3
Europe (without the USSR)	32.4
Asia (without the USSR)	20.8
Africa	17.8
North America	28.5
Latin America	18.8
Australia and Oceania	25.4
The World	22.4

The median age is below 16 in Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic, and Surinam; at the level of 16 or 17 in Algeria, Morocco, Kenya, Tanzania, and Zambia; Iraq, Jordan, Pakistan, and Thailand; Colombia, Ecuador, and almost all the countries of Central America. At the same time the median age is over 30 in most countries of Europe, and is even above 35 in Sweden, West Germany, the German Democratic Republic, and Luxembourg.

The changes now taking place in the age structure of the population will ultimately lead to a reduction in the proportion of the productive age group in all groups of countries. This is happening in developed countries because of the rise in the proportion of old people, in developing countries because of the rapid growth in the proportion of children and a certain increase in that of the oldest age groups. All this is raising many economic, social, and medical problems. The 'demographic load', i.e. the ratio of the number of children and old people to the number of persons of working age, is generally becoming heavier almost everywhere, although it manifests itself differently in different countries. It holds back raising of the population's standard of living because of the great outlays on bringing up children and providing pensions for the elderly.

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In Asia, Africa, and Latin America (except Japan, Argentina, Uruguay, and a few other countries) there are more than 700 children per 1000 persons of productive age. There are even countries in which there are more children than 'workers' (Iraq, Algeria, Togo, Costa Rica, Nicaragua). On the contrary, the number of children is less than half the number of productive persons in all the countries of Europe except Albania and Ireland, and in some of them it is a little less than a third.[1] In the USA, Canada, and Australia the proportion of children is around half of the productive age groups. In the USSR there are 490 children per 1000 productive persons (in the Tajik SSR 1015, in the Uzbek SSR 988, in the RSFSR and the Ukrainian SSR a little more than 400, and in the Esthonian and Latvian SSRs only 361 and 354 respectively).

On the other hand, there is a very considerable 'load' of old people on the productive age groups in certain regions and countries. In Europe (excluding the USSR) it is 279 per 1000 on the average, being highest in the German Democratic Republic (403), Austria (362) and Belgium, France, Sweden, and Great Britain (more than 300). In the USA the 'load' is 246, in Australia 208, and in the USSR 200 (highest in Latvia—287, and lowest in Turkmenia—151). Its level is much lower in Latin America (118), Asia (105), and Africa (96). Demographers estimate that in the next two or three decades elderly people will constitute more than 20 per cent of the total population in most countries or more than a third of the number of persons of productive age.

The specific features of the age structure of the urban and rural population must also be emphasised, because of the fact that natality is higher among the rural population in the vast majority of countries (in the USSR, for example, it is 50 per cent higher). The longer expectation of life in the country, and especially the constant exodus of young people to the towns, lead to the proportion of old people also being much higher in rural localities than in towns. As a result the percentage of persons of productive age is higher in towns in the vast majority of cases.

[1] The ratio of children to persons of productive age is around the same order in Japan.

4. SEX STRUCTURE

There have been considerable modifications of the population's sex structure in different countries and at various times, through the effect of many factors. It is well known what a great influence wars have had on it (war casualties always being much higher among men). Local disproportions may also arise through migration, in which men predominate as a rule.[1]

Table 9 indicates that present-day sex structure is not due simply to these causes (or rather, not due so much to them). Like other demographic indices, sex structure differs greatly in developed and developing countries.

In Europe (excluding the USSR) there are 13 million fewer males than females. The percentage of males is especially low in the German Democratic Republic (46.4), Austria (46.9), Portugal (47.4), and West Germany (47.7). Only in Albania, Iceland, and Ireland do males constitute a little more than half the total population.

In the biggest developed countries of other parts of the world (the USA and Japan) there are also fewer males than females (in the USA they constitute 48.8 per cent, in Japan 49.1 per cent of the total population). In the USA the proportion of males is falling all the time as a consequence of the exceptionally high and continuously widening gap between the expectations of life of males and females (67 and 75 respectively in 1974). Immigration, which used to increase the proportion of men, has now not only diminished but has also become more balanced in sex structure. In other countries (Canada, Argentina, Australia, and New Zealand), which are still taking considerable numbers of immigrants, among whom men slightly predominate, there are about as many males as females.

In Asia (without the USSR) there are 55 million more males than females. In the vast majority of Asian countries the number of males exceeds the number of females; in many of them, incidentally, the statistics are not very reliable. Only in Burma, Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam, and in Japan (as mentioned above) are there rather fewer males than females. This preponderance of males in Asian

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[1] In recent years, in connection with the levelling out of the proportion of males and females among emigrants (see below), this factor's impact on a population's sex structure is diminishing.

Table 9.

The Sex Structure of the World's Population
(mid-1975)

Region	In millions		In percentages		Difference between the number of males and females (millions)
	males	fe-males	males	fe-males	
The World	1982.6	1964.8	50.2	49.8	+17.8
USSR	118.1	136.2	46.4	53.6	—18.1
Europe (excluding the USSR)	230.5	243.5	48.6	51.4	—13.0
Eastern	52.3	55.7	48.4	51.6	—3.4
Southern	65.0	68.0	48.9	51.1	—3.0
Western	73.1	77.9	48.4	51.6	—4.8
Northern	40.1	41.9	48.9	51.1	—0.8
Asia (excluding the USSR)	1147.7	1092.3	51.2	48.8	+55.4
Western	44.0	43.0	50.6	49.4	+1.0
South	428.0	397.0	51.9	48.1	+31.0
South-East	159.7	162.3	49.6	50.4	—2.6
East	516.0	490.0	51.3	48.7	+26.0
Africa	200.8	202.2	49.8	50.2	—1.4
North	48.8	48.2	50.3	49.7	+0.6
West	57.7	57.3	50.2	49.8	+0.4
East	57.0	58.0	49.6	50.4	—1.0
Central	23.0	24.0	48.9	51.1	—1.0
Southern	14.3	14.7	49.3	50.7	—0.4
The Americas	274.9	280.1	49.5	50.5	—5.2
North	115.5	120.5	48.9	51.1	—5.0
Central	39.8	39.2	50.4	49.6	+0.6
Caribbean	13.5	13.5	50.0	50.0	0
Tropical South	86.7	87.3	49.8	50.2	—0.6
Temperate South	19.4	19.6	49.7	50.3	—0.2
Australia and Oceania	10.6	10.5	50.2	49.8	+0.1
Australia and New Zealand	8.3	8.3	50.0	50.0	0
Melanesia	1.7	1.5	53.1	46.9	+0.2
Polynesia and Micronesia	0.6	0.7	49.0	51.0	—0.1

countries is the result of centuries of oppression of women; the change in their status in recent decades has not yet been able to affect demographic structure in a substantial way. The fact that there is a marked disproportion of the sexes primarily in the countries of South Asia and in China is striking. And it has a decisive effect on the sex structure of the whole world population. There are 52 million more males than females in them (21 million in China and 21.5 million in India), and that, in spite of emigration having

been typical of them for the past century, with a preponderance of males among the emigrants, which should have smoothed out the imbalance of the sexes.

In Africa as a whole the number of males and females is about equal, but in the countries of North Africa, where the population is Moslem, there are more males (from 50.4 per cent in Egypt to 53 per cent in Libya), but rather fewer in the countries of Central and Southern Africa (under 48 per cent in Botswana, Gabon, Malawi, Mozambique, Ruanda, and Swaziland).

In Latin America the numbers of males and females are also equal. There are no great disproportions in the individual countries. The lowest percentage of males is in Chile, Haiti, and Jamaica (under 49 per cent), the highest in Cuba and Trinidad and Tobago (more than 51 per cent).

In the USSR there were only a million more females than males in 1913. The position was altered essentially after World War I and the Civil War, and in particular after World War II. In 1950 females numbered 21.5 million more than males and constituted 56.1 per cent of the population (probably the highest percentage in all the countries of the world). The disproportion of the sexes is now only preserved among the older age groups. According to the 1979 Census the proportion of males has now risen to 46.7 per cent, and the difference between the numbers of the two sexes has declined to 17 600 000).

Interesting patterns can be discerned when the USSR's sex structure is examined by republics. Before World War II, while there was a general preponderance of females in the country as a whole, there were fewer females than males in all the Central Asian republics, and in Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Armenia. The causes of that phenomenon were apparently rooted in the depressed status of females in the East before the Revolution. Industrialisation of the national periphery probably also played a role, being accompanied by the migration of sizable groups of population, primarily males, to those areas.

The 1959 Census had already recorded a preponderance of females in all Union Republics, but in Central Asia and Transcaucasia (except Georgia) the sex disproportion was not manifested so sharply as in other areas of the country. A similar position has been noted in subsequent censuses. In 1970 the percentage of females in the Ukraine was 54.8,

in the RSFSR 54.4, in the Latvian and Esthonian SSRs 54.3. At the same time their proportion in the Tajik, Turkmen, Armenian, Uzbek, and Azerbaijan SSRs varied between 50.8 and 51.5 per cent.

The sole areas of the USSR where there are more males than females are the Komi and Yakut ASSRs, and the Kamchatka and Magadan Regions, i.e. areas of big construction projects in thinly populated parts of the country with harsh natural conditions. Taking the figures for nations, there were more males than females in 1970 among the Turkomans, Uzbeks, Karakalpaks, Uighurs, Tuvans, Lezghins, and Ingushi.

The sex structure of the urban and rural population differs considerably. In developed countries there are usually rather more males than females in rural localities, owing to the bulk of the work with highly mechanised farming being performed by men, and to some of the women migrating to the towns to work in the services sphere.

We find an opposite picture in countries that have taken the road of industrial development comparatively recently. The rapidly growing towns attract a considerable number of male migrants (underdevelopment of the economy causes high unemployment in the towns, which in turn complicates the employment of women, who have more difficulty in acquiring urban trades and professions).

The differences in the sex structure of the two groups of countries can be seen from the examples given in Table 10.

Table 10.

Male/Female Ratio in Urban and Rural Localities
(early 1970s)

Country	Number of males per 100 females	
	in towns	in rural localities
USSR	86	84
France	93	99
USA	94	104
Egypt	104	100
India	118	104
Sri Lanka	118	106
Pakistan and Bangladesh	129	109

In the USSR the proportion of males in the urban population is now slightly higher than in rural localities (46.3 and 45.8 per cent respectively) in 1970, (46.7 and 46.6 per cent in 1979), but the difference is only great in the Ukraine (46.3 and 43.9 per cent in 1970, and in Byelorussia (47 and 45.2 per cent); it is also noticeable in the RSFSR (45.9 and 45.2 per cent). In the Baltic republics, and in Moldavia and Armenia, the proportion of males in town and country is approximately the same. In the Kirghiz, Uzbek, Tajik, and Georgian SSRs the proportion of males in the towns is rather less than in the countryside.

We spoke above of the effect of time and local factors (wars and migration) on a population's sex structure. In the past more than 30 years they have no longer had so big an impact but the disproportion between the sexes continues to increase in many countries. In the USA, for instance, the biggest country receiving immigrants, which was almost unaffected in this respect by the two world wars, there were more males than females in 1940 and now males are five million fewer. Over the past 75 years the percentage of males in the total population of Europe (not counting the USSR) declined from 49.4 to 48.6.

What factors are now having the biggest impact on sex structure?

In most countries (in any case in those for which account of the population's age and sex structure has been taken) 104 to 107 boys are born on the average for every 100 girls (a fact that has not yet been explained); that would seem to be a stable ratio characteristic also of countries for which the relevant data are not available.[1] Around four million more boys are born annually than girls for the world as a whole, but boys' higher mortality leads to the numerical ratio between the sexes normally being evened out by the time the rising generation reaches 15 to 20. The percentage of males is quite clearly higher as a rule in developing countries where the proportion of children is almost twice as high.

[1] For the nearly 150 countries for which data on age and sex are available there are rather more girls under one year of age than boys only in Lebanon and Nepal; Ghana, Malawi, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Swaziland, Tanzania, and Uganda; El Salvador, Guadeloupe, and Guatemala.

The high proportion of children in the Soviet republics of Central Asia and in Azerbaijan may substantially explain why the difference between the number of males and females is comparatively small in them.

Another cause with a strong impact on sex structure is the increasing difference in the post-war period in males' and females' expectation of life, which is especially characteristic of developed countries (where it is six years longer on the average for females). In the USSR the difference is ten years, in the Argentine, Austria, and the USA eight, in Canada, Czechoslovakia, France, Poland, and West Germany seven. Only in Kampuchea, India, Jordan, and Pakistan; Nigeria, Upper Volta, and among the indigenous population of the Republic of South Africa, and possibly in Indonesia, is females' expectation of life shorter.

The marked disproportion of the sexes in the countries of South Asia (the relevant data are not available for China) can probably also be explained in the light of these facts. In Pakistan and Bangladesh, for instance, the average expectation of life of females (in 1962) was five years shorter than that of males; at the same time an unusually high difference in the number of boys and girls under one year of age is recorded in these countries (in 1968 there were 114 boys for every 100 girls). Both of these factors operate in the same direction, namely, toward a decline in the proportion of females in the total population.

It is impossible, it must be noted, to explain the existing disproportions wholly by that. There are also very essential differences within separate countries. When the returns of India's 1971 Census were analysed, there were much fewer females among some peoples, and among other there were just as many females as males. On the whole a marked preponderance of males is typical only of North Indian peoples (of the Indo-Aryan language group), among whom 52.3 per cent of males were recorded. At the same time males were only 50.5 per cent among the Dravidian peoples of South India, while the number of males and females was about equal among the Tibeto-Burmese peoples of the north of the country and the Munda-speaking peoples of Central and Southern India.

5. MIGRATION

The character of migration has altered quite considerably since the war. Apart from economic factors, which always play an important role in it, political factors have been acquiring more and more significance (the formation of new states, changes of frontiers, political and economic reforms in different countries, etc.), and sometimes national and religious motives have impelled it. Migration from country to town in connection with ever increasing urbanisation has played the biggest role, as before, but we shall discuss that in the next section.

Migration took on a large scale during World War II in connection with the unorganised flight and organised evacuation of civilian population from areas of military operations. In the post-war period most of them returned to their former places of residence. The greater part of the prisoners of war and persons forcibly displaced by the Hitlerites from the countries temporarily under fascist occupation also returned home. Groups of 'displaced persons' remained only in Western Europe, who were later resettled in the USA, Australia, Canada and other non-European countries (in Europe, mainly in Belgium, France, Great Britain, and West Germany, 200 000 persons were settled, or around 15 per cent of the total number).

During the war there were also marked territorial shifts in the distribution of the USSR's population in connection with evacuation to eastern regions from occupied areas and front-line zones (altogether, around 25 million persons).[1] In subsequent years the bulk of them returned to their native parts.

In the first post-war years there were voluntary exchanges of national minorities between the USSR and Poland, the USSR and Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Romania, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Yugoslavia, and Yugoslavia and Italy. Rather later, in 1950-1, some of the Turks of Bulgaria left for Turkey while Bulgarians left Turkey for their homeland. Since the war around 100 000 Armenians, mainly from the Levant, North Africa, and South Europe have come to Soviet Armenia.

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[1] *Vtoraya mirovaya voina. Obshchie problemy* (World War II. General Problems), Book 1 (Moscow, 1966), p 74.

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After fascist Germany's defeat, resettlement of nearly ten million Germans was organised from Poland and Czechoslovakia to the German Democratic Republic, West Germany, and West Berlin (and in part to Austria). Correspondingly, around five million Poles and 2 300 000 Czechs were resettled in the liberated areas. In 1945-7 mass return of Japanese to Japan from territories earlier seized by them (mainly China and Korea) was begun (and went on until 1956); altogether some 6 300 000 persons were returned.

With the formation of two—and later three—independent states on the territory of former British India (India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh), there was an exchange of population between them that affected around 18 million Hindus and Moslems.

Considerable migrations took place in the Near East. In the four years after the founding of the state of Israel in 1948, around 700 000 Jews moved there, mainly from Europe and Arab countries in Asia and Africa. At the same time (and especially during the Israeli-Arab war of 1948) around 750 000 Arabs fled to neighbouring countries from Israel and the Arab territories seized by it; now they and their children, the 'Palestine refugees', who constitute a considerable percentage of the population of Arab countries bordering on Israel, are fighting for their right to national independence, return of their traditional lands, and the creation of a Palestine Arab state.

In countries that have long attracted settlers—the USA, Canada, Australia, and several countries in South America—new laws were passed in the post-war period limiting interstate migration. In spite of that, however, the flow of population to them from other countries rose considerably compared with the last pre-war decade when the overseas countries, gripped by economic crisis, could not provide work for their own citizens. In 1921-30 nearly six million people emigrated from European countries (excluding the USSR), in 1931-9 only 1 200 000, and in the post-war period almost ten million. The bulk of the European emigrants went to countries in the Americas: around three million to the USA in 1946-71 (mainly from West Germany, Great Britain, and Italy), nearly two million to Canada (from Great Britain, Italy, West Germany, and the Netherlands), a million to Argentine (from Italy and Spain),

800 000 to Brazil (from Portugal, Spain, and Italy), 500 000 to Venezuela (from Italy and Spain).

A large number of emigrants also went to Australia from Europe after the war (1.5 million in 1946-70, mainly from Great Britain, Italy, and West Germany), and to New Zealand (260 000 in the same years).

Emigration of Negroes from the West Indies (predominantly from Jamaica) and West African countries, Indians and other groups of the population from Asia, Africa, and Latin America to Great Britain acquired a considerable scale, and also emigration of Arabs from North African countries to France, of people from Great Britain, the Netherlands, and West Germany to South Africa, and of Japanese, Chinese, and Indonesians to the USA.

As a result of the political changes in the post-war period, more immigrants came to Europe from certain countries in other parts of the world than left it. A large number of British, for instance, returned home from former colonial possessions (India, Pakistan, and other countries), of Dutch from Indonesia, of French from Algeria and Morocco (more than a million), of Italians from Ethiopia, Libya, and other African countries, and of Portuguese from Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau.

The scientific and technical revolution has increased mobility of the population. A new type of migration, peculiar mainly to the USA, has developed, viz., that of skilled specialists (the so-called brain drain). This migration began in the 1930s, when the USA had a monopoly opportunity of selecting scientists fleeing from fascist Germany and the occupied countries of Europe. Intracontinental and intracountry migration also rose steeply after the war, and affected not only countries in Europe, for which it used to be characteristic, but also other parts of the world.

West Germany, France, Belgium, Switzerland, and to a lesser extent other countries in Western and Northern Europe, became lands receiving immigrants. The numbers migrating to them, mainly unskilled workers, reached five to nine million in various years. They came from economically less developed countries in Southern Europe characterised at that time by a high rate of natural growth (Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Yugoslavia, and Turkey). In the mid-70s there were around four million immigrants

in West Germany (mostly from Greece, Italy, Turkey, and Yugoslavia), nearly three million in France (from Italy, Portugal, and Spain), more than a million in Switzerland (mainly Italians), i.e. 17 per cent of its total population. As a rule the immigrants in capitalist countries are the lowest paid, most exploited, and rightless section of the working people. The majority of them return home after several years' work. In recent years, with crisis phenomena in all the capitalist countries of Europe and growth of unemployment, this migration has fallen off, and some of the migrants have been forced to return home sooner than they planned.

Seasonal immigration of Mexicans (mainly for farm work)—around a million a year—has become characteristic of the USA, in addition to continuing immigration from Europe. Some of the Mexicans, however, settle and become part of the permanent population. Puerto Ricans, settling mainly in New York and other big cities, also supplement the contingent of America's low-paid workers.

In the 70s the ratio between intracontinental and intercontinental migration altered radically in the main country attracting it, viz., the United States. In the first fifteen years of the century, for instance, Europeans constituted 85 to 95 per cent of all immigrants to the USA; between the two world wars they were a little less than 70 per cent, and in 1961-70 were only 34 per cent (immigrants from other countries of the Americas were 52 per cent, and from Asian countries 12.5 per cent).

In spite of a comparatively small variation in the annual increment to the US population through immigration (from the 1940s to the 1970s between 300 000 and 400 000 a year), their proportion in its total increase is once more rising a little in connection with the decline in natural growth: in the 1940s it was 9 per cent, in the 1950s 11 per cent, in the 1960s already 16 per cent. In Australia nearly 40 per cent of the total growth of population in the postwar period has been through immigration.

In other regions, economically much less developed, migration plays a comparatively minor role. In Africa, for instance, 200 000 to 300 000 people from neighbouring African countries work in South Africa, Zimbabwe, Ghana, and the Sudan. In South-West Asia migrants (main-

ly from densely populated Syria and Lebanon) are attracted to the oil-producing Arab countries. The migration of Indians to countries in South-East Asia has almost ceased.

Present-day intrastate migration presents a very motley picture. It has mainly the same impelling causes as emigration abroad: a moving from relatively overpopulated areas with little land to newly developed regions; from rural localities to towns; seasonal migration for farm work or to towns, etc. In Europe such migration is comparatively minor—the small size of the countries and high density of population do not encourage mobility.

The population in North American countries is much more mobile. In the USA around 30 per cent of the people live in states other than where they were born. Settling of the West and South-West still continues, and also the gravitation of people to big urban agglomerations, migration of Negroes to the north, and an intensification of seasonal migration of workers caused by chronic high unemployment.

The higher the level of the productive forces in developing countries, the greater is internal migration. But in most cases it does not play an essential role. The waves of migrant fugitives from the countryside to the towns in vain search of work are still not great compared with the millions of the peasant masses firmly settled on the land. The penetration of agriculture by capitalist relations, it is true, is increasing the percentage of hired labourers, who often work outside their own villages, and sometimes outside their own district, but that migration is still usually confined to limited areas.

In countries with a mixed economy, especially in Africa, where clan/tribal relations are preserved, but where there are already foci of a plantation economy or mining areas, temporary migration to these places is very common (for a few months to a few years). The forming of communities of fellow-countrymen sometimes bears a strong impress of tribalism (of archaic survivals of tribal interrelations).

In the developing countries of Latin America the intensity of migration is largely determined by the unsolved character of the agrarian problem. There are areas, for instance, where huge latifundia and survivals of peonage

still exist, and areas where more developed social relations already predominate, to which internal migration tends to go.

In the USSR and other socialist countries, state planning of the economy creates the basis for an organised flow of migrants within the country, removing the spontaneous feature of migration. Migration is purposefully controlled by direct or indirect economic and social levers, and is planned to correspond to the economy's needs for a rational distribution of population. In socialist countries underdeveloped areas are being intensively developed and migration is primarily directed to them. Since the war migration has been even more intense in the USSR to new industrial areas, new construction sites, and areas of the development of virgin lands (the flow of people to Kazakhstan and Central Asia in 1959-70 alone was 1 200 000).

6. URBANISATION

Urbanisation, i.e. increase in the role of towns in a country's affairs, is now recognised to be a complex affair, often difficult to bring under control. Close attention is being paid to it not only by town planners and demographers but also by economists, sociologists, philosophers, geographers, ethnologists, and other specialists.

The growth of towns, the rise in the role of the urban population, and spread of the urban mode of life have a direct effect on socio-economic processes, above all on reproduction, the population's age and sex structure, the character of migration, and so on.

The quantitative picture of the level of urbanisation reached, it must be stressed, is being more and more complicated by the vagueness of the concept 'town' itself. A whole set of criteria, different in different countries, are used to class a human settlement in this category. In most cases, however, the criterion of populousness is used in censuses: in some countries all settlements with more than 5000 inhabitants are classed as towns, in others those with more than 10 000 inhabitants, and so on. In many countries, including the Soviet Union, a settlement acquires the official status of a town by a special decision in each individual case.

It is more justified to divide town and country according to the predominant type of the inhabitants' occupations.

The division of labour ... leads at first to the separation of industrial and commercial from agricultural labour, and hence to the separation of *town* and *country*.[1]

In recent decades, however, the position has been further complicated (a) by the spread of industrial labour to rural localities; (b) by the broad development of commuting, with which substantial groups live in the country but work in urban enterprises; and (c) by the conversion of cities into agglomerations or conurbations, i.e. groups of towns situated close to one another and tightly linked together, with a tendency to grow together and become a continuous urbanised territory.

Data on the size of the population of towns within their limits ('administrative towns') and of cities plus their suburbs ('actual towns') are very often published separately in the statistics. The differences are very substantial.

Let us consider how the concept 'town' is treated in two highly urbanised countries, the USA and West Germany. In the USA more than 200 urban concentrations are distinguished ('metropolitan statistical areas'). These areas are adjoining counties whose population is not mainly engaged in agriculture and which gravitate to one or more towns with a population of at least 50 000. Because the counties are included as a whole in these 'areas', however, the population engaged in agriculture, though it constitutes a negligible percentage, is included in its structure.

As for West Germany, there are very many of these actual conurbations (a considerable part of the Rhein-Westphalia Land is a single continuous conurbation). Densely distributed small settlements have also grown together. It is difficult to draw a line between them according to the character of the population's occupations. That has led to the country's statistical authorities' having ceased in recent years to divide settlements into urban and rural. Data are published only on their populousness. The total proportion of persons living in populated points with more than 50 000 inhabitants in West Germany is 43.2 per cent,

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[1] Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. The German Ideology. *Collected Works*, Vol. 5 (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1976), p. 32.

in places with more than 20 000 inhabitants 72.1 per cent, and in places with more than 2000 inhabitants 91.7 per cent of the total population.

This lack of co-ordination explains in the main why the United Nations until recently included all settlements with a population of 20 000 and more in the list of the world's cities in its statistical publications, and determined the percentage of the urban population from these lists. The actual size of the urban population so calculated was thereby reduced, on the average, by a quarter. UN demographers have therefore been forced in recent years to change over to considering the data used in each country, which gives a more accurate picture of the course of urbanisation on the whole both for the separate continents and for the world as a whole.

With the scientific and technical revolution, the urbanised character of society is steadily increasing. A little more than 10 per cent of the world's population lived in towns at the beginning of the century, 25 per cent in 1940, 29 per cent in 1950, and already 40 per cent in 1978. The proportion of the urban population is increasing annually by nearly 0.5 per cent on the average. It is suggested that the number of urban dwellers in the world will more than double by the year 2000 and exceed half of the world's total population.[1]

Over the past 25 years the population of towns has increased from 716 million to 1560 million, i.e. has more than doubled. In the same period the rural population has increased from 1770 million to 2387 million, or altogether by a third, and in many countries, including the USSR, has even diminished.

The rise in the number of townsmen (see Table 11) is due to the urban population's natural growth itself, and to the consequences of an influx of part of the rural population to the towns, to the founding of new cities, to the

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[1] The suggestion that the urban population will rise to two-thirds or four-fifths of the total, very common in popular literature, is not shared by specialists. Even accelerated development of countries in Asia and Africa will hardly lead to an increase of urban population to more than 40 per cent in those areas by the end of the century; with maximum urbanisation in other regions (80 to 85 per cent), that would give a world average of 52 or 53 per cent.

Table 11.

Growth in the Size and Weight of Urban Population

Region	1940		1950		1960		1970		1975	
	mill	%	mill	%	mill	%	mill	%	mill	%
USSR	60	31	73	41	105	49	136	56	155	61
Europe (less the USSR)	200	53	216	55	245	58	286	62	309	65
Asia (less the USSR)	160	13	216	16	335	20	514	25	608	27
Africa	20	10	30	14	50	19	72	21	100	25
North America	85	58	108	65	140	70	171	75	180	76
Latin America	40	31	65	40	105	49	147	52	191	60
Australia & Oceania	5	45	8	62	10	63	14	74	17	81
The World	570	25	716	29	990	33	1340	37	1560	40

inclusion of suburban areas within city limits, and to the conversion of rural settlements into urban ones.

The role of the migration of rural inhabitants is usually particularly great in the early stages of urbanisation. In the USSR, for instance, it accounted for 63 per cent of the total growth of the urban population in 1927-38, and 46 per cent in 1959-69. The proportion of natural growth was respectively 18 and 40 per cent.

Developing countries are distinguished by relatively higher rates of urbanisation, especially in Asia and Africa, where the percentage of the urban population is still very low. In several developing countries the flood of rural population to the towns (especially to the cities, and above all to the capitals) is outstripping the demand for labour, which is increasing the army of unemployed and semi-employed. The scale of urbanisation in Asia and Africa itself, however, is much lower than that on other continents. In Latin America, the overwhelming majority of whose countries are counted as developing ones, there are already more townsmen than countrymen.

The proportion of the urban population within major regions varies within significant limits, as will be seen from Table 12, which includes data on separate countries marked by high and low levels of urbanisation.

The growth rates and degree of urbanisation in the separate regions can best be judged from data on the change

Table 12.

**Proportion of the Urban Population in the Total
Population of Selected Countries**

Country	Per-centage	Year	Country	Per-centage	Year
Europe			*Africa*		
			Algeria	52.0	1974
Belgium	87.1	1974	Tunisia	50.0	1975
Sweden	81.4	1970	South Africa	47.9	1972
Netherlands	77.2	1974	Egypt	44.6	1975
Great Britain	75.0	1973	Morocco	37.9	1974
German Democratic			Burundi	2.2	1970
Republic	75.4	1975	Ruanda	3.4	1971
France	70.0	1970	Uganda	7.1	1972
Albania	33.8	1971	Tanzania	7.3	1973
Yugoslavia	38.6	1971	Ethiopia	11.7	1975
Romania	43.0	1975	*America*		
			Canada	76.1	1971
Asia			Chile	76.0	1970
			Venezuela	74.6	1975
Japan	72.1	1970	USA	73.5	1970
Iraq	63.7	1975	Haiti	20.3	1971
Mongolia	46.4	1973	Guatemala	33.8	1973
Syria	45.9	1974	El Salvador	38.8	1974
Iran	44.0	1975	Ecuador	41.3	1974
Turkey	42.6	1974	Dominican Repub-		
The Philippines	31.8	1970	lic	43.5	1973
Nepal	4.0	1971	*Australia and*		
Bangladesh	8.8	1974	*Oceania*		
Thailand	13.2	1970			
Indonesia	18.2	1974	Australia	85.6	1971
Pakistan	25.5	1972	New Zealand	81.4	1971
			Papua-New Guinea	11.1	1971

in the size of cities (with a population of 100 000 or more)
and their weight in the total population (see Table 13).

In 1900 there were around 360 cities with a population
greater than 100 000 in the world, in 1950 there were al-
ready around 1000, and at the end of 1970s more than 2000.
The weight of their inhabitants in the total population has
almost doubled since the war. Faster growth has been
typical of cities on the whole during that time; 44 per
cent of the world's urban population was concentrated

Table 13.

Increase in the Size of Cities and Their Weight by Regions

Region	1900		1950		1960		Mid-1970s	
	mill	%	mill	%	mill	%	mill	%
USSR *	5	4	35	19	49	23	97	37
Europe (less the USSR)	43	14	83	21	140	33	146	32
Asia (less the USSR)	19	2	106	8	204	12	287	14
Africa	1	1	10	5	20	7	48	13
America	19	13	75	23	170	41	249	43
Australia & Oceania	1	17	5	38	7	44	9	48
The World	88	5	314	13	590	20	836	22

* In the USSR on 17 January 1979.

in them in 1950 (in 1900 only 15 per cent), and in the early 1970s already 58 per cent.[1]

The slowing down in the growth of such cities in the past ten years, however, deserves attention. Suffice it to recall that their relative weight in total urban population was 60 per cent in 1960. This slowing down applies in particular to Europe, where the proportion of townsmen in the population, in general, is hardly rising (in spite of the rapid growth of cities in the socialist countries and in countries located in the south and south-west of the region).

How is that to be explained?

Comparison of the data for the past several years indicates that the percentage of townsmen in the total population of several highly urbanised countries in Europe is beginning to fall. There has been a decline, moreover, in the absolute size of some cities. In West Germany, for instance, the population of 30 cities (out of 61) fell between 1970 and 1973; in Great Britain in 38 cities (out of 61) from 1971 through 1972; in Belgium in four (out of nine) from 1970 through 1971; in Sweden in four (out of ten) from 1970 through 1972; in Switzerland in five (out of six) from 1970 through 1972.

[1] In the USSR the percentage of the inhabitants of cities rose from 48.6 per cent in 1959 to 59.3 per cent in 1979.

Here, it would seem, we have a case of a quite new phenomenon not so far observed in countries as a whole. It may be due to several causes. (1) All highly urbanised countries have a very low natural growth of population. This growth is even lower in cities; in some of them, especially the big ones, it is negative (i.e. mortality exceeds natality). (2) The wide spread of motor transport has made it possible for people working in cities to live in a rural locality. The polluted character of the urban environment, plus the low cost of housing in the country, is also encouraging such migration, and inducing many people to move out of the cities. It can also be assumed that these trends will affect other countries with a comparatively high urban population in the future.

The cities growing fastest of all are those with a million or more population; their weight in the total and the urban population, in particular, is increasing. In 1900 there were only ten such cities; in 1955 there were 61, in the early 1960s 102, and in the mid-70s 181 (see Table 14).

Table 14.

**Proportion of the Inhabitants of Cities
of One Million or More (with Environs)
in the Total and Urban Population**

Region	Early 1960s				Mid-1970s *			
	No. of cities	Population (mill)	Percentage in population		No. of cities	Population (mill)	Percentage in population	
			total	urban			total	urban
USSR	3	11	5.1	10.5	18	33	12.6	20.2
Europe (less the USSR)	26	54	12.7	22.0	34	75	16.1	26.2
Asia (without the USSR)	42	93	5.7	27.8	64	170	8.2	32.8
Africa	3	6	2.2	12.0	9	17	3.8	25.1
North America	16	53	26.6	37.9	36	87	38.1	50.9
Latin America	10	27	12.7	25.7	18	56	19.7	38.0
Australia & Oceania	2	3	18.8	30.0	2	5	28.4	38.6
The World	102	247	8.3	24.9	181	443	11.6	32.5

* The USSR on 17 January 1979.

7. ETHNIC AND RACIAL STRUCTURE

Many demographic factors are bringing about a change in the ethnic structure of the world's population. The ethnic picture has been altered substantially in several regions, in particular, by migration. The uneven rates of natural growth of the various peoples of the world is having an even bigger impact on the dynamics of ethnic structure. Socio-economic factors have also had a considerable effect, and also the political events of the post-war period. The reforms being made in the overwhelming majority of developing countries are promoting the breakdown of people's clan/tribal structure and accelerating their ethnic consolidation and growth of national identity.

The 'ethnic mosaic' typical of many developing countries until recently is gradually fading. New nationalities and nations are being formed from clan/tribal and local ethnic groups. In Africa, for instance, such major national groups as the Hausa, Ibo, Yoruba, and Somali peoples, and others, have taken shape from tribal groups. Consolidation of many of the peoples of India, the Philippines, and other Asian countries is proceeding apace. In many emancipated countries with a polyethnic population ethnopolitical communities have taken shape as a result of interethnic integration.[1]

Such communities usually take shape within the limits of existing states, even when the boundaries between countries are ethnically artificial. One can speak, for example, with some degree of reservation, of the ethnopolitical communities of India, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Tanzania, which embrace all or many of the peoples of the respective countries; state unity, as has happened more than once in history, is a leading factor in this.

Assimilation processes are more typical of economically developed countries in which the bulk of the population took shape as a nation long ago and has a marked national consciousness, while the other national groups living among them are small in numbers and often less developed socially, economically, and culturally. In developed countries there has been a rapid rate of urbanisation in recent decades

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[1] For further details on this point see: S. I. Bruk and N. N. Cheboksarov. Metaethnic Communities. In: I. P. Grigulevich *et al.* (Eds.) *Rasy i narody*, No. 6 (Nauka, Moscow, 1976), pp 15-41.

and migration (in particular internal migration) has assumed a broad scale, all of which naturally could not help accelerating assimilation. Assimilation has affected various groups of the population, both national minorities and immigrants.

Above we considered the quantitative changes in various demographic indices throughout the post-war period. As for the population's ethnic structure, its movement over the same period cannot be analysed because composite figures in the size and distribution of the peoples of the world were not generally available before the early 1960s.[1] We can therefore only indicate the changes in ethnic structure that have taken place since 1961. Nevertheless the world's population increased in that short time by nearly 1000 million, or one-third. The growth of population in the various regions of the world, however, was not uniform; the size of some peoples increased by more than 50 per cent, while other hardly increased at all. That has substantially altered the proportions of the various people in the world's population.

Much work has been done in the past 15 years, moreover, to study areas of the world previously poorly investigated ethnically and linguistically, which has made it possible

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[1] Data on the size of the 584 principal peoples of the world were published for the first time in our book *The World's Population*, which was a supplement to the map *Peoples of the World* published in Moscow in 1961. The estimate was made for the middle of 1958. Later, in the series 'Peoples of the World' a volume of ethnographic essays appeared in 1962 under the title *Chislennost' i rasselenie narodov mira* (Numbers and Distribution of the Peoples of the World) in which the size of 880 peoples was estimated for 1959. These figures were recalculated and made more precise in the middle of 1961 (for the USSR at the beginning of 1962) in the *Atlas of the Peoples of the World*, published in Moscow in 1964, to which another 30 peoples were added. There are similar, later publications. Volume 5 of *Kratkaya geograficheskaya entsiklopediya* (The Short Geographical Encyclopaedia), published in Moscow in 1966, for instance, gave figures on the size of peoples for the middle of 1963, and the handbook *Narodonaselenie stran mira* (The Population of the Countries of the World), published in Moscow in 1974, provides information on the numbers of peoples for various years (e. g. for 1963 for Asia, 1970 for the USSR and Europe). In most cases, however, all subsequent estimates are very approximate and were largely made by extrapolating the figures of the *Atlas of the Peoples of the World*, with only minor corrections (the size of peoples was increased proportionally to the total population growth in one country or another).

to introduce substantial corrections into earlier estimates (which also explains the reduction in the size of certain peoples). Several corrections have also been made in the classification of the peoples of the world in the light of the latest research findings.

To determine the ethnic structure of the world's population in 1975 we used censuses taken in the late 1960s and early 1970s.[1] In most censuses, however, there is no direct information on the national structure of the population. As before we have employed data on mother tongue to determine the size of peoples in those cases, and also figures on country of origin or birth, citizenship, race, religion, tribe, or caste.[2] To determine the size of the national minorities in a country we have used the data of current estimates given by countries in handbooks or annuals.[3] Extrapolation was employed only to establish the growth in size of peoples over the past few years (since the taking of the last census in the country to the middle of 1975).

The use of indirect data, the employment of extrapolation, and the unreliability of the initial information of the total size of the population of some countries have a negative effect, of course, on the accuracy of the estimated size of various peoples. We have therefore deemed it expedient to give the data on the biggest peoples (numbering more than ten million) rounded off to the nearest million, and for smaller peoples rounded off to the nearest 100 000.

There are at least 2000 different peoples in the world at the present time—from tiny tribes numbered in hundreds (and sometimes only in tens)—the Andaman-Minkops in India; the Toala in Indonesia; the Botocudos in Brazil, the Alacaluf and Yamana in Argentina—to very large ethnoi of 100 or more million each.[4] In the past 14 years

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[1] Such figures have been published in the UN *Demographic Yearbooks for 1969 to 1975* (United Nations, New York, 1970 to 1976).

[2] For details of the method of employing these figures to determine the size of peoples, see: *Chislennost' i rasselenie narodov mira* (USSR Academy of Sciences Publishers, Moscow, 1962), pp 45-53.

[3] A most authoritative and efficient international reference work (whose material is revised annually) containing data on the ethnic structure of the population of many countries is *Europa Yearbook*, published by Europa Publications, Ltd. in London.

[4] Around 1500 peoples, united under 910 entries (several small related peoples often being joined together in one entry), were includ-

Table 15.

**Grouping of Peoples (Numbering More Than 100 000)
According to Size**

Grouping of peoples by size	1961 *			1975		
	No. of peoples	Total size of group (mill.)	Percentage of world population	No. of peoples	Total size of group (mill.)	Percentage of world population
More than 100 million	4	1065	34.7	7	1627	41.2
50 to 100 million	6	444	14.5	8	491	12.4
25 to 50 million	14	504	16.4	12	469	11.9
10 to 25 million	19	280	9.1	34	509	12.9
5 to 10 million	47	324	10.6	49	352	8.6
one to five million	136	310	10.1	147	351	8.9
100 000 to a million	67	48	1.6	95	65	1.6
500 000 to 500 000	226	58	1.9	199	50	1.3

* Here, and subsequently, the data for 1961 are taken from those published in *Atlas narodov mira* (1964).

the grouping of peoples according to size has changed as follows (see Table 15).

There are 257 peoples numbering more than a million each (in 1961 there were 226), who constitute 96.2 per cent of the world's total population, the 61 biggest nations, numbering more than ten million each (in 1961 there were 43) form almost three-quarters of all mankind (see Table 16). Another 294 peoples number from 100 000 to one million; their total numbers come to 115 million (2.9 per cent of the world's population). The total size of the many hundreds of the smallest peoples is only 33 million.

ed in the *Atlas of the Peoples of the World* (1964). In most cases the uniting of tribes and national groups was associated with the generalisation necessitated by its maps' comparatively small scale (e. g. many small Indian peoples, small peoples of Indonesia and other South-East Asian countries, and not very numerous ethnoi of African countries, were not included in the Atlas). In other cases the unifying was due to the fact that a number of ethnoi living near one another and close in language and culture were in the course of consolidating. The undoubted arbitrariness of these unifications needs to be stressed; it is due to the inconsistency of the various sources as regards the total number of peoples in the world.

Table 16.

Sizes of the Peoples of the World

№	People	Numbers in mid-1975 (mill.)	1975 as percentage of 1961	№	People	Numbers in mid-1975 (mill.)	1975 as percentage of 1961
1	Chinese	813	119	33	Afghans (Pushtuni)	21	140
2	Hindustani	169	150	34	Siamese (Khon thai)	21	150
3	Americans	168	114				
4	Russians	136	112	35	Bisaya	19	146
5	Bengalis	125	144	36	Romanians	19	119
6	Japanese	111	117	37	Sundanese	18	138
7	Brazilians	105	148	38	Persians	16	167
8	Germans *	88	106	39	Lahnda	15	140
9	Bihari	66	129	40	Hausa	15	163
10	Italians	65	114	41	Dutch	14	117
11	Javanese	60	136	42	Hungarians	14	108
12	Mexicans	56	167	43	Arabs of Algeria (Algerians)	14	159
13	Telugu	52	130				
14	British	52	111	44	Rajasthanis	14	78
15	Koreans	52	133	45	Amhara	13	118
16	Punjabi	48	145	46	Quechua	13	148
17	Marathi	48	133	47	Uzbeks	12	154
18	French	48	112	48	Arabs of Morocco (Moroccans)	12	150
19	Tamils	47	134				
20	Ukrainians	44	110	49	Fulani	12	154
21	Poles	38	109	50	Lao	12	156
22	Vietnamese	38	141	51	Sindhs	12	185
23	Arabs of Egypt (Egyptians)	37	142	52	Ibo	12	188
				53	Australians (Europeans)	11.5	131
24	Turks	37	142				
25	Gujerati	32	152	54	Venezuelans	11.5	160
26	Spaniards	27	112	55	Yoruba	11.3	174
27	Kannara	25	139	56	Greeks	10.7	113
28	Colombians	24	171	57	Portuguese	10.5	104
29	Malayali	24	150	58	Czechs	10.3	106
30	Burmese	23	144	59	Azerbaijanis	10.2	157
31	Oriyas	23	144	60	Assamese	10.2	167
32	Argentines	21	117	61	Chuang	10.0	118

* Since the founding of the German Democratic Republic a socialist nation of that country has begun to take shape.

Several large ethnic masses that can only be called peoples very conditionally are included in Table 16. In several countries in Asia and Africa that have recently won independence, the processes of ethnic consolidation of groups speaking related languages or dialects have, as we know, intensified; they have been promoted in these countries by the creation of a single literary language for groups of related ethnoi, the drawing of administrative boundaries by ethnolinguistic considerations, and several other factors. And although all that has not yet led to a final merging of the ethnoi, many workers, allowing for the clearly expressed consolidatory trends, already count ethnoi that are in the course of forming a community as united (true, while noting the conditionality of this procedure in each concrete case). That applies to such very big ethnic masses as the Bihari, Rajasthani, Lahnda, Bisaya, and certain others. The Bihari, for example, include three multimillion peoples—the Bhojpuri, Magaha, and Maitkhala—and around a dozen smaller groups; the Rajasthanis include the Marvari, Jaipuri, Mevati, and others; the Lahnda the Jats, Avani, Khokhari, Janjua, and others; and the Bisaya the Cebuanese, Panay-Jiligaynonese, Samar-Leyteans, and others.

Things are even more complicated with the Hindustanis who people vast areas of the Indian states of Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh, the city of Delhi, eastern parts of the states of Rajasthan and Haryana, and the west of Bihar (the historical region of Hindustan). The Hindustani community consists of numerous local groups related in culture and way of life, the boundaries between whom are very vague; they are all united by a single literary language Hindi. The various groups of Hindustanis speak numerous dialects of this language—Khari boli (on the basis of which the literary language was formed, Bangaru, Braj, Bundeli (dialects of Western Hindi), Avaji, Bagheli, Chattisgharhi (dialects of Eastern Hindi); the speakers of some of these dialects, moreover, do not understand speakers of others. Literary Hindi is spoken as a second language in one form or another by all educated people in North India; and being the state language of the whole country it is becoming more and more common outside North India.

In the long run, depending on the concrete historical conditions, all these groups (among whom a common ethnic

Table 17.

Size and Distribution of Peoples by Language
Families and Groups (mid-1975)

Language family or groups	Millions
Total population	3947
I. Indo-European family	1860.8
Slavonic group	270.9
Letto-Lithuanian group	4.7
Germanic group	414.8
Celtic group	8.7
Romance group	482.0
Albanian group	3.6
Greek group	10.7
Iranian group	65.0
Indo-Aryan group	595.6
Armenian group	4.8
II. Semito-Hamitic (Afrasian) family	191.0
Semitic group	147.9
Berber group	9.0
Cushitic group	15.1
Chad group	19.0
III. Caucasian family	6.5
Kartvelian group	3.6
Abkhazo-Adygeian group	0.9
Naxo-Daghestan group	2.0
IV. Dravidian family	154.1
Southern group	95.6
South-Western group	1.3
South-Eastern group	51.7
Central group	0.3
Gondwanean group	3.3
North-Eastern group	1.4
North-Western group	0.5
V. Uralian family	23.4
Finno-Ugrian group	23.37
Samodi group [1]	0.03
VI. Yukagirs	0.001
VII. Altaic family	96.9
Turkic group	89.1
Mongolian group	4.2
Manchu-Tungus group	3.6
VIII. Korean	52.4
IX. Japanese	111.0
X. Nivkhi	0.005
XI. Chukchi-Kamchatka group	0.025

[1] Samodi is the term accepted in Soviet linguistics and ethnology for the Ugrian people of North-West Siberia, instead of the previously used form, Samoyed.—*Ed.*

Language family or groups	Millions
XII. Basque	1.1
XIII. Burushaski	0.05
XIV. Kettic	0.001
XV. Congo-Cordophan (Niger-Cordophan) family	212.6
Niger-Congo group	212.0
Western Atlantic peoples	18.0
Mande peoples	9.6
Volta peoples (Gur group)	11.0
Kwa peoples	41.8
Benue-Congo peoples	126.2
Adamaya-Eastern peoples	5.4
Cordophan group	0.6
Koalib	0.2
Tegali	0.1
Talodi	0.1
Tumtum	0.1
Katla	0.1
XVI. Niloto-Saharan family	23.2
Songaian group	1.3
Saharan group	4.2
Maba	0.3
Fur	0.4
Shari-Nilotic group	17.0
Eastern Sudanese peoples	14.0
Central Sudanese peoples	2.8
Berta	0.1
Kunama	0.1
Hona	0.01
XVII. Koysan family	0.241
South African-Koysan group	0.2
Sandawe	0.04
Hatsa	0.001
XVIII. Sino-Tibetan family	865.0
Chinese group	818.0
Tibeto-Burmese group	47.0
XIX. Thai family	52.0
XX. Austroasiatic family	64.5
Viet group	39.0
Mon-Khmer group	10.5
Wa-Palauan group	1.35
Malacca group	0.03
Khasi group	0.6
Nicobarian group	0.02
Mund group	7.5
Miao-Yao group	5.5
XXI. Austronesian family	191.4
XXII. Andamanese	0.001
XXIII. Papuan peoples	3.1

Language family or groups	Millions
XXIV. Australian aborigines	0.1
XXV. Aini	0.02
XXVI. Eskimo-Aleut family	0.12
XXVII. Indian peoples	33.0
Na-Dene group	0.6
Algonkin-Mosan group	0.3
Penutian group	4.0
Hokan-Siouan group	0.3
Azteco-Tanoan group	1.5
Macro-Oto-Manguean group	1.6
Tarascan group	0.1
Macro-Chibchan group	0.4
Ge-Pano-Carib group	0.5
Andean-Equatorial group	18.6
Indians of various groups mainly speaking Spanish, English, or other languages	5.1
Other peoples, and not known	4.4

identity is still weakly developed) should either become consolidated in a single nation (in our view that is the dominant trend) or become the basis for the forming of several independent, though closely related, peoples. In all the groups named above only among the Bihari is the process of ethnodifferentiation noticeably predominant, taking the direction dividing the three biggest peoples. The Hindustanis, in spite of their vast numbers, diversity of groups, and highly dispersed character, should most likely form a single ethnic community. As for the Lahnda, the groups forming this community are gradually merging with the Punjabis.

Evidence of the rapid natural growth of the population in many regions is the fact that 102 of the 257 major peoples (living mainly in developing countries) have increased in size by more than 50 per cent over the past 14 years (including such big peoples as the Hindustanis, Mexicans, Gujeratis, and Colombians), and another 60 peoples by more than a third. At the same time European nations have grown less than 15 per cent in size as a rule (the Germans, Portuguese, Czechs, Scots, Irish, Finns, Slovaks, and certain other peoples, moreover, have grown by only 2 to 7 per cent).

The size of the various language families and groups

of the peoples of the world is given in Table 17. By comparison with previous classifications the new one introduces quite substantial changes, as noted above. In particular Greenberg's classification which has been widely adopted in recent years, has been used to group the peoples of Africa.[1]

Many linguists now include only two groups in the Sino-Tibetan family—Chinese and Tibeto-Burmese. The place of the Thai group in the system of linguistic classification is not yet finally settled; some workers put it in the Sino-Tibetan family, other in the Austroasiatic. It is also not unlikely that this group (or family) is remotely related to the Austronesian family. The closeness of the many languages of South-East and South Asia noted by many workers has found reflection in the singling out of an Austroasiatic family that includes the following groups: Viet, Mon-Khmer, Wa-Palauan, Malaccan, Khasi, Nicobarian, Mund, and Miao-Yao. The Austronesian family used to be divided into four groups: (Indonesian, Polynesian, Micronesian, and Melanesian), but in the light of the latest work this grouping is not justified. Several new classifications of the Austronesian languages have been suggested, but none of them is generally accepted.[2] We have therefore given this family in the table with a breakdown into groups. The grouping of the languages of the Indian peoples of America is given in accordance with the classifications of Joseph Greenberg, N. A. McQuown, and Edward Sapir.[3]

There are certain other contentious questions of classification. Some linguists relate Korean to the Altaic languages (primarily to the Manchu-Tungus ones). Many workers relate Japanese to the Altaic languages, recognising a substratum in it, however, of an Austronesian type. The community of the Altaic languages itself is denied, and the Turkic, Mongolian, and Manchu-Tungus languages are

[1] J. H. Creenberg. *The Languages of Africa* (Mouton, The Hague, 1966).

[2] See, for example, Isidore Dyen's classification in: G. P. Murdock. Genetic Classification of the Austronesian Languages: a Key to Oceanic Culture History. *Ethnology*, 1964, *3*, 2: 117-126.

[3] J. H. Greenberg. The General Classification of Central and South American Languages. In: Anthony F. G. Wallace (Ed.). *Men and Cultures*. Selected Papers of the Fifth International Congress of Anthropological and Ethnological Sciences, Philadelphia, Sept. 1-9, 1956 (Univ. Penn. Press, Philadelphia, 1960), p 791.

recognised as independent families. Some workers reject a genetic unity of the Caucasian languages, considering the Kartvelian, Abkhaso-Adygeian, and Naxo-Daghestan languages as three independent families. These hypotheses have not been taken into account in Table 17.

There are also some alterations in the table compared with the *Atlas of the Peoples of the World* in the order of presentation of the families and groups. The new sequence makes more allowance, in particular, for the 'Nostratic' or 'Borean' hypothesis, according to which the Indo-European, Semito-Hamitic (Afrasian), Caucasian, Dravidian, Uralian, and Altaic languages are remotely related.[1]

The distribution of language families and groups by major regions is given in Table 18.

Table 18.

Regional Distribution of Language Families and Groups
(in percentages)

Families/groups	USSR	Europe (less the USSR)	Asia (less the USSR)	Africa	America	Australia & Oceania	The World
Total population	6.4	12.0	56.8	10.2	14.1	0.5	100.0
Indo-European family	5.2	11.5	16.6	0.3	13.2	0.4	47.2
Semito-Hamitic family	0.0	0.0	1.1	3.7	0.0	0.0	4.8
Caucasian family	0.2	—	0.0	—	—	—	0.2
Dravidian family	—	—	3.9	0.0	—	0.0	3.9
Uralian family	0.1	0.5	—	—	0.0	0.0	0.6
Altaic family	0.9	0.0	1.6	—	0.0	—	2.5
Korean	0.0	—	1.3	—	0.0	—	1.3
Japanese	—	—	2.8	—	0.0	—	2.8
Congo-Cordophan family	—	—	0.0	5.4	—	—	5.4
Nilotic-Saharan family	—	—	—	0.6	—	—	0.6
Sino-Tibetan family	0.0	0.0	21.9	0.0	0.0	0.0	21.9
Thai family	—	—	1.3	—	—	—	1.3
Austroasiatic family	—	—	1.6	—	—	—	1.6
Austronesian family	—	—	4.6	0.2	—	—	4.8
Papuan peoples	—	—	0.0	—	—	0.1	0.1
Indian peoples	—	—	—	—	0.8	—	0.8
Others and unknown	0.0	—	0.1	—	0.1	—	0.2

[1] V. M. Illich-Svitych. *Opyt sravneniya nostraticheskikh yazykov* (An Experiment in Comparing Nostratic Languages), 2 vols (Nauka, Moscow, 1971, 1976).

Table 19.

Size and Distribution of the Human Races
(in mid-1975) *

Race	Millions
Total world population	3947.0
I. Negroid (African) major race	250.5
Negroes	250.0
Negrillos	0.2
Bushmen and Hottentots	0.3
II. Mixed and transitional types between the	
Negroid and Europeoid major races	352.5
Ethiopian type	44.0
Transitional forms of the Western Sudan	13.0
South Indian type	217.0
Mixed forms of the Sudan	10.0
Mulattos	66.0
South African 'Coloured'	2.5
III. Europeoid (Eurasian) major race	1794.0
Northern branch	140.0
Transitional and Central European types	616.0
Southern branch	1037.0
IV. Mixed types of the Europeoid race and the	
American branch of the Mongoloid major race	120.0
American metisos	120.0
V. Mixed and transitional types between the	
Europeoid major race and the Asiatic branch of	
the Mongoloid major race	44.8
Central Asian types	23.0
South Siberian type	8.5
Types of the Uralian group	0.2
Lappoid and sub-Uralian type	13.1
Mixed populations of Siberia	0.01
VI. Mongoloid (Asiatic-American) major race	705.2
1. American branch of the Mongoloid (Asiatic-American) major race	33.0
American Indians	33.0
2. Asiatic branch of the Mongoloid (Asiatic-American) major race	672.2
Continental (northern) Mongoloids	8.0
Eskimos and Palaeoasiatics	0.2
Pacific (eastern) Mongoloids	664.0
VII. Mixed and transitional types between the	
Asiatic branch of the Mongoloid major race and	
the Australoid major race	657.0
Types of the South Asian group (southern Mongoloids)	542.0
Japanese type	111.0
Eastern Indonesia type	4.0
VIII. Australoid (Oceanian) major race	9.2

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Race	Millions
Veddoids	5.0
Australian aborigines	0.1
Aini	0.02
Melanesians and Papuans	4.1
Negritos	0.1
IX. Other racial types (mixed)	9.0
Malagasians	7.9
Polynesians and Micronesians	1.0
Hawaiians	0.1
Unknown	4.8

* To determine the size of the human races data on the percentage of one racial type or another in the composition of each people were used. Because these are tentative and the lines between races are very arbitrary, the size of the separate races must be considered approximate. We suggest that each figure has an accuracy around ±10 to 20 per cent.

As a consequence of the uneven growth in the size of the various peoples there have been quite considerable changes in the ranking of the different groups in the world's total population. The proportion of peoples belonging to the following families has increased most of all: Congo-Cordophan (from 4.4 to 5.4 per cent), Semito-Hamitic (from 4.2 to 4.8 per cent), and Austronesian (from 4.4 to 4.8 per cent). The percentage weight of peoples of the Indo-European, Sino-Tibetan, and Uralian families, and of the Japanese, has fallen in the same period. In general there has been a quite significant fall in the proportion of peoples of the Indo-European family as a whole, while the weight of peoples of its separate groups in the world's population has increased considerably: Indo-Aryan from 13.8 to 15.1 per cent, Iranian from 1.4 to 1.7 per cent, Romance from 11.8 to 12.2 per cent (through the rapid growth of Latin American peoples); at the same time the weight of peoples of the Germanic group has fallen from 11.7 to 10.2 per cent, and of the Slavonic group from 7.9 to 6.9 per cent.

* * *

Until recently anthropologists distinguished three major races in the world (Europeoid, Mongoloid, and Equatorial or Negro-Australoid), and a number of transitional and

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mixed racial types.[1] In recent year data have accumulated on the existence of two racial stems or trunks (western and eastern), the first including the Europeoids and Negroes of Africa and the second the Mongoloid and Australoid races.[2] Most workers therefore now divide the Equatorial race into two major races, the Negroid and the Australoid. The numbers and distribution of the human races are given in Table 19.

There has been a certain redistribution of the proportions of the different races in the world's population. The first thing that strikes the eye is a certain increase in mixed and transitional types, which is natural considering the continuous mixing of races. At the same time the proportion of the Europeoid and Mongoloid major races has declined considerably. The weight of the different branches within each race in the total population of the world has also undergone substantial changes. The southern branch of the Europeoid race, for instance, has grown a bit, while the transitional and Central European types, and especially the northern branch, have diminished greatly. The distribution of the human races by regions is given in Table 20.

* * *

There has been a gradual fall in natality in the world on the whole in recent decades, and a rather quicker reduction of mortality, which has led to an increase in rates of natural growth. Only in the past five to seven years have these rates begun to slow down a little, which is associated with the accelerating fall in natality in both developed and developing countries. There has been an increase in the proportion of children and old people in the population (at the expense of people of productive age), and a certain increase in the proportion of females (associated with the increasing difference in the expectation of life of men and women), and a rapid rise in the urban population.

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[1] By transitional types is meant those formed as a result of the blending of members of the main races in antiquity, and by mixed types those resulting from interbreeding in mediaeval and modern times (including the present). Typical representatives of the first are the Dravidian types of South India, and of the second the metisos and mulattos of America.

[2] A. A. Zubov. A Propos of the Racial-Diagnostic Significance of Certain Odontological Features. *Sovetskaya etnografiya*, 1968, 3: 49-59.

Table 20.

Regional Distribution of the Human Races
(in percentages)

Races	USSR	Europe (less USSR)	Asia (less USSR)	Africa	America	Australia & Oceania	The World
Total population	6.4	12.0	56.8	10.2	14.1	0.5	100.0
Negroid major race	—	0.0	0.0	5.5	0.9	—	6.4
Mixed and transitional types between the Negroid and Europeoid major races	—	0.0	5.5	1.8	1.6	0.0	8.9
Europeoid major race	5.6	12.0	17.1	2.7	7.6	0.4	45.4
Mixed types of the Europeoid major race and the American branch of the Mongoloid major race	—	0.0	—	—	3.1	—	3.1
Mixed and transitional types between the Europeoid major race and the Asiatic branch of the Mongoloid major race	0.8	0.0	0.3	—	—	—	1.1
Mongoloid major race							17.9
American branch	—	—	—	—	0.9	—	0.9
Asiatic branch	0.0	0.0	17.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	17.0
Mixed and transitional types between the Asiatic branch of the Mongoloid major race and the Australoid major race	—	—	16.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	16.6
Australoid major race	—	—	0.2	—	—	0.1	0.3
Other racial types (mixed)	—	—	0.1	0.2	—	—	0.3

All these trends, however, are manifesting themselves differently in socialist and non-socialist countries (in the latter there are significant differences between developed and developing countries). Under the planned economies in socialist countries the possible negative consequences of these trends are reduced to the minimum. In the other countries the patterns of demographic development mentioned often give rise to problems that are difficult to deal with.

With the accelerated growth of population since World War II there has been, characteristically, a flood of neo-Malthusian books, whose authors write of the disaster threatening the world from overpopulation. Some bourgeois writers qualify this acceleration as a 'natural calamity', speaking without grounds of a danger of world famine. By exaggerating the imbalance between population growth and the growth rates of economic potential, they cast doubt on the possibility of supplying the population with food in the future. Such 'theories' are founded on lack of faith in the progress of science and in the possibilities of transforming society socially. The new demographic situation that has arisen since World War II is being used by the bourgeoisie's ideologists for new attacks on Marxism and to justify and defend capitalism.

Two groups of bourgeois writers are now distinguishable—extreme reactionaries (neo-Malthusians) and 'liberals'. Both are trying to justify and defend the capitalist system, which is unable, however, to meet the needs of the increasing population. The former extol war as a means of solving the social problems that are becoming increasingly acute as population increases, while the latter seek ways of preserving capitalism.

The neo-Malthusians propagate a doctrine that consists, in essence, in the following: that all capitalism's main contradictions can be overcome by birth control. In their view (1) natality is a purely biological process, and (2) reproduction of the population dominates economic and social processes.

The neo-Malthusians also claim that the world's resources are limited while people's fertility is unlimited. They laud the past when capacity to multiply the human race was compensated by a number of controlling factors: famine, epidemics, and wars. The West German sociologist Pfeffer disseminates racial ideas as well as Malthusian ones. In one of his books he preaches the theory that Europeans should not permit the native populations of colonial countries to obtain an education or to sense their human dignity. Social progress and the development of medicine, he says, only bring harm to developing countries; while lowering mortality they do not reduce natality; and at the same time limitation of births, in his view, is the sole possible road of progressive development. He regrets that

brutal, harsh means of limiting population growth, though lifesaving for society, are no longer employed.[1]

There are no longer many scholars now who would take a purely biological stand in regard to the relation between development of the economy and population. Few bourgeois workers deny the social factors. There are discrepancies only in their interpretation and evaluation of their role. The watershed between Malthusians and anti-Malthusians is whether to recognise overpopulation as natural and inevitable or as governed by the socio-economic system in various concrete historical circumstances, to recognise the source of poverty as an excessive number of working people or their exploitation.

The liberal trend in modern bourgeois demography was developed by the eminent French sociologist and demographer Sauvy. He thought that physiological fertility was a constant quantity, and that changes in population growth rates could therefore only be the result of all the changes that affect social fertility.[2] He explained the reduction in natality in developed countries by socio-economic causes.

In Sauvy's view overpopulation is relative in character.
> If there are many poor countries presenting a picture of overpopulation, malnutrition, underemployment, and poverty, it is because their resources are poorly exploited, in the light of modern techniques.... To estimate that there are 'too many people' is to suggest demographic remedies—emigration, birth control (and some go so far as to resign themselves to a severe epidemic thinning the population)—while, by putting the accent on technical backwardness, one proposes a very different solution, viz., amelioration of soils, training of people, etc.[3]

In spite of these basically correct ideas, Sauvy unjustifiably dramatised the overpopulation problem and suggested that the leading countries should drop their disputes and unite so as to cope with the problems of birth control.

Soviet Marxists have contributed much to exposing Malthusianism. Its misanthropic, deeply reactionary char-

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[1] See: Karl Pfeffer. *Die sozialen Systeme der Welt* (Diebrichs, 1961), pp 248, 289.

[2] See: Alfred Sauvy. *Malthus et les deux Marx* (Paris, 1963), p 81.

[3] *Ibid.*, pp 121-122.

acter, which has contributed to the isolation that the more zealous Malthusians have ultimately found themselves in, has been convincingly demonstrated in particular by Soviet economists, sociologists, demographers, and ethnologists.[1] Marxists consider population a socio-economic category with primacy of the social; demographic processes primarily depend on the economic system and social structure of society, so that measures like birth control can only play a subsidiary role in relation to basic social and economic reforms in developing countries.

In fact, of course, with the backward agrarian economy still preserved in those countries, and given low national income, mass unemployment, and illiteracy, rapid population growth does hamper social and economic development. It is not by chance that birth control programmes are being implemented in most developing countries, although a radical solution of the problem is associated with basic socio-economic reforms, freeing of the economy from foreign dependence, the development of industry and growth of towns, education and science, agrarian reforms, the elimination of archaic survivals in everyday life, and so on.

The planet's natural resources are capable of feeding a much greater number of people than live on it at the present time, given rational utilisation of them. Most spokesmen of developing countries at the world conference on population held in Bucharest in 1974 stressed that the solution of population problems lay in economic development and not in compulsory birth control measures. Engels long ago pointed out the possibility of stabilising the world's population, given the supremacy of new social relations:

> There is of course the abstract possibility that the human population will become so numerous that its further increase will have to be checked. If it should become necessary for communist society to regulate the population of men, just as it will have already regulated the production of things, then it, and it alone, will be able to do this without difficulties.[2]

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[1] See, for example: D. I. Valentey (Ed.). *The Theory of Population* (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1978).

[2] Frederick Engels' letter to Karl Kautsky in Vienna, 1 February 1881. Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. *Selected Correspondence* (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1975), p 315.

NATIONAL PROCESSES AND RELATIONS IN WESTERN EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA

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It is usual to refer to almost all the non-socialist countries of Europe and to the USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan as developed capitalist countries. Argentina, Uruguay, and a few other countries are also sometimes included. Developed capitalist countries are quite diverse in their political and socio-economic characteristics and ethnic structure, and in the origin of their national processes. In this paper, therefore, we shall of necessity survey only the most typical cases and most acute situations, nationally speaking, in countries in Western Europe and North America.

Lenin stressed, in his writings on the national question, that bourgeois-progressive national movements had long been completed in developed capitalist countries, above all in Western Europe and North America (the USA).[1] In addition he noted that 'it is *impossible* to abolish national (or any other political) oppression under capitalism',[2] but admitted the possibility of the national question becoming more acute in some capitalist countries.

> Class antogonism has now undoubtedly relegated national questions far into the background, but, without the risk of lapsing into doctrinairism national

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[1] V. I. Lenin. The Socialist Revolution and the Right of Nations to Self-Determination. *Collected Works*, Vol. 22 (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1974), p 150.

[2] V. I. Lenin. The Discussion of Self-Determination Summed Up. *Collected Works*, Vol. 22, p 325.

question cannot appear temporarily in the foreground of the political drama.[1]

As experience has shown Lenin's prediction proved right; national problems have been greatly aggravated in several developed countries in the past 15 or 20 years.

In Europe the processes of ethnic consolidation and of the forming of bourgeois nations (viz. the English, Dutch, French, Swedish, and others) were completed everywhere quite long ago (as a rule in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries), which is one of the most specific features of that part of the world.

Ethnic consolidation was closely linked with the forming of states that were national in essence, with the result (and that is a second essential feature of Europe, ethnically speaking) that the national structure of most of these countries is comparatively uniform. In many countries (Denmark, Italy, Norway, etc.) there are in fact no ethnic minorities (or they are very small and in advanced stages of assimilation by the country's main nationality). When we speak of national relations in that part of the world, we have individual multinational countries in mind and those with a very significant number of immigrants settled in them.

The following countries can, with certain provisos, be classed as the multinational states of capitalist Europe: Switzerland, Spain, Belgium, and Great Britain.

The population of Switzerland consists of three main, ethnically different groups: the so-called Swiss Germans, (4 200 000 in 1975), French Swiss (1 100 000), and Italian Swiss (200 000), and a small group of Rhacto-Romanians. The national question was already settled, on the whole, in the nineteenth century on the basis of bourgeois-democratic principles: the main nationalities of Switzerland, as Lenin remarked, 'live together in peace'.[2] The ethnolinguistic boundaries in Switzerland do not coincide with the administrative boundaries of the cantons. In several areas, especially in the Bern and Uri Cantons, the nationalities are interspersed. The political and economic integration of the nationalities of Switzerland, their lin-

[1] V. I. Lenin. The National Question in Our Programme. *Collected Works*, Vol. 6 (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1961), pp 459-460.
[2] V. I. Lenin. The Working Class and the National Question. *Collected Works*, Vol. 19 (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1973), p 91.

guistic and cultural equality and highly developed bilingualism and trilingualism, the gradual convergence of their traditional cultures, and other factors are laying the basis for their integration into a single Swiss nation. The process, however, has not yet been completed and interethnic friction sometimes arises, so that we often find that the term 'Swiss' has a predominantly political connotation in the literature rather than an ethnic one.[1]

To some extent similar processes of inter-nation integration have developed in Belgium between the two principal peoples of that country—the Flemings (5 300 000 in 1975) and Walloons (four million). Some workers, by exaggerating the degree of this integration, even infer the existence of a 'Belgian nation'[2], but almost from the very institution of the Belgian state (1830) strained relations arose between the then economically dominant Francophone Wallonia and Flanders, which was relatively retarded in its development. This tension found expression in Flemish calls for a federal structure and separation. In Belgium, as in Switzerland, bilingualism is very common, and in recent decades Flemish and French have been accorded equal rights.[3] But national feelings, fanned by rivalry between the now rapidly developing north of the country (Flemish) and the previously dominant south (Walloon), have continued to be inflamed. In order to reduce national friction somehow, the Belgian Parliament passed an act in 1970 that put the country's administrative and territorial division on a linguistic basis. Under this system administrative workers in Flanders must know Flemish and in Wallonia French, and in Greater Brussels both. National friction still continues, however, and is sometimes displayed in secondary issues. Not so long ago, for example, it developed into a conflict over the transfer of the French

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[1] There are many immigrants in Switzerland (more than 800 000 in 1975, or 13 per cent of the total population), mainly from Italy. We shall deal with the problem of immigrants in European countries below.

[2] See, for example, M. S. Junusov's article 'The Nation as a Socio-Ethnic Community of People' in *Voprosy istorii*, 1966, 4.

[3] For further details see: V. I. Kozlov. On the Dynamics of the Language and National Structure of Belgium. In: O. A. Gantskaya, I. N. Grozdik, M. Ya. Salmanovich (Eds.). *Etnicheskie protsessy v stranakh zarubezhnoi Evropy* (Nauka, Moscow, 1970), pp 9-32.

part of Louvain University, located in Flemish territory, to Wallonia. Many of the country's political organisations and trade unions are organised nationally. The overwhelming majority of members of the Christian Social Party and Federation of Christian Trade Unions are Flemings, and of the Liberal and Socialist Parties and the General Federation of Labour Walloons. The Communist Party of Belgium, recognising the importance of the national problem, stands for democratisation of public affairs and the creation of institutions of a federal type. It is still difficult to judge what the future development of national relations in Belgium will be, but it is quite clear at least that it is premature to speak of the existence of a 'Belgian nation'.

The impossibility of settling the national question fully under capitalism, and the difficulties of developing objectively normal movements within that system are clearly visible in Spain. The relatively normal development of such major peoples of that country as the Catalans (5 400 000 in 1975), Galicians (2 700 000), and Basques (800 000), which would have led to their linguistic and cultural revival and the formation of autonomous areas, was interrupted by Franco's putsch in 1936. The autonomy granted under the Republic was annulled, and the local languages were banned from state and public affairs. The unitary fascist state formed in 1939 after the defeat of the Republic made it one of its objectives to end the national question in Spain by way of forcible assimilation of the national minorities. The carrying out of this policy in respect of Catalans and Galicians was facilitated to some extent by the closeness of their languages and cultures to those of the predominant Spanish nation, but the process of assimilation only affected certain strata among them and is far from completed on the whole. As for the ethnically and culturally distinct Basques, their hispanisation proceeded extremely slowly and painfully.

Catalonia and the Basque Country, it should be specially noted, are the most industrially developed regions of Spain, so that a converging of the national movements with the general struggle of the working class and other progressive forces for democratic reforms is particularly characteristic of them. At the end of the 1960s the publication of books in Catalan was permitted in Catalonia, and there was a certain revival of the national culture. But national repression

remained; the National Assembly of Catalonia, convened at the beginning of 1971, which brought together representatives of all the political and national forces opposed to the Franco regime, was forced to carry on its activity clandestinely. A very tense situation built up in the Basque Country; the Franco government's attempts to limit the scale of the Basque movement for national autonomy by repression were unsuccessful. The trial of Basque patriots in Burgos (in 1970) evoked a new wave of the Basque national movement that was supported by all the progressive forces of Spain. The terrorist activity of certain extremist Basque organisations, driven underground, obviously damaged the movement. The new Spanish government that succeeded the Franco regime decided to grant the Catalans and Basques autonomy, and announced a democratic settlement of the national question. This decision is now being implemented.

The national political situation and national processes in Great Britain—a country that it is customary in bourgeois literature to depict as a model of democracy—are very indicative. There we see very different forms of national relations—from processes of natural assimilation taking place relatively peacefully to armed struggle for national equality. An example of comparatively peaceful assimilation is that of the Gaels (Highlanders), a small (less than 100 000 by 1970 estimates), Celtic-speaking national grouping *(narodnost'*), most of whom long ago became part of the Scots, giving them many elements of their traditional culture, while the rest are bilingual and in the concluding stage of assimilation. Some workers already include the Gaels as part of the Scots, distinguishing them as a special ethnographic group of the latter. The course of the assimilation of the other, larger Celtic-speaking people of Great Britain, the Welsh (around 900 000 in 1975) by the English has proceeded much more slowly. By the beginning of the twentieth century the majority of Welsh were bilingual and some of them had completely passed to English. After World War II the movement for revival and development of the Welsh language and culture began to broaden. Teaching is in Welsh in several hundred elementary schools, and the number of publications in Welsh is growing. In recent years the Welsh nationalist movement has revived, which is associated with the deterioration in the economic

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position of that part of Great Britain, and in particular with the crisis in the coal industry.

National relations between the English and Scots have developed differently. The Scots preserve a stable national identity and a memory of past independent statehood. No small role has been played in that respect by the Church of Scotland (Presbyterian), which differs from the Church of England. In Scotland an active campaign for self-government continues, and for the setting up of a Scottish Parliament autonomously deciding Scottish affairs.

The national situation in Northern Ireland (Ulster), which was retained as part of the United Kingdom after the granting of Dominion status to Ireland (the Irish Free State) in 1921, is especially acute. As a result of the colonisation of Ireland, carried out mainly in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, very sizeable groups of settlers from England and Scotland were planted there, especially in Ulster, who were given big grants of land and formed the core of the local landlords. These settlers were Protestants, i.e. differed in religion from the local Irish Catholic population. The socio-economic inequality of Catholics compared with Protestants in Northern Ireland was subsequently maintained. The national question and national relations there are thus an intertwining of social, class, and religious factors, which greatly aggravates the situation. By deliberately fomenting religious discord and cultivating national prejudices the ruling classes have countered in every way the uniting of all the working people of Ulster (Protestant and Catholic) to fight for a general solution of democratic and class problems.

The new crisis in Ulster that developed in 1967-1968 arose from the movement of the socially, economically, and culturally oppressed, politically rightless groups of Irish Catholics for democratic reforms. As a result of this crisis national friction has repeatedly developed in Northern Ireland into armed clashes between the oppressed Irish Catholic minority, on the one hand, and the Protestant Anglo-Scottish majority striving to maintain its position, on the other hand. The British troops sent into Ulster to 'reconcile' the hostile sides did not relieve the situation but made it even more complicated; the terrorist acts committed by Protestant ultras and extremist members of the Provisional Irish Republican Army, and the associat-

ed repression, are leading to the death of many innocent citizens. The elections held for a local 'coalition' assembly have also not yielded a positive result. The Communist Party of Great Britain has condemned the policy of 'direct rule' of Northern Ireland from London introduced by the British Government, and stands for the democratisation of Ulster and recognition of its right to self-determination.

The aggravation of the national situation in Great Britain, as in other countries, is largely due to economic causes. The traditional industries of Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland (shipbuilding, textiles, etc.) fell into decline after World War II; new industries were weakly developed, which led to an increase in unemployment. The rate of unemployment is twice as high in Scotland as the average in Great Britain, and even higher in Northern Ireland, where the building of new factories is encouraged only in Protestant areas as a rule. In the predominantly Protestant town of Antrim, for example, unemployment among men is 1.6 per cent while it is 17.1 per cent in predominantly Catholic Derry. In Scotland and Northern Ireland and other national areas of Great Britain, the medical services are worse, the average standard of education lower, and the housing crisis more acute.

The Communist Party of Great Britain opposes national discrimination and stands for the granting of autonomy and self-government to Scotland and Wales, and the implementation of general democratic measures to eliminate economic and social inequality.

This road to solution of the national question is strewn with difficulties. The Callaghan Labour Government held referendums in Wales and Scotland in 1979 on the granting of partial autonomy to them. In Wales, where most of the population is English-speaking, a majority expressed themselves against autonomy (as posed in the referendum), while in Scotland a majority voted for it, but less than the two-thirds required for its granting.

The national question has also not been completely solved in France, where large ethnic minorities (Bretons, Alsatians, etc.) are fighting for free development of their own languages and cultures.[1]

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[1] See: S. A. Tokarev. Ethnographic Observations in France. *Sovetskaya etnografiya*, 1968, 3: 131-142.

The acuteness of this issue in France, however, is mitigated somewhat by the democratic reforms that were already developed with the great French Revolution.

In the nineteenth century there was migration from many economically developed countries in Western Europe (Great Britain, Germany, etc.) to the USA, Canada, and Australia. Certain countries (France, Belgium, etc.), in turn, attracted immigrants from less developed countries in Europe with a high natural growth of population (Italy, Spain, etc.); in recent decades large groups of immigrants have come from Algeria, Turkey, and certain other developing countries. At present there are considerable groups of migrants in a number of European countries: around three million in West Germany, more than three million in France, around 1 million in Great Britain, and 800 000 (as noted above) in Switzerland. The social and economic position of immigrants is much worse than that of the native population, but that does not always lead to serious national friction. The migrants are often forced to reconcile themselves to their status because most of them come to temporary jobs, usually do unskilled work, and on the expiry of a certain period return home. There are considerable groups of naturalised immigrants, in fact, only in the old centre of immigration, France, and their assimilation as Frenchmen has in the main a natural character.

At present relations between the native population and immigrants are a most acute issue only in Great Britain, where large groups of 'coloured' immigrants arrived after the war, mainly Blacks from the West Indies and Indians, Pakistanis, and Bangladeshi (the total in 1980 with children born in Great Britain is around two million.) They were almost all British subjects and are considered juridically equal with the native-born population of Great Britain, but in fact suffer racial discrimination. They are employed, as a rule, on unskilled work, have worse housing conditions, and are segregated to a considerable extent in social and everyday relations, which prevents their natural assimilation. The activity of neofascist and racist organisations in the country has been intensified, and the situation arising as a result has a certain resemblance to the Negro question in the USA.

In dealing in rather more detail with the national processes in the leading capitalist country of the world, the United

States of America, we would note that its present-day population can be considered ethnically the result—and the latest stage—of a long process of the building of a single nation from various ethnic components. Each of the ethnic groups that swelled American society had individual features determined by its historical past and social and cultural traditions. The relations that such a group entered into with the population established there before its arrival depended, however, not only on these features but much more on the social conditions and level of ethnic evolution of America at that historical stage of its development. That circumstance also determined the considerable common line in the historical experience of the various ethnic groups of the USA. Initially the immigrants were drawn into the receiving society's economic structure, and their subsequent social, linguistic, and cultural assimilation took place on that basis. All the ethnic groups of the USA were subjected to national and racial discrimination to varying degrees and in various forms, which usually slowed down their assimilation.[1]

Discrimination of a special and very harsh kind has been suffered by the indigenous inhabitants of America, the Indians, and in the north the Eskimos, not to mention the Negroes. In the past they were physically massacred and driven off the land; now they live partly on reservations and partly in the cities among a mixed population, but in both cases in difficult conditions.

In spite of a century of successful, though contradictory, assimilation processes, the American nation is still a young ethnic formation. While not having any special ethnolinguistic parts it nevertheless by no means represents a uniform mass of ethnically levelled individuals. It has drawn all the arriving ethnic elements into its economic and social structure, united them by a common language, and created an American kind of culture, but has still a whole number of unassimilated (though much altered in America) ethnic groups in its structure that can be considered structural elements of the present-day American nation rather than remnants of foreign peoples.

[1] See: Sh. A. Bogina. The Immigrant Population of the Present-day United States. In: *Natsional'nie protsessy v SShA* (Nauka, Moscow, 1973), pp 328-359.

In all the ethnic groups, not excepting the most socially homogeneous ones (the Negroes, Puerto Ricans, and Mexicans), there is a class structure. At the same time each of them differs in certain specific, social, and sometimes occupational features. There are many unskilled workers especially among the Puerto Ricans, for example; among Germans there is a rather higher fraction of farm population than among other groups; people coming from Great Britain gave America many miners, Italians building workers, Greeks confectioners; among Poles there are many workers in the automobile industry, and so on.

Ethnic groups thus still continue to play a role in the social division of labour. The mixing of the ethnic and social streams in the stratification of the American population, sometimes their combination, has justified the American sociologist Gordon's designating the crossings of social groupings by the special term 'ethnoclass'.[1] The social prestige and heightened attention to ethnic origin that permeate people's relations in the United States and are reflected in American literature are associated with this intermingling. A whole ethnic hierarchy was gradually built up. At present Negroes, Puerto Ricans, and Mexicans ('Chicanos'), the most destitute socially and economically, are at the bottom. The position of immigrant groups on the ladder also depends on how far they have been assimilated. At the top is a vague community—White Anglo-Saxon Protestant (WASP)—that exists more as a standard of 100 per cent Americanism than as a reality.[2]

Allowance must also be made for the fact that the multiplicity of ethnic groups has long served as one of American capitalism's important social mechanisms. Its function is to facilitate economic exploitation of the masses by setting some nationalities against others, by counterposing them in the political game, and by substituting ethnic concepts for class ones in social psychology, and so on. This mechanism operates in less pronounced form in all capitalist countries that have an ethnically heterogeneous population, especially in countries receiving immigrants.

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[1] See M. Gordon. *Assimilation in American Life. The Role of Race, Religion and National Origin* (New York, 1964), p 51.

[2] Sh. A. Bogina. Interethnic Relations in the USA. *Sovetskaya etnografiya*, 1974, 4: 68-69.

The level of ethnic consciousness has risen among the national groups of America in recent decades, and they are much more vigorously demanding recognition of their rights, respect for their culture and history, and so on. Members of the various Indian tribes, for example, have created a national Indian organisation and are putting forward common demands.[1] In the spring of 1970 there were lively hearings before the education sub-committee of the House of Representatives on a bill, later passed, to introduce study of the history and culture of the ethnic groups of the USA in school. The representatives of national organisations appearing before the sub-committee demonstrated, in pressing for the bill's adoption, a high degree of ethnic consciousness and a very jealous concern for the prestige of their own national groups.[2] This growth of ethnocentrism with progressing and far-reaching assimilation is explained by some American writers as disappointment with the so-called American Dream, i.e. with the idealised picture of America that was one of the stimuli of their immigration.[3]

The rise in ethnic consciousness has also found expression in the statistics. The size of immigrant groups used to be given until recently in US Censuses by the country in which the inhabitant of the USA or his (or her) parents were born. That provided data only on the first two generations. The last Census (1970) gave the number of American Irish as about 1.5 million, of Germans as more than 3.5 million, of Poles as a little less than 2.5 million, of Italians as more than four million, of Greeks as fewer than 500 000, and so on.[4] Since 1969, however, the Bureau of the Census has made several sample surveys of Americans' ethnic origin according to their self-identity. The size of the ethnic groups sampled in their surveys was expressed in much more significant figures. In 1972 nearly 16.5 million Amer-

[1] Yu. P. Averkieva. The Indians Yesterday and Today. *SShA: ekonomika, politika, ideologiya*, 1973, 4.

[2] *Ethnic Heritage Studies Centers*. Hearings before the General Sub-committee on Education of the Committee on Education and Labor, House of Representatives, 91st Congress, 2nd Session, HR 14910 (Washington, D. C., 1970).

[3] J. M. Goering. The Emergence of Ethnic Interests. A Case of Serendipity. *Social Forces*, 1971, *49*, 3: 383.

[4] M. Ya. Berzina. The Ethnic Composition of the US Population. In: S. A. Gonionsky *et al.* (Ed.). *Op. cit.*, p 49 (Table 14).

icans expressed an Irish origin, more than 25.5 million a German origin, more than five million a Polish origin, nearly nine million an Italian origin. Half of the inhabitants of the USA numbered themselves by origin among the eight biggest ethnic groups distinguished in the surveys. Nearly 9 per cent did not indicate an ethnic origin. The rest answered that they came from other groups, including Negroes and Indians, or gave a mixed ethnic origin.[1]

The difference between the census figures and the surveys is due to the fact that the third, fourth, and later generations of the descendants of immigrants were considered in the latter. In fact, for the old immigrant groups, for example the Irish and Germans, the first two generations constituted 8 to 14 per cent of all those acknowledging themselves as descendants of the corresponding nationalities, and for later groups, e.g. Italians and Poles, nearly half.[2] It is characteristic of the present-day level of ethnic consciousness, however, that the overwhelming majority of the inhabitants of the USA, while considering themselves Americans (of that there can hardly be any doubt), remember their ethnic origin and feel it necessary to acknowledge it. The findings of the surveys, it goes without saying, are neither precise nor exhaustive. It would have been interesting, in particular, to know the number of people who declared a mixed ethnic origin.

The sharpening of the national question in the USA has undoubtedly been stimulated by the Negro movement, although its impact is far from uniform. The process is also a partial case of the wave of national movements that has swept many countries of the capitalist world and the developing countries in our day.

The national consolidation of the US population is far from completed, although it is now nearly half-a-century since the ending of mass immigration in the 1920s, but it has deepened and accelerated. The only new mass ethnic group of immigrants in this period has been the Puerto Ricans (they numbered 1 400 000 according to the 1970

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[1] Bureau of the Census. *Current Population Reports. Population Characteristics.* Series P-20, No. 249. *Characteristics of the Population by Ethnic Origin* (Washington, D. C., 1973), pp 1, 11.

[2] *Ibid.*, p 1.

Census).[1] The last Immigration and Nationality Act, passed in 1965, and associated with the needs of the scientific and technical revolution (the USA's mounting need for scientists and people with skills and high qualifications in general), although it altered the discriminatory racist national admission of immigrants, did not increase their total numbers substantially, and scarcely altered the population's ethnic structure in spite of changes in immigrants' countries of origin.[2]

One of the United States' most acute problems is the Negro question, in which the national or ethnic issue is most closely linked with racial differences and is rather a racial-ethnic matter.[3]

In the past half-century the Negro population of the country has more than doubled and according to the 1970 Census constituted around 23 million persons or 11.2 per cent of all Americans.[4] But the concept 'Negro' (or 'Black') in the United States is an arbitrary one and is defined differently in the statutes of different states. Until very recently anyone who had even 1/8th of 'Negro blood' was considered a Negro in many states, and in some persons even with 1/32nd or 1/64th part.

In the first quarter of this century, however, the eminent American anthropologist Franz Boas had concluded that modern American Negroes differed from Africans and were close to white Americans in certain of their anthropological features. Another American anthropologist, Herskowits, and the eminent Negro scholar W. E. Du Bois estimated that three-quarters of American Negroes were already in fact mulattos in the 1930s.[5]

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[1] M. Ya. Berzina. *Art. cit.*, p 49.

[2] S. V. Filippov. *SShA: Immigratsiya i grazhdanstvo* (The USA: Immigration and Citizenship), Nauka, Moscow, 1973, pp 60-89.

[3] For more details see E. L. Nitobourg's special article on this problem on pp 357-378 of this book.

[4] *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1971* (Washington, D. C., 1974), p 16. According to the official figures their numbers have increased to 25 million, and according to the estimates of the American economist Victor Perlo even to 28 million. See: Victor Perlo. *Economics of Racism U.S.A. Root of Black Inequality* (New York, 1975), p 11.

[5] W. E. B. Du Bois. *Black Folk. Then and Now* (New York, 1939), p 197. Cited from E. L. Nitobourg. On the Negro Problem in US His-

The chauvinist conception of 'white superiority' has long been official US policy, and the definition of racial origin has a class-political character rather than a biological one. When the 1930 Census was taken, for example, only persons with a half or more of Negro blood were counted as 'Negroes', and those with less than half were treated as mulattos; in the 1950 Census the Bureau of the Census instructed enumerators to count all persons born of mixed marriages between Negroes and whites as Negroes. The US Administration thus began to number many persons as 'Negroes' that belonged to the white race rather than the black. The category of 'mulatto' has disappeared in general from American statistics.[1]

Before World War II most Negroes lived in the South and rural localities, but in the past 35 years there have been enormous changes in the distribution and social structure of the Negro population in the USA. According to the 1970 Census, more than 80 per cent of all Negroes are townsmen, and more than two-thirds of them (6 600 000) live in 12 big cities. There are around 1 700 000 Negroes in New York, more than a million in Chicago; and in Washington, D.C. they constitute three-quarters of the population.[2]

The mass migration to the towns has radically altered the social structure of the Negro population. In 1971 more than 86 per cent of the gainfully employed population belonged to the working class in the broad sense of the term; 3.4 per cent were employed in agriculture, farmers being only 0.7 per cent, the rest farm labourers; the Negro urban bourgeoisie constituted 1.3 per cent, managers and administrators of various kinds 2.7 per cent, and the intelligentsia 9 per cent.[3]

Centuries of slavery and racist terror seriously retarded Negroes' cultural and social assimilation in the USA; nevertheless it happened. The mass migration of Afro-Americans to the city noticeably accelerated it, because it encouraged not only changes in the migrants' everyday way of

torical and Ethnographic Literature. In: A. V. Efimov, Yu. P. Averkieva (Eds.). *Sovremennaya amerikanskaya etnografiya* (Contemporary American Ethnology), Nauka, Moscow, 1963, pp 140, 141.

[1] E. L. Nitobourg. *Art. cit.*, pp. 135, 136.
[2] *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1972* (Washington, D. C., 1977), pp 16, 20-23.
[3] *Ibid.*, p 231.

life, psychology, and behaviour, and growth of their class consciousness, but also swings in their ethnic consciousness and identity. A whole number of factors, however, prevent their full ethnic assimilation. These are above all the chauvinistic trends in the government policy and legislation of Southern states, and the racist moods and 'traditions' of a certain part of White Americans encouraged by reactionary circles. Marriages between white Americans and Negroes, in particular, are still quite rare, even in the North (where the law does not forbid them in several states). Racial segregation has markedly increased in recent decades as regards housing, which has led, in combination with the process of suburbanisation, to the rise of rapidly growing 'Black ghettos' in the urban centres of the USA. There is not a single one of the biggest US cities that does not have a Negro ghetto.[1] That has led in turn to actual racial segregation in urban schools. In addition, racial discrimination has been maintained in hiring, promotion, and pay, with the result that Negro workers' average pay is much lower than white workers', while a Negro family's average income is not more than two-thirds of that of a family of white Americans. Unemployment among Negroes has always been double that among white Americans over the past 25 years.

The American monopolies need racial discrimination and segregation because (1) they yield them vast superprofits, and (2) they can be employed as a most important instrument for splitting the working class and bribing certain groups of white workers. The creation of residential areas for whites only and ghettos for Negroes has the objective of deepening the split along racial lines.

Oppression and discrimination have always evoked a response in American Negroes that is displayed in various forms, in particular in development of their sense of ethnic identity. In any case, two trends can be traced in it over the past century and a half: one a striving for complete integration into American society and the other a tendency

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[1] See: E. L. Nitobourg. Suburbanisation and the Negro Ghetto in the USA. *Sovetskaya etnografiya*, 1968, 5; *idem*. Housing Segregation and Discrimination against the US Negro Population. In: A. V. Efimov, I. R. Grigulevich, E. L. Nitobourg, (Eds.). *Netl—rasizmu* (Nauka, Moscow, 1969), pp 26-34.

to withdraw into a special, ethnic community. Right down to our day the evolution of Afro-Americans' ethnic consciousness has been characterised by a kind of 'oscillation' between these two trends. An intensifying of the one or the other has usually been associated with an upsurge or a decline in the democratic movements in the USA, and in the twentieth century with those outside the country as well. After World War II the dominant trend became a striving for integration in connection both with mass urbanisation and the radical changes in the Negro population's social structure and with several other domestic and international factors. A clear expression of it was the Negroes' mass Civil Rights movement, whose outstanding representative was Martin Luther King.

In the 1960s, however, there was a considerable rise in the popularity of several Negro organisations of a nationalist and separatist character (of the type of the Black Muslims). In the late 1960s and early 1970s the racists' offensive, and the intensification of police repression in the Black ghettos, and the whole anti-Negro policy of the US Administration in general, led to a marked growth of nationalist moods, especially among the Negro youth. This was reflected even in the stand of such mass Negro organisations of the 1960s as the Congress of Racial Equality and the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), which had previously stood unreservedly for integration. The growth of Black nationalism found reflection also in the activity of Negro churches, and in the work of a whole number of Negro writers, composers, and artists. It was also encouraged by the growing isolation of the vast mass of Afro-Americans in the Black ghettos, which became foci of unemployment, poverty, hunger, and despair. As for the outlook for this problem, it is clear that so long as there are racial oppression and actual discrimination against Negroes in the United States, some Negroes will retain a desire for ethnic exclusiveness expressed in various forms of nationalism and separatism.

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There has also been an aggravation of social contradictions in Canada, a country with a complicated, heterogeneous ethnic structure. According to the last Census, taken in

1971, 9 600 000 of the country's 21.5 million inhabitants were English Canadians and 6 100 000 French Canadians. The numerical superiority of English-speaking Canadians is neutralised to some extent by the fact that the English Canadian nation is not as monolithic and homogeneous in its own internal ethnic structure as the French Canadian. The latter took shape several decades earlier, in the first quarter of the nineteenth century. Consolidation of the English-speaking Canadians into a nation occurred in the second half of the nineteenth century. One of the reasons was the ethnic diversity of the immigrants from the British Isles and the existence among English-speaking Canadians of members of other ethnic groups of immigrants (Germans, Dutch, Scandinavians, etc.) who were assimilated to one degree or another. This non-uniformity of the English Canadian nation has been preserved to this day through the mass influx of immigrants from the British Isles (English, Scots, Irish, and Welsh) and other countries in Europe, Asia, and America, and the assimilation of the members of the other ethnic groups by the English-speaking Canadian nation.[1]

After English and French Canadians come Canadian Germans (1 300 000), Italians (731 000), Poles (316 000), etc. The native population consists of Indians and Inouit (Eskimos) (297 000 and 18 000 respectively).[2]

The most acute national question in Canada is the French Canadian problem. The French Canadians' movement, which has a long prehistory and solid traditions, entered a new phase in the 1960s. An upswing of the movement was provoked by French Canadians' social, economic and political inequality, national discrimination by the ruling bourgeoisie of English Canada and the intensification of the national liberation movement throughout the world. The conflict was made specially acute and pressing by the fact that French Canadians are compactly settled. Their historical,

[1] For further details see: M. Ya. Berzina. *Formirovanie etnicheskogo sostava naseleniya Kanady* (The Moulding of the Ethnic Structure of Canada's Population), Nauka, Moscow, 1971; L. N. Fursova. *Immigratsiya i natsional'noe razvitie Kanady*, 1946-1970 (Immigration and the National Development of Canada, 1946-1970), Nauka, Moscow, 1975.

[2] *1971 Census of Canada* (Advanced Bulletin, Population by Ethnic Group), Ottawa, 1973, p 1.

national territory is the Province of Quebec, where the majority of Canadians of French origin live (85 per cent of the people of the province speak French).

French Canadians are not only striving for equality with English-speaking Canadians in all spheres but also for the right to self-determination up to and including withdrawal from the Confederation. A very popular demand is to achieve actual equality of the languages, realisation of which is sabotaged by the monopolies of English Canada and the USA, even in Quebec. The demand for French to be made the sole official language of the province has become widespread. A not unimportant reason for the movement, too, is some French Canadians' dissatisfaction with the penetration of American capital into Canada and Quebec, and their fear that the United States will absorb the country.

The French Canadians' national struggle led in the 1960s to the most serious Canadian crisis since Confederation, threatening Canada's very existence as a united country. The movement involved very different strata of Quebequois—workers, the progressive intelligentsia (especially the students), the petty and middle bourgeoisie, farmers, and the clergy. Separatist organisations of various hues standing for an independent Quebec also exist. One of them, the *Front de Libération*, which unites the most extreme elements, has resorted at times to terrorist tactics that have harmed the movement.

The ruling classes of Canada, while forced in fact to admit that Quebec's special status differentiates it from the other nine provinces, are trying at the same time to smooth over the contradictions by compromises that are often contradictory and to keep the solution of the national question within the context of a bourgeois approach.

When the Trudeau Government took office in 1968 the issue of meeting French Canadians' national demands became the subject of decisions by the authorities at both federal and provincial level.[1] The Federal Parliament passed a bill in the autumn of 1969, introduced by Trudeau, that

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[1] For further details see: O. S. Soroko-Tsupa. From the History of the French Canadian National Question. In: Yu. P. Averkieva (Ed.). *Natsional'nie problemy Kanady* (Nauka, Moscow, 1971), pp 74-132; V. A. Tishkov. Bilingualism and Politics. *SShA: ekonomika,*

recognised French as the official language of Canada together with English, and proclaimed equal status and opportunities for both languages. In the late 1960s and early 1970s the Federal authorities adopted a series of measures on the teaching of French in the schools, about broadcasting by Canadian radio and television in the two languages, and so on. The carrying out of Bill 63 after 1969, however, met resistance from some of the English-speaking majority. The provincial legislature and government of Quebec acted much more resolutely in this respect; at the end of 1969, for instance, the legislature passed an act making French the compulsory language of instruction in all the province's schools. Subsequently, in 1974, French was proclaimed Quebec's official language by law.

The compromise legislation of the Liberal Government in Ottawa, aimed at blunting the acuteness of the conflict in the country and weakening the chronic crisis of Confederation, like the attempts of moderate bourgeois circles in Quebec, led by the Bourassa Cabinet, to divert the national movement of the French Canadian people into the quiet, safe channels of partial reforms in the sphere of education, language, and culture, did not yield the desired results because they did not affect the socio-economic and political basis of the movement. The policy of half-measures therefore suffered complete political defeat. In 1976 René Lévesque's separatist party, which openly called for withdrawal from Confederation and the forming of an independent French Canadian state, won a decisive victory over the Liberals in the Quebec provincial elections.

This election result had wide repercussions throughout Canada and abroad, and specially alarmed the monopoly circles of English Canada, which have huge investments in the province. Trudeau declared, in the name of the Ottawa Government, that withdrawal from Confederation required the consent of the other provinces as well as a clearly expressed mandate from the people of Quebec.[1]

politika, ideologiya, 1977, 2; L. N. Fursova. Sharpening of the French Canadian Issue. In: I. R. Grigulevich, I. A. Zolotarevskaya, R. F. Ivanov, E. L. Nitobourg (Eds.). *Ot Alyaski do Ognennoi zemli* (Nauka, Moscow, 1967), pp 186-201; *idem. Op. cit.*

[1] Toronto *Globe and Mail*, 18 November 1976, p 8; 24 November 1976, p 1.

In 1978 the Quebec legislature passed an act on holding a referendum in the province on whether its people wanted to remain in the Confederation or preferred to withdraw from it. In reply the Federal Government threatened to proclaim a state of emergency in Quebec and send armed forces there. The Federal authorities, and many leaders in the English-speaking provinces considered that the result of a plebiscite on the withdrawal of any province from Canada could only be considered valid with the consent of the other nine. The assumption of office by the Lévesque Government, which reflected the most nationalistic moods of French Canadians, created a new situation in Canada, once more demonstrating the unresolved character and acuteness of the French Canadian issue.

The Federal elections held in May 1979 brought about the defeat of the Liberal Party that had stood at the helm for 16 years. A government of the Progressive Conservative Party, led by Joe Clark, took office. The Trudeau Cabinet had not managed to cope with inflation, the uncontrolled growth of indebtedness, the decline in rates of economic development, and the high level of unemployment. The main causes of its defeat thus had an economic character, but lack of a settlement of the French Canadian issue also played no small role in its fall. The inconsistency of Trudeau's policy had not satisfied French Canadians while it had very strongly irritated the chauvinistic circles of English Canada. That is why the voters did not listen to his election promises of constitutional reforms and safeguarding of the Confederation's unity. In one of his election speeches he declared that the growing separatist mood in Quebec and the centrifugal trends in other provinces were creating a danger to Canada's very existence as a single, sovereign state. The English-speaking Canadians, however, misled by chauvinistic propaganda, saw the danger precisely in the Liberals' concessions to French Canadian demands. It is indicative that the Conservative Party, which captured only two seats in Quebec, won out through the votes of English-speaking Ontario and the provinces of the West.

The Clark Government, however, lasted less than a year. It could not cope with the mounting economic difficulties, could not deal with any of the country's political problems, and was defeated in the pre-term general

election held in February 1980. In the referendum held in Quebec in May 1980 60 per cent of those voting rejected Lévesque's separatist plan.

The situation in Quebec, however, has caused deep concern in progressive circles in Canada, and above all among Communists. The Communist Party of Canada, true to its general line on this issue, viz., the achieving of genuine, real equality of the French Canadian nation with the English-speaking one, and revision of the out-of-date constitutional basis of the country (the British North America Act), while preserving and consolidating Canada's unity, declared the Liberals' official policy bankrupt, in a statement on the Quebec provincial elections.[1] It called for a solution of all the fundamental issues connected with the crisis of Confederation, demanded the drafting of a new constitution, and the signing of a new Federal pact between the two nations that would guarantee French Canadians' equality. The gist of the Communist Party's idea for a solution of the crisis is the slogan: 'One Country, Two Nations'. While defending the French Canadian people's right to self-determination, including the right to secede, the Communist Party of Canada considers that Quebec's secession in the present historical conditions would be harmful to the interests both of the working class and of the whole population, since it would weaken the fight for independence from the USA, and since the majority of Canadians stood for a united, sovereign Canada.

Neither separatism nor the programme of 'renewed federalism' proclaimed by the two parties of Big Business (the Liberals and the Progressive Conservatives), which denies the French Canadian nation's right to self-determination, can provide a genuine solution. A rational basis for settling the crisis of Canadian federalism is provided by the democratic programme of the progressive forces of both parts of Canada. This programme, which makes allowance for the need to settle the national question by taking the economic, social, and political factors into account, contains the following demands:

(1) repeal of the old constitutional basis—the British North America Act—which has been in force since the colonial period;

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[1] *Canadian Tribune*, 22 November 1976.

(2) the convening of a constituent assembly on the basis of equal representation of Quebec and English Canada to draft a new, republican constitution of Canada that would serve as the basis for confederation and be acceptable to both nations;

(3) the constitution should recognise the existence of two nations and guarantee the social, economic, and cultural equality of each of them, and the rights of the native peoples, including their demands for land;

(4) the constitution should guarantee the right of both nations to self-determination up to and including secession, if that is expressed by a majority of their people.

The essence of the programme is thus recognition of Canada as a single, but two-nation country in which the English and French Canadian nations would dispose of the right to self-determination, including secession. The Communists of both nations justly stress that the guaranteeing of linguistic and cultural equality will not of itself settle either the national question or even less the social, economic, and political problems of French Canadians. That, they emphasise, needs above all limitation of the power of the imperialist monopolies and transnational companies.[1]

Canada's subordination to American capital threatens her economic and political independence. The US monopolies' penetration into her economy is accompanied with an Americanisation of Canadians' culture, everyday life, and intellectual affairs. The spread of anti-American moods in the country (in the universities, among the scientific and technical intelligentsia, and in other strata of society, political parties, etc.), a growing feeling of national pride, and a number of other sings are evidence of the strengthening of a Canadian national patriotism and national identity in post-war Canada. The Communist Party of Canada has contributed much to this. In 1947, when a broad system of measures aimed at managing the Canadian economy in accordance with US economic needs was carried out under the Abbot Plan (called after the then Finance Minister of Canada), the Communist Party was already calling these actions a step toward full economic and political integration of Canada into the United States. The time that has passed since has completely confirmed the justice of the

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[1] *Canadian Tribune*, 4 June 1979.

Party's misgivings, while the reality of the late 1960s and late 1970s evoked even greater alarm.

The continuous, unhindered Americanisation of Canada that has been going on throughout the post-war decades in the domain of Canadians' everyday life, manners, and customs (almost without encountering any resistance in the country's economic, political, and intellectual life), only evoked a response of self-preservation at the end of the 1960s. The danger of Canada's losing its national independence by peaceful penetration has become a publicly acknowledged fact. Understanding of the imminent peril penetrated all strata of Canadian society. Anti-American moods strengthened in 1967 when the centenary of Confederation was widely celebrated.

The 1960s were marked by very substantial contradictions even between Canada's monopolistic bourgeoisie and US imperialism. The Communist Party of Canada therefore deemed it necessary at its 21st Convention in 1971 to alter the thesis in its 1962 Programme about united American-Canadian finance capital to a statement about the contradictory partnership of the monopolies of the United States and Canada.

The existence of these contradictions was reflected in a whole series of the Canadian Government's political actions and financial and economic measures, the most important of which were the following: refusal to join in the economic blockade of Cuba and to be directly involved in military intervention in Vietnam; a gradual limiting of activity in the military organisations of NATO and NORAD; extension and deepening of relations with the USSR; extension of economic and cultural co-operation with other socialist countries; the passing of the first, though still far from consistent, legislation and orders-in-council limiting uncontrolled operations by foreign (i.e. American) monopolies; subordination of all foreign firms' business in Canada, including that of the daughter companies of American monopolies, to Canadian laws; banning of foreign firms from the mining of uranium and development of new oil fields; the imposing of import duties on certain types of goods from the USA; restrictions on the transfer of certain Canadian firms and undertakings to American ownership; control over investments.

In 1976 sales of crude oil to the USA were reduced with

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the aim of completely stopping the pumping of Canadian oil to the United States by 1981.

These measures cannot be considered anything other than concrete expressions of the national aspiration for economic and political independence.

The problems of the native peoples, the Indians and Inouit, who are subject to social, economic, and political discrimination, still await solution. After World War II the Indian people's movement, supported by progressive opinion, forced the government to grant the Indian communities on the reservations the right of self-government. In the 1960s and 1970s the Indian people's fight for equality broadened. The Indians are now fighting not only for the abolition of discrimination but also for payment for the lands seized from them, and for their recognition as a special ethnic community different from other Canadians but equal with them. The Canadian Government has taken several steps to maintain the traditional hunting grounds and fisheries of the Indians and Inouit in connection with the broad development of the northern territories.[1] The opening up of new areas, however, often threatens to disrupt them and the native people's way of life and culture. The monopolies' encroachment on the Indians' land has evoked their resistance. In 1976 the Crees and Ojibways of 42 Indian villages in Northern Ontario protested against plans to transfer 60 000 square kilometres of forest lands to the Reed Paper Co. Ltd. for the production of pulp and paper, and against destruction of the forests that constitute the basis of their traditional economy.[2] For the same reasons the laying of a pipeline in the Mackenzie Valley in the Northwest Territories, and extraction of oil from the Athabaska oil sands area (Alberta) caused sharp dissatisfaction among the native peoples.[3] The Indian people's movement of recent decades has given Canadian ethnologists grounds for writing about a dramatic upswing in both

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[1] For more details see: Yu. P. Averkieva. Ben Swankey, L. A. Fainberg, The Native Population of Canada. In: Yu. P. Averkieva (Ed.). *Op. cit.*, pp 22-73.

[2] *Frankfurter Allgemeiner Zeitung*, 18 November 1976; *Canadian Tribune*, 15 November 1976; R. Gibbons and I. Ponting. Public Opinion and Canadian Indians: a Preliminary Probe. *Canadian Ethnic Studies*, 1976, *8*, 2: 4.

[3] Toronto *Globe and Mail*, 14 March 1976, 19 March 1976.

the volume and the range of their actions and the vigorous entry of Indians into the political process.[1]

Canada, like the USA, was built up as a colonised country, but the moulding of its population cannot yet be considered a completed process. Only since World War II it has received 3 500 000 immigrants among whom settlers from the British Isles, Italians, Dutch, Scandinavians, Germans, and Americans predominated. As a result of immigration there has been a significant increase in people of European, but not British or French, origin. Immigration continues to have a big impact on the ethnic processes taking place in Canada. The intensive reinforcement of certain ethnic groups by immigrants speaking their mother tongue and preserving an attachment to their native land and its customs and culture, is strengthening the trend toward isolation of certain, numerically growing ethnic groups and creating obstacles to their assimilation. This growth in the number of Canadians of non-English and non-French origin is a very important feature of Canada's national development in recent decades. A numerous new group, the Italians, has been formed, for instance, through post-war immigration. There has been an increase in the national consciousness of ethnic groups that maintain their own language and national way of life and culture, in which the impact of the French Canadian movement has been a not unimportant factor. Canada's Communists also take this circumstance into account in their work. The 23rd Convention of the Communist Party of Canada called on Communists to draw the workers of immigrant groups more broadly into the movement of the democratic forces and to concern themselves with meeting their requirements in the ethnocultural sphere. That Convention resolution was developed in the spring of 1977 by the setting up of an Italian Bureau of the Central Executive Committee and the decision to publish an Italian newspaper *Lotto Unitara* from April 1977, a decision that indicates the growing role of Italian Canadians in the working class and democratic movement.[2]

At the same time Canada's industrialisation and rapid technical progress and the scientific and technical revolu-

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[1] R. Gibbons and I. Ponting. *Art. Cit.*, p 1.
[2] *Canadian Tribune*, 21 March 1977.

tion are promoting a growth of bilingualism, a levelling out of everyday ways of life and culture, and a converging of Canadians of various nationalities in the process of production, so creating the conditions for their assimilation.

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The events of the recent past thus provide evidence that the national question has not only been taken off the agenda in developed capitalist countries but has on the contrary become a sharper issue. We would therefore draw ethnologists' attention to certain circumstances that in our judgement are important. (1) The undoubted links between the aggravation of the national question in Europe and North America and the breakdown of imperialism's colonial system, the rapidly developing national liberation movement, and national processes in developing countries; the evolution of systems of communication and means of mass communication and the scientific and technical revolution have greatly strengthened this link. (2) The scientific and technical revolution has led to an aggravation at its present stage of all the social contradictions of capitalism, ethnic ones included, and more and more emphasised the unevenness of the distribution of material and spiritual goods among the various national groups. (3) The growth of ethnocentrism in modern capitalist society with its increasingly complicated social stratification is also, apparently, a reaction against the intensification of standardisation, the uniformity of 'mass culture', and the alienation of the individual so characteristic of capitalism at the present stage of the scientific and technical revolution.

In conclusion we would note that research into national relations and national processes in both developed capitalist and developing countries is usually hampered and complicated by the fact that religious motives (as for instance in Northern Ireland), or linguistic ones (in Belgium), or racial ones (in the United States and in part in Great Britain), rather than strictly national ones, occupy the foreground. In several cases this reflects the uncompleted character of the processes of national consolidation, but more often than not is linked with the objective intertwining of all these factors.

ETHNIC PROCESSES
IN SOUTH-EAST ASIAN COUNTRIES

A. A. Bernova and N. N. Cheboksarov

Before turning to the main theme of our paper, namely a survey of ethnic processes in South-East Asia (one of the most complicated regions of the world in this regard) it would seem desirable to make several general points about the content of the concept 'ethnos' and the general attributes of an ethnos, drawing on data from South-East Asia. In recent decades there has been broad discussion of these points in Soviet ethnological literature but many of them are nevertheless unresolved.[1]

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[1] Yu. V. Bromley. The Term 'Ethnos' and Its Definition. In: I. R. Grigulevich and S. Ya. Kozlov (Eds.). *Races and Peoples. Contemporary Ethnic and Racial Problems* (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1974), pp 17-44; S. I. Bruk, N. N. Cheboksarov, and Y. V. Chesnov. National Processes in Asiatic Countries Outside the USSR. In: I. R. Grigulevich and S. Ya. Kozlov (Eds.). *Op. cit.* pp 182-211; A. I. Kuznetsov. *The Concept of 'Ethnic Community' in Contemporary Soviet Science* (Chicago, 1973); S. A. Arutyunov, N. N. Cheboksarov. The Transmission of Information as a Mechanism of the Existence of Human Ethnosocial and Biological Groups. In: I. R. Grigulevich and others (Eds.), *Rasy i narody*, No. 2 (Nauka, Moscow, 1972); *Idem.* Language Communications and Ethnic Consolidation. In: Yu. D. Desheriev and others (Eds.). *Sotsiolingvisticheskie problemy razvivayushchikhsya stran* (Nauka, Moscow, 1975), pp 16-19; Yu. V. Bromley. *Etnos i etnografiya* (Ethnos and Ethnography), Nauka, Moscow, 1973; S. I. Bruk, N. N. Cheboksarov. Metaethnic Communities. In: I. R. Grigulevich and others (Eds.). *Rasy i narody*, No. 6 (Nauka, Moscow, 1976), pp 15-41; V. I. Kozlov. *Dinamika chislennosti narodov mira* (Dynamics of the Size of the World's Peoples), Nauka, Moscow, 1969; N. N. Cheboksarov, I. A. Cheboksarov. *Narody, rasy, kul'tury* (Peoples, Races, and Cultures), Nauka, Moscow, 1971.

By 'ethnos' (in Russian *narod*, a people) we mean a large, historically formed community of people differing in certain attributes from other historically formed communities.

What are the distinguishing features of an ethnos? That is to say, what kind of an ethnic community are we justified in calling an ethnos? In the opinion of Soviet ethnologists there are several such attributes. In our view the main feature of any ethnos is the specific culture created by that people. Each ethnos has a complex of material and spiritual culture peculiar to itself that distinguishes it objectively, and in its own view, from its neighbours. The culture of an ethnos develops and alters along with the ethnos itself but separate elements of its spiritual culture, and even of its material culture, retain a continuity.

Each culminating stage in an ethnos' development is accompanied with a stage of the flowering of its culture. The epoch of the consolidation of the Viet nationality (eleventh to thirteenth centuries), for example, was a period of the flourishing of Viet culture. The period of the forming of the Khmer nationality (thirteenth to fifteenth centuries) was one of the flowering of Khmer culture. The national liberation movements in all the countries of South-East Asia put forward a slogan, in addition to that of political independence, of the opportunity to develop the national culture (which had suffered great damage in the colonial period). The contemporary stage of ethnic development, which is characterised by ethnic integration, has such an inherent phenomenon as the converging and mutual enrichment of the cultures of the various ethnoi, and the rise of a culture common to the country on the basis of that of its leading nation.

All Soviet ethnologists recognise that language is the main ethnic determinant, but in the final analysis a language is closely linked with the culture of the people speaking it, and the culture is expressed in that language. Language, as a means of intercourse, has very great significance in the processes of ethnic history. One can say with confidence that, until an ethnos has moulded a common language, it itself has not taken shape. The ethno-consolidating role of language especially increases when it acquires a system of writing.

A system of writing, and a religious and later a secular

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literature, had already developed in South-East Asia in the Middle Ages, but they were mainly accessible to the feudal aristocracy and the priesthood. Under the colonial regime public education was reduced to the minimum governed by the colonial authorities' needs. The official languages in the colonies were those of the metropolitan countries. Teaching in the few educational institutions was carried on in those languages, following the syllabuses of the metropolitan country. The elite of the local society were educated in the teaching establishments of the metropolis. A thin stratum of local intelligentsia and bourgeoisie developed under colonialism who had mastered European languages; that position still partially survives.

The national liberation movements began a fight to revive the national languages, i.e. the languages of the main ethnoi of the countries, and for the right to teaching in these languages.

The South-East Asian countries freed from colonial oppression are taking all steps to develop the national culture and national literary language, i.e. the culture and language of the main ethnos of the country. Their governments consider one of their main jobs to develop education in the state language. The official language in many of them, especially on the continent, has become that of the main ethnos around which the processes of ethnic consolidation are developing. The state schools, it should be noted, pursue the aim in their curricula of bringing pupils up as citizens of their country and bearers of its traditional, ancient culture as well as giving them an education.

By virtue of several features of their historical development, namely, the preponderance of the peasantry (isolated and not very mobile because of the specific nature of their production), the weak development of a working class and bourgeoisie, and mass illiteracy, the leading force in the national liberation struggle in South-East Asian countries, and then in their state development after liberation, has been intelligentsia. The future of the development of the national languages and education was naturally in their hands. As economic relations between various ethnoi of these countries have developed the role of the lingua franca, which is predominantly the state language, has increased. A mutual enriching of the languages of these ethnoi is taking place and also, it must be stressed, of the state lan-

guage, which is being enriched by the vocabulary of the country's neighbouring languages. One of the main factors in the development of the Indonesian language at the present time, for example, is the influence of Javanese on it.[1] Each developing language is working out its own terminology and subordinating the terminology borrowed from other languages, including European ones, to its own lexical rules. A language capable of acquainting the masses with the national and world culture has the basis for becoming a state language and a powerful instrument of national consolidation. To the extent that the public receive elementary, secondary, and even higher education in this language, broad prospects develop for its becoming the lingua franca for the bulk of the population. These possibilities exist for the Indonesian, Burmese, Malay, Thai, Viet, Khmer, and Lao languages and possibly for Pilipino.

During the establishment of a single lingua franca the population of all polyethnic states [2] go through a stage of bilingualism or multilingualism. The length of this stage depends on many important circumstances, including (at the present stage) an active, purposeful language policy to encourage the development of a single language as the instrument of national consolidation.

In most South-East Asian countries at present the state language has not yet come to be used by all strata of the population. Where it is not the language of the overwhelming majority of a country's people, it is spoken by the comparatively thin stratum of the national bourgeoisie and by the intelligentsia, civil servants, military, and students. It was these layers in the older generation that had learned European languages; the thinner the stratum the more quickly the colonial power's language has gone out of use. That happened with Spanish in the Philippines although it was the language of the Christian missionaries who converted a large part of the country's population. Dutch quickly lost the role of lingua franca in Indonesia, and has been

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[1] E. A. Kondrashkina. On Certain Sociolinguistic Problems of Modern Indonesia. In: Yu. D. Desheriev *et al.* (Eds.). *Op. cit.*, p 86.
[2] The term 'polyethnic states' was introduced by the Soviet scholar Yu. V. Maretin (see his paper on the peculiarities of Bahasa Indonesia as the state language of the Republic of Indonesia in *Voprosy sotsial'noi lingvistiki*, edited by A. V. Desitskaya, V. M. Zhirmunsky, and L. S. Kovtun (Nauka, Leningrad, 1969), p 217.

completely ousted from all spheres of public affairs by the
Indonesian language. This process, it must be added, was
the more rapid and successful because of the fact that even
in the colonial period Malay (which underlies the Indonesian
sian language), rather than the official language—Dutch—
performed the maximum functions of lingua franca. The
languages of the major capitalist colonial powers, like
French and English, are still quite common in the countries
of the region. French is employed by a certain stratum of
the intelligentsia in, for example, Laos and Kampuchea.
English is studied as a foreign language in higher schools
of Indonesia, Burma and the Philippines, and is often
used in commerce, industry, and the scientific sphere. In
the Philippines English began to be used by the top people
at the beginning of the twentieth century. It retains its
position to this day, competing at times with the country's
state language, Pilipino, especially during the period of
the ruling class's emphatically American orientation.
The strengthening of English's position in Malaysia is due
to the same cause. In the cities it often ousts Malay, even
in the schools. In Singapore English is one of the official
languages.

The processes of national consolidation in South-East
Asian countries are closely linked with strengthening of
the position of the state language as the one with the max-
imum public functions.

Another common attribute of an ethnos that is a *sine
qua non* of its functioning is self-awareness or identity.[1]
This is the quality that distinguishes an ethnos from any
other stable community of people. In the view of some
ethnologists the formation of an ethnic consciousness com-
pletes the moulding of an ethnos.[2] It is a very stable attri-
bute that persists when other determinants disappear. It is
usually underlined by the people's own name for them-
selves, which is an important distinguishing sign. In censuses
it is the sole criterion for determining ethnic membership.

An indispensable condition for the rise of an ethnos
is unity of the territory it inhabits. This circumstance re-
tains its significance even for already formed ethnoi. Ethnoi

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[1] Yu. V. Bromley. *Op. cit.*, p 98.
[2] M. V Kryukov. The Evolution of Ethnic Identity and the Prob-
lem of Ethnogenesis. In: I. R. Grigulevich *et al.* (Eds.). *Rasy i narody*,
No. 6, pp 42-63.

that have lost their territorial unity and come to be in the position of a small people among another, more numerous one (and more developed socially, economically, and culturally), are often assimilated by them, losing their ethnic distinctiveness. Such has been the fate of the Maukens and southern Mon, assimilated by the Burmans, of the Hill Mon, assimilated by the Thais, of the mountain Mnong, assimilated by Vankieu, and so on. The state defends the territorial unity of the ethnos that constitutes the majority of its population. Bromley has suggested calling all types of ethnic community with a political organisation an 'ethnosocial organism'.[1] Ethnoi that have created a high culture, it must be said, also prove very stable outside their ethnic territory. Such, for example, are many of the peoples of India who have lived for several generations in various South-East Asian countries.

Another prerequisite of the forming and development of an ethnos in a common territory is the existence of firm economic ties. The role of the economic community is particularly great during the consolidation of such a form of ethnos as a nation.

Lenin considered the main feature in the forming of a nation to be the consolidation of economic ties between the previously isolated territorial groups of the country's population, and the merging of local markets in a common national market.[2] The common national market takes shape, of course, within the political boundaries of the state and not within separate ethnoi.

There is no doubt that an ethnos at the national or even nationality stage of its development aspires to political organisation. The process of national consolidation is completed either by the forming of a national state or by autonomy within a multinational state. In South-East Asia these processes have followed their own paths. They began within the major feudal states before the final establishment of colonial regimes in them. The annexationist colonial wars of the European capitalist powers upset the natural, independent processes of economic and ethnic integra-

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[1] Yu. V. Bromley. *Op. cit.*, p 127.

[2] See: V. I. Lenin. What the 'Friends of the People' Are and How They Fight the Social-Democrats. *Collected Works*, Vol. 1 (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977), p 129.

tion. The boundaries of the colonies in the countries of In-
dochina, except Malaya and Singapore, were those of the
states already existing there; and they were not altered after
the rise of independent states in the area. In liberated South-
East Asian countries, like Vietnam, Burma, Kampuchea,
and Laos, the main ethnos became the centre of
ethnic and national consolidation; the other peoples be-
came associated ethnoi or merged with the principal ethnos.
The supremacy of one nation has not been proclaimed in any
South-East Asian country (except Thailand). Nevertheless
they all, including Burma, have rejected a federal structure
for their polyethnic states. Autonomy has been granted to
certain ethnoi only in the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.

A special feature of the ethnic processes in South-East
Asian countries is that the national liberation movements
in them developed in colonies that had already been drawn
into the world capitalist system. During the national libera-
tion struggle a national identity was built up and the out-
ward sign of the forming of an ethnos in its highest form—
the nation—arose before the economic basis of a nation,
a national market, had been formed. The state in turn has
had a very strong influence on development of the economy.
The countries of South-East Asia have each taken effective
steps to create their own common national economies.

South-East Asia is a complex region characterised by an
extreme diversity of population, socio-economic systems,
ethnic communities, languages and anthropological types.
Over a long historical period there have been various socio-
economic structures there, and still are, from pre-class
formations to capitalist and socialist ones. The feature is also
reflected in the diversity of ethnic communities—from the
most archaic (which it is customary in the Soviet literature
to call a tribe or tribal community) to nations. Processes
of ethnic and national consolidation, moreover, are to be
observed at the present time in ᵗhis region.

In addition to the various stadial types of ethnic commu-
nity in the strict sense, metaethnic ones are distinguished
in South-East Asia that include several ethnoi united by
certain attributes—linguistic, cultural, religious, racial,
or political. These macroethnic formations have an identity
in rudimentary or residual form. They have transitional
character (as the term 'metaethnic' itself implies); they may
be converted into an independent new ethnos, given vigor-

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ous processes of integration, or may disappear, dissolved into other ethnoi.

The oldest type of such formations were ethnolinguistic metaethnic communities consisting of several peoples speaking closely related languages, who explained this closeness by a common origin, and who distinguished themselves from ethnic communities speaking other languages. The clearest example of ethnolinguistic metaethnic communities are the Malays and the Thais.

Ethnocultural metaethnic communities are distinguished on the basis of the economic and cultural features of the peoples composing them. Such communities are the Punans, Dayaks, and Toradjas of Indonesia, the 'sea nomads' or 'sea Gypsies' found in various countries of the region (the Orang-laut, Selung, Maukens, and Bejau). Economic-cultural metaethnic communities are the zonal groups of Laos: the Lao-lum, settled valley farmers, engaged in irrigated cultivation of rice; the Lao-then, hill dwellers, who also include several peoples of the Hill Thai and Mon-Khmers; a third, mountain group of dry farmers includes the not very numerous Tibeto-Burmese peoples, the Miao and Yao. Each of these metaethnic groups of Laos is conscious of its cultural and economic individuality, which is also neighbouring peoples' criterion for distinguishing them.

Ethno-confessional metaethnic communities embrace a great many ethnoi, often highly developed. The peoples belonging to them often attach such great significance to their religious affiliations, which divide them from neighbours, that they identify them with ethnic origin. That, of course, is groundless. Religion plays a role in the ethnic history of South-East Asia both as an ethno-consolidating factor and as an ethno-divisive one. The major world religions (Buddhism, Islam and Christianity) have played, and still play, a great ethno-consolidating role, and so has Hinduism, which functioned as a world religion in the concrete historical conditions of South-East Asia. The isolation of the hill and lowland peoples of the Philippines is largely due to the difference in their religion: the lowlanders were converted to Catholicism during Spanish rule, while the hill peoples were converted to Protestant Churches in a later period and in part retain tribal beliefs. The group of peoples of the south of the Philippines known as Moros, having adopted Islam, largely became consolidated by that factor;

and it is precisely their religion that divides them from the other peoples of the Philippines.

There are also ethno-racial metaethnic communities in this region, which are distinguished from the surrounding population by their anthropological features and economic and cultural community. The preservation of these features itself is due to long isolation of the populations in the heart of the jungle. Examples are the Aeta in the Philippines, who consist of several small ethnic groups dispersed on the various islands, and the Semangs and Senoi of Thailand and Malaysia. Ethno-racial metaethnic communities break up more rapidly than the others in the course of assimilation by neighbouring peoples.

There is also a special group of metaethnic communities associated with various socio-economic formations.

The metaethnic community of the type of a union of tribes seems to have been characteristic of the final stages of communal-clan organisation.

In class societies another type of metaethnic community takes shape, arising within the boundaries of states and uniting people who speak various languages but are conscious of their common membership of a single political whole. This consciousness is reinforced in tense periods in the country's history, usually associated with the fight for independence. It is customary to call these communities ethno-political. They are characteristic of a feudal society.

A metaethnic community of the type of a national-political community is characteristic of the epoch of capitalism in Europe, and of the period of the establishment of independent states in the place of former colonies. In developing countries this type had already begun to take shape within the colonies.

In national-political metaethnic communities there are active processes of ethnic consolidation and uniting of all the peoples within the country, which is quite necessary in modern conditions for the very existence of a sovereign state.

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In order to understand the ethnic processes in South-East Asian countries correctly and to forecast the outlook for their ethnic development it is advisable to distinguish several groups among them.

In the first group we may put those countries in which one ethnos constitutes the overwhelming majority of the population, is, moreover, socially and economically, and culturally developed, and plays the principal role in the country's political affairs. In addition to the principal ethnos there have been other major and minor ethnoi in these countries for a long time. The small peoples related to the principal ethnos are gradually merging into it. The others, which are at different levels of socio-economic, cultural and ethnic development, will exist independently for a long time yet.

The Socialist Republic of Vietnam is a polyethnic country inhabited by more than 60 peoples belonging to three linguistic families, namely the Sino-Tibetan, Austroasiatic, and Austronesian. A socialist nation, the Viets, the principal ethnos of the country, however, constitutes 87 per cent of the population. Most workers relate the Viet language to the Mon-Khmer languages and assign it to the Austroasiatic family. Among the national minorities there are 1 200 000 persons who speak Thai languages, a million who speak Mon-Khmer languages, around 500 000 who speak Indonesian languages, and some 33 000 who speak Tibeto-Burmese languages.[1]

The Viet ethnos had already consolidated in the early Middle Ages. It has then created a high culture and was the centre of attraction for many of the peoples of Vietnam.

The national liberation movement of the peoples of Vietnam was led by the Communist Party of Vietnam and that fact was decisively reflected in the course of the country's socio-economic transformation and in the solution of the national problems. Victory against the French colonial regime and American imperialism made it possible to defend the socialist gains in the north and to reunite Vietnam. After victory over the foreign aggressors united Vietnam took the road of full-scale building of socialism.

The government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, guided by Marxist-Leninist theory, has ensured equality of all the peoples of the country, including the right to autonomous development. The first autonomous areas were formed in 1954-6. Much work is being done to clarify the

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[1] A. N. Dementieva-Leskinen. Vietnam's Roads of National Development. In: I. R. Grigulevich *et al.* (Eds.). *Rasy i narody*, No. 6, pp 90-92.

list of peoples. The devising of systems of writing for peoples that lacked them, viz. for the Tay people (the biggest group after the Viets), Nungs, and Meo, and reformation of the complicated Pali calligraphy of the Thai system of writing were of great significance. Teachers have been trained for the schools of the national minorities.

Active processes of ethnic consolidation are taking place in Vietnam. The foci are the major peoples, especially those that already have a system of writing, viz., the Tay, Thai, and Meo. Peoples that were a group of related tribes comparatively recently (Bana, Mnongs, Vankieu, Stieng, Ede, etc.) are becoming consolidated into more compact ethnic communities.

The most powerful centre of consolidation for all the peoples of Vietnam is the Viet nation. The Viet literary language is firmly entrenched and is the real lingua franca for all the peoples of the country and in all spheres of life. The smaller peoples are becoming familiar with Viet culture through it. The forming of a single nation in the country is under way.[1]

Soviet ethnologists studying the ethnic processes in Vietnam are working together with Vietnamese workers, many of whom are publishing their works in Russian in Soviet publications.

In *Kampuchea* the principal ethnos, the Khmers, constitutes 85 to 90 per cent of the population.[2] Strictly speaking, groups of peoples close to them in language and culture are counted as Khmers. There are also small ethnic communities dispersed among the Khmers that are almost merged with them (Anraks, Pors, etc.). The autochthonous population of Kampuchea, the Rade and Djarai, readily lend themselves to assimilation by the Khmers. The Chams and Malays speak their own languages but commonly use Khmer as well. They maintain their specific cultural character and Islam. Chinese constitute a stratum of influential bourgeoisie in the country, and remain a closed ethnic group. Vietnamese also preserve their own culture, language, and ethnic identity.

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[1] A. I. Mukhlinov. Vietnam. In: A. M. Reshetov, N. N. Cheboksarov, Ya. V. Chesnov (Eds.). *Etnicheskie protsessy v stranakh Yugovostochnoi Azii* (Nauka, Moscow, 1974), pp 107-108.

[2] Ya. V. Chesnov. Kambodia. In: A. M. Reshetov *et al.* (Eds.). *Op. cit.*, pp 173-90.

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The Khmers have a long, rich history. In the big mediaeval states of the tenth to fifteenth centuries there was already Khmer nationality with a high original culture. Khmer has had a system of writing since the seventh century A.D.

Language is of great significance for modern processes of ethnic consolidation. The state language of Kampuchea is Khmer. In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries that country already had a highly developed culture, and was a land of comparatively high literacy (for South-East Asia), the population being educated in a wide network of monastery schools. There has been a secular literature in Khmer since the 1930s. The dialectal differences of Khmer are small, so that it is understood by the overwhelming majority of the population. In the 1950s French was still employed by 10 per cent of the population, predominantly members of the social upper crust. On obtaining independence Kampuchea paid great attention to reforming education in Khmer and to developing the language itself as the medium for the broadest spheres of the country's affairs. The language of the former metropolian country is being ousted by it.

A single ethnic community is consolidating around the Khmer ethnos on the basis of Khmer culture and the Khmer language.

In 1975 a Maoist clique came to power in Kampuchea which carried out an ethnocide unprecedented in history, as a result of which around three million people were killed. Since the fall of this reactionary regime the people of Kampuchea have been restoring their economy and culture in extremely difficult conditions.

In *Thailand*, with its great ethnic diversity, Thai-speaking people constitute 85 per cent of the population, and although Thai is not strictly the mother tongue of all of them, used in everyday life, they nevertheless readily become bilingual. The Siamese (Khon-tai), who number 21 million, had already become a nation by the end of the nineteenth century, and undoubtedly constitute the nucleus around which intensive processes of ethnic consolidation are taking place. In addition to them there are many peoples in Thailand speaking other languages (Mons, Lava, Khmers, Kui, Karens, Akha, Lisu, Lahu, Meo, Yao, Maukens, etc.). Chinese constitute a large group of the population (five million) and play an important role in the country's economy. And

there is a big group of Malays (one million).[1] These peoples preserve their ethnographic traits and language. The 'Thai-isation' of the population has a dual character. On the one hand, it is the result of a voluntary joining of the Thai ethnos by the small peoples (or groups of them) that are in intensive economic and cultural contact with the principal, privileged ethnos of the country and are losing their own specific ethnic character. Such is largely the fate of the Mon (100,000); some of the Lava, in part of the Karens, and of some of the Malays. On the other hand, the government of Thailand is pursuing an active policy for forced assimilation of the small peoples. This programme is being implemented through the schools, press, literature, and art, and through the Church, and finally by means of laws and official directives. The state language of Thailand, Thai, is a powerful weapon in this direction.

The official assimilation policy has evoked protests and open resistance, which is particularly sharp among the Lao and Malays. More recently the policy has been pursued more circumspectly. The Malays have been granted a measure of cultural autonomy. So-called mobile development squads operate in the areas inhabited by the smaller peoples ('hill tribes'); their work in the main is propagandist, and is raising the cultural standards of these peoples to some extent, and is facilitating the breaking down of obstacles to consolidation.

In the *Laotian People's Democratic Republic* the principal ethnos—the Lao—constitutes 62 per cent of the population, but 72 per cent speak Thai languages (to which Laotian belongs). The Hill Mon and Khmers, who speak other languages, are settled in a dispersed way. Newcomers to the country are Chinese and Vietnamese.

The Laotian nationality took shape in the Lao feudal states. The chauvinist Thai ideology that prevailed in them in the Middle Ages and during the colonial period foreordained inequality of the other ethnoi of Laos and discrimination against them.[2] The smaller peoples of the country were divided by intertribal hostility. Only during the liberation

[1] E. V. Ivanova. Problems of the Ethnonational Development of the Peoples of Thailand. In: I. R. Grigulevich *et al.* (Eds.). *Rasy i narody*, No. 5 (Nauka, Moscow, 1975), p 146.
[2] G. G. Stratanovich. Laos. In: A. M. Reshetov *et al.* (Eds.). *Op. cit.*, p 202.

struggle against the French colonial regime and the American-Saigon aggressors was unity of the people of Laos forged and a consciousness of belonging to a single, national, political community. At present a Laotian nation, which is also the centre of convergence of the other peoples of the country, is becoming consolidated. A major role in the process is being played by Lao, the language of education of the broad masses of the people.

The principal ethnos of *Burma*, the Burmans (Mjamma), numbers 23 million; among the other large peoples mention must be made of the Karens (2 800 000) and the Shan (2 100 000).[1]

The first major nationalities of a feudal type took shape in Burma in the early Middle Ages (the Mon, Shan, and Mjamma states). Only the Burmans grew from them into a nation.

After gaining independence the country took the title of the Union of Burma, i.e. represented a federation of the Burmese lands and autonomous Kachin, Shan, Kayah, and Karen states. The constitution adopted in 1974 altered a federal structure to a unitary one and confirmed a new name for the country, the Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma. Its national policy is guided by recognition of the equality of all the peoples of the country.

Measures promoting ethnic consolidation are being vigorously implemented.[2] There are strong centripetal forces of ethnic development; the smaller peoples are consolidating around the Burmese nation on the basis of Burmese and Burmese culture, but the ethnic communities of various degrees of consolidation (Shan, Kayah, and Karen) associated with the Burmese nation will seemingly continue to exist alongside it for a long time yet.

Indonesia and the Philippines may be classed in a second group of countries in which there are several large independent, highly developed ethnoi.

The crest of the *Republic of Indonesia* bears the significant words 'Unity in Diversity', a motto that reflects the ethnic situation in Indonesia.

Around 96 per cent of the population speak languages and dialects of the Indonesian branch of the Austronesian

[1] S. I. Bruk. The Ethnodemographic Situation in the Postwar World. *Sovetskaya etnografiya*, 1976, 3: 35.
[2] G. G. Stratanovich. Burma. In: A. M. Reshetov *et al.* (Eds.). *Op. cit.*, p 40.

family; 1 per cent speak Papuan and North Hamaheran languages and 2 per cent languages of the Sino-Tibetan family. Indonesia's population consists of numerous ethnoi, a full list of which is not available, ethnoi that are at various levels of the development of socio-economic relations and that differ in numbers, language, cultural features, and degree of ethnic consolidation. The biggest ethnos (62 million), which has a highly developed, original culture and plays the foremost role in the country, is the Javanese. Among other big ethnoi we should note the Minangkabaus (5 100 000), Sundanese (19 million), Madurese (nine million), Malays (7.6 million), Bataks (3 100 000), Macassarese (1 400 000), Buginese (3 800 000).[1] These peoples are centres of the consolidation of neighbouring related peoples. In the Middle Ages a single historico-ethnographic community took shape in Indonesia. The long-standing economic ties in this area have been of great significance; the middlemen in these relations were the Malays. Malay was already the lingua franca in the seventh century A.D. for a large group of the coastal population of the archipelago's islands. The mediaeval states of Sri Vijaya and Majapakhit of the thirteenth to fifteenth centuries played a big role in consolidating economic, cultural, and ethnic ties. At its peak the Majapakhit Empire, nominally united all the states of Indonesia. It was then that a sense of belonging to a single whole developed among the peoples of Indonesia and the archipelago's name—Nusantara—came into use.

The more than 350 years of a colonial regime in Indonesia interrupted its natural socio-economic, cultural, and ethnic development. The Dutch, pursuing a policy of 'divide and rule', retained the feudal splintering and ethnic dissociation of the country. A common Indonesian identity was strengthened during the national liberation struggle and remained a cementing force determining the country's ethnic development after proclamation of the Republic of Indonesia.

The most important factor in which the centripetal tendencies of ethnic development find expression is language. The state language of Indonesia became Indonesian and not Javanese, the language of the main ethnos. That situation came about because Indonesian is based on Malay, the former language of commercial, cultural, and political inter-

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[1] S. I. Bruk. *Art. cit.*, pp 35-40.

course of the peoples of Indonesia in the Middle Ages. It was the language of the national liberation movement and became an 'expression of the state unity of the Republic of Indonesia'.[1]

At present Indonesian fully reflects both the political unity of the peoples of Indonesia and their growing economic, cultural, and ethnic unity. We would recall here once more that a sense of ethnic unity developed in South-East Asia before the economic conditions for it had been adequately consolidated.

It cannot be said yet, of course, that Indonesian has become the language used in the everyday life of the bulk of the population. It is becoming the mother tongue in the families of intellectuals. It is used as a second language by school pupils, students, civil servants, and the military (members of the various ethnoi of Indonesia). The state is encouraging the development of Bahasa Indonesia itself, and of a press, literature, radio, cinema, and theatre in it. It is studied in the classes for eliminating illiteracy, and in the army, and is becoming the language of literacy for peoples that previously had no system of writing.

A common Indonesian culture has been developing since independence that is absorbing and being enriched by elements of the cultures of the various ethnoi. This is a purposeful and natural process that is encouraged both by the extension of economic relations between the peoples of Indonesia and by the mixing of the population in the cities that is taking place in connection with economic development. The new culture is expressed in Indonesian, which is also being enriched by words from both other Indonesian languages and unrelated ones.

The main form of ethnic process in Indonesia, as in the rest of South-East Asia, is that of ethnic consolidation. In Maretin's view many of the peoples of Indonesia are on the way to forming nations: the Minangkabaus, Sundanese, Balinese, Achinese, Buginese, Macassarese, Minahasa, and Amboinese, as well as the Javanese.[2] Other Soviet workers

[1] Yu. V. Maretin. The Peculiarities of Bahasa Indonesia as the State Language of the Republic of Indonesia. In: A. V. Desnitskaya, V. M. Zhirmunsky, and L. S. Kovtun (Eds.). *Voprosy sotsial'noi Lingvistiki* (Nauka, Leningrad, 1969), p 183.
[2] Yu. V. Maretin. The Main Trends in the National and Ethnic Development of Modern Indonesia. In: B. H. Gafurov (Ed.) *Kolonia-*

consider that a single Indonesian nation is being formed through gradual convergence of the country's peoples, and are inclined to recognise the great potentialities of the centripetal trends in Indonesia's ethnic development.[1] That will undoubtedly be a lengthy process and associated peoples will exist alongside the united ethnos for a long time.

The Philippines are also a polyethnic state inhabited by interrelated peoples speaking languages of the northern subgroup of the Indonesian branch of the Austronesian family. They constitute a single historico-political region.

The biggest ethnos, which has played a major role in the history of the Philippines, is the Tagalog (8 600 000).[2] It constitutes only 20 per cent of the population but is the centre around which the other peoples of the country are consolidating. Thus the Bikol and neighbouring peoples closely related to them (more than two million) are consolidating around the Tagalog. The Bisaya, a group of ethnoi speaking related languages, constitute 43 per cent of the population. A concentrated ethnos, also living on the lowlands, is the Ilokan people, who constitute around 10 per cent of the population. The numerous mountain peoples of the Philippines (the Ifugao, Bontok, Kalinga, Bilaana) and the population of the isolated ethnic groups, the Aeta, mentioned above, are less consolidated. The Moros occupy a special place for historical reasons already mentioned.

As everywhere else, the national liberation struggle rallied the peoples of the Philippines. A common Filipino identity arose during it. The national, political, metaethnic community that developed after independence has definite prospects of becoming a Filipino nation.

lizm i natsional'no-osvoboditel'nie dvizheniya v stranakh Yugo-Vostochnoi Azii (Nauka, Moscow, 1972), pp 23-54; *idem.* Indonesia. In: A. M. Reshetov *et al.* (Eds.). *Op. cit.*, pp 111-72.

[1] N. A. Simoniya. *Burzhuaziya i formirovanie natsii v Indonezii* (The Bourgeoisie and the Formation of a Nation in Indonesia), Moscow, 1964; N. N. Cheboksarov. Forty Days in Indonesia. *Vestnik AN SSSR*, 1962, 10; *idem.* Problems of the Typology of Ethnic Communities in the Work of Soviet Ethnologists. *Sovetskaya etnografiya*, 1967, 4; A. A. Bernova. *Naseleniye Malykh Zondskikh ostrovov* (The Population of the Lesser Sundas), Nauka, Moscow, 1972; A. I. Kuznetsov. Dissertation. *Natsional'nie protsessy v sovremennoi Indonezii* (Moscow, 1969); *idem.* Political and Ideological Factors in the Forming of an Indonesian Nation. In: I. R. Grigulevich *et al.* (Eds.). *Rasy i Narody*, No. 3 (Nauka, Moscow, 1973).

[2] S. I. Bruk. *Art. cit.*, p 36.

A difficult problem in the way of general Filipino consolidation is that of the lingua franca. Pilipino is the state language; created on the basis of the Tagalog literary language it is still used only by a narrow stratum of society. English largely retains its position as the lingua franca. The course of general Filipino consolidation will apparently be protracted. The mountain peoples and the Moros will remain associated peoples for some time.

Countries whose ethnic composition is complicated by a late (nineteenth and twentieth century) interaction of quite different peoples of quite different origin, speaking different languages, and preserving very distinct cultural and confessional features, constitute a third group. It includes Malaysia and Singapore, which joined Malaysia in 1963 but then left it. A national, political metaethnic community is also developing in them.

The course of national processes in *Malaysia*, a state that has existed since 1963, is complicated. The Malays, the principal ethnos of the country, constitute around 50 per cent of the population. Second in numbers are the Chinese (3.5 million), the greater part of whom settled in Malaya at the beginning of the century during the British domination. Indians, predominantly Tamils, also immigrants to this area, number a million. The aboriginal population constitutes around a million (Djakuns, Semangs, Senoi, and the Dayak peoples of North Borneo (Sabah)).

The Malays are the basic population of Malaysia. They were already an established nationality in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, having absorbed streams of related peoples. Since the fifteenth century Islam has been their main religion, cementing their identity. Islam is now the state religion of Malaysia, which divides the Malays from the non-Moslem Chinese. The Malaysian ethno-linguistic community stimulated many independent ethnoi, including the Malays of Borneo, who have not at present merged completely with the Malay majority of Malaya proper.

The Chinese at present constitute the middle and big bourgeoisie of Malaysia. This ethnos, though not homogeneous, preserves its specific ethnographic features. Religion is a big obstacle to interethnic contacts (the Chinese being Buddhists).

The Indians, too, still retain their specific ethnographic

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features, live with fellow-countrymen, and are not given to mixing with the country's other nationalities.

Great difficulties are arising in connection with the use of Malay as the state language.

In striving to maintain national equality the government of Malaysia is forced to manoeuvre so as to avoid infringement of the interests of any one of the peoples in economic, political, or cultural affairs.[1]

As for the aboriginal population of the Malay Peninsula—the national minorities of Malaysia—they are being gradually and peacefully assimilated by the Malays.

The Dayaks of Borneo are not inclined to submit to Malay assimilation, but are not consolidating among themselves; and the individual Dayak peoples retain a close relationship with the Dayaks of Indonesian Kalimantan. An ethnopolitical community exists in Malaysia.

In *Singapore* 76.2 per cent of the population are Chinese, and the preponderance of one ethnos is putting its stamp on the development of national processes there.

The first Chinese settlers began to live in this area among a Malay-speaking population in the fourteenth century. In the 1920s and 1930s there was extensive Chinese immigration (predominantly from South China and neighbouring countries), because of the needs of Singapore's industry, commerce, and plantations. In the mid-nineteenth century a Singaporean bourgeoisie and working class took shape. Later they led the national liberation struggle which culminated in the granting of autonomy within the British Commonwealth in 1959. In 1965 Singapore became an independent state (withdrawing from the Federation of Malaysia, which it had joined in 1963).

None of the major ethnoi of Singapore is monolithic. The Chinese, for instance, came from various, predominantly southern provinces of China, and retain their specific ethnic traits in everyday life, and live with fellow-countrymen, uniting by dialects.

The Malays do not constitute a united ethnos by origin; they are divided between those born in Singapore (or Malaysia) and immigrants of various periods from Indone-

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[1] E. V. Revunenkova. Malaysia. In: A. M. Reshetov *et al* (Eds.). *Op. cit.*, pp 225-31.

sia. The Malays also live in separate quarters of the city; their religion, Islam, brings them all closer to one another.

The Indians of Singapore are also not homogeneous ethnically or linguistically, practise various religions, but nevertheless strive to maintain an ethnic separateness. Such an exclusiveness is also characteristic of the other national minorities, like the Arabs, Armenians, and Jews. The British, too, constitute an isolated national minority.

A process of consolidation of a united Singaporean national political community is taking place.

The government proclaims equal opportunities for the development of all the peoples of the country and makes great efforts to develop and reinforce a Singaporean consciousness,[1] an aim that is also expressed in its language policy.

The state language of Singapore is Malay. English, Chinese, and Tamil are official languages together with it, but preference is given to English, which has long had a firm position in industry, commerce, and interethnic intercourse. The new national political community is apparently taking shape on the basis of English.

The main ethnic process typical of all the countries of the world that have taken the road of independent development is one of ethnic consolidation. That is the clearest expression of the results of the ending of colonial regimes and of the establishing of national states.

A main feature of the ethnic processes in South-East Asian countries is the forming of nations of a capitalist or socialist type. These processes involve all the biggest peoples of the region and are having a strong influence on ethnic processes among all the other peoples of these countries.

Ethnic consolidation is taking a different form and proceeding at different rates in this region, for various reasons. One is the great variety of ethnic structure. The size of the peoples and territory they occupy differ; so, too, do their linguistic affiliations and anthropological composition, level of ethnic development, and degree of ethnic identity. Socioeconomic relations, which are extremely varied, are also

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[1] A. M. Reshetov. Singapore. In: A. M. Reshetov *et al.*, (Eds.). *Op. cit.*, p 250.

having a big impact on the forms and rates of ethnic consolidation in South-East Asia.

The concrete content of the consolidating processes in the various countries is also governed by the political set-up in which they are occurring.

The building of a socialist society in re-united Vietnam whose people, having won their fight against American imperialism and its puppets, the former Saigon regime, later successfully beat off the attacks of the Chinese hegemonists, is of immense significance for the region's development.

The victory of the democratic, patriotic forces of Laos and Kampuchea is also historically important. Their people, overcoming enormous difficulties inherited from the past, have also taken the road of socialist reform in all spheres of life, including the road of truly democratic solution of the national problem.

THE SPECIFIC CHARACTER
OF ETHNIC PROCESSES
IN AFRICAN COUNTRIES

B. V. Andrianov

The historical evolution of the peoples of the African continent has reached a new stage. The main objectives of this stage are associated with the winning of economic independence, the elimination of all forms of dependence and backwardness, and radical reform of African society. The road to these reforms is strewn with difficulties inherited from the colonial and pre-colonial periods. Ethnic problems have a special place among them, i.e. matters of the peoples' ethnocultural and national political development within present-day state frontiers. They are bothering many Africans.

Is modern Africa an 'ethnic chaos'? Or are the outlines of big communities visible behind the kaleidoscope of ethnic names? What ethnic processes predominate now in African countries? And what is their specific character? What do we know about them?

Each of these questions deserves special investigation, but as all aspects of Africa's affairs are intertwined in the peoples' modern social life and consciousness, it is necessary to try and survey them in their interaction so as to bring out the specific features of African peoples' ethnic evolution more fully.

Not so long ago certain Western ethnologists used to exaggerate the motley character of the population's ethnic structure, the backwardness of African peoples, and the archaic character of social institutions. They presented exotic, long outlived customs as the modern state of Africans' culture. In the first half of this century, during the 'heyday'

of colonial empires, British ethnologists (Malinowski, Radcliffe-Brown, and others) justified the retention of any tribal customs, even the most archaic ones, chiefs' powers, etc. Thousands of isolated languages and peoples appeared in linguistic and ethnic maps. The German ethnologist and linguist Tessmann, for example, distinguished 224 independent languages and peoples in the Camerouns alone in the 1920s. Murdock presented a list of 7000 tribal names in his 1959 monograph on African peoples.[1]

A different approach to the ethnic situation in Africa has been typical of Soviet Africanists and ethnologists, who base their research on Marxist conceptions of national processes and the universal character of the historical patterns of development of the world's peoples. They also take into account the concrete experience of ethnographic study of the peoples of the national peripheries of Soviet Russia, where communal/clan, patriarchal/feudal relations still survived, intertwined with later socio-economic modes in the first post-revolutionary years.

Soviet workers established that the so-called tribes and clan groups of certain peoples (Turkomans, Karakalpaks, Kirghiz, etc.) hid deep class antagonism and a variety of forms of feudal and semi-feudal exploitation under cover of clan names. Study of the features of these peoples' social structure and everyday mode of life and culture played a part in the practical measures to eradicate survivals of the past, overcome backwardness, and bring the peoples to socialism.

Soviet Africanists (Olderogge, Potekhin, Ismagilova, Yablochkov, and others) have established that 'tribes' and 'clan communities' survive in Africa in many cases only as an outer shell that does not correspond to the new social content. Behind the external diversity of ethnic tribal autonyms bigger ethnic communities are already concealed. At the same time it is indisputable that there are considerable survivals of a clan/tribal consciousness in Africa, relics of clan/tribal structures, and of many social phenomena characteristic of past epochs.[2]

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[1] G. P. Murdock. *Africa. Its Peoples and Their Culture History.* (New York, 1959).

[2] For further details see: R. N. Ismagilova. *Ethnic Problems of Tropical Africa. Can They Be Solved?* (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1978).

But what is the reason for the past backwardness of many African peoples? This problem, about which many bourgeois ethnologists write so much, is not simply one of the historical unevenness of these people's development in the distant past when the character and diversity of geographical conditions had a marked effect on the rate of social development of the populations of separate countries and even of continents.[1] It is also African peoples' falling behind in colonial times when the main cause of their backwardness was the brutal system of colonial exploitation.

In antiquity the most varied factors played an important role in the relative backwardness of the peoples of Africa south of the Sahara, such as, for example, the natural conditions of the equatorial and tropical belt, their isolation from the oldest centres of ancient agricultural civilisations, the weak differentiation of the continent, inconvenience of internal communications, etc.[2]

Differences in rates of historical development were manifested in the separate regions of Africa in remote antiquity when the unique ancient Egyptian civilisation, class society, and statehood were born on the banks of the Nile in the fifth and fourth millennia B. C.

Later, other states also arose in the north-east of the continent, viz., Napata, Meroe, Ethiopia, and Aksum. The cultivation of cereals and stock-raising provided their economic basis.

Iron-working played an immense role in the development of progressive forms of economy in Africa. The broad penetration of agriculture into the forest zone of the hunters of Tropical Africa, and the rise in the first millennium A.D. and early second millennium, of early class state formations in a whole number of the inner regions of the continent can also be linked with spread of the skills of fashioning iron tools and weapons. From the eighth to the eleventh centuries an intermittent chain of African states had already been formed both in North Africa and south of the Sahara, from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean, some of which were linked in one way or another with Arab civilisation.

[1] See: Karl Marx. *Capital*, Vol. I (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1975), p 481.
[2] S. P. Tolstov. Some Problems of World History in the Light of Moslem Historical Ethnography. *Voprosy istorii*, 1961, 11: 116.

The penetration of Arab culture, Arabic, and the Mohammedan religion into North and East Africa in the eighth to eleventh centuries altered the ethnic geography of the whole northern part of the continent. A considerable part of the old peoples, speaking 'Berber' languages, gradually adopted the Mohammedan religion, Arabic, and Arab culture. The Arabs' penetration into Central and East Sudan in the Middle Ages and their appearance on the coast and islands of the Indian Ocean encouraged the formation of mixed population groups.

Individual early class state formations were established in the interior of Africa at that time, as a kind of periphery of the more developed regions of North Africa, viz. Monomotaps, Congo, Lunda, Buganda, etc. They were surrounded by the numerous pre-class societies of the equatorial and southern parts of the continent.[1]

Within the boundaries of the state formations thus established processes of the uniting of related tribes into bigger ethnic communities developed. These processes were contradictory: there was an opposition of unifying and divisive tendencies; many related tribes, by uniting, formed big nationalities, others broke apart and were assimilated by more developed neighbours; and ethnic mixing and merging took place over considerable areas of Tropical Africa. We still know little about these processes, however, and many pages of the African peoples' ethnic history have not yet been deciphered. It can be assumed to have been a lengthy ethnosocial process during which ethnic communities characteristic of early class society were built up, i.e. early nationalities *(narodnosti)*.[2]

Their subsequent development was largely retarded by the slave trade, European conquest, and the creation of colonies, which went hand in hand with extermination of the population of extensive regions.

At the beginning of the twentieth century almost the whole of the continent had come under colonial domination, and a new stage in the ethnic history of African peoples

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[1] Yu. M. Kobishchanov. The Space-Time Structures of Africa's History. In: *Afrika: Vozniknovenie otstalosti i puti razvitiya* (Moscow, 1974), pp 5-45.

[2] B. V. Andrianov. The Problem of the Formation of Nationalities and Nations in African Countries. *Voprosy istorii*, 1967, 9: 103-104.

began connected with this colonial period. The colonial partition broke up the previous economic and cultural ties. The new political frontiers of the colonial possessions cut across long-established ethnic territories and dismembered many African peoples. In striving to divide the peoples who were struggling for independence the colonial powers artificially supported tribal splintering for a long time, and fanned racial, religious, and ethnic antagonisms. There were also contrary unifying tendencies, however, in the colonial period, evoked by the broad introduction of commodity-money forms of production, the spread of plantation export crops, the growth of industrial and urban centres, and the migration of great numbers of the population in search of employment.[1]

A broad anti-colonial movement arose in many colonies, which encouraged the uniting of oppressed peoples and the birth of a common state, political consciousness. Anti-colonialism united the interests of the population's varied social, ethnic, and religious groups. Survivals of clan/tribal communal ideology and feudal separatism were subordinated in those years to the common interests of the national liberation struggle. During the break-up of the colonial system in Africa in 1950-70 independent states were formed. They were all set up within the previous colonial frontiers, which did not correspond to the ethnic boundaries, and that is a potential source of friction between neighbouring countries which is frequently exploited by reactionary forces to foment disputes and border conflicts between them.

Unifying, centripetal factors, however, are predominant in Africa. The Organisation of African Unity (founded in May 1963, in Addis Ababa) and a number of Pan-African organisations (the All-African Trade Union Federation, and youth and women's organisations) have a special place among them. The Organisation of African Unity has encouraged growth of ideas of African unity and solidarity.

Each African country has its own special ethnic processes peculiar to it, but there are also general typical features that permit us to group them into four major historico-eth-

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[1] I. Potekhin. The Formation of Nations in Africa. *Marxism Today*, 1958, *2*, 10.

nographic regions differing in the specific nature of the ethnic and cultural processes developing in them.[1]

The *first group* consists of the countries of North Africa with populations of more or less uniform ethnic composition (Arabs and Berbers), close in religion (Islam) and culture. The ethnic differences between the Arab and Berber populations are now mainly expressed in the spoken languages (Arabic and Berber) and in certain features of the everyday mode of life, traditions, customs, and folklore. The overwhelming majority of the native population of North African countries speak Arabic, profess Islam, maintain Arab customs and cultural traditions, and in many cases consider themselves Arabs. A single Arabic literary language is disseminated everywhere.

Big nations have already formed among them on the basis of a broad national liberation movement and in conditions of political independence won by persistent struggle against the colonial powers. And that has been encouraged by the historical conditions, viz., community of territory, language, economic affairs, and culture. Concepts like 'Moroccan', 'Algerian', etc., expressing the national state community of the people have acquired deep meaning and political resonance in present-day public affairs. In countries with a uniform ethnic composition (Egypt, Libya, Tunisia), the national state community already coincides with the ethnic one. Arab nations have formed in them (Egyptian, Libyan, and Tunisian). In Algeria and Morocco, Algerian and Moroccan nations have been formed, although national political unity in them does not yet fully coincide with ethnic unity. In these two countries there are quite big groups that speak various Berber languages; the majority of these populations, however, also speak Arabic, i.e. are bilingual. Past differences are being rapidly eliminated and national unity is being consolidated within the context of big Arab nations.

In North-East Africa, in Ethiopia, an Ethiopian nation has begun to form the nucleus or centre of whose ethnic consolidation is the large Amhara nationality. Its language, Amharic, is employed by around a third of the population,

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[1] See: B. V. Andrianov. *Naselenie Afriki (etnostatisticheskii obzor)* (The Population of Africa. An Ethnostatistical Survey), Moscow, 1964, pp 169-70; *idem. Art. cit.*, pp 106-107.

and is the state language. Neighbouring, related Semitic-speaking nationalities (Gurage, Tigrai, Tigre, etc.) are being drawn into the processes of national consolidation, and so are the Gallas and the many small Sidamo peoples who speak languages of the Cushitic group of the Semito-Hamitic language family. The ethnic processes in Ethiopia are very complex and contradictory; in addition to unifying tendencies there are regional centrifugal ones, and processes very varied in character are developing. In addition to assimilation (e.g. the Amhara are assimilating the small Agau and Gurage peoples), broad integrational processes (in Ismagilova's terminology) are developing, uniting peoples who differ from one another in level of socio-economic, linguistic, and cultural development.[1]

The Somali Republic has a uniform ethnic structure. Since its gaining of independence, there has been a consolidating of Somalis into a single nation.

The countries of East, Central, and West Sudan form a *second major region* of Africa. The ethnic and linguistic structure of their populations is particularly complex and differs both from North Africa and from Equatorial and Southern Africa. This vast tropical region is mainly inhabited by negroid African peoples differing from each other both in level of social development and distinctiveness of traditional cultures and in languages. There is a vast variety of languages, which have been classified into a whole number of families and groups (West Atlantic, Mande, Kwa, etc.)[2].

East Sudan and, in part, Central Sudan are a kind of transition zone between the Mediterranean Arab world, with its old traditions of urban and settled agricultural life, and Tropical Africa. In the Republic of Sudan more than half the population consists of North Sudanese Arabs, who are gradually assimilating the Nubians, Beja, and certain other neighbouring nationalities and tribes. During the broad national liberation movement a North Sudanese nationality took shape at the end of the nineteenth century.

In the south of the Republic there are Nilotic nationalities and tribes (negroid in their physical appearance) like

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[1] R. N. Ismagilova, *Op. cit.*

[2] See: B. V. Andrianov. *Karta narodov Afriki (s poyasnitel'nym tekstom)* (A Map of the Peoples of Africa with Explanatory Text), Moscow, 1960; S. I. Bruk and V. S. Apenchenko (Eds.). *Atlas narodov mira* (Atlas of the Peoples of the World), Moscow, 1964.

the Dinka, Nuer, and others. They differ markedly from the North Sudanese Arabs not only in racial attributes but also in language, historico-cultural traditions, religion, and level of socio-economic development. The Nilotic tribes still preserve patriarchal/clan relations and old forms of a subsistence economy associated with a semi-settled mode of life. Under British colonial domination Southern Sudan was a closed area. The colonial authorities tried to preserve clan/tribal social relations. All these features of recent history, and the traditional differences between the Nilots and the North Sudanese Arabs, are complicating the unifying ethnic processes developing there.

The ethnic structure of the population in West African countries is very mixed, although there are several historico-cultural features that arose in the mediaeval early class states in which many of the Sudanese peoples were united. In colonial times West Africa's ethnic and linguistic diversity was aggravated by the colonial powers. They broke up the latitudinal historico-cultural and linguistic zones and related peoples into a large number of separate colonial possessions stretching north and south. There was thus a largely artificial fragmentation of the peoples, which has determined the multinational character of the new states since independence.

In this part of Africa, too, with the upsurge of the anti-colonial revolution, there have been processes in the new states of a converging of nationalities and tribes speaking different languages and the forming of stable 'national political' communities (Senegalese, Camerounian, Ghanaian, etc.)[1]. The uniting of peoples within state frontiers has been promoted by many factors: the traditions of the national liberation movement, cultural and economic ties, joint participation of the carrying out of national economic projects.

These ethnic processes in West African countries are developing in a contradictory way: along with 'national political' communities (Guinean, Senegalese, Togolese, Camerounian, etc.), there are also separate nationalities that are consolidating on the basis of a local ethnic, linguistic,

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[1] See: S. I. Bruk, N. N. Cheboksarov. The Present Stage in the National Development of the Peoples of Asia and Africa. *Sovetskaya etnografiya*, 1961, 4: 78; *idem*. Metaethnic Communities. In: I. R. Grigulevich *et al.* (Eds.). *Rasy i Narody*, No. 6 (Nauka, Moscow, 1976), p 38.

and cultural community of the populations of separate areas of the African states. Examples are the Grusi, Lobi, and Bobo in Upper Volta, the Baule in the Republic of Ivory Coast, the Fang in Cameroun, etc. A process of further development of certain big nationalities into separate nations (the Yoruba, Ibo, Hausa, etc.) has also been noted, which is linked with a growth of national consciousness, further class differentiation, strengthening of the national bourgeoisie, and the development of a working class.

The *third region*, Equatorial Africa, is a broad zone inhabited by peoples speaking related Bantu languages. These peoples, however, differ in origin, level of socio-economic development, and certain racial traits and cultural traditions. Most of them were at various stages of disintegration of the primitive communal system at the time of the partition of Africa at the end of the nineteenth century; only some of them had class structures and had taken shape as nationalities.[1]

With the gaining of independence contradictory processes of the forming of 'national political' communities and, at the same time, of the forming and consolidating of separate nationalities began to develop in the countries of Equatorial Africa, as in West Africa. General unifying processes within separate states were stimulated in this area by the closeness of cultural traditions and kinship of the Bantu languages; in East Africa a common language, Swahili, became widely disseminated, and is now employed probably by 30 to 40 million people.

The *fourth region*, Southern Africa, is an area of mass European colonisation. The course of ethnic processes there has given a special, deformed character through the impact of the colonists and the rapid development of capitalist relations and growth of mining and towns; the indigenous peoples have been driven off the lands they occupied, and forcibly settled in reserves with the aim of creating a surplus population in them and providing factories and mines with cheap labour. The reactionary regimes in the Republic of South Africa began to pursue a policy of racial segregation and separate existence of the racial groups of the population on a broad, state-wide scale, and created a complex

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[1] See: D. A. Olderogge and I. I. Potekhin (Eds.). *Narody Afriki* (The Peoples of Africa), Moscow, 1954, pp 421-426, 485-491.

system of legalised racist rules—apartheid. Under the demagogic slogan of 'defending' African cultures against a European civilisation 'foreign' to them, the South African government is pursuing a policy of establishing so-called 'national homelands' of the indigenous peoples—Bantustans. Having set aside 85 per cent of the country's area for the white population, including almost all the towns, the Pretoria regime has assigned the rest, as a rule infertile, for the Africans who constitute four-fifths of the population. The creation of Bantustans is an attempt to split up the African population, isolate the indigenous peoples from one another, perpetuate the regime of apartheid, and undermine the struggle against the racist regime being waged by the Africans of South Africa under the leadership of the African National Congress. Mass struggle against racial discrimination and brutal oppression is also uniting the many African peoples of South Africa (Xosas, Zulus, etc.). They speak closely related Bantu languages, have a basically common culture, and similar customs and manners. Active processes of their consolidation into separate nations are developing.[1]

The broad national liberation movement in the former Portuguese colonies in the south of Africa has already led to the independence of their peoples. The character of the ethnic processes in them is changing rapidly. The overwhelming majority of the population in both Angola and Mozambique belong to Bantu peoples close in culture and language. In Angola the biggest peoples, the Bambundu and Bakongo, occupy the northern coastal area. In the centre are the Ovimbundu and the closely related Waluchazi, Wambundu, and Waluimbe peoples. All of them are united by a closeness of language and culture, and by struggle for the country's national independence. Similar processes are taking place in Mozambique where Bantu peoples also predominate, the Makua and Lomwe, Malawi, Tsonga, and others. The foundations of broad national political communities have already begun to take shape in those countries.

What ethnic processes predominate in most African countries?

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[1] I. I. Potekhin. The Forming of a National Community of the South African Bantu. In: *Trudy Instituta Etnografii AN SSSR*, No. 29 (USSR Academy of Sciences Publishers, Moscow, 1955), pp 241-242.

The forming of communities that had already been developing vigorously in the pre-colonial period on the basis of groups of the population close in language and culture has come to the fore in many of them since independence. These communities can be called nationalities *(narodnosti)*. They differ considerably, it is true,* from the ancient and mediaeval nationalities of Europe, for example, and the modern nationalities of the USSR. The processes are not straightforward and are full of contradictory phenomena, such as tendencies to unite ethnic groups with various languages and to unite different peoples within the frontiers of the present-day states, and tendencies toward isolation and separatism and a reinforcing of ethnic and national barriers. The processes are manifested both in the form of a consolidation (i.e. merging) of several peoples (tribes, tribal groups) into one people and in the form of assimilation. For many of the countries a kind of duality of the main trends of ethnic development is typical: namely, (1) the uniting and consolidation of big ethnic communities formed from ethnic groups closely related by language and culture, and (2) the strengthening and growth of a national political identity within the independent states.

During the anti-colonial revolution, which united all the peoples of each colony without distinction of ethnic affiliation, language, and culture, a consciousness of belonging to the national political community had already taken shape. In many North African countries national political unity already coincided to a considerable extent with ethnic unity. Consolidatory processes have developed in them on a more or less compact and single ethnic basis.

Things are different in Tropical Africa. The countries there provide rich material for investigating ethnic processes, presenting not only processes of various types (consolidatory, integrational, and assimilatory) but also different stages of development and a diversity of forms of ethnic community ranging from tribe to nation.

The general laws of human development have manifested their universality in Tropical Africa in a special, unique way: namely, that features of clan/tribal relations, customs and rituals, prejudices and superstitions that have come down from past epochs still survive in a vestigial state in the environment of numerically predominant peasantry. The reactionary forces in Africa are widely exploiting sur-

vivals of clan/tribal relations and ancient customs and prejudices in setting one group of the population against another and directing the energy of social protest onto a path of interethnic conflict. But what is the true role of clan/tribal structures and consciousness in the ethnic processes of present-day Africa?

First, the forming of broad ethnic communities, it must be noted, is finding expression in many countries in rapid development of an identity of these communities that does not immediately supplant or completely eliminate old ethnic ideas about tribal relations established in an earlier period. In some cases tribal identity corresponds to a still prevailing clan tenor of life. Such are certain of the hunters of Tropical and Southern Africa (the pygmies of the equatorial forests of the Congo basin, the Hadzapi or Kindiga of Tanzania, the Bushmen in Botswana). Among other peoples, for example the cattle-raising Nilots of Kenya and Uganda, the Luo and others, clan/tribal identity is less expressed and clan ties are rapidly giving way to territorial links. A marked class stratification of society is beginning, and this process has gone quite far among many peoples (the Wolofs in Senegal, the Akan in Ghana, the Yoruba, Ibo, and Hausa in Nigeria, etc.). We can therefore conclude not only that a vast variety of forms of ethnoi's existence, and variants of ethnic communities, is typical of Africa but also that the hierarchy of these forms, which does not always fit well into the traditional units of ethnic communities (tribe, nationality, and nation) is very complicated. And here we come to the principal specific feature of ethnic processes in Africa, which has already been noted by Suret-Canale, who considers that there are many transitional forms between tribes based on blood ties and the modern nations of the capitalist era.[1]

The African continent, with its many peoples and complexity of ethnic geography, has to be thought of in the dynamics of the ethnic processes and trends that are altering the 'socio-ethnic' map of Africa before our very eyes rather than in the statics of phenomena and a categoric classification of peoples under some one socio-ethnic heading or another. Whereas the road from tribal formations to big nationalities

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[1] Jean Suret-Canale. *Afrique Noire occidentale et centrale. Géographie. Civilisations. Histoire*, Paris, 1958.

took centuries in Europe, the establishing of ever bigger ethnic communities is developing vigorously in Africa, in a matter of decades in the new historical conditions, and at the same time is embracing various levels from the lowest ethnosocial units—families (large and small), and patriarchal (or matriarchal) groups of families—to the clan, tribe, group of related tribes, and nationalities.

Patriarchal forms of family relations still exist to a considerable extent in a rural locality in Tropical Africa. Take the village of the Luo people in Western Kenya, in which the family—a related group of people under the control of the senior member—includes the husband and his several wives, and his married and unmarried sons, daughters and grandchildren.[1]

The Luo used to be divided, not long ago, into several large tribes the differences between which had lost their significance as a result of ethnic consolidation, and which survived in fact only in ethnic consciousness. The separate tribes of the Luo have already merged into a single Luo nationality, which was fostered by the socio-economic processes of recent decades, viz., the penetration of commodity-money relations and conversion of the area's subsistence economy into a modern, small-scale, commodity-producing capitalist economy.

Among both the Luo and many other peoples of Tropical Africa, tribes united various structures (clans, groups of families, and extended families) that also included alien groups. And this whole kaleidoscopic, ethnosocial structure altered continuously from generation to generation, ramified, and became segmented. Everything in it was in motion. Hence the difficulty of employing the traditional concept 'tribe' to describe the predominant form of ethnos in modern Tropical Africa. 'Tribe', it must be admitted, is largely a conventional term behind which may be concealed either exogamous clans or nationalities already consolidated on the basis of antagonist class relations.[2]

Contemporary economic processes, migration, and the growth of towns are rapidly altering the content of tradi-

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[1] A. W. Southal. *Lineage Formation among the Luo*, London, 1952; B. A. Ogot. *A History of the Southern Luo*, Vol. 1, Nairobi, 1967.

[2] D. A. Olderogge. A propos of Certain of Africa's Ethno-Linguistic Problems. In: A. V. Desnitskaya, V. M. Zhirmunsky, L. S. Kovtun (Eds.). *Op. cit.*, p 140.

tional ethnosocial structures, preserving only certain external features, in particular the ethnic consciousness of belonging to a certain group. Such, for example, are the Bemba in Zambia, the Kikuyu in Kenya, the Bakongo in Zaire, and many others. A vigorous process of ethnic mixing is going on in the centres of consolidation, where various cultures are found in areas of mixed population, and there is an interpenetration of some lineages, clans, and tribes with others. This is characteristic of the broad zone of economic and cultural contacts and bilingualism between the Bantu and Nilotic peoples in Kenya, Uganda, and Zaire.

Ethnic mixing at the level of the lowest ethnosocial communities is encouraged by complicated assimilatory processes, which are especially marked where peoples differing sharply from one another in level of socio-economic development, origin, language, and culture, live in the same vicinity. The ethnic geography of Tropical Africa is full of such contrasts: such are the Kikuyu in Kenya and the groups of Ndorobo hunters assimilated by them; the agricultural Luo and the pastoral Turkana; the Banyaruanda and their ethnographic group the Batwa pygmies in Rwanda; the Bechuana and Bushmen in Botswana. In Nigeria the Hausa are assimilating the neighbouring Angas, Ankwe, and other peoples.[1] In Togo the small ethnic communities (Akebu, Akposo, Adele) are gradually merging with the Ewe. Ethnically divisive processes still retain their significance, alongside unifying ones, in several areas of Tropical Africa. In Kenya, for example, the Masaba and Bukusu peoples (tribes) have separated off from the Bagishu. Ethnic division and the separating off of individual peoples went hand in hand with the great historical migration of the Luo south from the Nile to the area of the lakes. There was also a big migration of the Nguni into South Africa and others.

As a result of unifying processes (consolidation, integration, and assimilation), and of divisive ones, big new ethnic communities are taking shape and consolidating, the language of one of the ethnic components (as a rule the most numerous and developed one) being transformed into the common language as links between the separate groups become stronger, while the other, related languages acquire the char-

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[1] R. N. Ismagilova. *Narody Nigerii* (The Peoples of Nigeria), Moscow, 1963.

acter of dialects; the cultural community becomes stronger
and the common name for the nationality, by which it is
known to its neighbours, spreads. Sometimes this is simply
a new ethnonym, as happened in Kenya when the Baluhya
nationality took shape from the Bantu tribes of the Kaviron-
do area. These tribes have only been calling themselves
'Abaluya', 'Luhya' (meaning kinsmen) since 1935. The
coastal peoples (Giryama, Nyika, Duruma, and others),
who mainly speak Swahili, have been given the name
'Midjikenda'. A converging of the Bantu peoples is charac-
teristic of Southern Cameroun, where three groups are dis-
tinctly defined: the Duala (and Balundu, Basa, and Batan-
ga), Fang (and Bulu, Eton, and Yaunde), and Maka (togeth-
er with the Nzem and Kaka). The Duala's language is
the most developed one and has long become common among
neighbouring tribes as the language of trade.[1] The converg-
ing of peoples is being promoted by modern economic
and cultural processes and migration, and in particular by
urbanisation. African cities—industrial, commercial, and
administrative centres with a rapidly growing African pro-
letariat, a national petty and medium bourgeoisie and in-
telligentsia—have become centres of general national move-
ments and of the development of the ethnic mixing and
uniting of related tribes and peoples. Exchange of cultural
values between members of different peoples is most intensive
in the towns, and so too is the converging of languages and
dialects and forming of literary languages, which is an im-
portant condition for the establishment of broad national
communities.

The development of common national literary language
is becoming an extremely acute issue in many independent
African countries. Major changes of an economic, social,
and cultural character are also affecting linguistic processes.
Bilingualism (and even multilingualism) is characteristic
of a whole number of areas, and also the existence alongside
the native languages of a regional lingua franca and commer-
cial languages (e.g. Hausa, Lingala, etc.), and various
forms of simplified jargons (pidgin English in Sierra Leone;
Kileta at the mouth of the Congo, etc.).[2] Linguistic splin-

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[1] B. V. Andrianov. The Ethnic Structure of Contemporary Came-
roun. *Sovetskaya etnografiya*, 1959, 6: 56-68.
[2] T. A. Sebeok (Ed.). *Current Trends in Linguistics*, Vol. 7 (*Lin-
guistics in Sub-Saharan Africa*), The Hague, 1971.

tering has survived in Tropical Africa, although linguists often exaggerate it, treating tribal dialects as independent languages. The linguistic diversity of some countries also corresponds to their ethnic diversity. Problems of bilingualism and multilingualism face most countries in Africa, and of course not just in Africa.

In most African countries European languages are recognised as the official ones. Only in a comparatively few (the countries of North Africa, the Sudan, Somalia, Tanzania, and the Democratic Republic of Madagascar) have African languages become the state ones. The priority of European languages in many countries will apparently continue for the near future.[1]

The processes of ethnic development are not isolated but are closely intertwined with economic, political, racial, and religious relationships, and are also complicated by the struggle of political forces and parties.

The development of Africa's new countries in the contemporary period of transition from capitalism to socialism is governed by the struggle of opposing trends: on the one hand, free national development in the interests of the broad masses of the working people under the impact of the world of socialism, and, on the other hand, tendencies toward the implanting and reinforcing of capitalist relations. One group of countries is tackling the main economic task of overcoming backwardness by the road of non-capitalist development (especially the countries of a socialist orientation); another group is orienting itself on a capitalist road, while leading trends have not yet manifested themselves clearly enough in a third group. Almost everywhere, however, the economic structure has a mixed character.[2]

This factor *(inter alia)* determines the multilevel character and diversity, and typological differences, of the ethnic processes, within the context of the population's separate economic and cultural groups.

African subsistence agriculture is associated with the economic isolation of certain regions, the domination of a

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[1] R. N. Ismagilova. *Narody Nigerii* (The Peoples of Nigeria), Moscow, 1963, p 296; D. A. Olderogge. *Op. cit.*

[2] R. Ulyanovsky. Certain Matters of the Non-Capitalist Development of Afro-Asian Countries. *World Marxist Review*, 1969, 9: 83; *Razvivayushchiesya strany: zakonomernosti, tendentsii, perspektivy*, Moscow, 1974.

feudal or patriarchal-clan order, the narrowness and back-wardness of ideological notions, and ethnic fragmentation, supported by reactionary forces. The development of a pub-lic sector and of modern economic structures is linked, on the contrary (as Soviet ethnologists have established), with a continuous extension of the areas of production and exchange, a mixing of the population's various ethnic groups, and the appearance of unifying trends in the economy and public affairs.

In Africa, as in other parts of the world, there is a distinct interconnection between the economy's level of development and that of the ethnic communities.

Soviet Africanists have developed a theory of foci or centres of peoples' ethnic (national) integration and con-solidation, drawing on a large corpus of data. Foci are distinctly discernible in modern Africa in the biggest peo-ples, around whom various ethnoi are grouping (groups of related tribes, individual tribes, and ethnographic groups). Apart from the forming of nationalities and national con-solidation, processes of ethnic integration are developing in Africa, that is to say of the forming of big ethnic commu-nities from various ethnic components differing from one another in level of socio-economic, linguistic, and cultural development, in which the leading role is played by state and political institutions. The special role of the state in most African countries is that, in contrast to Western Eu-rope, the rise of the state was not the result of the formation of a nation but on the contrary is the instrument itself of the creation of a nation.[1]

Certain African leaders, in endeavouring to stress the national unity of the citizens of their countries, identify the nation with the state. In the future, of course, ethnically united nations will probably take shape within the separate states, but in many sub-Saharan countries the processes of national integration are still far from completed.[2]

These countries are very acutely faced with the business of resolving ethnic and linguistic problems, establishing an order that will ensure equality of development for all the peoples and their cultures and languages. It is impossible to overcome backwardness in economic and cultural affairs

[1] Sekou Touré. *La révolution et l'unité populaire* (Conakry, 1964), p 44.
[2] S. I. Bruk, N. N. Cheboksarov. *Op. cit.*, p 38.

without overcoming the burden of the past, viz., ethnic and linguistic fragmentation. Study of all the phenomena of contemporary life that are holding back the progress of Africans' culture and tying them to the past is therefore of immense socio-political importance. At the same time this is also a matter of the cultural heritage, i.e. of all the spiritual values and folk traditions that play a progressive role in the life of modern Africa. Ethnologists' attention is now focused on the historical fate of each African people and on ethnic processes at all levels, from the lowest rank of ethnosocial community (the extended family, clan, and lineage) to broad national political communities, nationalities, and nations.

PROBLEMS OF THE DEVELOPMENT
OF AFRO-ASIAN LANGUAGES
AND SOVIET EXPERIENCE
OF LANGUAGE DEVELOPMENT

L. B. Nikolsky

The emancipation of the peoples of Asia and Africa through victory of their national liberation movements, and their acquiring of their own statehood, have raised a host of similar socio-economic, political, and national issues and problems of cultural and linguistic development. One of them that is common to various countries is above all that of a common state language or macro-lingua franca so as to ensure communication throughout the country. The complexity and political acuteness of this problem are not the same in the different countries and depend on the peculiarities of the ethnic, socio-political, and national-language situation. They are governed in the first instance by objective factors, to wit, the ethnolinguistic structure of the population, the existence either of centripetal tendencies giving rise to spontaneous assimilation of ethnic groups by the bigger community or, on the contrary, of centrifugal trends tending to a deepening of the country's ethnic differentiation.

Afro-Asian countries can be classified as follows according to how complicated this problem has become:

(1) ethnically uniform countries (like the Korean People's Democratic Republic and Somalia) in which the problem of a macro-lingua franca simply does not exist, although no less urgent matters of developing literary norms, introducing order into the vocabularly (North Korea) or spreading a national system of writing (Somalia) are the order of the day;

(2) ethnically non-homogeneous countries where this issue

is posed in all its complexity because of one or the
other of the above-mentioned trends; in a country like
Egypt or Kampuchea, in which big ethnic communities of
Egyptians or Khmers live together with relatively small
groups, the big communities have become the basis of
ethnic consolidation within the country, and by virtue
of the numerical preponderance of one of the nationali-
ties there are the objective conditions for its language
to become the predominant one naturally, taking on the
character of the inter-nation and common state means of
communication, which leads to mass bilingualism among
the national minorities, who master the macro-lingua
franca but whose own languages continue to function
as the means of intraethnic communication;

(3) ethnically heterogeneous countries inhabited by sev-
eral big ethnic communities (rather than one) that dif-
fer, however, in degree of consolidation (India and Ni-
geria); the very existence of more than one big community
within a country objectively raises the question of the
choice of language to be the macro-lingua franca, a
problem that cannot be decided automatically by itself.
In this case the ethnic heterogeneity is fraught with
the conditions for the rise of secessionist trends in lan-
guage development that are reflected in rivalry of the
languages of the major ethnic communities and their
struggle to become the marco-lingua franca rather than
in a spontaneously occurring functional stratification
of the local languages as in countries of the second
type.

Yet another group can be distinguished characterised
by the existence of large ethnic communities in them. These
are countries like Indonesia and Tanzania, in which the role
of macro-lingua franca has been taken, because of certain
historical circumstances, by the language of a national
minority that had spread long ago with the development of
commerce. This fact can be taken as evidence that the road
to integration of the population into a higher ethnopolitical
community coinciding with the state is being laid in them.
When such a trend exists it does not, however, always sus-
pend the action of another, opposite tendency toward con-
solidation of related ethnic groups into separate nations
within the frontiers of one and the same state. In Indonesia,
for example, despite individual signs of the establishing

of such an ethnopolitical community,[1] there is an intensive process of consolidation into various nations, in addition to the Javanese,[2] of the Madurese, Sundanese, Bataks, and Minangkabaus.[3] Nevertheless we can see the results, in both Indonesia and Tanzania, of a similar process of the promoting of a local language to the role of lingua franca, though it is realised to different degrees; in Indonesia it is the language of the Malay minority and in Tanzania Swahili.

In both Indonesia and Tanzania the problem of the lingua franca can be considered solved in principle by the course of historical development itself; and the striving of the peoples constituting a single state to have a common means of intercourse is undoubtedly proving stronger, in spite of signs of opposite trends.[4]

The problem of a lingua franca is above all a matter of communication, and is directly linked with the organisation both of direction of the economy and society, and of mass information. The training of national personnel, increasing of their mobility, and extension of the sphere of using the lingua franca itself depend on its solution.

In many new Afro-Asian states, in which a local language does not perform the role of lingua franca, the situation is complicated by the existence of several languages whose speakers do not understand one another, and in the vast majority's ignorance of the Western language adopted as the official one in some of these countries.

At the same time there are spontaneous processes in these countries whereby intercourse is becoming more and more direct. This is due to the operation of several factors, na-

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[1] A. I. Kuznetsov. The Involvement of the Peoples of Indonesia in National Processes in Accordance with their Level of Socio-economic Development. In: *Tezisy dokladov 'Etnicheskaya istoriya i sovremennoe national'noe razvitie narodov mira'* (Moscow, 1967), p 60.

[2] *Kratkaya vsemirnaya istoriya* (Short World History), Vol. 1, (Moscow, 1966), p 536.

[3] N. A. Simoniya. Nationalism and the Political Struggle in Emancipated Countries. *Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnie otnosheniya*, 1972, 1: 92.

[4] In this connection we cannot agree with Whiteley (see: W. H. Whiteley. Some Factors Influencing Language Policy in Eastern Africa. In: *Can Language Be Planned?* Honolulu, 1971), who suggests that the adoption of Swahili as the official language of Tanzania was mainly due to implementation of the ideological principles of the TANU Party (which merged in 1977 with the Afro-Shirazi Party of Zanzibar and took the name *Chama Cha Mapinduzi* [Revolutionary Party]).

mely: (1) the social differentiation of society and, as a consequence, proliferation of social communities and extension of the field of intercourse associated with that; (2) the breaking down (in the conditions of socialist and developing countries) of traditional social and national barriers; (3) development of the mass media; (4) the increase in population; and (5) twentieth century dynamism and intensification of the mode of life,[1] and (it must be added) expanding urbanisation.

One result of the operation of these factors is a language situation typical of many developed multinational countries, which is characterised by a functional distribution of co-existing languages governed by their hierarchy and the multilevel character of intercourse.[2] At the top of the hierarchy is the lingua franca, which has the biggest number of partial communicative functions (i.e. all the functions of a national language plus those of the state and inter-nation means of communication), and at the bottom are the rustic tongues employed in everyday intercourse only. Such a situation is specific to those countries in which a local language functions as the lingua franca (e.g. the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, Indonesia, Burma). The language situation in many emancipated countries differs primarily in that the language of the former metropolitan country serves as the lingua franca while not performing the maximum number of communicative functions in them proper to any local language in the same role.

Since the 'imported' lingua franca is employed by a limited number of the autochthonous population (according to Donne's data, French, for example, was understood by only 10 per cent in Tropical Africa and was spoken fluently by 1 or 2 per cent; in Asian countries Western languages are also spoken by an insignificant minority of the population).

In spite of there being a need for a common medium ensuring direct communication throughout the state, clearly

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[1] See B. D. Parygin. *Osnovy sotsial'no-psikhologicheskoi teorii* (The Principles of Social Psychological Theory), Moscow, 1971, pp 338-339.

[2] For further details see: S. A. Arutyunov and N. N. Cheboksarov. Linguistic Communication and Ethnic Consolidation. In: Yu. D. Dezheriev, A. N. Baskakov, L. B. Nikolsky, and N. V. Okhitina (Eds.). *Sotsiolingvisticheskie problemy razvivayushchikhsya stran* (N auka, Moscow, 1975), pp 16-19.

recognised not only by the governments but also by the masses of the people of new countries, the choice of a local lingua franca is a very complicated business. The fact is that it is primarily a political matter in these countries, inextricably linked with the national question.

The complexity and political acuteness of the problem of a local lingua franca are aggravated still further by the fact that most emancipated Afro-Asian countries were formed as multinational states in conditions such that there was no nation that played the role of centre of ethnic consolidation, and their boundaries exactly reproduced those of the former colonial possessions, which frequently divided nationalities and other ethnic units. Thus, unlike Europe of the period of rising capitalism, when victory of the national movement signified the creation of a national state, many Afro-Asian peoples have realised self-determination on an ethnically varied, multinational basis.[1]

Since 'the centre of gravity of the national question is shifting inside the country to the field of relations between different ethnic groups',[2] the choice of lingua franca directly affects the interests of the various ethnic units. If one of the local languages is chosen its speakers naturally receive greater privileges, while the interests of the other ethnic units are thereby infringed.

The urgent communicative need for a lingua franca, supported by the striving of the ruling circles of several Afro-Asian countries to artificially integrate peoples speaking different languages into a community coinciding with the state, is fostering the development of a concept of 'one nation' that denies the population's ethnic heterogeneity.[3] This concept presupposes the use of 'a single national language',[4] which leads to imposition of the language of the

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[1] See G. B. Starushenko. *Natsiya i gosudarstvo v osvobodivshikhsya stranakh* (Nation and State in Emancipated Countries), Nauka, Moscow, 1967, p 104.

[2] *Ibid.*

[3] See V. B. Iordansky. *Tupiki i perspektivy Tropicheskoi Afriki* (Tropical Africa's Blind Alleys and Perspectives), Nauka, Moscow, 1970; G. B. Starushenko. *Op. cit.*; N. A. Simoniya. *Art. cit.*

[4] A special term 'nationism' has been introduced and used in American sociolinguistic literature, which signifies integration, also by means of a common language, of the socially and culturally different ethnic units within a politico-geographical unit (country or state). See: J. A. Fishman. Nationality-Nationalism and Nation-Nationism.

dominant nationality onto other nationalities and ethnic groups, and resistance on their part. So it happened, for example, in India in 1965. Language policy also gave rise to inter-nation friction and conflicts in Burma up to 1962, where the 'national' Burmese language had been compulsorily spread and the languages of the national minorities banned.[1]

In several countries with a complex ethnic structure, especially those in which one of the local languages has not spontaneously come to be the lingua franca, the language of the former metropolitan country was proclaimed the 'national' one in accordance with the concept of 'one nation'. It would seem, however, that the reason for the conversion of an 'imported language' into a 'national' one is not merely the absence of a widely disseminated local language in a country, or of several languages that could become such a lingua franca. It is also difficult to explain it simply by the Western language's having broader communicative functions and a richer scientific and technical vocabulary.

The neutrality of a lingua franca on the plane of national relations is of no little significance in its choice.[2] The Indonesian language and Swahili, for example, are neutral. Western languages also have this attribute within a country, ostensibly offering equal opportunities to all ethnic groups and not giving one of them any advantage.

There is another point that reinforces the position of Western languages and their spread in emancipated countries, and this is that they are associated at present with the scientific and industrial revolution on which the ruling circles of developing countries place great hopes. There is the illusion that access to world scientific and technical progress will enable the problems of social development to be solved, as well as economic ones. Because of that much interest is displayed in direct linguistic contacts with developed capitalist countries; large contingents of students are sent to the countries of the West to study. That is why English, in

In J. A. Fishman *et al.* (Eds.) *Language Problems of Developing Nations* (J. Wiley & Sons, New York, 1968), pp 39-47.

[1] See H. Tinker. The Union of Burma (London, 1957).

[2] See A. Mazrui. Language and Politics in East Africa. *Africa Report*, 1967, *12*, 6: 59-61; See also: UNESCO. *Meeting of Experts on the Contribution of African Languages to Cultural and Literacy Programmes, Yaounde, Cameroun, 10-14 August 1970* (UNESCO, Paris, 1970).

particular, is widely used, even in countries that were not British colonies (Ethiopia, Nepal). For all that, the use of Western languages as the lingua franca is only a palliative, although they now have a relatively firm position in the new multinational states, and in all probability will function in them for a comparatively long time to come. There is nothing surprising about that, incidentally, when we remember that these new states are only a decade or so old, on the average, and the colonial period lasted scores and hundreds of years; allowance must also be made for the fact that the language of the former metropolis is better (from the angle of communication) than the local languages, the most common of which are used mainly in oral communication and do not yet have either a developed scientific and technical terminology or differentiated styles, and sometimes even a system of writing. Latin American countries, for example, which have a long period of independent existence, still use Spanish and Portuguese, although the majority of the population in some of them know and use local languages.[1]

Resorting to a Western language, however, does not, it would seem, solve the national question, but on the contrary complicates it. Complications and difficulties do not just arise in its dissemination among the broad masses of the people (for they can hardly master them in less than several decades in view of the lack of schools, teachers, and textbooks, and the weak development of the mass media). The complexity consists primarily in the social plane and the solution of another pressing matter, namely the rise and development of a national culture.

The use of a Western language entails an aggravating of the existing social differentiation of society in emancipated countries and creates a gulf between the ruling elite and the broad masses. Aggravation of society's social differentiation cannot, of course, strengthen the processes of intrastate consolidation that is also posed as an objective

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[1] In Paraguay 46.1 per cent of the population speak only the local language Guarani, 3.2 per cent only Spanish, and 49.8 per cent both Guarani and Spanish. Guarani is widely disseminated, being the language of everyday intercourse for 95.9 per cent of the population of Paraguay. See: J. P. Rona. The Social and Cultural Status of Guarani in Paraguay. In: William Bright (Ed.). *Sociolinguistics* (Proceedings of the UCLA Sociolinguistics Conferences, 1964), Mouton, The Hague, 1966.

by the ruling circles of those countries in which a Western language has been proclaimed the 'national' or 'state' language.

The use of a Western language to express the national culture raises the no less complex and difficult problem of its adaptation (1) to the ethnocultures of the various communities inhabiting the country, and (2) to the supra-ethnic culture (which is a complex entity absorbing elements of both the local ethnocultures and world culture). For a Western language to be an adequate means of reflecting culture it must be 'adapted', and undergo differentiation, as with Spanish in Cuba, Portuguese in Brazil, French in Canada, and English in the United States and India. At the same time, a demand of uniformity is made on the Western language that performs the function of a lingua franca. A contradiction thus arises between the developing society's communication and culture needs when it employs a borrowed language rather than a local one.

Supposedly the peoples of emancipated countries will gradually pass to using their own languages in all spheres of intercourse. The transition will naturally depend on how deeply the Western language has become rooted in the country and on the effect of many social factors, including the state's language policy. In Niger and Ghana, where the governments considered it desirable to introduce French and English respectively as the language of instruction in schools (until a system of writing has been devised and disseminated for the main local languages spoken by the majority of the population),[1] language policy is fostering the spread and establishment of Western languages. The government of Tanzania's language policy, on the contrary, which has been characterised as anti-English [2], is encouraging the spread and development, for the present, of a 'second national language', Swahili.

The stand of the national intelligentsia, which has immense influence in the solving of the language problem, must also not be ignored. When moved by patriotic feelings they may be advocates of local languages, but on the contrary, when guided by selfish considerations (a striving to maintain the privileged position given by knowledge of a Wes-

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[1] See D A. Olderogge. *Art. cit.*, p 156.
[2] See L. Harries. Language Policy in Tanzania. *Africa*, 1969, *39*, 8: 276.

tern language and acquaintance with Western culture), they may defend the use of Western languages.[1]

How long Western languages will be used will also depend on the trends of the new states' socio-economic development. In socialist countries, and ones adopting a socialist orientation, the ousting of the language of the former metropolitan country and its replacement by a local language or languages is much more intensive than in countries with a capitalist bias. In the Socialist Republic of Vietnam French had already been superseded in intercourse in the first years after the August Revolution of 1945. In the Republic of Guinea, a single orthography has been developed for several of the country's languages, and primers and textbooks written in them, by way of preparation for passing to the use of local languages. In those countries the state expresses the interests of the majority of the people; language problems are therefore being decided in them in the interests of the broad masses.

Quite obviously, the matter of a lingua franca cannot be decided immediately in the interests of the overwhelming majority of the population, but the impression should not be created in the 1970s that there are no languages in emancipated countries that could not, in certain conditions, replace Western ones in this role. Western languages have been successfully replaced by Arabic in the countries of the Arab East; the position of English has been undermined in Burma, and its functional sphere in India has shrunk with the spread of Hindi.

In Tropical Africa there are local languages that could in time become strong rivals of Western languages and claim the role of lingua franca (Swahili in East Africa; the Wolof language in Senegal, for which a system of writing had now been devised, and which is widely used in the towns; in the north of Ghana Hausa and dialects of Akan predominate;[2] in Nigeria people speaking Hausa, Ibo, Yoruba, Edo, and Efik are growing in number). These major nationalities are

[1] V. B. Iordansky. *Op. cit.*, p 278.
[2] What a great role the Soviet Africanist Potekhin attributed to Akan in Ghana is well known. He suggested that at some stage of Ghana's social development it would 'become a universal means of intercourse and the national language of the Ghanaian nation'. See: I. I. Potekhin. *Stanovlenie novoi Gany* (The Establishing of New Ghana), Nauka, Moscow, 1965, pp 323-325.

becoming the centres for the forming of nations, and around them 'related peoples are grouping and adopting their languages, cultures, and customs in so doing'.[1]

As local languages spread and take root as state and official languages, problems of their rapid development, reinforcement of their inadequate socio-political and scientific and technical terminologies, and stylistic differentiation arise. In other words, the use of local languages on a country-wide scale is inconceivable without a great deal of preliminary work to 'pull them up' to the level of development of the polyfunctional Western languages they are to replace.

The development of languages of state communication, and above all of their vocabulary, is proving a quite complicated and difficult matter. In many countries, in the first period after independence, purist trends tended to predominate in terminological affairs. The rise of purism in Afro-Asian countries then was understandable and justifiable. It was a reflection of the oppressed peoples' nationalism in linguistic matters, and had an anti-colonial bias. The purists were opposed above all to the dominance of a Western language and stood for linguistic decolonialisation. At the same time the predominance of purist trends in word-formation was also due to an orientation on reviving the national culture suppressed by the colonial authorities, which they were trying to realise in the course of cultural decolonialisation. The concept 'national culture', however, was usually identified with 'traditional culture', whose flowering was dated to the pre-colonial period, which coincided with the epoch of feudalism. In that connection borrowing from classical languages (e.g. Sanskrit in India, Pali in Kampuchea) was abused in the creation of terms and neologisms. The artificially created neologisms proved cumbersome and incomprehensible as a result, since the basic requirement of neologisms (to be etymologically clear and semantically motivated from the angle of the modern language) was infringed. This purist practice discredited the important and necessary work that was being done to develop the languages' lexical systems, and did not stop penetration of the local language by a vocabulary from Western European languages, but on the contrary stimulated it.

[1] G. B. Starushenko. *Op. cit.*, p 263.

Purist trends are now less openly displayed in developing countries and work on extending the vocabulary is going ahead successfully at higher tempos. Neologisms are being created from indigenous and borrowed elements, and many international terms are entering the languages. Their enriching with a new vocabulary is naturally furthering their conversion into a polyfunctional means of intercourse and is raising their competitiveness against the languages of the former metropolitan countries.

There are thus certain grounds for supposing that languages are spreading and developing in those countries that will be able in time to replace those of the former metropolitan countries.

Correct application of Soviet experience of language development could, in accordance with the concrete conditions, be of great help in developing the local languages that are to replace Western ones. The peoples of the young Land of Soviets were faced with approximately the same problems as developing countries are now, as regards the national language situation. These problems have been fully resolved in the USSR. The languages of Soviet peoples were rapidly developed, which ensured elimination of the almost complete illiteracy, the liquidation of age-old backwardness, and the flowering of culture.

Lenin's line, which proclaimed and guaranteed equality of all the peoples and their languages, was consistently followed in Soviet language development; that meant, in particular, rejection of the very concept of a 'state language', which Lenin sharply opposed because 'a compulsory official language involves coercion, the use of the cudgel'.[1]

The practical carrying out of this line during language building took the form of broad efforts to devise alphabets for languages without them, to transform languages that employed borrowed systems of writing to a system specially devised for them (initially on the basis of the Latin alphabet, and later of Russian Cyrillic), to compile grammars and dictionaries, and write ABCs and primers, schoolbooks, etc., for all the peoples that wanted to have their own system of writing and to study and create a literature in their own native language, irrespective of their numbers. As a result al-

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[1] V. I. Lenin. Is a Compulsory Official Language Needed? *Collected Works*, Vol. 20 (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1972), p 72.

phabets were devised and schoolbooks written, for peoples that numbered hundreds of thousands and for little nationalities numbering only a few hundred persons; the most important political literature and belles lettres were translated for both of them.

Practice brought its own correctives. Some of the small peoples do not use the alphabets and textbooks created for them but prefer to study, read, and write in the language of their bigger neighbours, e.g. in Tajik, Azerbaijani, or Russian. It could not always be taken into account at the time, unfortunately, that these small peoples were already in fact bilingual, or had a tendency toward bilingualism. Since only mastering of the language of the bigger people of itself increased the social mobility of members of the smaller nationalities, their mother tongues did not become literary languages, though continuing to function orally in everyday life; and it turned out that several of the systems of writing devised did not, in fact, find broad practical application.

At that time, however, it must be remembered, when it was necessary to eliminate the alienation of oppressed nations and nationalities caused by Czarism's chauvinist policy, recognition of the equality of all peoples and their languages, without exception, and the practical steps taken to develop those languages were of great political significance.

The establishing of the socialist system and the carrying out of Lenin's national policy were propitious conditions for coping with national language problems.

> The experience of building the Soviet multinational state has brilliantly confirmed Marxism-Leninism's conclusion that the national question can only be tackled consistently on the basis of a socialist reconstruction of society.[1]

The national question was tackled in practice in the USSR on the basis of the principles of self-determination, national autonomy, and equality. The forms of national autonomy are the Union Republic, Autonomous Republic, Autonomous Region, and Autonomous Area. Unity of the nation that

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[1] Resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU on Preparations for the 50th Anniversary of the Founding of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. *Pravda*, 22 November 1972.

constitutes the majority of the population of a national territorial-administrative unity is based on a community of economic relations, a common culture, national self-government, and (of course) a common language.

Since each national territorial-administrative unit is equal (and this equality is ensured economically, as well as by political guarantees, by means of a proportional allocation of funds from the state budget and a policy of equal, proportional development of the economy), there are no grounds for inter-nation friction and conflicts.

The language problem was thus resolved in the USSR on a national basis and that is the main difference from its solution in certain new multinational states. Broad employment of Soviet experience of language development therefore presupposes, above all, the existence of similar conditions for its application.

The main thing that follows from Soviet experience is the need for equality of all nationalities and for guaranteeing them the right to self-determination within the frontiers of the state and to employ their own mother tongues within the autonomous national unit. In that case the language of official communication in a state could remain the language of the former metropolitan country, which would undoubtedly be replaced in the course of time, as the local languages developed, by one of the more widely disseminated local languages.[1] Linguistic pluralism corresponds best to the interests of the masses of the people, who would be better able to master the country's official language, as well as their own mother tongue. In that case, though, a stage-by-stage type of linguistic communication is officially introduced, one language being replaced by several, while the merging of ethnic groups into a bigger unit coinciding with the state is postponed, as it were.

Progressive elements in the countries of Asia and Africa,

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[1] The following variant of a solution of language problems is considered the optimum one for African countries by the Hungarian linguist Fodor: to retain the European language (possibly two); to select the most common language as the future second official language; and to develop only certain of the most widely disseminated local languages in the territory of one ethnic group or another. See: J. Fodor. Linguistic Problems and Language Planning in Africa. Suggestions with Regard to the Reports of a Conference. *Linguistics. An International Review*, 1966, 25: 28-29.

however, now already see that the imposition of one 'state' or 'national' language from above, with the object of artificially uniting peoples into an ethnic community coinciding with the state, is fraught with a danger of aggravating interethnic friction, growth of nationalism, and strengthening of separatist tendencies.

As the Soviet Union's experience has demonstrated, the process of the uniting of nations and nationalities into an international community of people higher than the nation within a multinational state, and of the transformation of Russian into the inter-nation medium of communication is accelerated rather than held back by the establishing of friendship and co-operation among the nations with consistent observance of the principles of self-determination and equality.

The solution of the language problem would therefore seem to be more expedient in those countries that have decided that it will be useful for them to employ Soviet experience of national language development. Much attention is being paid in them to developing local languages, including those of national minorities, to devising and perfecting systems of writing for them, and to liquidating illiteracy by means of native languages.

A second, no less complicated matter of a comprehensive character is the choice of the local languages that it would be advisable to develop, the devising of a system of writing for them, and their introduction in the schools as the language of instruction. The complexity of this matter is due to the existence of a great many languages in multinational countries and the obscurity of their origin, genetic links, and contacts.

The complexity of the issue is that its solution necessitates attention to the attitude toward the language both of the ethnic group whose mother tongue it is and of other ethnic groups, and also to the objective facts regarding it (number of speakers, degree of uniformity or non-uniformity associated with territorial differentiation).

Many ethnic groups, especially small ones, with the exception of isolated groups (living in the mountains or large forested areas) are bilingual; a majority of their most socially active members speak the language of a bigger ethnic group, and this bilingualism, moreover, has a tendency to spread within the whole, not very numerous group. In that case the

question may be posed, not of devising a system of writing for its mother tongue, but of mastering the non-mother tongue so as to speed up the linguistic integrating of ethnic communities that use one and the same language. The view of the members of the ethnic group as to the language they would like to use for written communication (the mother tongue or the second language mastered in conditions of linguistic contact) should not, however, be ignored. The optimum would seem to be to devise a system of writing for big ethnic groups, or several ethnoi united by use of a common language that may not be the mother tongue of any one group.[1] Otherwise linguistic measures will reinforce the trends toward automisation observed in new multinational countries, and sustained by the feudal and tribal upper stratum (feudal princes and tribal chiefs).

It is also important to allow other ethnic groups' attitude to a given language since imposition of a language being promoted to the role of literary language, with the function of a lingua franca, will usually cause a breach of interethnic links if there is a negative attitude toward it.

The choice of the language which, on becoming the literary language, will be called upon to play the role of lingua franca is made easier in many countries in Asia and Africa by the fact, mentioned above, that languages spoken by considerable numbers of the population function in several areas of these two continents.

The problem of the orientation of the system of writing being created, and consequently of the literary language on one of its spoken forms, i.e. the problem of the dialect used as its basis, is usually resolved simultaneously with the creation of the literary language.

The base dialect is readily determined when there are no significant differences between dialects complicating or precluding mutual comprehension by their speakers. The dialect disseminated in the area that functions as the economic, political, and cultural centre for all the rest is usually taken as the basis for the literary language. This dialect enjoys relatively high standing and is considered a model worthy of imitation.

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[1] See: R. N. Ismagilova. *Op. cit.*, p 123. The experience of devising alphabets so as to unify the dialects and local forms of six African languages undoubtedly presents interest in this respect.

The problem is enormously complicated, however, when a language's dialects diverge so much as to exclude mutual comprehension, and when their social prestige is about equal. In some Afro-Asian countries missionaries and the colonial authorities invented systems of writing on different bases for the dialects of one and the same language, which estranged them even more from one another.

Similar complex matters were dealt with in two ways in the Soviet practice of language development. The first way was to create two literary languages for one forming nation. Two literary languages were created, for instance, for the Mordvins, two for the Mari people, two for the Komi people, and so on. The second way was to integrate a language's dialects into one literary language, which was the path followed for the Udmurts and the Bashkirs.

The second way, which posits the integration of dialects during the creation of the literary language, would seem to be more suitable for the peoples of Asia and Africa, because it encourages the uniting of linguistic communities into bigger ethnolinguistic groups.

Finally, there is yet another problem of a literary language's intrasystemic development, i.e. the creation of a stratum of socio-political, scientific, and technical terminology in it, without which it cannot serve the sphere of state administration, science, and technology.

This matter was tackled in the Soviet Union in the 1920s and 1930s. Extreme, opposing tendencies, it must be noted, however, were displayed in the creation of terminology: (1) a thoughtless, unjustified phonetic borrowing from a more developed language, which hindered the adopting language's development, depriving it of the incentive to use its own word-building elements and models; and (2) an extreme purism, which was expressed in a striving to invent 'native' terms artificially not only for new concepts but also to replace terms already borrowed and in common use, and since the earlier dominant trend had been a striving to use words of archaic form or borrowed from other languages (Arabic and Persian in Central Asia and the Caucasus), the new terms invented on an archaic or Arabo-Persian basis were incomprehensible to the majority of the language's speakers and were not taken up by the people. In struggle against both these extreme trends a correct principle for the coining of words was developed by which terms should be

invented primarily by using the contemporary national language's resources and at the same time might be borrowed from Russian or other languages of the peoples of the USSR.[1]

Many scholars, politicians, and public figures in Afro-Asian states think it would be both possible and expedient to apply Soviet experience of language development in their countries. To do so, however, it is important to allow for the concrete socio-economic state of affairs and national language situation and to study them deeply.

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[1] Yu. D. Desheriev. *Zakonomernosti razvitiya i vzaimodeistviya yazykov v sovetskom obshchestve* (The Patterns of Development and Interaction of Languages in Soviet Society), Moscow, 1966, p 118.

INTEGRATION
OF THE INDIGENOUS POPULATION
IN LATIN AMERICA

T. V. Goncharova

The forming of capitalist nations in Latin America has several distinguishing features and is giving rise to specific problems that have not occurred during national consolidation on other continents. After the discovery of America a migration, mixing, and interaction of genetically different ethnoi began there. Typologically this phenomenon can be compared with the great movements of the peoples that took place in the Old World in more ancient times. Before the conquest the American continents were peopled by numerous autochthonous tribes and nationalities (to whom the conquistadores gave the general, very arbitrary name of Indians) that were at various stages of social development. In the first century of colonisation many of the Indians were exterminated, while the rest were held back in their development and doomed in fact to gradual extinction. Nevertheless the beginnings of the formation of new ethnic types had already been laid then through the interaction of the indigenous population, European colonists, and the Africans introduced as slaves.[1] It is that which allows us to speak now of Mexicans and Bolivians, Brazilians and Peruvians, and not simply of the Indians, Creoles, and Negroes living in those countries.

The subsequent history of each of the Latin American regions did not take the same path, so that the fate of the individual Indian peoples and the degree to which they merged

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[1] M. Mörner (Ed.). *Race and Class in Latin America* (New York, 1970). pp 75, 95.

during the establishment of national associations were very different. The level of the Indian population's development itself was of no little importance in that. The lot of the tribes of the Caribbean Basin, who are now completely extinct, and of the so-called bush Indians of the Amazon proved most tragic. Only the names of some of them now survive, others are gradually dying out or are being assimilated. In the 1960s and 1970s the indigenous population of a whole number of Latin American countries (quite numerous before the conquest) is now a very small percentage: in Argentina 0.7 per cent; [1] in Colombia (by various estimates) between 2 and 7 per cent; [2] in Venezuela 1 per cent [3]; in Brazil around 100 000 in a population of 100 million; [4] in Guyana 28 000 in a total population of 628 000. [5]

With the intensification of capitalist development of Latin American countries since World War II, the opening up of new areas, and the building of roads (like the Transamazonian Highway in Brazil), the expulsion of Indians from their age-old lands has accelerated. The consequences of economic progress have often proved disastrous for that part of the native peoples of Latin America that had still remained outside modern civilisation. The grievous experience of the development of new lands in Colombia, Guyana, and Brazil is evidence of that.

A different situation has come about where highly developed civilisations had already taken shape in remote times, and where the Indians constitute around half of the population (in Peru more than 50 per cent, [6] in Bolivia 65 per cent, [7] in Guatemala 43.3 per cent, [8] in Ecuador 38 per cent. [9] The indigenous population has left a substantial mark on the national culture and psychology of those countries. The forming of a 'mestizo' nation in Mexico presents great interest. Although 'pure' Indians (on the basis of linguistic criteria)

[1] *A n érica indígena*, 1973, 3: 646.

[2] *América indígena*, 1972, 4: 1092.

[3] *América indígena*, 1974, 1: 5.

[4] L. A. Fainberg. *Indeitsy Brasilii* (The Indians of Brazil), Moscow, 1975, p 3.

[5] *Naselenie zemnogo shara* (The Population of the World), Moscow, 1965, p 293.

[6] *Ibid.*, p 313.

[7] *América indígena*, 1972, 3: 682.

[8] *América indígena*, 1972, 2: 278.

[9] *América indígena*, 1974, 3: 588.

constitute around 10 per cent of Mexico's population,[1] the overwhelming majority of Mexicans are mestizos, and many elements and traditions of Indian culture have already become an inalienable part of the developing national culture.

Consolidation is taking a complicated, contradictory course in these countries. On the one hand, mestization and natural assimilation are becoming more and more intensive. The number of Indians who speak both their own language and Spanish is increasing. In Puno (one of the most Indian provinces of Peru), for example, one Indian in ten was already speaking Spanish in 1961, whereas only one in 25 had done so according to the data for 1940.[2] There is an undoubted tendency, moreover, for Indians (e.g. in Bolivia) to adopt 'city culture' willingly and speak Spanish.[3]

On the other hand, there are large populations of Indians still in the mountain regions of Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, and Guatemala. They are mainly communities that have not lost their characteristic ethnic traits and old cultural traditions. In recent decades, moreover, the culture of the individual Indian peoples, e.g. the Quechua, has been clearly displaying a tendency to develop. All that could become the essential basis for further national consolidation if it were not being countered by a stronger trend toward the forming of mestizo, Spanish-speaking nations. This consolidating process had already begun in the towns in the first decades after the Conquista, and is developing more and more noticeably, being fostered by the socio-economic situation in those countries.

The Indians are being drawn more and more into the economic systems of their countries in the course of capitalist development, and are becoming more and more proletarianised, migrating to the towns and to the mines and plantations. A considerable part of the indigenous population, however, remains agricultural, retains a communal-patriarchal system, and carries on subsistence farming. The Indian communities of Peru, Bolivia, Mexico, and Guatemala have preserved many of their traditional features and institutions going away back in time. They are now the guardians of the original Indian cultures, since Indians quitting the communes

[1] *América indígena*, 1973, 4: 932.
[2] A. Dew. *Politics in the Altiplano* (Austin, Texas, 1969), pp 53-54.
[3] *Journal of Latin American Studies*, 1970, *2*, 1: 14-16.

largely lose their traditional spiritual and cultural values. In acquiring the more modern, developing culture of their countries, however, they are injecting a number of valuable elements into it. The originality of Peruvian and Mexican culture is itself due to the legacy of the great civilisations of the past. And what is very characteristic is that the Mexicans, and Bolivians do not oppose their national culture to the traditions of the Indian peasantry but, on the contrary, consider the latter their historical soil.

At the same time, as we have already said, some of the Indian population continues to maintain its cultural and ethnic integrity, which makes it legitimate to ask whether territorial autonomy of certain Indian areas would help preserve, and further the development of, their traditions and national traits.

Thus, in speaking of the position of the bulk of the native population of Latin America, and of the essence and content of the 'Indian question', it is necessary, in our view, to speak mainly, and primarily, about the Indian peasantry. J. C. Mariategui, the founder of the Communist Party of Peru, who first gave a Marxist interpretation of the Indian question, pointed that out many times.[1] At present there is a quite large Indian agricultural and mining proletariat and Indian petty bourgeoisie. Indians may occupy the most diverse social positions—from urban lumpen proletarians to industrial millionaires. That does not, however, alter the main substance of the matter. Most of the indigenous population continue to live as in the past, divided among themselves, carrying on a subsistence economy outside the course of modern civilisation.[2] They continue to remain a very poor, mercilessly exploited, socially and racially discriminated against part of the population. The uneven and dependent development of capitalism in Latin America encourages continuation of this situation, and although there has been some socio-economic progress in the Indian communities in the past 20 or 30 years, a considerable part of the Indian population continues to live in a state of isolation and backwardness. The forces of reaction gamble on that quite successfully, trying to keep the members of the communes apart

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[1] J. C. Mariategui. *Siete ensayos de interpretacion de la realidad peruana* (Havana, 1963), p 23.
[2] *Estudios sobre la cultura actual del Perú* (Lima, 1964), p 17.

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from the workers' class struggle and the general anti-imperialist movement.[1]

In view of all that socio-economic integration of the Indian population is one of the most urgent problems facing many Latin American countries. This is a particularly acute issue in the Andes region. Integration has already begun in a natural way and is becoming more intensive with those countries' economic advance. Its essence consists, in our judgment, in drawing the Indians into the national economic system, involving them in public and political affairs, opening technical progress and modern professions to them. This is an extremely complicated matter, the end result of which should be the building of a single socio-economic system embracing all strata of the population.

The substance of the Indian question, and the state of the indigenous population, as we have already remarked, are far from the same in each Latin American country. In Mexico, for example, as a result of the revolution of 1910-1917, the Indian peasantry, which played a major part in it, largely gained access to their country's public and political affairs. The natural process of assimilation has gone much further there than in other Latin American countries, although there are also big groups of the native peoples who retain their own cultural and ethnic traits.[2] A similar situation is building up at present in Bolivia, where the revolution of 1952 is also having a decisive influence on the consolidatory process.

The Indian communities of Peru and Guatemala have also evolved considerably in the 400 years that separate them from the time of the Incas and Mayas. Many of them nevertheless continue to live within the traditional 'Indian world', taking little part in the progress of their countries.[3] Finally, the Indian question has its own specific character in countries like Brazil, Colombia, Venezuela, Paraguay, and Argentina. That is because the degree of the indigenous population's development is quite different, and because their history since the conquest has proceeded differently, and

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[1] *Unidad* (Lima), 27 November 1965.

[2] I. F. Khoroshaeva. Mexico. Ethnic History and National Relations. In: S. A. Gonionsky, I. F. Khoroshaeva (Eds.). *Natsional'nie protsessy v Tsentral'noi Amerike i Meksike* (Nauka, Moscow, 1974), p 83.

[3] L. Valcárcel. *Ruta cultural del Perú* (Lima, 1964), p 99.

also because the stand of the ruling circles on this matter is not the same.

Although the question of the fate of the indigenous population had already arisen in colonial times, only a few humanists tried to answer it from the standpoint of humanity and justice. With the gaining of independence it began to attract the attention of many progressive-minded people, who tried to alleviate the Indians' lot, educate them, and defend them against the tyranny of the latifundists. The issue had become especially acute at the beginning of this century. In had become clear that the further development of a whole number of Latin American countries was itself impossible without emancipation of the masses of the Indian peasantry and their involvement in socio-economic affairs.[1] In spite of awareness of the importance of this matter, however, the Indians have continued to remain the most oppressed part of the working population, and their frequent unrest at the beginning of the century was suppressed with extraordinary ferocity.

Interest in the indigenous population, which rose especially in the 1920s and 1930s, was due to several, far from simple factors. On the one hand, there was compassion. The progressive intelligentsia, and especially the revolutionary-minded youth, strove to do something to help the rightless, poverty-stricken masses, seeing in them the roots of their developing nations. This striving was expressed in the founding of educational societies, as in Peru, in the 1920s. On the other hand, the ruling circles tried to get the Indian peasantry under the influence and to draw them into the capitalist system of their countries. By means of unimportant reforms and minor improvements they endeavoured to block the possibility of an alliance of the Indians and other sections of the working people, opposing reformist projects to the Indians' revolutionary aspirations. The most varied political forces strove to monopolise the right to deal with the Indian question and to lead the Indian masses, on whom the success of any one political undertaking largely depended; at the turn of the century, in Bolivia for example, a whole number of caudillos sought the Indians' support in their power struggle.

It was in Mexico that the idea of integrating the Indian

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[1] J. C. Mariategui. *Op. cit.*, p 180.

population and involving it in the nation's affairs was first advanced in Latin America. Integration was seen as the answer to the Indian question and its final solution. The development of this idea was also due to the effect of several, far from simple matters. The progressive Mexican intelligentsia of the revolutionary period sincerely believed in the need to consolidate a united Mexican nation, hoping to improve the Indians' life and to raise their cultural standards by means of various integration programmes. The original content of the integration idea, however, was subsequently largely distored and it became an instrument of demagogy and political speculation, and even of forced assimilation of the indigenous population. The content and trend of the conception were altered, and today its interpretation depends on who adopts it and for what ends.

Its father was the Mexican Manuel Gamio, one of the most eminent specialists on Indian affairs. Mexican Indianists like Caso, Aguirre Beltran, and Comas also made a big contribution to its development. In a many years' polemic against theoreticians of a racist hue they defended the 'racial viability' of the Indians and their capacity to assimilate all the advances of modern civilisation and to master modern trades and professions.[1] And although Mexican Indianists have worked for many years in quite close contact with North American specialists, they have remained basically alien to the theories typical of US anthropology (like psychoracism), and have always fought for a change in the indigenous population's social position.[2] At the same time certain practical measures began to be taken in Mexico to educate the Indians and draw them into the country's affairs. Several special agencies were set up for the purpose, and a system of cultural missions began to operate from 1923.[3] This activity flourished especially during the presidency of Lazar Cardenas, when radical steps were taken to improve the Indian peoples' economic position, textbooks

[1] J. Comas. *Estudios sobre indigenismo* (Mexico, 1953), p 18.

[2] I. F. Khoroshaeva. The Acculturation Problem in Mexican Ethnography. In A. V. Efimov and Yu. P. Averkieva (Eds.). *Sovremennaya amerikanskaya etnografiya* (USSR Academy of Sciences Publishers, Moscow, 1963), p 232.

[3] I. F. Khoroshaeva. The Modern Indian Population of Mexico. In: A. V. Efimov and Yu. P. Averkieva (Eds.). *Amerikanski etnograficheski sbornik* (USSR Academy of Sciences Publishers, Moscow, 1960), p 189.

were published in the Indian languages, and hundreds of enthusiastic young teachers worked in the Indian villages.

Subsequently, however, with a change in the political and ideological situation in the country, Indianist activity took on a less democratic character. The objectives of improving the indigenous population's life and educating it were gradually pushed into the background and the activity of Indianist agencies was mainly directed to stimulating assimilation processes. Certain measures were also taken in the 1920s and 1930s in other Latin American countries (e.g. Peru) to draw the Indians into their socio-economic affairs, but the issue of integration was not yet posed officially in them.

Only in the 1940s did the line of national integration become government policy for dealing with the Indian question in most Latin American countries. There were several reasons for that of a socio-economic and political character. First, capitalist development necessitated rapid incorporation of millions of Indian peasants into the national economic systems. In addition, the winning of several democratic freedoms (primarily the right to vote) granted to the Indians in several countries, converted them into a real social base for which the most diverse parties now struggled. In the situation of the revolutionary movement developing in Latin America, ruling circles strove to prevent a uniting of the forces of the urban workers and the Indian peasantry.

The so-called Roosevelt acts passed in the USA in 1935, which laid the basis for governmental protectionism in regard to the indigenous population, also had a big impact on the development of official integrational activity. The 'North American line' largely became the model from that time for Latin American Indianists, and specialists in Indian affairs from the USA began to be actively involved in the drafting and carrying out of integration programmes.

In 1942 the Inter-American Indian Institute was founded as a specialised agency under the Organisation of the American States; later several national Indian institutes were set up in Ecuador (1943), Guatemala (1945), Peru (1946), Bolivia (1949), and Mexico (1949). Similar agencies were founded in other Latin American countries in the 1950s and 1960s. Their main object became the implementing of a policy of integration supported by the United Nations and UNESCO. We must note, immediately, in this connection, that quite

a few major specialists, honest, progressive-minded people who are trying to help the Indians and have devoted years to educating them and protecting their traditional cultures, have been working in these institutions, and still are.

Integration was discussed at many conferences and symposia, for example the International Conference on Labour Problems in Geneva in 1958,[1] and the symposium on migration and integration held in Peru in 1961.[2] As a result the substance of 'integration' was defined more or less as agrarian reform, the building of a modern infrastructure in Indian areas, education, medical services, and the provision of agrotechnical services in the communes, etc. The main aim of all these measures was to involve the Indians actively in developing capitalism's system of economic relations.

A broad discussion about the rates and methods of implementing integration developed, however, since it had its own features in each Latin American country. Some experts (e.g. in Peru) stood for gradualness, considering that the bulk of the Indians were quite unprepared for incorporation into modern life. Others (e.g. in Bolivia and Mexico) favoured stimulation of integrational processes in every way. There were also those who held an openly assimilationist position, proposing forced inculcation of Spanish and European culture among the Indian peoples.[3] The overwhelming majority of the advocates of integration, however, defended the Indian peoples' cultural traditions. Each of the Latin American countries thus had its own interpretation of integration and to some extent of how to implement it, though still within the context of the general programme drafted by the Inter-American Indian Institute.

In those countries where Indians are the overwhelming majority of the peasantry, the carrying out of measures for their development in the main determines these lands' rates of socio-economic advance in general. Nevertheless practical efforts in regard to integration do not develop in the same way everywhere. In Guatemala, for instance, the bulk of the Indian peasantry still retain a communal-patriarchal organisation, are illiterate, and lack medical services and social security. Almost no real steps of any kind have been taken there to alter this state of affairs. At the beginning of

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[1] *Perú indígena*, 1958, *7*, 16/17: 208.

[2] *Perú indígena*, 1961, *9*, 20/21: 106.

[3] *Casa de la cultura ecuatoriana* (Quito), 1966, 24: 180.

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the 1950s, it is true, during the period of the Arbenz Government's revolutionary reforms, certain measures were adopted to allocate the peasants land, provide them with doctors and teachers, and to reinforce their communes. But all that was reduced almost to naught after the revolution's defeat; and although Guatemala also has a national programme of communal development (El Programa Nacional de Desarrollo de la Comunidad) [1] and has drafted projects for individual communes, [2] most of the planned measures still remain on paper. The overwhelming majority of the Indian peasants are landless, or almost so, although the government has taken some steps in recent years to deal with the agrarian question. The main accent in the official interpretation of integration, however, is put on developing the Indian population's initiative who should (it is claimed) themselves try to 'modernise' their way of life with the minimum financial and technical support from the state.

Some measures to integrate the indigenous population were undertaken in Colombia in the second half of the 1960s. A national programme was drafted there, the so-called Indianist Plan (1966-9)[3], and several commissions were set up to develop the Indian communities. Some regional programmes were drafted on the basis of this plan and local centres organised to carry them out, like the Cauca Regional Committee (Comité indigenista regional de Cauca). The work of Indianists in Colombia to improve the native peoples' life and draw them into the nation's affairs cannot yet be said, however, to have yielded the desired results. The main reason for the ineffectiveness of Indianist practice both there and in other countries is that it is not based on sweeping socio-economic reforms in favour of the Indian peasants.

Much the most active work toward integration is being developed in Peru, Bolivia, and Mexico. Once again, as in the 1920s, the Mexican nation is considered the result of a process of socio-economic integration, of the interaction of all the cultural and ethnic elements, and of the political equality of all Mexicans. A tendency toward 'Hispanisation' has, however, developed to a much greater extent there than in, for example, the Andean countries. In practice it has often led to crude assimilation. The mistaken character

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[1] *América indígena*, 1972, 2: 419-420.

[2] *Ibid.*, p 303.

[3] *América indígena*, 1972, 4: 1104.

of this interpretation became obvious at the beginning of the 1970s, and in consequence 'pluriculturismo' was proposed, which is understood as a combination of the country's economic unity and preservation of the cultural and ethnic traits of the individual Indian peoples.[1]

The general administration for Indian affairs and the National Indian Institute of Mexico have drafted several programmes in these years for the development of separate Indian tribes and nationalities, e.g. the Tarasco Project, the Lerma Plan, the Los Altos de Chipas Plan, the Cora Huichol Plan, and others.[2] Their carrying out was assigned to many educational and co-ordination centres, the number of which rose to 40. Much attention has also been paid in recent years to community development, since it had become obvious that the old line of reinforcing 'Indian farming' had come into serious conflict with the Indian peasants' traditional socio-economic ties. The setting up of co-operatives based on the communes is now considered a more expedient way of 'modernising' them. On the whole, however, although the Mexican government devotes quite considerable attention to Indian affairs,[3] the native peoples' development is not proceeding as rapidly as was expected. Their standard of living remains very low. The widely advertised Indian 'renaissance' and the process of national integration on the whole are being hampered by the socio-economic system itself, under which they are trying to cope with the very intricate question.

In Bolivia and Peru the beginning of official Indian policy is taken as the late 1940s when a few 'acculturation centres' were set up in several Indian communes. In the 1950s and 1960s North American experts with a bias toward assimilative methods played a big role in these centres. After several years of joint work, however, voices began to be heard among local Indianists casting doubt on its expediency.[4] The 'Andes Mission', in the founding of which experts from the United Nations and the Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) were involved, also had a definite impact on the development of integrationalist work in this region. The Mission usually sent out small groups of specialists,

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[1] *América indígena*, 1973, 4: 946.

[2] *Ibid.*, p 950.

[3] *Ibid.*, p 952.

[4] *América indígena*, 1954, 2: 109.

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more often than not students, who, while carrying out some positive measures as regards educating the Indians, concerned themselves at the same time with influencing them ideologically, and fostering the preservation of paternalistic, reformist illusions among the members of the communes. In the early years of the Andes Mission local Indianists placed great hopes in it. Subsequently manifest dissatisfaction was caused by the errors of the 'missionaries', most of whom were not familiar with the specific nature of the problem and did not even know the Indian languages.[1]

Several big integration projects were drafted in Peru in the 1950s and 1960s, and a single national plan for the integration of the Indian population *(Plan nacional de integración de la población abrigen)* was adopted whose aim was to draw the isolated Indian communities into the country's life. There were three such projects: Peru-Cornell (from 1952, centred on the Vicos commune in the Ancash Department;[2] the Punto Tambopata (from 1961) for settling the land and demographic problem on the Altiplano by colonising lands in the area of the Tambopata and Yambari Rivers and resettling Indians there from the Puno province;[3] and finally the 'Southern Plan', drafted at the end of the 50s, intended for the country's most backward Indian areas. Narrower programmes, like the Cusco and the Ajakucho plans envisaged the development of those departments' communes.

In order to carry these programmes out serious measures like land reform, the abolition of semi-feudal forms of exploitation of the Indian peasants, and the building of roads to inaccessible mountain areas were required. The advocates of integration in Peru, Bolivia, and Ecuador considered the agrarian problem the determining aspect of the Indian question, but at the same time put their main hopes in colonising new lands and resettling of members of the communes, and only occasionally put forward demands for the breaking up of the latifundia. The peasants' unrest in the mid-1960s, and the broad public campaign for agrarian reform, led to the adoption of decrees on land reform in Peru and Ecuador in 1964. The land reforms, however, had such a restricted

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[1] *América indígena*, 1959, 3: 173.

[2] *Perú indígena*, 1961, *9*, 20/21: 125-129.

[3] *Perú indígena*, 1963, *10*, 22/23: 7; *Cuadernos americanos*, 1958, 100: 152-153

character that they did little to further the pro-
claimed aim of creating a broad stratum of 'solid Indian
farmers'.

In addition, implementation of an integration policy
inevitably raised the question of the fate of the communities
of the Quechua and Aymara Indians. The answer depended
on their actual situation in each of the Andean countries.
In Bolivia and Ecuador, for example, where the communal
sector had already been broken up at the end of the nine-
teenth century, it seemed more expedient in the 1960s
to overcome the communal traditions gradually. As for Pe-
ru, the main means of drawing the Indian peasants into the
country's economic life was seen in a modern co-operative
based on the traditional commune. Parts of these projects
(like building of roads and the opening of new hospitals
and schools) were actually carried out in Peru in the early
1960s, but could not alter the positions of the communes'
members essentially. When, therefore, the progressive mili-
tary government took power in 1968, solution of the Indian
question had become one of the main objectives contemplat-
ed by it. Several measures were adopted to improve the
Indian peasants' economic position. In its reconstruction
of agriculture the government has constantly relied on com-
munal traditions. Certain measures to grant land to landless
and almost landless peasants have been undertaken in Peru
since 1969, and since 1975 Quechua (which is spoken by a
considerable part of Peru's population) has been introduced
as a second state language.

In Bolivia the issue of integration had a rather different
interpretation from the very start, because the Indians'
integration into the nation's life had gone much further there
after the 1952 revolution, and especially after the land re-
form of 1953, than in neighbouring Andean countries. Sev-
eral acculturation centres had also been functioning there
and measures had been taken to set up co-operatives in the
communes. In the 1960s, however, the main stress was put
on colonising new lands.[1] A general plan was drafted for
that purpose to develop the eastern regions of the country,
special agencies were set up, and the army was brought
in to help.[2] The colonists' settlements, however, only suc-

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[1] *América indígena*, 1967, 3: 523.
[2] *Beyond the Revolution* (London, 1972), p 259.

ceeded in individual cases. The bulk of the settlers did not have farm implements and seed, and lacked medical care, so that some of them died in the first year from illness and inadaptability to the tropical climate. In addition, the interests of some groups of Indian peoples were met through the opening up of new lands by infringing the rights of others. In particular there was widespread expulsion of 'bush Indians' from their age-old hunting grounds.

Much more attention has been paid to development of the communes in the 1970s, since it proved that the Bolivian communes had far from exhausted their social potentialities.[1] On the whole there was a marked decline in Indianist activity, since the anti-popular line of the government in the first half of the 1970s gradually restricted all measures of a social character, including those relating to Indians.

In Ecuador Indianism has been much less developed in practice. For a long time a little work was done to educate the Indians at the Andes Mission's centres only, and a system of mobile 'culture missions' on the Mexican model was operated in the 1950s.[2] Only after the land reform of 1964 was the objective officially advanced of incorporating the Indians into the national life. As in Bolivia, attention was mainly devoted to colonising new lands and resettling members of communes from mountain regions on them. Projects were drafted, in addition, to improve the peasants' agro-technical knowledge, and to revive traditional crafts.[3] But there were neither the funds nor the experts to carry them out. This situation persisted into the 1970s; and although the Rodriguez Lara military government undertook certain steps to carry out socio-economic reforms in the Indian villages, the educating of the Indians and drawing of them into country's cultural life have nevertheless been mainly done by the efforts of individual enthusiasts.[4]

At the beginning of the 1970s some steps were also taken to improve the indigenous population's position, and draw it into modern civilisation, in those Latin American countries in which the Indian peoples constitute a very small

[1] *América indígena*, 1972, 3: 475.
[2] *América indígena*, 1974, 3: 601.
[3] *América indígena*, 1966, 1: 91-92.
[4] *América indígena*, 1974, 3: 602.

percentage. In Argentina, for example, a campaign to edu-
cate the Indians and provide work for them was announced
in 1968, since the range of their natural means of existence
was contracting more and more as the national economy and
urbanisation developed. A Department of Indian Affairs
was set up, and several development programmes drafted.[1]
Similar measures are being taken in Costa Rica,[2] El Sal-
vador, and Panama, where the Indian population is not
numerous and is largely assimilated. In Venezuela 'incorpo-
ration' measures had begun in the 1950s when several
experimental centres were established for the Indians'
education and social development.[3]

While such protectionist measures have been taken in
relation to the indigenous agricultural population, many
'bush' tribes, however, are still outside the law, as it were,
in these same countries. In essence the integration policy
applied to the Indian communal peasantry only. Wherever
the native peoples had no 'special' significance for economic
affairs, a quite different situation developed. In Brazil,
for instance, as the Soviet ethnologist Fainberg has
put it:

> there was a rapid reduction in the number . . . of In-
> dians in the first half of the twentieth century, which
> went hand in hand with a diminution of their role in
> the country's affairs, and as the 1960s have shown . . .
> the Indians, and their culture and language, will con-
> tinue to disappear to the extent that the Brazilian na-
> tion colonises the deep interior of the country.[4]

There is also an organisation in Brazil, the National In-
dian Fund, whose job is to make the Indians' contact with
modern capitalist civilisation less painful. In actual fact,
however, it is mainly a matter of accelerated forced assimi-
lation and of providing cheap labour for the needs of colo
nisation. A similar situation existed in British Guiana where
there were cases of the extermination of 'bush' Indians, and
it was considered normal to drive them from the land and
segregate them.

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[1] *América indígena*, 1973, 3: 647-648.
[2] *América indígena*, 1974, 2: 293.
[3] *América indígena*, 1974, 1: 200-202.
[4] L. A. Fainberg. *Op. cit.*, p 154.

Even in those countries, however, where attempts have been made to improve the Indians' life, there are many objective difficulties that often defect even the most modest development plans for the indigenous population. The state does not always provide the finance, equipment, and experts, which leads to a need to co-operate with such organisations (that have acquired such lamentable notoriety) as the Peace Corps and the Pope Volunteers. They pursue an assimilative, neo-Malthusian policy under a mask of philanthropy, with the result that many of the still existing Indian tribes and nationalities may disappear altogether.

How is one to evaluate (given the objective reality of Latin America and the general historical patterns) the idea of national integration, which continues to evoke varied reactions? It seems to us that it is necessary to start from the fact that socio-economic integration and the incorporation of the Indian population into the affairs of their developing countries are an objective, historical process that had already begun naturally and is becoming more and more intensive with these countries' capitalist progress. In the 1920s Mariategui had already, more than once, written directly and unambiguously that his ideal was a united, integrated, socialist Peru.[1] The region's future ethnic development may take various forms: the tendency to form Spanish-speaking mestizo nations may prevail; or it may happen that individual Indian peoples will get the chance of independent national development, and that the issue of autonomy will arise. One thing is clear: these developing communities' social and economic integration is a phenomenon necessary for their progress and will largely determine their future. The integrational process, however, though progressive in essence, is acquiring a distorted and contradictory character. On the one hand, genuine integration is impossible without radical changes in the Indian peasants' status and without sweeping structural reforms in general. On the other hand, various political forces, sometimes very reactionary, are trying to influence this process and subordinate it to their own interests. The natural assimilative process is often being replaced by voluntarist tendencies to force it. Under the slogan of 'immediate modernisation' of the indigenous pop-

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[1] J. C. Mariategui. *Obras completas*, Vol. 13 (Lima, 1959), pp 222-223.

ulation, certain advocates of integration in Mexico and Bolivia lose sight of, or deliberately ignore, the specific character of the Indians' ethnic and psychological traits, and their unpreparedness in the mass for 'accelerated' incorporation into modern life. An element of compulsion and forced assimilation thus arises, as a result of which the price of capitalist development, very heavy as it is for the Indians, could become truly disastrous.

Finally, many of the advocates of integration see it primarily as a means of releasing 'social tensions' in the Indian village,[1] and of isolating the communes' members from the general stream of the revolutionary movement. The various missions from the United States operate from that angle. By making certain improvements in the Indians' life they create an impression of being concerned for the native population of Latin America and, accordingly, a more favourable psychological climate for further imperialist expansion. As for the Catholic Church, which has long and persistently claimed the role of the Indians' saviour from poverty and inequality,

> the activity of the missionaries and other servants of the Catholic Church has been linked (from the very beginning) with the interests of the colonisers, who . . . have always seen the clergy as their reliable ally in enslavement and pillage.[2]

National integration, in its given official, governmental version, can thus hardly be considered a really radical and democratic solution of the Indian question. The Indians' mounting striving to solve their problems themselves is evidence of that. They are trying to defend their rights and interests through organisations like the Indian Association of Venezuela, the Ecuador Indian Federation, and the Araucan Association in Chile (which had great significance under the Popular Unity Government).

The failures of integrationist practice over the past 20 years have given rise to serious disagreement among Indianists

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[1] G. Escobar. *Organización social y cultural del sur del Perú.* (Mexico, 1964), p 47.
[2] I. R. Grigulevich. Applied Missionary Ethnography. In A. V. Efimov and Yu. P. Averkieva (Eds.). *Sovremennaya amerikanskaya ethnografiya* (USSR Academy of Sciences Publishers, Moscow, 1963), p 241.

themselves as well. For those of them who are really trying to defend the native peoples' interests, the many minuses of the national integration policy are obvious. It is becoming increasingly clear that the drawing of the Indians into the system of the capitalist economy does little to improve their life or to encourage their cultural development. It leads above all to a change of one form of exploitation for another (more modern but no less heavy for that), and in some cases even to ethnocide. Only where the drawing of the Indians into a country's economic and public affairs is seen as part of general structural reforms on the path of non-capitalist development can a real acceleration of the integration process and socio-cultural revival of the Indian peoples be expected.

POLICY ON THE NATIONAL QUESTION
AND INTERETHNIC RELATIONS
IN OCEANIA

P. I. Puckhov

The gaining of independence by several countries in Ocea-
nia has faced them with a number of problems in the field
of national development, among which the defining of a
policy on the national question and regulation of interethnic
relations has a very important place. In several of them these
problems are very intricate because of the extraordinary eth-
nic fragmentation characteristic of many areas of Oceania.

We must first make a certain reservation about employing
the phrase 'policy on the national question' in Oceanian cir-
cumstances. The fact is that there are no nations in Oceania
(excluding New Zealand) in the ordinary, full sense of the
word. It will thus actually be a matter not of policy on
issues affecting the interests of various nations, but of pol-
icy on problems associated with the development of ethnic
communities of various historical and taxonomic levels.[1]

Policy on the national question naturally has a quite differ-
ent place in colonially dependent countries, on the one hand,
and those, on the other hand, that are independent states.
In the first group the treatment of national questions has a
subsidiary character and is intended to facilitate control
over, and exploitation of, the colonial people. But in inde-
pendent states (especially when they have a complex ethnic
structure) much attention is paid to national problems in
most cases, although the methods of dealing with them are
very different, depending on the country's socio-political
structure, the external political situation, the specific

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[1] We must stress that the phrase 'policy on the national question'
is often used in Soviet literature in relation to ethnoi that are not na-
tions.

character of its ethnic structure, historical conditions, and many other factors.

Until recently there was not a single independent country in Oceania except New Zealand. The states governing the Oceanian archipelagoes did not attach much significance to the ethnic problems existing in them. That is evident just from the fact that little attention was paid even to such an elementary aspect of the study of ethnic problems as investigation of ethnic structure. And that despite the fact that many of the countries of Oceania are ethnically very diverse.

The only thing that was quite plain in the colonial powers' policy on the national question was their endeavour to exploit the complex ethnic structure of certain Oceanian countries for their own selfish ends. By employing 'divide and rule' tactics they often set the local ethnoi against each other, and prevented their consolidation in every way so as to make it difficult for a united front to be built in the national liberation struggle of their colonies. As an example we may cite the case when the British colonial authorities in the Solomon Islands prevented the local Nggela language from being made the colony's common language,[1] fearing that a common language would speed up consolidation of the local population. Another example is the long history of British rule in Fiji, where the colonial administration did everything possible to make the interests of the two main ethnic groups—Fijians and Indians—clash. They systematically intimidated the Fijians, suggesting that the Indians' much higher natural increase would lead to their gaining a leading political position in the archipelago. 'Disagreements' between Fijians and Indians were also exploited to delay the granting of independence to Fiji. The colonial authorities skilfully used the issue of Fiji's political system so as to increase interethnic friction, and fomented anti-Indian feelings among the Fijians.[2]

More recently the comlexity of the ethnic structure of the population of Papua-New Guinea was skilfully exploited by the Australian authorities, along with other factors (the local population's lack of 'experience' of political affairs; financial and economic difficulties, etc.), to delay full

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[1] C. E. Fox. Some Notes on Nggela Grammar. *The Journal of the Polynesian Society*, 1950, *59*, 2: 137.

[2] Dominion Status, Sweet Reason Predicted for Fiji. *Pacific Islands Monthly*, 1970, *41*, 2: 22.

liquidation of colonial regime in that rich country. And the differences that existed in the US Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands served as a pretext for separating the strategically important Mariana Islands from the rest of the territory, with the aim of perpetuating the United States' supremacy there. During the referendum on the issue of the Trust Territory's future political status, held in the mid-1970s, the American authorities succeeded, with the support of the Marianas' local elite, in getting the population of that archipelago to vote for separation from the Carolines and Marshall Islands, and for maintenance of links with the USA.

Attempts were made to practise 'divide and rule' in other Oceanian countries. In French Polynesia, for example, the colonial authorities intended to divide the whole country up into little self-governing units ('communes') with their own autonomous administrations and separate budgets, but the plan was decisively rejected by the local progressive parties.[1]

In those Oceanian countries in which there were sizable groups of a metis population, with a preponderant majority of Oceanians, the colonial administrations, by granting these groups certain privileges, sought to oppose them to the bulk of the population and to convert them into their own support. Such was the case, for example, in French Polynesia, and especially in Western Samoa. Among the Samoa-European metis (then called 'Euronesians') the New Zealand authorities tried to inculcate a feeling of admiration for everything European. A special 'European' status was established in the country, which could be obtained by all 'Euronesians' desiring it. The New Zealand administration built a special settlement—Aleisa—for them in the west of the island of Upolu, which was granted various privileges.[2]

As for the Oceanian states that have recently obtained independence (Western Samoa 1962, Nauru 1968, Tonga and Fiji 1970, Papua-New Guinea 1975), much attention is being paid to their national problems. At the same time

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[1] Tahitians Berate France over Autonomy. *Pacific Islands Monthly*, 1970, *41*, 10: 119; France Presses on with 'Divide and Rule' Plan. *Pacific Islands Monthly*, 1971, *42*, 1: 24; Y. Bojock. Tahiti Letter. *Pacific Islands Monthly*, 1972, *43*, 4: 32.

[2] J. W. Fox, K. B. Cumberland. *Western Samoa. Land, Life and Agriculture in Tropical Polynesia* (Christchurch, 1962), p 173.

policy on the national question has substantiated differences in the various independent Oceanian countries depending primarily on their specific ethnic structure. Of the five that gained independence in the 1960s and early 1970s, two (Western Samoa and Tonga) have an almost monoethnic structure, while three (Nauru, Fiji, and Papua-New Guinea) are polyethnic. Ethnic problems, of course, are more complicated in the polyethnic countries.

In the monoethnic countries (Western Samoa and Tonga) one of the governments' most important objectives is to try and preserve the unique local culture and to protect it against what the local leaders consider to be undesirable outside influences. That does not mean, of course, that the Western Samoan and Tongan governments are against any kind of borrowing, or against employing the scientific, technical, and cultural advances of more developed countries.

As regards the metis, the Western Samoan leaders are pursuing a policy of incorporating them fully into a single Samoan ethnos (in Tonga the mixed population is very small, only 1 per cent). The constitution proclaimed them Western Samoan citizens possessing the same rights and having the same duties as 'pure' Samoans.

The alien population forms a very small fraction in these two countries and its presence does not give rise to any special problems.

An interesting trend in the policy of the two independent states of Polynesia is stress on fraternal links with other Polynesian peoples, which is evidence of continuing strengthening of consciousness of a common Polynesian cultural community.

The three polyethnic states (Nauru, Fiji, and Papua-New Guinea) inherited very complicated national problems from their former masters.

The main ethnos in the tiny state of Nauru (7000 population), the Nauruans, constitute only half of the population. The other half is formed by Tungaruans (Gilbertese) and Tuvaluans, who are comparatively close to the Nauruans in culture, and Chinese (bearers of a quite different cultural model). The government of Nauru, having proclaimed the slogan 'Nauru for the Nauruans' at the very beginning of its existence, categorically refuses to recognise members of all the other groups as full citizens, considering them only temporary inhabitants of Nauru. In not recognising immig-

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rants from other countries and their descendants as citizens, the Nauruan government at the same time is not pursuing a discriminatory policy against foreigners either economically or culturally. The pay of the latter does not differ in any way from that of Nauruans doing the same work, and the street signs of Nauruan settlements are written in all the languages of the island's inhabitants (i. e. Nauruan, Tungaruan, Tuvaluan, Chinese, and English).

The Fijian government's policy on the national question differs greatly from that pursued by the Nauruan leadership. It would be quite unthinkable there, of course, to put the now preponderant local Indian population in any kind of unequal position: (1) the overwhelming majority of Fiji Indians (more than 90 per cent) were born in Fiji and consider it their native land;[1] (2) the absolute size of the Indian population is not a few hundreds (as with the foreigners in Nauru) but hundreds of thousands; (3) Fiji Indians occupy 'eading positions in the economy and other spheres of local affairs. The only alternative to acute interethnic conflict in Fiji was to reach some sort of compromise between the two main communities and to build a multiracial society in the country. And although the Alliance Party that assumed office primarily represents the interests of the Fijian elite, it cannot ignore the interests of the Indian population. That is expressed, in particular, in the fact that the cabinet includes representatives of the latter (though, it is true, they hold secondary posts), and that English has been recognized as the official language of the country, rather than Fijian, as being 'neutral' for both Fijians and Indians.

Fijian politicians have many times stated that they will respect the customs and traditions of all the ethnic groups inhabiting the country. Such assurances were given in particular to the Banabans (the aborigenes of Ocean Island) resettled on Ramba Island.[2]

For all that, Fijians occupy a dominant position at present in Fiji's political affairs though they constitute a minority of the population. That came about because the former British colonial administration as a rule supported the more

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[1] A. Burns. *Fiji* (London, 1963), p 22; T. F. Kennedy. Life in the South Seas. *New Zealand Geographer*, 1962, *18*, 1: 127.

[2] Mara: You are Welcome. *Pacific Islands Monthly*, 1970, *41*, 5: 32.

'docile' Fijian population,[1] but mainly because the Indians, split up into various religious and ethnic groups, do not always present a united front. Many Indians are not satisfied with their present position, and the National Federation Party, basing itself mainly on the Indian population (it is also supported by a comparatively small number of opposition-minded Fijians) sharply criticises the government.

The national problems facing recently independent Papua-New Guinea are very intricate. The population consists of hundreds of ethnoi and (in the view of some of its politicians) one of the best roads for dealing with the national question there may be an active policy encouraging integration of all the various tribal populations into a single whole, i.e. a policy similar to that being pursued by many African countries with a complex ethnic structure. At the same time it must be remembered that the specific cultural and social nature of the various ethnoi should not be ignored in pursuing this policy, and that their desire to maintain their cultural traditions should be respected. Only in that way, as experience has shown, can various ethnic conflicts be avoided and smooth ethnic integration ensured.

The task of uniting various ethnic communities also faces the self-governing territory of the Cook Islands, and its leaders are well aware of it.[2] It is, however, an immeasurably simpler business there than in Papua-New Guinea. Instead of hundreds of peoples there are not more than a dozen ethnic groups on the Cook Islands, almost all of them very closely related in both language and culture.

Policy on the national question has a very essential effect on future ethnic development. The policy of the Western Samoan government in regard to the Euro-Oceanian metis, for instance, will obviously accelerate that group's complete dissolution into the Samoan medium. The policy that guides the Nauruan authorities in regard to foreigners will complicate incorporation of the immigrant population into the structure of Nauruan society.

As for the policy of the colonial powers on the national

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[1] The comparative moderation of the Fijians was due to the considerable influence among them of the clan/tribal upper stratum supported by the British.

[2] It's a Happy Marriage (Albeit a Tense One). *Pacific Islands Monthly*, 1970, *41*, 9: 27.

question, it achieved its aim to some extent of complicating integrational and consolidatory processes.

It was suggested above that the government of Papua-New Guinea might make efforts to bring the multitribal population of the country together. Such a policy would have a favourable effect on the spontaneously developing process of interethnic integration. The governments of newly formed independent states in Oceania are facing a task in the field of national relations similar to that which faced the government of Papua-New Guinea. And it would appear that the experience of dealing with national problems that Papua-New Guinea has acquired could be used with success after critical analysis by other new states in the region.

The relations built up between the peoples in Oceanian countries are having a strong influence on their policy on the national question.

The problem of interethnic relations has long attracted the attention of ethnologists, who have asked why the character of the relations established between various peoples differs so in essence, and in what lies the secret of ethnic sympathies and antipathies. Lacking the space to deal with these complex questions in any detail, we can only say that interethnic relations are the result of a whole set of factors, one of the most important being a country's social structure. Many other factors, however, also operate alongside it, for example the historical experience of contact between peoples, the closeness or remoteness of their standard and type of culture, the similarity or dissimilarity of their anthropological aspect, community or difference of religion, and so on.

Policy on the national question, in turn, has a reverse effect on interethnic relations. In characterising the interethnic relations in various Oceanic countries we shall be concerned mainly with those that have a complex ethnic structure, because it is in them that relations between peoples are an essential element of the ethnic situation. And we shall dwell in special detail on the independent countries (or those soon to become independent), allowing for the fact that interethnic relations have the greatest impact in them on the whole course of national development.

One of the most difficult tangles of inter-nation problems has built up in Fiji, where there are two, numerically almost equal ethnic groups, Fijians and Indians. The opposition

between them has quite deep roots, and is due to a whole number of causes. The clan/tribal elite influential among the Fijian population consider themselves the rightful masters of the islands, and the immigrant population not very desirable lodgers. The Fijian chiefs, viewing the Indians' constantly increasing numerical superiority with dislike fear they will lose their position in the islands. This fear of the establishment of Indian political and economic supremacy explained, in particular, the firm resistance of Fijian politicians and those of the smaller ethnic groups to the Indian leaders' proposal for a common system of voting in the elections for the Fijian Parliament.[1] The Fijian chiefs persistently strove for the elections to the Legislative Assembly to be held by separate communities, and in the end won their point. They obtained the creation of an Upper House in which broad representation of the Great Council of Fijian Chiefs is provided for.[2]

The local Indian bourgeoisie, on the other hand, who claim leadership of the Fiji Indians, are endeavouring, by stressing the Indians' numerical superiority and their big role in the archipelago's economy, to occupy a more leading position in its political affairs. They also complain against the unfair system of land tenure already established by the colonial administration, by which Indians were deprived of the right to acquire land. As a result they own very few plots and in general are forced to rent land from Fijians (to whom four-fifths of the total belong).[3] The role of Fiji's former rulers in inflaming these contradictions has already been noted above. By relying on the Fijian clan/tribal elite in the main, they sowed seeds of discord and animosity on Fijian soil. The old friction between the two main ethnic groups could not, of course, be overcome quickly after the proclamation of independence. The socio-economic order now existing in Fiji creates definite grounds for the existence of a certain Indo-Fijian opposition in the future as well. Only radical socio-economic reforms will be able to eliminate it completely. At the same time, we must note, there are un-

[1] Dominion Status. Sweet Reason Predicted for Fiji. *Pacific Islands Monthly*, 1970, *41* 2: 22.

[2] Fiji's Approach to Dominion Status. *Pacific Islands Monthly*, 1970, *41*, 3: 26.

[3] What We Can Expect from an Independent Fiji. *Pacific Islands Monthly*, 1970, *41*, 11: 26.

doubtedly opportunities for a considerable improvement in relations between the two main ethnic groups. There are no unresolved contradictions of any kind between rank-and-file Fijians and Indians. It is significant that they presented a united front on more than one occasion in the years of struggle against the British colonial regime.[1] The problems of interethnic relations in Fiji, however, are not just those between the Fijian and Indian communities. Fiji Indians themselves are not homogeneous either ethnically or confessionally, and that in turn raises a new set of issues.

First of all, everything is not sweetness and light in relations between their two religious groups—Hindus and Moslems. The Moslems hold themselves rather apart, and there is a certain interreligious antagonism. Their tendency to exclusiveness, it should be noted, became stronger after the division of former British India into two states built on confessional lines. Many Fiji Moslems, descendants of immigrants from territories that separated from India, began moreover to call themselves 'Pakistanis'. The Indian Moslems in Fiji have their own special organisations; there is a Moslem League (Fiji) and a Moslem Association of Fiji (which unites followers of the akhmadi sect).[2] The estrangement between Moslems and Hindus manifests itself in particular in their seldom intermarrying.[3] The Dravidians are also quite strongly differentiated from the bulk of the Fiji Indian population. Researchers have noted that mixed marriages almost never occur between them and descendants of immigrants from northern areas of India. That is sometimes explained by the great language differences between the two.[4] In an earlier work we expressed certain doubts on that score, for it is known that almost all Fiji Indians know Hindustani.[5] The Punjabis and Gujeratis also keep aloof from the other groups of Indians. Because a big part of them belongs to the bourgeoisie, the bulk of the Indian population identify these groups with exploiters and have a hostile attitude to them.

[1] *Politika Anglii v stranakh Yuzhnoi i Yugo-Vostochnoi Azii* (Moscow, 1966), p 289.
[2] A. G. Mayer. *Peasants in the Pacific. A Study of Fiji Indian Rural Society* (London, 1961), p 10.
[3] *Ibid.*, p 149.
[4] *Ibid.*, pp 144-145.
[5] P. I. Puchkov. *Formirovanie naseleniya Melanezii* (The Forming of the Population of Melanesia), Moscow, 1968, p 185.

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It would be an error, however, to see only the negative aspects of relations between the different groups of the Fiji Indian population. The main feature of the situation in the Indian community, however, is its great solidarity, which is much higher, significantly, than that achieved in India itself. This, incidentally, is typical of many groups living outside India. Cut off from the homeland they value the ties that bind them together. Fiji Indians, interestingly, do not observe strict caste distinctions in most cases;[1] and friction between the Hindu and Moslem religious communities is much less acute than in the Indian Peninsula. The Indian Association (Fiji), founded in 1934, unites both Hindus and Moslems. Among the other national minorities living in Fiji, the Rotumans are not quite happy with their position. During the negotiations for the proclamation of Fiji's independence they demanded that they be granted autonomy, motivating their request by a desire to defend and preserve their community, rights, customs, and traditions.[2]

Interethnic relations are quite complicated in Papua-New Guinea and could hardly be otherwise, since there are hundreds of ethnoi differing from one another in a marked way in customs and traditions. In addition, there were hostile relations between some of them until quite recently that used to lead to bloody clashes.[3] On the eve of Papua-New Guinea's independence certain foreign circles that had an interest in separating areas off from it were not above exploiting that circumstance. For instance, they used the geographical separateness and distinctiveness of Bougainville Island, rich in copper ore, widely to stimulate a separatist movement there. The Napidakoe Navitu political organisation that arose on the island agitated for its separation from the rest of Papua-New Guinea.[4] And not long before the proclamation of Papua-New Guinea's independence Bougainville separatists declared the founding of a separate state, which they called the Republic of the Northern Solo-

[1] A. Burns. *Op. cit.*, p 111; A. C. Cato. Fijians and Fiji Indians: a Culture-Contact Problem in South Pacific. *Oceania*. 1955, *26*, 1: 31; R. A. Derrick. *The Fiji Islands* (Suva, 1951), pp 140-141; *Fiji. Handbook of the Colony* (Suva, 1936), p 41.

[2] The Rotumans Aren't Happy. *Pacific Islands Monthly*, 1970, *41*, 7: 24.

[3] See, for example, K. Read. *The High Valley* (New York, 1964).

[4] What New Guineans Want as Their Political Future. *Pacific Islands Monthly*, 1970, *41*, 6: 46.

mon Islands. There are also separatist tendencies in the Bismarck Archipelago, geographically isolated from New Guinea. The overwhelming majority of New Guinean politicians, however, expressing the desire of the population, vigorously opposed such sallies by the advocates of dismemberment of the country into small, weak political formations. In 1970, for instance, five years before independence, one of the leaders of the Mataungan organisation very influential among the Tolai people declared that he thought it inexpedient to separate the territory inhabited by the Tolai from the rest of New Guinea.[1]

Interethnic relations are also of no little importance in the development of such an Oceanian state as Nauru. The Nauruans treat the relatively big group of Chinese with great suspicion, seeing in them, on the one hand, an instrument of foreign influence and, on the other hand, money-grubbing profiteers who do not disdain combining labour at the phosphate workings with petty trade. It is difficult to judge how just these suspicions are, but they are largely the reason for the Nauruan government's policy in relation to foreigners, about which we spoke above.

Interethnic relations are a problem, too, or were until recently, in two other countries in Northern Oceania, viz. the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands and the former colony of the Gilbert and Ellice Islands.

In the first of these countries the considerable cultural differences between the Chamorro, on the one hand, and a large part of the rest of the population (Trukians, Ponapeans, Marshall Islanders, etc.) , on the other hand, have caused a certain striving of the former to maintain their ethnic exclusiveness. As a result strong separatist tendencies arose in the Marianas,[2] that were actively supported by the American administration, which was interested in separating these strategically important islands from the rest of the Trust Territory. What the results were we already know.

In the Gilbert and Tuvalu (formerly Ellice) Islands, lying to the east of the Trust Territory, which were a single British colony until the end of 1976, a certain friction has arisen between the Tungaruans (the aborigines of the Gilbert Islands), to whom the overwhelming majority of the popu-

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[1] J. Kaputin. In New Guinea, as Elsewhere, 'Violence is a Reality Which You Have to Face'. *Pacific Islands Monthly*, 1970, *41*, 2: 34.
[2] Micronesians Hopeful. *Pacific Islands Monthly*, 1972, *43*, 1: 112.

lation belong, and the comparatively few Tuvaluans (inhabitants of the Tuvalu Islands). Differing a little in culture and customs from their Tungaruan neighbours, and possessing a quite distinct ethnic identity, the Polynesian Tuvaluans had a certain suspicion that after the colony became independent they, being the minority, would occupy a secondary position in the future administration. It was even suggested that coexistence of Tuvaluans and Tungaruans in one state would lead to oppression of the former by the latter.[1] In the end that all led to division of the former colony into two new administrative units in 1976 (still, as before, under British control)—the Gilbert Islands and Tuvalu.

Little is known of present-day interethnic relations in the Solomon Islands and New Hebrides. It may be assumed, however, that the intertribal antagonism that used to exist there not so long ago, which had cannibalistic traditions, has largely been overcome; evidence for that, in particular, is the fact that the various tribes of these archipelagos often presented a united front in the struggle against the colonial regime. On the other hand, relations between the aborigines and the immigrant population leave much to be desired; those between the local inhabitants and Fijian immigrants to the Solomons, for instance, have a very tense character.[2]

As for such a polyethnic and polyracial country as New Caledonia, the big cultural and property distinctions between the various groups still make themselves felt, being expressed in their marked mutual exclusiveness.

A similar situation is found in another French possession, French Polynesia. Unlike New Celedonia, it is true, there is a large group of Euro-Oceanian metis there, who occupy an intermediate position in cultural and economic relations between the French and the Tahitians. These 'Démis' are more and more drawn to the French in culture and particularly in language, but the racial prejudices existing among the prosperous section of the French complicate full incorporation of the 'Démis' into the French community. On the other hand, some 'Démis', especially the well-to-do among them, look down on the 'pure' Tahitians. There is also a

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[1] Ellice Islanders Fear Suppression by Gilbertese. *Pacific Islands Monthly*, 1970, *41*, 4: 24.

[2] Fijians Celebrate in Honiara, but with Few Solomon Islanders. *Pacific Islands Monthly*, 1970, *41*, 11: 24.

certain friction between Tahitians, on the one hand, and other Polynesians. Among the latter there is a fear, in particular, that the Tahitians would soon absorb all the remaining Oceanian groups. These views are most typical of the local population of the Marquesas, and it is no accident that in all the elections held in the Marquesas they have invariably supported the Gaullist Party operating in French Polynesia against those who advocate the granting of autonomy to the country.[1] That is due to some extent to the great influence of the Catholic Mission in the islands, which is hostile to the autonomists, considering them 'pro-Communist' but the Marquesan aborigines' definite distrust of Tahitians (perhaps cultivated by the same Catholic Mission), with whom the autonomist forces are associated, also plays a big role. As for the Oceanians, they, being exploited by the local Chinese bourgeoisie, often transfer their hostility to the whole Chinese population. What we have said, however, does not, of course, mean that there is complete social isolation of the various groups of French Polynesia's population. There are close economic and cultural contacts between them, and also mixed marriages.

Relations between ethnoi thus have a very considerable impact on the political and ethnic development of Oceanian countries, the character of this influence varying from place to place because of the great diversity of interethnic relations in the different countries. When relations between the ethnoi peopling a country are marked by relative harmony, its political, social, and ethnic development proceeds quite smoothly after independence, other conditions being favourable, and the processes of integration and consolidation develop comparatively fast. Ethnic opposition, however, complicates ethnos-uniting processes, hampering a country's successful political and social evolution. The link between the ethnic situation, on the one hand, and the socio-political situation, on the other hand, however, it must be noted, has a dual character, the leading role being played as a rule by the socio-political set-up. The carrying out of sweeping socio-economic and political reforms ultimately leads to the establishment of sound, friendly relations between the peoples inhabiting a country.

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[1] W. Tagupa. The 1973 National Assembly Elections in French Polynesia. *Pacific Viewpoint*, 1973, *14*, 2: 192.

THE NATIONAL ASPECT
OF THE NEGRO QUESTION IN THE USA

E. L. Nitobourg

English settlers first landed on the territory of the future United States in 1607 and founded Jamestown in Virginia. In 1619 a Dutch vessel landed a score or so of Negroes, trading them for tobacco. So, only 12 years after the arrival of the first colonists in Virginia, a new ethnic and racial element—Africans—had appeared. That is why, seemingly, the American Negro historian Quarles remarks that
> except for the first settlers at Jamestown, the Negro's roots in the original thirteen colonies sink deeper than those of any other group from across the Atlantic.[1]

Other American bourgeois historians write the same.[2]

At first the Africans in England's North American colonies were not slaves but indentured servants—bound for a period—and after a certain time became free men. Negro slavery grew up gradually in these colonies and took shape only in the last third of the seventeenth century and early eighteenth century. At the time of the first American revolution, War of Independence (1775-89), a quarter of a million Africans had been introduced into the colonies and constituted a fifth (and in the South even two-fifths) of the total

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[1] B. Quarles. *The Negro in the Making of America* (New York, 1967), p 7.

[2] Pettigrew, for example, also considered that 'after fourteen generations on American soil, the Negro's roots are firmer than even those of the most direct descendants of *Mayflower* stock'. (Negroes landed in Virginia in 1619, one year before the landing from the *Mayflower* at Plymouth Rock—*E. L. N.*) Thomas F. Pettigrew. Negro American Personality: Why Isn't More Known? *The Journal of Social Issues*, 1964, *20*, 2: 14.

population.[1] Their immense labour created a considerable part of the capital needed for the colonies' (and later for the young North American Republic's) rapid economic development. The plantation economy of the southern colonies was wholly based on slave labour. In the North, especially in New England, slavery did not become common, and had been abolished there by the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth century. Several thousand slaves who took part in the War of Independence were freed.

In the Southern States slavery was not only retained, but was considerably reinforced, in connection with the rapid growth of cotton growing caused by the mounting demand for it from Great Britain. Exploitation increased; whereas a slave lasted ten years of hard labour on the average in the eighteenth century, he only survived seven years in the nineteenth.[2] It took another three-quarters of a century of bitter struggle, and required a second American bourgeois revolution—the Civil War of 1861-5 and Reconstruction (1865-76)—before slavery was abolished.

The black slaves came from various parts and countries in Africa, belonged to various tribes and peoples, and ethnic and linguistic groups, and differed from one another in their way of life, culture, and physical appearance. The hardiest Africans, who had managed to survive all the hardships of the terrible ocean crossing, usually landed up on the plantations, but there, in strange surroundings, thousands of kilometres from home, the slaves, speaking different languages and dialects, and having different social pasts, were too helpless to unite. The 'tyro' was added to slaves who had already forgotten or very vaguely remembered their life in Africa, and had to adapt himself to the new environment, viz., to learn English, the sole language in which he could communicate with other slaves, and also the new work habits, standards of behaviour, and customs of the American surroundings. As a result there were already few Negroes at the beginning of the nineteenth century who spoke African lan-

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[1] *Historical Statistics of the United States. Colonial Times to 1957* (Washington, D. C., 1960), p 756.
[2] See: Karl Marx. *Capital*, Vol. I. Translated by Samuel Moore and Edward Aveling (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1978), p 226; A. V. Efimov. *Ocherki istorii SShA* (Essays in US History), Moscow, 1955, p 65.

guages, and after the Civil War African speech soon disappeared altogether in the USA.[1]

The diversity of tribal cultures gradually eroded away in the conditions of slavery and also disappeared. The second generation of slaves knew Africa only from the reminiscences of mothers and fathers, the third and fourth generation already accepted family traditions about it sceptically. At the same time the community of fate, language, and fundamental interests that took shape among the slaves during the experience acquired on American soil, back-breaking toil, and struggle against the slaveowners, united the Negroes and created the objective basis for the forming of a racial-ethnic community of Afro-Americans, and development of the rudiments of a racial-ethnic consciousness and common psychological mentality among them. That was fostered not simply by the institution of slavery itself but also by the policy of inculcating racism among the white population. The banning of inter-racial marriage, slave codes, and the legislation connected with them, drew a distinct social line between whites and Blacks. Racism became the official ideology of the ruling classes, who strove in every way to instil among white Americans the idea of Blacks' age-old 'racial inferiority', which gradually bore its own fruit—racism penetrated deeply into the consciousness of the mass of the people. Slavery and racism, which had a very strong effect on the psychology of American Negroes, also laid a deep impress in the same way on the psychology of the whole rising American nation.

The bulk of present-day Americans are the descendants, of course, of the millions of immigrants who arrived in the USA over the past 150 years and merged into the American nation—one of the most ethnically mixed that there is. Interaction, social and cultural assimilation, and physical mixing of the various ethnic elements—all these are the basis of its ethnic history. A whole number of factors promoted rapid assimilation of members of the many national and ethnic groups in the USA. As Lenin wrote in that connection:

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[1] See: E. F. Frazier. *The Negro Family in the United States* (Chicago, 1969), p 6; A. W. Read. The Speech of Negroes in Colonial America. *The Journal of Negro History*, 1939, *24*, 3: 249-258; E. L. Nitobourg. *Negry SShA (XVII-nachalo XX v)* (The Negroes of the USA: Seventeenth to Ear y Twentieth Centuries), Nauka, Moscow, 1979, pp 48-58; 184-186.

We know that the especially favourable conditions in America for the development of capitalism and the rapidity of this development have produced a situation in which vast national differences are speedily and fundamentally, as nowhere else in the world, smoothed out to form a single 'American' nation. [1]

The process could not help affecting American Negroes as well. Their physical, cultural, and social assimilation had already begun, in fact, in the colonial period, but had affected various strata and groups to a different degree. Although there was lees physical mixing of Negroes and Europeans in the British North American colonies than in the Spanish and Portuguese colonies, mulattos already constituted more than 13 per cent of the US Negro population by 1860; whereas they were only 10.3 per cent among the slaves, however, they were more than a third among the free Negroes. [2]

In the mid-nineteenth century there were 3 639 000 Negroes and mulattos in the USA, including 3 204 000 slaves; of these, 2 800 000 worked on plantations (300 000 served the families of slaveowners or worked on their estates), and 400 000 lived in towns. [3] Even the 2 500 000 field workers, however, were not a homogeneous mass. More than 1 500 000 of them were employed on large and medium-sized plantations and, overseers excepted, had almost no contact with white Americans. Some of them had been brought to the USA direct from Africa and there could be no question of their rapid cultural (let alone social) assimilation.

Almost half the slaveowners had between one and four slaves, who usually worked and often lived and fed together with their masters. Regular contact undoubtedly encouraged their cultural assimilation. Slave craftsmen and especially the house servants on the big slaveowners' estates were also in regular contact with the planter and his family, which affected their outlook, psychology, way of thinking, views and criteria, and purity of English speech, creating the conditions for a more rapid assimilation than of the field workers. Many slaveowners, finally, hired out slaves in the towns,

[1] V. I. Lenin. Statistics and Sociology. *Collected Works*, Vol. 23 (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1964), p 276.

[2] *Negro Population, 1790-1915* (Washington, D. C., 1918), pp 207-208.

[3] L. C. Gray. *History of Agriculture in the Southern United States to 1860*, Vol. 1 (New York, 1941), pp 529-533.

where control over them was laxer than on the plantations. In the towns they had dealings with free Negroes and with white workers and artisans, and occasionally—in spite of the ban on educating them—became literate and read newspapers. All that fostered the development among them, even more than among house servants, of a feeling of belonging to the population of the town concerned and of the whole country, moulded many features of behaviour and views in them in common which accelerated assimilation. The process was much quicker among free Negroes than among slaves.

Several factors, however, and above all slavery, prevented the assimilation of American Negroes. The US system of slavery, perhaps the most brutal in the whole Western Hemisphere, deprived Negroes of civil and human rights of any kind. Karl Marx called it the 'lowest and most shameless form of human oppression ever met in history'.[1] The increased exploitation and oppression of the black slaves in the nineteenth century intensified their struggle for freedom. In essence it was a very acute class struggle between slaves and slaveowners, the main opposing classes at that time in the US South who were, at the same time, distinguished from one another by racial affiliations. After the abolition of slavery the assimilation of Afro-Americans was held back by a system of racial segregation and discrimination, and the everyday racism and spirit of race hatred that the ruling class instilled for decades into the minds of white Americans. And since the Negroes almost always found themselves on the lowest rungs of the social ladder after the abolition of slavery, racial and ethnic principles were objectively and subjectively interwoven in the ethnic stereotype. As a result 'white chauvinism [and racism] is a cancerous disease in American culture'[2].

Oppression and discrimination evoked a response in Negroes that was manifested in various forms, including the development of a racial-ethnic consciousness among them, that was spread first by free Negroes, above all by members of the rising Negro intelligentsia. A stratum of free Negroes had already arisen in the seventeenth and eighteenth cen-

[1] Karl Marx/Friedrich Engels, *Werke*, Bd. 15, Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1964, p 327.
[2] W. Z. Foster. *The Negro People in American History* (International Publishers, New York, 1954), p 544.

turies. In 1790 they constituted 7.9 per cent of the US Negro population and 10.9 per cent (488 000 persons) in 1860.[1] A process of social differentiation began early among the free Negroes, but the overwhelming majority of them were labourers and navvies, petty artisans, teamsters, and various kinds of servants. They were deprived of the franchise and many other civil rights in almost all states, occupying a position intermediate between white Americans and black slaves. White workers, especially the Irish, among whom labourers predominated for a long time, saw the free Negroes as competitors, and that sometimes led to race riots in the cities of the North.

In protesting against racial inequality the free Negroes began to set up their own religious communities. In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries Negro Baptist and Negro Methodist Churches arose that gradually became stronger and played an important role in the American Negroes' social life and liberation struggle. A whole number of Negro societies and brotherhoods developed; and although their aims were different—religious, philanthropic, educational—the very fact of the uniting of free Negroes was of enormous significance.

The free Negroes began to oppose propaganda about Africans' 'racial inferiority' increasingly actively and were broadly involved in the abolitionist movement. The slave-owners' attempts to 'get shut' of them by means of the American Colonisation Society, founded in 1816, and by buying a territory in Africa which they called Liberia, where it was planned to send free Negroes, ran up against stubborn resistance from the latter. In 1817 the National Convention Movement arose, and in 1830, at the first National Negro Convention, the American Society of Free Persons of Color was founded as a national political organisation of free Negroes with a central leadership, local branches, and national conventions.

By the middle of the nineteenth century the process of cultural assimilation among free Negroes, the overwhelming majority of whom had been born in the USA (many belonged to the second, third, fourth, and later generations on American soil) and lived in towns in close contact with the white population, had gone quite far. Some had obtained a

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[1] E. L. Nitobourg. *Op. cit.*, pp 138-142.

certain access to education, which also accelerated their cultural and social assimilation. At the same time racial discrimination, humiliation, and race riots in Northern cities could not help having an effect on them.

The fact that free Negroes had set up their own religious and other organisations in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries is evidence of the development among them of a consciousness of belonging to a special racial-ethnic group.[1] On the eve of the Civil War the Negro intelligentsia had a quite developed racial-ethnic consciousness, and although most of them considered themselves as American by right as the white population and aspired to integration into American society, there was a minority that was disappointed with American reality and had lost any hope of integration and attaining equal rights. This minority came out with ideas of an ethnocentric, nationalist, and separatist character.[2]

The growth and development of American Negroes' racial-ethnic consciousness were marked by a constant, quite clearly expressed dualism, and characterised by a kind of 'wavering' between striving for full assimilation and integration and a tendency to withdraw into a special ethnic community. The split in the National Convention Movement at the end of the 1830s over the issue of Negroes' moving from the USA, and of whether to fight slavery jointly with white abolitionists or to set up their own Negro organisations for that purpose, in particular, reflected the existence of these two opposing trends. The majority of Negro abolitionists, led by Frederick Douglass, continued to fight together with white opponents of slavery, and considered themselves Americans and the United States their homeland. Many documents of the 1820s to 1850s witness to that, including a num-

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[1] Evidence of that, in its own way, is the letter of the Negro poetess Phillis Wheatley of 19 May 1772, in which she called American Negroes people 'of my nation'. See C. G. Woodson (Ed.). *The Mind of the Negro* (Washington, D. C., 1924), p XVII, cited from H. Aptheker. *Afro-American History: The Modern Era* (New York, 1971), p 110.

[2] The separatist trend in the history of Negro thought and the Negro movement in the USA took very different forms—from calls for mass resettlement in Africa and other parts of the world, and the formation of an independent country or Negro state on American territory, to the founding of 'purely' Negro settlements (in Oklahoma, Mississippi, etc.) and demands for the setting up of 'black communities' with their own local authorities in contemporaneous American towns.

ber of articles in the Negro press, speeches, and other statements by free Negroes.[1]

At the same time certain Negro leaders placed high hopes in Liberia, seeing in it the prototype of a reborn 'Mother Africa', and tried to organise mass resettlement of American Negroes there with the help of the American Colonisation Society. At the State Convention of the Colored Citizens of Ohio, in 1849 a delegate, George R. Williams, declared: 'We must have nationality. I am for going anywhere, so we can be an independent people.'[2] He was supported by another delegate, J. Mercer Langston, who said: 'We must have a nationality, before we can become anybody.'[3] And although the Convention rejected the idea of resettling free Negroes from the USA while their brethren remained enslaved, the resolution passed said:

> In the event of universal emancipation (of the slaves—E.L.N.)... we are willing... to draw out from the American government, and form a separate independent one, enacting our own laws and regulations.[4]

In 1852 the leading Negro abolitionist M. R. Delaney published a book in which he wrote that American Negroes were 'a nation within a nation' like 'the Poles in Russia, the Hungarians in Austria, the Scotch, Irish, and Welsh in the United Kingdom'.[5] He called on American Negroes to develop a 'national feeling' so as to decide their destiny themselves, and proposed the setting up of a National Council of the Colored People that would concern itself with questions of expatriation. The Council was set up and held several conventions, which discussed repatriation. From the very start, however, the idea got a positive response only from an insignificant minority of the free Negroes, as is evidenced by the fact that fewer than 3000 free Negroes emigrated to Liberia between 1820 and 1852.[6]

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[1] See E. L. Nitobourg. *Op. cit.*, pp 175-176, 188-191.

[2] Cited from H. Aptheker. Consciousness of Negro Nationality. A Historical Survey. *Political Affairs*, 1949, 6: 91-92.

[3] *Ibid.*

[4] *A Documentary History of the Negro People* (New York, 1951), p 368.

[5] See: M. R. Delaney. *The Condition, Elevation, Emigration and Destiny of the Colored People of the United States, Politically Considered* (New York, 1968), p 12.

[6] M. Yu. Frenkel. *SShA i Liberiya* (The USA and Liberia), Moscow, 1964, pp 138-139; E. L. Nitobourg. *Op. cit.*, pp 191-199.

Thus, although the tendency to withdraw into a special ethnic community persisted, and was even reinforced by the increase of racist terror in the decades preceding the Civil War, the leading, predominant trend in American Negroes' ethnic consciousness in the second third of the nineteenth century was a striving for integration. It reached its peak during the war that put an end to slavery, and during the Reconstruction, when the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution were adopted, which gave Negroes civil rights, and a reorganisation of power was carried out in the South which was, as they hoped, to give them equal rights to take part in public affairs. Frederick Douglass and the majority of other Negro leaders were then resolute supporters of integration. The Negro conventions held in the South at that time rejected any plans for Negro emigration from the USA.

The Civil War and Reconstruction played an important role in developing American Negroes' ethnic consciousness. Having ended slavery and displaced enormous numbers of former slaves, the war put an end to their isolation, greatly broadened their contacts with the outside world, and united free Negroes and former slaves, natives of the various states. The merits of the Negro regiments and feats of the black soldiers fostered a certain shaking of the race prejudices that poisoned many white Americans' minds. During Reconstruction the Negroes showed themselves to be energetic workers in the field of education and on local authorities. A whole host of talented public figures and political leaders, writers, and poets came forward among them. Their relations with the white population were altered. They got the right to vote and other civil rights, and their social consciousness rose as a result.

After the Civil War the bourgeoisie of the North, who made a deal with the planters of the South in 1876, began to invest their capital more and more extensively in the Southern States' economy, and the development of industry there was intensified in a marked way. They took the lion's share of the profits, while the planters became their junior partners. That led to new, more refined forms of enslaving the 'freed' Negroes.[1] In the period between 1890 and 1910 new

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[1] V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 22 (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1964), p 24-25; see also *idem*. Vol. 29, p 275-276.

constitutions and laws were adopted in the Southern states that deprived the Negro population of the franchise and many of the other civil rights that they had obtained in the Reconstruction years, and that legalised racial segregation and prohibited inter-racial marriages. This Jim Crow system—a system of all-embracing racial segregation and discrimination—also included a carefully worked out 'racial etiquette' unswervingly observed in the life of the South and upheld by brutal racial terror that had the aim of constantly stressing the white man's superiority and the inferior position of 'coloreds'.

Meanwhile the social stratification that had begun during slavery quickened rapidly in the half-century after Abolition. At the beginning of the twentieth century the proletariat had become the biggest class numerically among Negroes, the majority being farm labourers. In the towns, where a quarter of all Negroes lived in 1910, they were mainly engaged in domestic service, transport, and road work. The colour bar closed their access to skilled work in most industries, and an industrial Negro factory working class had still only begun to take shape. The American bourgeoisie, however, had already managed, then and in subsequent years, to exploit racism to split the working class movement.

Growing urbanisation, and the formation of a Negro market in the towns, promoted a perceptible growth of a Negro bourgeoisie and intelligentsia. On the eve of World War I there were thus all the classes and strata characteristic of capitalist society among the US Negro population, but their development was artificially held back by American monopoly capital and the ruling class.

With brutal oppression and racist terror, and the flourishing of a system of racial discrimination and segregation, Negroes' hopes of taking an equal part in the American nation almost dissolved at that time, and ideas of an ethnocentric character became quite popular. The majority of influential Negro leaders gradually took up a stand of more or less clearly expressed nationalism, and some even of separatism.[1] Henry Turner, a bishop of the African Methodist Episcopal Church, for example, publicly declared that the only salvation for the victims of the white nationalism of

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[1] See: A. Meier. *Negro Thought in America, 1885-1915* (New York, 1952).

'this bloody, lynching nation' was Black nationalism. Saying that the American Constitution was 'a dirty rag, a cheat, a libel and ought to be spit upon by every Negro in the land', he declared that if the Black man wanted to win respect and prosperity he must build his own nationality and civilisation, and that it was only possible to do that in Africa. In his sermons, and in the journal *Voice of Missions*, he said that God was black and called on American Negroes to emigrate to Liberia.[1] At the end of the 1870s, and in the 1890s, and in 1912-3, several attempts were made in the South to organise such emigration.

At the turn of the century a capitulating ideology of reconciling themselves to the Jim Crow system dominated the Negro movement and Negro thinking for a time. Its most outstanding exponent was Booker T. Washington, founder and principal of the Tuskegee Normal and Industrial Institute in Alabama. Calling on Negroes to 'co-operate' with the white ruling class, to reconcile and adapt themselves to the existing situation, he founded at the same time the National Negro Business League, and a number of commercial bodies associated with it, intended to help the nascent Negro bourgeoisie win itself a 'place in the sun'. Objecting to the migration of Negroes to the towns and their assimilation, and adopting in essence a stand of Negro bourgeois nationalism, he employed a nationalist ideology in the fight to influence the Negro population.

The Back to Africa movement that developed under the leadership of Marcus Garvey at the end of World War I and in the post-war years, which was utopian and separatist in character, had, however, the most clearly expressed racial and nationalist tones. The rapid growth of war supplies from the USA to Europe had entailed an immense demand for labour. And since European immigration to the USA had almost ceased, the main reserve of cheap labour was the Negro population. During the war years half a million Negroes migrated from the agrarian states of the South to the industrial centres of the North, and the Negro worker then began gradually to become a more and more appreciable element in American industry.

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[1] See: *Black Nationalism in America* (Indianapolis, 1970), pp 154-155; E. S. Redkey. *Black Exodus. Black Nationalist and Back-to-Africa Movements, 1890-1910* (New Haven and London, 1969), pp 41-42.

When the USA entered the war, President Woodrow Wilson told the Black people:

> out of this conflict you must expect nothing less than the enjoyment of full citizenship rights—the same as are enjoyed by every other citizen.[1]

Later, however, when the Negro soldiers returning home from the front demanded the promised rights, the answer to their demands was an outbreak of racist terror. Hundreds of Negroes were savagely murdered in the South. In the North there was a wave of race riots. The decisive rebuff given to the rioters in several cities, however, showed that the Negroes had learned to stand up for themselves, that a 'new Negro' had taken the stage who 'stood for absolute social equality, education, physical action in self-defence, freedom of speech, press, and assembly'.[2]

The impact of the Russian Revolution and the policy of Soviet Russia played a big role in this, giving oppressed peoples an example of genuine democratic solution of the national question. 'The Soviet Government proceeds apace,' the leading Negro Left journal of those years, *The Messenger*, said in one of its articles. 'It bids fair to sweep the whole world. The sooner the better.' [3]

The heavy hardships of the post-war economic crisis years, plus the wave of racist terror, sharply increased dissatisfaction and ferment among the Negro masses. Their sense of protest and readiness to fight found clear expression in those years in the mass movement led by Marcus Garvey, founder of the Universal Negro Improvement Association. He was able to attract the hundreds of thousands of Negroes who had migrated to the cities of the North and who were deeply disappointed with life there, by appealing to their sense of outrage and humiliation, awakening in them a consciousness of belonging to the 'Black race' and the hope of a better future in Africa. Negroes, he said, would not get justice in countries where they were a minority; they should therefore go back to the land of their forebears. 'Up! Up! You mighty race. You can accomplish what you will.'[4]

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[1] Cited from H. Aptheker. *Op. cit.*, p 161.

[2] *The Messenger*, 1920, 8. Cited from W. Z. Foster. *Op. cit.*, p 376.

[3] *The Messenger*, 1919, 6. Cited from W. Z. Foster. *Op. cit.*, p 437.

[4] Cited from F. C. Fax. *Garvey. The Story of a Pioneer Black Nationalist* (New York, 1972), p XV.

The Back to Africa movement, which coincided with what is known as the Harlem Renaissance in Negro literature and art, was permeated with ideas of Negro nationalism and separatism, and in the early 1920s enjoyed considerable popularity among American Negroes. It was the culmination, as it were, of the racial-ethnic consciousness that had been steadily maturing in them during the almost half-century since Reconstruction in the South of a tendency not only to withdraw into a special ethnic community but also for complete separation from the American nation. The outstanding American Negro sociologist E. F. Frazier has written:

> The emergence of the Garvey Movement was an extreme expression of race consciousness and nationalistic sentiment which came into prominence during and following World War I.[1]

There were no real possibilities, however, for mass migration of American Negroes to Africa. The steamship company founded by Garvey went bankrupt, and he himself was imprisoned, and then deported from the USA. By that time, however, he had lost his old radicalism. The demands for equal rights for Negroes that had figured earlier in his programmes disappeared with his political degeneration, and all his practical activity amounted to trying to carry out a utopian 'Back to Africa' plan. For the sake of it he even resorted to an agreement with the leaders of the Ku Klux Klan, who dreamt of expelling the Negroes from the United States. Garvey became a violent opponent of all the progressive forces in the Negro movement. His Universal Negro Improvement Association, lacking their support, declined.

It was no accident that his movement came to nothing comparatively quickly. In the 1920s migration of Negroes from the South was continuing. Altogether more than a million moved to the industrial centres of the North between 1915 and 1930.[2] That not only gave rise to a fighting spirit and reinforced a sense of dignity and consciousness of their strength in the Negro population but also quickened the continuing process of their social and cultural assimilation. Hundreds of thousands of migrants from the agrarian South

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[1] E. F. Frazier. *The Negro in the United States* (New York, 1957), p 530; E. D. Cronon. *The Story of Marcus Garvey and the Universal Negro Improvement Association* (Madison, 1955), p 70.
[2] C. E. Silberman. *A Crisis in Black and White* (New York, 1964), pp 25, 29.

came into close contact with urban culture, assimilated the white townsman's way of life, became members of trade unions and organisations of an inter-racial character. Migration considerably quickened their occupational differentiation. The intelligentsia grew rapidly, and in the 1920s a whole galaxy of writers and poets, musicians and composers, artists, sculptors, and actors appeared among them, and hundreds of Negro newspapers and journals were published.

In the 1920s and 1930s the Negro movement became much more active, but the leadership of the biggest Negro organisation of those years, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), founded in 1909, and the National Urban League, founded in 1912, was in the hands of the Negro bourgeoisie and white liberals, who steered the movement along a reformist path. For that reason one of the founders of the NAACP, the outstanding Negro scholar, writer, and fighter for equal rights for Afro-Americans in the USA, W. E. Du Bois, left it in 1934.

American socialists, as is known, treated the Negro question as a purely class matter. Only the young Communist Party of the USA, which openly declared itself from its foundation a defender of the interests of the Negro people, began to treat the Negro question as a national, independent problem. Its programme included the Negro population's specific demands, envisaging its complete economic, political, and social equality. The Communist Party was and remains the sole party in the United States that has developed a programme for a democratic solution of the Negro question, and which considers this one of the key issues of its work. Taking into account the situation then existing the Communist Party passed a resolution in 1928, and again in 1930, that characterised the Negro people living in the Black Belt, where they constituted a majority of the population, as an oppressed nation with the right to self-determination, and its struggle against the monopolies' and plantation-owners' oppression as basically a national liberation struggle.[1]

From approximately the mid-1930s, however, a trend toward integration and merging with the whole American nation began to strengthen in the ethnic consciousness of Afro-

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[1] E. L. Nitobourg. Lenin and the Negro Problem in the USA. *Sovetskaya etnografiya*, 1970, 2: 41.

Americans—at first latently and then more and more openly—and in the post-war period again became dominant. This was due to a whole set of objective factors, like President Roosevelt's New Deal, the formation of the Congress of Industrial Organisations (which included Negroes in its ranks), and the upsurge of the antifascist movement, but mainly to radical changes in the distribution and structure of the Negro population.

At the end of the 1930s physical, cultural, and social assimilation of Afro-Americans had gone quite far. Only a quarter of them had no admixture of 'white blood'.[1] The culture of their African forebears had been almost completely lost, and they did not differ at all, or almost not at all, from white Americans in either language or the religion professed, and in their principal cultural values. Many elements of Afro-Americans' culture, moreover, both those preserved from their African forebears and those arising from features of their life in America (e.g. music, dance, folklore), have become part of the general American culture. In both their spiritual image and culture and their social structure and the character of their social institutions, the Negro minority in the US population was becoming more and more like the white majority.

During World War II, and especially since, millions of small farmers were ruined in connection with the chronic excess of rural population, agrarian crisis, and the technical revolution in agriculture, and poured into the towns. Between 1940 and 1970 the number of farms in the USA was almost halved. This process developed even faster among Negroes, and their migration to the cities took on an unprecedented scale. During those 30 years, 4 200 000 Negroes migrated to the North and West, and another two million to the towns of the South.[2] Whereas 89 per cent of the Negro

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[1] The eminent American anthropologist Herskovits estimated that the proportion of 'full-blooded' Negroes among Afro-Americans by 1930 did not exceed 22 per cent, and Du Bois that it was 25 per cent (M. Herskovits. *The Anthropometry of the American Negro*, New York, 1930, p 177; W. E. Du Bois. *Op. cit.*, p 197).

The American anthropologist Franz Boas had earlier concluded that the modern American Negroes already differed considerably from Africans and that their anthropological traits were close to those of white Americans (F. Boas. The Problem of the American Negro. *Yale Quarterly Review*, 1921).

[2] *U. S. News & World Report*, 15 March 1971, p 24.

population had lived in the South in 1910, only 53 per cent did in 1970; 27.4 per cent lived in towns in 1910, and 81.3 per cent in 1970 (and only 72.4 per cent of white Americans). In other words the Negro population has outpaced the white in rates and level of urbanisation. A quarter of all Afro-Americans are concentrated in the 12 biggest cities (in New York their numbers exceed 1 700 000, in Chicago 1 100 000, in Los Angeles, Detroit, Philadelphia, and Washington 500 000).[1] And since their settlement in the cities of the North has long been by racial criteria, with the best quarters occupied by whites and the poorest by Negroes, hundreds of thousands of the latter have been crammed into the only districts open to them, the Negro ghettos. There is not a one of the hundred biggest US cities that is without a 'Black ghetto'. American ethnologists and sociologists note that racial segregation and housing discrimination have increased considerably in recent decades.

The Negro population's mass migration to the city has led to a fundamental change in its social and occupational structure. Now less than 2.7 per cent of the gainfully employed Negro population is engaged in agriculture (owner-farmers constituting less than 0.7 per cent). The urban bourgeoisie does not exceed 1.3 per cent, being mainly small and middling businessmen engaged in retail trade, services, insurance and credit within the confines of the narrow Negro market. The proportion of the intelligentsia rose in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s to 10 per cent. Around 9/10s of the gainfully employed Negro population belong to the working class, and more than half of them are employed in industry, building, and transport, about a quarter in the services sphere, while an eighth are office workers.[2] Negroes have become not only the most urbanised of the major ethnoracial groups that constitute the North American nation, but also the most proletarianised.

The radical shifts in their distribution and social structure have also altered the character of the geography of the Negro question, transforming it from a 'regional', Southern one into a national problem, and have fostered not only a

[1] *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1971* (Washington, D. C.), pp 17, 21, 23; *idem., Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1972* (Washington, D. C.), p 30.
[2] *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1975* (Washington, D. C.), p 360.

marked growth of class consciousness among Afro-American workers, and a change in their economic and political demands, but also shifts in their ethnic consciousness. It was the growing consciousness among the majority of Afro-Americans of belonging to the North American nation, and of their right to equality with white Americans in all spheres of life, that led in the 1950s and 1960s to the powerful upsurge of the civil rights struggle. It was also due to several other factors of a domestic and external order. New mass organisations developed during that struggle, and new leaders and new forms of struggle. The upswing of the Negro movement, which attained its broadest scope and was supported in the first half of the 1960s by a growing number of white Americans, led to an acute internal political crisis in the country and forced the ruling circles to make certain concessions and abolish the crudest and most open forms of racial segregation and discrimination.

The socio-economic position and living conditions of most of the inhabitants of the 'Black ghettos', however, hardly improved, while the absolute gulf between the incomes of Negroes and whites widened. As a result the movement's centre of gravity shifted in the mid-1960s from the South to the cities of the North and West, where Negroes developed a struggle for the right to work and equal pay, for decent housing and education, and against slums and poverty. Issues affecting the very foundations of American capitalism and the holy of holies of the monopolies, their income, came onto the agenda. Whereas the Negro masses had been downtrodden and divided in the South, which weakened their protest, in the ghettos of the big cities they proved to be concentrated and united by their very living conditions. The poor from the ghettos, having lost hope and faith in laws passed in Washington, and struggling against exploitation and poverty, brought an unprecedented tenseness and fighting spirit into the Negro movement. Almost the whole of the second half of the 1960s was full of spontaneous revolts in the 'Black ghettos' that sometimes erupted into bitter, bloody battles with the police and troops. Racial conflicts also spread to the American armed forces, both in the United States itself and abroad.

The ruling circles responded to the activation of the Afro-Americans' struggle by intensifying repression and terror. Exploiting the fact that many white Americans, including

workers, were infected with racism, reactionary propaganda strove to frighten the white philistine by the 'Black peril', to set him against the Negroes, and then to foist the blame for the 'exacerbation of race relations' onto them and so justify bloody repression of Negro demonstrations. But the powers that be did not limit themselves to setting white Americans against Blacks and trying to oppose the trade unions to the Negro movement; they also tried to split this movement, setting one organisation against another, and playing on the contradictions between the Negro bourgeoisie and the poor.[1]

The transformation of the majority of Negroes into urban proletarians, and their regular dealings at work with people of various ethnic backgrounds, membership of one trade union, joint participation in the production process and the struggle for better working conditions, a feeling of class solidarity, and joint participation with white Americans in the struggle for civil rights and peace, and against the war in Vietnam, all intensified Afro-Americans' striving in certain conditions for full integration into American society. At the same time the position remains whereby at least half of them live in 'Black ghettos', while housing discrimination only deepens the actual segregation of the school system in the cities of the North and West. Government policy in relation to the Negro population has become much tougher, police repression has been greatly intensified, and racist organisations terrorise Afro-Americans almost with impunity. That situation could not help being reflected in Negroes' consciousness and again strengthening their sense of belonging to a special racial-ethnic community and an oppressed ethnoracial minority.

As a backlash to the policy of police repression, judicial reprisals, and actual encouragement of white chauvinism pursued by the authorities in the late 1960s and early 1970s, a feeling of pride in belonging to the Black race that is ex-

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[1] The Negro bourgeoisie in the USA has never been spared from racial restrictions and segregation and finds itself in almost the same position in that respect as all Afro-Americans. It has therefore also been involved to one degree or another in the Negro movement. The Civil Rights Act passed in the 1960s benefited them to some extent, and accelerated class stratification among Negroes. The ruling circles are trying to exploit that circumstance by pursuing a policy of spreading 'Black capitalism', with the aim of opposing the Negro bourgeoisie to the Negro workers.

pressed in slogans like 'Black Power' and 'Black Is Beauti-
ful', and in an immense interest in the history and cultural
legacy of American Negroes and the peoples of Africa, has
grown noticeably, especially among the youth.

Whereas Afro-Americans strove in the late nineteenth
and first third of the twentieth centuries to write the word
'Negro' with a capital 'N', they now consider the word
itself humiliating to their dignity since the Portuguese
colonialists used it first for the inhabitants of Africa, and
prefer to call themselves simply 'Blacks'.

All this is evidence that, although a tendency toward
integration has predominated in Afro-Americans' ethnic con-
sciousness in recent decades, it does not follow that a striv-
ing toward ethnocentrism expressed in various forms of
Negro nationalism and separatism has completely disap-
peared among them. So long as racial suppression of Negroes
exists in the USA this striving will remain among some of
them, and may get stronger. That is why two main trends
were very clearly defined in the Negro movement in the
1960s—integrationist and separatist—reflecting a difference
in principle in the approach to solution of the Negro ques-
tion in the United States.

The first of these trends is the mainstream of the Negro
movement and has as its objective the integration or merg-
ing of Afro-Americans with the whole American nation in
economic, political, and cultural affairs, on the basis of
full, guaranteed equality. Its outstanding leader in the
1960s was Martin Luther King.

> This is a multiracial nation (he wrote) where all groups
> are dependent on each other, whether they want to
> recognize it or not. In this vast interdependent nation
> no racial group can retreat to an island entire of
> itself.[1]

He then explained, warning Afro-Americans against mechan-
ical borrowing of the experience of the national liberation
movement of the peoples of Black Africa:

> The Negro's struggle in America is quite different from
> and more difficult than the struggle for independence.
> The American Negro will be living tomorrow with the

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[1] Martin Luther King. *Where Do We Go from Here: Chaos or Com-
munity?* (New York, 1967), p 61.

very people against whom he is struggling today. The American Negro is not in a Congo where the Belgians will go back to Belgium after the battle is over, or in an India where the British will go back to England after independence is won. In the struggle for national independence one can talk about liberation now and integration later, but in the struggle for racial justice in a multiracial society where the oppressor and the oppressed are both 'at home' liberation must come through integration.[1]

Leadership of the integrationist movement in the 1960s was exercised by the NAACP (1970 membership 462 000), the National Urban League, the Congress of Racial Equality—CORE (founded in 1942), the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (founded by Martin Luther King in 1957), and the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee—SNCC (founded in 1960). The separatist trend also included several organisations, but the Nation of Islam (founded in the 1930s), which was led until his death in 1976 by Elijah Muhammed, was the only mass one. The leaders of the Black Muslims tried to inculcate the myth of the 'Black race's superiority' in the minds of Afro-Americans, depicting white people, irrespective of their class affiliation, as enemies (white devils), preached Black racism, and called on Negroes to refuse to identify themselves with the American nation. They extolled the economic, political, and cultural isolation of the Negro communities in the cities and demanded a piece of US territory for the creation on it of a Negro state.[2] In the early 1960s nationalist and separatist organisations became notably active on the wave of the upswing of the mass Negro movement, and swelled their ranks considerably. At the end of the 1960s and beginning of the 1970s the intensification of police repression and racist terror against Afro-Americans, and disappointment with white liberals' policy led to a growth of nationalist moods in the leadership of previously integrationist movements, like CORE and the SNCC, and to the founding in 1966 of the Black Panther Party and several smaller Negro youth groupings.[3] These

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[1] *Ibid.*, pp 61-62.

[2] Black Nationalism in America, *Op. cit.*, pp 403-420.

[3] Henry Winston. *Strategy for a Black Agenda* (International Publishers, New York, 1973), pp 207-229, 282-283, 305-307.

moods even penetrated the Negro Church; thus the founder of the National Movement of Black Christians, A. Cleage, preaching in the Church of the Black Madonna (depicted with a black baby in her arms), stated that Jesus was a revolutionary nationalist and that the object of Christianity was to liberate Negroes and create a 'Black nation'.[1]

A concrete historical approach to the analysis of any phenomenon is characteristic of Marxist-Leninist science. It is all the more so when such a complex social phenomenon as the national question is being considered, which has different aspects in different countries. The Negro population's exodus from the Black Belt and mass urbanisation, and the fundamental change in its social structure, indicate that the Negro question's character has altered and that a new approach is needed to its solution. As a result of the theoretical discussion among American Communists in the second half of the 1950s, the 17th National Convention of the Communist Party, U.S.A. (1959) passed a resolution that described Afro-Americans as 'the most severely oppressed and exploited of all the peoples that constitute the American Nation'.[2] But, it said:

> Though a specially oppressed part of the American nation, the Negroes in the United States are not constituted as a separate nation. They have the characteristics of a racially distinctive people or nationality. They are a component part of the whole American nation which is itself an historically derived national formation, an amalgam of more or less well differentiated nationalities.[3]

At the same time it was noted that the Negro question remained a national question, like any problem of national minorities and national and ethnic groups. Since the Negroes in the USA, however, were not a nation the Convention dropped the earlier slogan of their independence in the

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[1] See: E. L. Nitobourg. The Negroes of the USA. In: S. A. Gonionsky *et al.* (Eds.). *Natsional'nye protsessy v SShA* (Nauka, Moscow, 1973), pp 242-244; *U. S. News & World Report*, January 15, 1968, 35; July 26, 1968, p 48; *Time*, 6 April, 1970, p 44.

[2] Communist Party, USA. *The Negro Question in the U.S.A.* (New Century Publishers, New York, 1960), p 2.

[3] *Ibid.*

South and the creation of a Negro republic there, substituting for it a demand

to secure to the Negro people with all speed the complete realisation of genuinely equal economic, political and social status with all other American citizens.[1]

At the 19th National Convention of the Communist Party, U.S.A. (1969) it was emphasised, as before, that the oppression of Afro-Americans had a three-sided racial, national, and class character (although the stress put on any of them could alter at various times), and that

even though Black people do not now constitute a nation, we do not place any limitations on their struggle to satisfy their aspirations up to an including their right to develop self-government and to exercise the right to self-determination.[2]

That position was reflected in the Communist Party, U.S.A.'s new programme adopted by the Convention,[3] which posed struggle against racism and chauvinism as one of its most important tasks.

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[1] *Ibid.*, p 16. See also: E. L. Nitobourg. A Propos of the Negro Question in the USA. *Novaya i noveishaya istoriya*, 1963, 5: 49-54.
[2] *Daily World*, 6 June 1969; *Political Affairs*, 1969, 6: 8.
[3] Communist Party, U.S.A. *New Programme of the Communist Party, U.S.A.* (New Century Publishers, New York, 1970), pp 60-61.

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